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Domestic  criminal  law  helps  define  State  sovereign  identity.  Over  the  past  fifty  years 
some  criminality  has  become  increasingly  transnational  in  character.  In  the  absence  of  a 
universal  criminal  code  (as  opposed  to  specified  international  crimes),  States  apply  municipal 
law  to  prosecute  offences  of  a  transnational  nature  relying  on  mutual  legal  assistance  to  secure 
evidence  located  outside  the  prosecuting  State. 
A  comparatively  late  contributor  to  the  development  of  mutual  legal  assistance,  the 
UK  now  seeks  to  influence  the  work  of  the  EU  in  developing  a  legal  framework  upon  which 
to  base  mutual  legal  assistance  and  enhanced  international  law  enforcement  co-operation.  The 
course  of  this  development  is  outlined. 
This  thesis  examines  through  questionnaire  and  interview  data,  investigator  and 
prosecutor  experience  of  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  in  gathering  of  evidence  from 
abroad  for  use  at  trial  in  England  and  Wales.  Comparisons  are  made  with  data  from  an  earlier 
survey  of  UK  police  (1996)  and  with  an  evaluation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  administrative 
mechanisms  within  the  EU  (1999-2001)  in  order  to  identify  changes  in  investigator 
experiences  since  the  EU  began  to  drive  the  strategic  development  of  regional  international 
law  enforcement  co-operation  with  the  Treaty  ofAmsterdam  and  to  assess  whether  politicians 
and  administrators  are  delivering  the  solutions  needed  by  investigators  working  across 
national  borders. 
Set  within  the  legislative  context  of  the  Criminal  Justice  (International  Co-operation) 
Act  1990,  the  data  indicate  that  neither  this  regime  nor  the  emerging  EU  framework  were 
addressing  all  practitioner  concerns.  Political  responses  to  the  New  York  terrorist  attacks  of 
September  2001,  which  occurred  during  data  gathering  for  this  thesis,  accelerated  legislative 
construction  in  the  UK  and  the  EU.  Updated  to  include  discussion  of  these  changes  (some  still 
not  yet  entered  into  force),  the  thesis  now  provides  a  benchmark  against  which  to  assess  their 
impact  in  due  course. 
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"The  motto  of  the  Union  shall  be:  United  in  Diversity" 
Constitutionfor  Europe,  Article  IV-  I 
"freedom  loses  much  of  its  meaning  if  it  cannot  be  enjoyed  in  a  secure  environment  and  if  it  is 
not  backed  up  by  a  fair  and  smoothly  functioning  legal  system  ... 
member  States  now  accept  that  common  problems  need  common  solutions" 
Living  in  an  area  offreedom,  security  andjustice: 
justice  and  home  affairs  in  the  European  Union 
EC  information  brochure,  December  2000,  p.  I 
"In  an  age  of  international  crime,  the  response  also  has  to  be  international. 
The  EU  is  a  very  good  starting  point.  " 
Lord  Clinton-Davis,  HL  Hansard,  Second  Reading,  Crime  (International  Co-operation)  Bill, 
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Introduction 
Criminality  that  crosses  national  borders  and  which  actively  seeks  to  evade 
prosecution  by  doing  so,  is  a  phenomenon  that  has  fully  emerged  in  the  final  quarter  of  the 
twentieth  century  as  the  global  market  economic  infrastructure  provides  opportunities  for  the 
criminal  as  well  as  the  law-abiding  (Mitsilegas  et  al.,  2003:  63-64).  All  sovereign  States  are 
vulnerable  to  such  transnational  criminality  and  as  such  they  are  united  in  adversity.  This 
thesis  examines  whether  or  not,  in  relation  particularly  to  the  UK  and  the  EU,  governments 
are  approaching,  through  the  mechanism  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  despite  different  legal 
traditions,  a  position  against  transnational  organised  crime  in  which  investigators  from 
different  jurisdictions  are  truly  united  in  diversity. 
All  PhD  theses  are  supposed  to  be  characterised  by  relevance  and  topicality  but  there 
can  be  too  much  of  a  good  thing.  As  will  be  illustrated  here,  and  has  been  supported  by  other 
commentators  (ibid.:  59-61),  the  arena  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation,  already  rising  up  the  EU  political  agenda,  received  added  impetus 
following  the  events  of  9  September  2001  in  New  York  and  Washington  DC  [hereafter  9/11]. 
Occurring  as  these  did,  twenty  months  into  a  planned  programme  of  research,  there  were 
consequences  for  this  thesis  that  have  become  manifest  in  the  unconventional  structure  here 
presented.  During  the  lifetime  of  any  research,  changes  to  the  subject  or  research  sample 
might  be  anticipated,  but  in  this  case  the  changes  were  quite  significant. 
The  original  intention  (September  2000)  was  to  examine  the  practical  issues  faced  by 
investigators  reliant  upon  the  mutual  legal  assistance  regime  prescribed  in  the  Criminal 
Justice  (International  Co-operation)  Act  1990  [CJ(IC)]  in  order  to  inform  the  ongoing  debate 
within  the  Home  Office  about  how  best  to  implement  the  UK's  obligations  assumed  in  May 
2000  when  the  UK  signed  the  EU  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters 
[EUCMA].  The  UK  had  also  just  been  subject  of  a  peer  review  by  other  EU  Member  States  in 
relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  structures  and  so  these  two  drivers  had  initiated  a  complete 
review  of  the  UK's  administrative  infrastructure  and  statutory  regime.  The  author  was  assured 
by  a  Home  Office  official  (interview  29  August  2000),  that  because  of  this  review  there  was 
no  realistic  prospect  of  statutory  changes  being  made  to  ratify  the  EUCMA  during  the  lifetime 
of  this  research.  There  was  thus  a  potential  role  for  a  thesis  that  looked  at  investigator's 
experiences  alongside  those  of  administrators  examined  in  the  EU  peer  review  in  informing 
policy  considerations. 
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The  need  of  European  governments  to  be  seen  to  be  responding  robustly  in  the 
confused  aftermath  of  9/11  changed  all  that.  The  legislation  that  previously  could  not 
realistically  be  anticipated  before  the  submission  deadline  of  summer  2006,  was  attempted  in 
vain  in  late  2001  and  summer  2002  (in  order  to  meet  an  EU  deadline  of  December  2002)  and 
eventually  made  the  statute  books  in  the  winter  of  2003.  In  the  third  quarter  of  2004,  much  of 
it  is  still  yet  to  come  into  force.  And  preparing  this  legislation  diverted  Home  Office  staff 
from  other  mutual  legal  assistance  considerations,  necessitating  a  suspension  of  the  Home 
Office  review,  which  was  only  reinitiated  in  January  2004  and  which  is  not  expected  to  report 
until  the  end  of  2004. 
The  effect  of  these  events,  the  original  research  having  been  completed,  was  that  it 
was  necessary  to  revisit  certain  areas  to  identify  recent  changes  to  the  statutory  and  political 
context  in  which  the  original  research  had  now  to  be  viewed.  This  force  of  circumstance  had 
dictated  that  this  thesis  cannot  follow  structural  conventions.  It  divides  into  four  parts:  initial 
discussion  of  literature  and  context,  discussion  of  relevant  associated  research  to  date  and 
presentation  of  the  methodology  applied  here,  presentation  of  this  original  research  and  then 
further  discussion  in  the  light  of  changed  circumstances  in  order  to  update  the  context  for  the 
research. 
Chapter  I  introduces  the  reader  to  the  concept  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  explains 
why  such  formal  interaction  is  necessary  between  States.  Chapter  2  considers  relevant 
theoretical  models,  both  legal  and  political,  to  identify  current  approaches  to  the  issues. 
Chapter  3  completes  the  presentation  of  general  context  by  explaining  the  development  and 
evolution  of  the  mutual  legal  assistance  regime  adopted  in  the  UK  in  1990. 
Chapters  4  and  5  move  from  the  literature  review  and  contextual  discussion  toward 
the  original  research  by  discussing  first  the  EU  peer  review  evaluation  and  then  a  previous 
piece  of  UK  police  research  concerning  mutual  legal  assistance.  Against  this  background  the 
research  gaps  are  identified,  thus  demonstrating  the  scope  of  original  research  in  this  thesis, 
before  the  methodology  applied  in  this  instance  is  presented,  dictated  both  by  previous 
research  and  by  the  personal  circumstance  of  this  part-time  research  student  simultaneously 
engaged  in  full-time  employment. 
Chapters  6  and  7  present  the  findings  of  the  two  research  exercises  conducted  for  this 
thesis,  a  self-completion  questionnaire  and  a  programme  of  semi-structured  case  study 
interviews.  In  Chapter  8  the  emerging  themes  from  the  research  results  are  discussed  and  to 
the  extent  possible,  compared  with  the  research  discussed  in  Chapters  4  and  5. 
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The  way  in  which  the  statutory  and  political  contexts  have  changed  during  this 
research  are  briefly  outlined  in  Chapter  9,  pointing  the  way  towards  newly  identified  research 
gaps  before  general  conclusions  are  reached  in  Chapter  10. 
A  number  of  appendices  support  the  main  text. 
One  final  comment  on  the  geographical  parameters  of  this  research:  the  original 
research  has  been  conducted  amongst  police  investigators  in  England  and  Wales,  an  area 
which  comprises  one  of  the  three  separate  criminal  jurisdictions  within  the  United  Kingdom 
of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  The  jurisdictions  of  Scotland  and  Northern  Ireland  are 
considered  too  distinct  in  character  and  circumstance  for  inclusion  here  given  the  constraints 
of  a  PhD  thesis.  However,  there  are  a  number  of  issues  considered  within  this  thesis  for  which 
the  distinction  between  the  different  UK  jurisdictions  has  no  relevance  and  in  those 
circumstances  it  has  been  convenient  to  make  reference  to  the  UK  rather  than  England  and 
Wales.  No  disrespect  is  intended  but  for  the  sake  of  shorter  sentences,  references  to  'England' 
and  'English'  are  taken  to  include  'Wales'  and  'Welsh'. 
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Chapter  1 
Why  do  States  need  mutual  legal  assistance? 
In  1,215  pages  of  a  standard  text  recognised  as  one  of  the  most  comprehensive  guides 
to  international  law  currently  available,  Malcolm  Shaw  makes  just  a  single  reference  in 
passing  to  the  concept  of  mutual  legal  assistance  between  States  (2003:  598).  In  the  previous 
edition  of  his  seminal  work  he  made  no  reference  to  it  all  (1997).  Nor,  tellingly,  does  he 
include  the  1959  Council  of  Europe's  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters 
in  his  seventy-three-page  Table  of  Treaties  and  Agreements'.  '  Yet  he  takes  forty-nine  pages 
to  discuss  the  various  interpretations  of  and  approaches  to  the  concept  of  national  jurisdiction 
and  it  is  this  very  plethora  of  paradigms  that  gives  rise  to  the  need  for  mutual  legal  assistance 
between  States. 
Nor  is  Shaw  alone  in  such  academic  abstinence.  VA-iilst  probing  the  mechanics  of 
international  law  and  the  uses  to  which  it  is  put,  in  a  more  modestly-sized  yet  no  less  thought- 
provoking  work,  Rosalyn  Higgins  considers  problems  and  processes  in  international  law 
without  reference  to  the  concept  of  mutual  legal  assistance  (1994).  VVUch  begs  a  number  of 
questions.  If  lawyers  versed  in  the  international  law  determining  the  horizontal  norms  of  legal 
equality  by  which  States  regulate  their  relations  with  each  other  (ibid.:  1)  find  no  occasion  to 
discuss  it,  is  'mutual  legal  assistance  between  States'  really  a  tool  of  international  law  as  the 
phrase  suggests?  Is  it  perhaps  rather  political,  diplomatic,  or  administrative  in  nature?  Does  it 
serve  the  purposes  of  States  or  of  organisations  and  agents  working  on  behalf  of  States?  Are 
there  States  that  do  not  need  or  resort  to  mutual  legal  assistance?  What  are  the  characteristics 
of  this  concept  with  particular  reference  to  investigations  into  transnational  crime?  How  does 
mutual  legal  assistance  relate  to  international  law  enforcement  co-operation? 
What  is  meant  by  the  term'mutual  leizal  assistance'? 
Immediately  a  difference  in  phraseology  is  encountered.  Whereas  the  Home  Office  in 
England  uses  'mutual  legal  assistance'  (for  instance  in  the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Newsletter 
published  quarterly  by  the  UK  Central  Authority  [UKCA]  and  in  Home  Office  Circulars 
[HOC]  16/1997;  23/2004),  other  States  prefer  the  phrase  'mutual  judicial  assistance.  The 
language  of  nearly  all  international  legal  instruments,  meanwhile,  employs  the  less  specific 
(and  thus  more  accommodating)  'mutual  assistance'  (for  instance,  the  Council  of  Europe 
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European  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  1959,  the  United  Nations 
[UNJ  Model  Treaty  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  1995;  and  the  Commonwealth 
Scheme  Relating  to  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  (as  amended  in  1999)).  2  In 
relation  to  non-criminal  law  enforcement  and  regulation  (such  as  customs  and  excise  law),  the 
term  'mutual  administrative  assistance'  is  used  (for  instance  in  the  Explanatory  Report  on  the 
Convention  Drawn  Up  on  the  Basis  of  Article  K3  of  the  Treaty  of  the  European  Union,  on 
Mutual  Assistance  and  Cooperation  between  Customs  Administrations,  OJ  98/C  189/0  1) 
Such  diversity  is  founded  upon  different  legal  traditions.  The  Common  Law  system 
applicable  in  England  and  Wales,  Commonwealth  countries  and  the  USA  differs  from  the 
Civil  Code  (also  known  as  the  Roman  Code  or  Napoleonic  Code)  used  in  European 
continental  States  and  their  former  colonies  (Hatchard  et  aL  1996,  chapter  1).  In  the  former, 
pre-trial  investigation  is  undertaken  by  designated  investigative  agencies  such  as  the  police  or 
customs  officers.  With  the  exception  of  certain  intrusive  investigative  actions  that  require 
independent  authorisation  by  judicial  wan-ant,  the  judiciary  does  not  become  involved  at  any 
stage  of  evidence  gathering.  In  Common  Law  States  criminal  judicial  proceedings  commence 
at  trial  (McEwan  1992).  Pre-trial  criminal  investigations  in  Civil  Code  countries  are 
supervised,  and  in  a  minority  of  cases  actually  undertaken,  by  the  judiciary  (which  comprises 
both  trial  judges  and  prosecutors).  Hence  criminal  judicial  proceedings  begin  with  the 
investigation  and  not  merely  at  trial  (Merryman  1985).  It  is immediately  apparent,  therefore, 
that  judicial  co-operation  would  have  a  different  meaning  according  to  the  particular  tradition 
prevailing.  Seeking  investigative  assistance  between  Civil  Code  countries  presents  no 
problem  as  judiciary  will  talk  to  judiciary,  but  Common  Law  investigators  have  no  judicial 
status  and  so  within  the  international  mutual  legal  assistance  framework  cannot  directly 
request  assistance  from  Civil  Code  investigators.  There  would  be  an  "inequality  of  benefits 
and  obligations"  (UN  1995,29,  paragraph  4). 
The  UN  Model  Treaty  "was  designed  as  a  vehicle  for  international  co-operation 
between  all  countries  regardless  of  legal  system  or  background"  (ibid.  paragraph  2).  Hence  it 
speaks  of  "the  widest  possible  measure  of  mutual  assistance  in  investigations  or  court 
proceedings"  (UN  Model  Treaty,  Article  1).  This  language  echoes  and  elaborates  upon  the 
"the  widest  measure  of  mutual  assistance  in  proceedings"  provided  for  in  the  earlier  ECMA 
(Article  1),  the  first  such  instrument  to  address  assistance  (other  than  extradition)  in  criminal 
matters  between  Civil  Code  and  Common  Law  States  (European  Committce  on  Crime 
Problems  [ECCP]  1971:  10).  The  Harare  Scheme  makes  provision  for  assistance  "in  respect 
1  He  makes  only  two  references  to  one  of  the  several  international  conventions  addressing  crime 
suppression  (the  1988  Vienna  convention  against  drugs)  and  both  of  these  are  in  footnotes. 
2  Hereafter  theECAM',  the'UNModel  Treai)ý  and  theHarare  Scheme'  respectively. 
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of  criminal  matters"  between  "competent  authorities"  within  Commonwealth  States  (Harare 
Scheme,  Article  1(3))  and  does  not  preclude  Commonwealth  States  from  entering  into 
bilateral  or  multilateral  assistance  treaties  with  non-Commonwealth  countries  (Article  1  (1)). 
Given  the  sensible  flexibility  afforded  by  use  of  the  term  'mutual  assistance',  it  is 
interesting  to  observe  that  the  Manual  on  the  UNModel  Treaty  draws  a  very  clear  distinction 
by  noting:  "that  the  expression  'mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters'  (as  in  the  title  of  the 
Model  Treaty)  is  not  the  same  as  'mutual  legal  assistance'  (as  in  Article  7  of  the  UN 
Convention  against  Drug  Abuse  and  Illicit  Trafficking  in  Narcotic  Drugs  and  Psychotropic 
3  Substances  of  1988"  (UN  1995,29,  paragraph  3).  The  Manual  explains  this  distinction  by 
citing  the  differences  in  legal  tradition  between  Common  Law  States  and  Civil  Code  States 
(ibid.  ).  At  first  sight  this  explanation  seems  to  equate  'mutual  legal  assistance'  with  'mutual 
judicial  assistance'  and  the  subsequent  paragraph  (4),  does  indeed  refer  to  such  equivalence. 
But  the  distinction  is  less  obvious  when  the  original  texts  are  consulted. 
Article  7  of  the  UNDrugs  Convention  requires  signatory  Parties  to  afford  one  another 
"the  widest  measure  of  mutual  legal  assistance  in  investigations,  prosecutions  and  judicial 
proceedings"  relating  to  the  offences  specified  in  the  treaty.  As  will  be  seen  below,  the  actual 
activities  provided  for  are  almost  identical  to  those  of  the  more  general  Model  Treaty.  The 
provisions  of  Article  7  of  the  VW  Drugs  Convention  are  sufficiently  broad  and  inclusive  for 
the  distinctions  between  different  legal  traditions  to  be  immaterial. 
The  same  wording  appears  in  Article  14  of  the  UN  Convention  against  Transnational 
Organised  Crime  [UNTOC]  signed  at  Palermo,  Italy,  November  2000.  Neither  the  UN  Drugs 
Convention  nor  UNTOC  is  a  mutual  assistance  convention  per  se,  being  rather  treaties  aimed 
at  suppressing  specific  criminality,  but  both  make  provision  for  "mutual  legal  assistance"  in 
relation  to  multilateral  agreements  to  combat  specific  forms  of  criminality.  In  both  cases  a  list 
of  activities  held  to  comprise  mutual  legal  assistance  is  presented  by  way  of  definition  (for 
instance  evidence-gathering,  service  of  judicial  process  documents,  search  and  seizure, 
handling  evidential  exhibits).  All  of  these  activities  feature  in  the  UN  Model  Treaty  and  in 
conventions  established  for  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters  and  the  purpose  of  crime 
suppression  treaties,  in  making  such  provision,  is  to  ensure  that  mutual  legal  assistance 
measures  are  available  to  facilitate  co-operation  between  Signatory  Parties  in  the  absence  of 
any  formal  mutual  legal  assistance  treaty  [MLAT]. 
The  relationship  between  the  ECMA  and  the  European  Union's  2000  Convention  on 
Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  [EUCMA],  introduces  yet  another  perspective  in 
which  mutual  legal  assistance  occupies  a  hybrid  position  between  international  treaty  law  and 
3  The  UNDrugs  Convention  is  also  often  refeffed  to,  as  the  Vienna  (Drugs)  Convention. 
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European  Community  law  (Schomburg  2000:  58).  As  things  currently  stand,  the  EUCMA,  like 
other  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  [JHA]  instruments  within  the  European  Union  [EU],  is  an 
intergovernmental  treaty  similar  in  status  to  the  ECMA  and  the  crime  suppression 
conventions.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  new  EU  constitution  (OJ  C  169/1  2003)  will 
provide  the  starting  point  for  a  migration  of  JHA  instruments  from  Third  Pillar 
intergovernmental  status  to  First  Pillar  direct  effect  status.  (On  this  there  is further  discussion 
below,  Chapter  9). 
The  Home  Office  preference  for  the  phrase  'mutual  legal  assistance'  instead  of  'mutual 
assistance'  defmes  a  rather  different  distinction  (Loma  Harris,  UKCA  interview,  29  August 
2000).  Mutual  legal  assistance'  refers  to  formal  requests  for  assistance  using  treaty  provisions 
whereas  'mutual  assistance'  refers  to  informal  direct  contacts  between  UK  investigating 
agencies  and  their  foreign  counterparts,  for  instance  police-to-police  or  customs-to-customs 
sharing  of  information  and  intelligence  about  criminal  activities,  also  known  as  international 
law  enforcement  co-operation.  It  is  a  position  that  was  established  during  the  Parliamentary 
debate  on  the  Criminal  Justice  (International  Co-operation)  Bill. 
"By  mutual  legal  assistance  is  meant  the  process  whereby  one  state  provides 
assistance  to  another  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  criminal  offences  ...  a  'broad 
consensus'  has  developed  as  to  the  core  measures  which  are  covered.  These  include 
... 
providing  written  and  documentary  evidence  for  use  in  foreign  courts  proceedings;  the  service  of 
summonses  and  other  judicial  documents  on  behalf  of  another  country.  Making  arrangements  for 
the  personal  attendance  of  witnesses  at  court  hearings  abroad;  and,  the  search  for  and  seizure 
of  materials  for  use  in  evidence  in  overseas  proceedings.  More  recently  a  trend  has  developed 
... 
to  extend  the  traditional  reach  of  mutual  assistance  to  encompass  the  tracing,  freezing  and 
confiscation  of  the  proceeds  of  crime"  (Home  Office  Minister  of  State,  HL  Hansard,  12 
December  1989,  col.  1215). 
It  will  be  noticed  that  this  definition  excludes  direct  police-to-police  co-operation  (the 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  generally  referred  to  as  mutual  assistance  by  the 
Home  Office)  and  extradition.  The  latter  has  been  comprehensively  dealt  with  in  other 
legislation  and  is  a  subject  too  vast  to  be  incorporated  here.  4  The  definition  hints  at  the  third 
aspect  of  mutual  legal  assistance  which  was  then  just  emerging,  asset  recovery  and  money 
laundering  investigation,  which  is  also  subject  of  extensive  legislation  and  is  also  a  specialism 
too  vast  to  be  included  here.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  UK  government  regard  mutual  legal 
assistance  as  a  process  of  assistance  between  States,  rather  than  between  agencies  of  a  State. 
Assistance  between  agencies  constitutes  international  law  enforcement  co-operation.  In  this 
present  worký  which  focuses  on  pre-trial  investigative  assistance,  the  Home  Office  distinction 
will  be  employed  and  the  relationship  between  these  two  forms  of  assistance  is  explored 
further  below. 
4  Extradition  legislation  was  enacted  in  1870,1873,1877,1989  and  2003. 
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What  is  mutual  leizal  assistance  between  States  intended  to  achieve? 
The  rightful  power  of  a  State  to  exercise  jurisdiction  over  its  own  territory  and  its 
own  citizens  is derived  from  the  concept  of  the  independent  nation  State  in  international  law 
(Shaw  1997:  151;  see  also  Giddens  1987:  171;  Mitsilegas  et  aL  2003:  8-9).  During  the  last 
quarter  of  the  twentieth  century  globalisation  of  economic  interaction  and  communication 
(Cooke  1993;  Buckley  1998;  Findley  1999;  Scholte  2000;  Mitsilegas  et  aL  2003:  54-58)  has 
brought  with  it  an  increasingly  transnational.  aspect  to  criminal  behaviour  (UN  1989:  8;  House 
of  Commons  1995;  Council  of  Europe  1997:  chapter  1;  see  also  McDonald  1997).  There  is  a 
consequential  de  facto  interdependence  between  States  notwithstanding  their  de  jure 
individual  sovereignty  (Shaw  1997:  99;  Mitsilegas  et  al.  2003:  chapters  1-2).  In  enforcing 
domestic  laws,  States  increasingly  find  themselves  seeking,  abroad,  evidence  of  crimes 
committed  against  their  own  laws  because  one  or  more  of  the  actions  needed  to  prove  an 
offence  or  liability  has  taken  place  outside  the  investigating  State's  territorial  jurisdiction. 
There  arc  limitations  to  this.  "A  State  cannot  purport  to  enforce  its  laws  in  the  territory  of 
another  State,  nor  may  it  despatch  policemen  or  other  governmental  officials  to  arrest  alleged 
criminals  residing  abroad  without  the  consent  of  the  State  concerned"  (Shaw  1997:  152;  see 
also  Walker  1994:  24). 
There  are  five  principles  within  international  law  by  which  a  State  can  claim 
jurisdiction  over  an  issue  (Table  1;  see  also  Shaw  1997:  458-470). 
Table  1:  The  five  principles  of  national  iurisdiction 
TetWtorial  A  State  can  prosecute  crimes  committed  wholly  or  partially  within 
its  national  boundaries. 
Nationality  (Active  personality)  States  claim  jurisdiction  over  any  of  their  nationals  who  are  alleged 
perpetrators  of  an  offence  wherever  committed. 
Nationality  (Passive  personality)  States  claim  jurisdiction  where  their  nationals  are  the  victims  of  an 
alleged  offence  wherever  committed. 
Protective  (State)  States  claim  jurisdiction  over  offences  against  its  own  national 
interests. 
Universality  Every  State  has  jurisdiction  to  prosecute  particular  offences 
regarded  as  offences  against  the  international  community. 
Some  States  -  generally  Civil  Code  administrations  (Shaw  1997:  466)  -  claim 
jurisdiction  over  their  resident  nationals  who  commit offences  in  a  foreign  State  (and  then 
return  to  their  home  nation)  because  the  domestic  State  will  not  extradite  its  own  nationals. 
Common  Law  States,  particularly  the  UK  (Chase  &  Leigh  1998:  203),  prefer  the  territorial 
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principle,  although  increased  political  emphasis  on  'sex  tourism',  terrorism  and  computer- 
enabled  criminality  has  led  to  extraterritorial  jurisdiction  being  claimed  by  the  UK  for  certain 
offences  in  accordance  with  the  active  personality  principle  (Computer  Misuse  Act  1990  §4; 
Anti  Terrorism,  Crime  and  Security  Act  [ATCS]  2001  §17,44,51,109;  Sex  Offenders  Act 
1997  §7). 
Either  of  these  principles  can  accommodate  the  investigation  of  transnational 
offending.  Civil  Code  States  claiming  the  active  personality  nationality  principle  can 
prosecute  their  nationals  for  illegal  activities  committed  abroad  (there  is  usually  a  requirement 
for  double  criminality  as  there  is  for  extradition,  (Van  Den  Wyngaert  1989)).  This  requires 
trust  and  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  requesting  State  that  the  requested  State  will  indeed 
prosecute  its  own  citizens  as  rigorously  as  would  the  offended  State.  States  applying  the 
territorial  principle  rely  on  the  fact  that  if  the  criminality  is  cross-border,  then  some  part  of  it 
that  constitutes  an  offence  against  domestic  law  will  probably  have  been  committed  within 
their  territory  and  can  thus  be  prosecuted. 
This  latter  point  occasionally  requires  a  broad  interpretation.  A  criminal  in  England, 
for  instance,  might  arTange  with  persons  in  foreign  state  A  for  profit-motivated  criminality  to 
take  place  in  foreign  state  B,  the  proceeds  of  which  were  deposited  in  foreign  state  C:  all  of 
this  achieved  without  necessarily  leaving  England  or  committing  any  offences  contrary  to  UK 
criminal  law.  A  UK  citizen  can  be  prosecuted  for  being  concerned  in  the  importation  of  illicit 
drugs,  for  example,  even  though  acts  done  in  respect  of  this  occurred  entirely  abroad  (ibid.  ). 
Such  broad  interpretations  of  the  territoriality  principle  create  "extensions  to 
jurisdictions  [that]  enable  prosecutions  to  be  brought  in  respect  of  transnational  crime"  (ibid.  ). 
An  alternative  approach  to  extending  jurisdiction  is  to  construct  domestic  laws  so  as  to 
include  cross-border  activity.  "Statutory  criminal  offences  in  the  past  few  years  have  often 
provided  their  own  extended  jurisdiction  so  as  to  ensure  that  the  offence  will  capture  typical 
foreign  elemente'  (Chase  &  Leigh,  1998:  209).  Concerning  EU  revenues,  the  UK  also  "has  the 
ability  to  prosecute  people  for  acts  done  in  the  UK  that  assist  or  induce  the  commission  of 
offences  in  other  Member  States  of  the  EU'  (Bolt  1998:  189). 
Claiming  jurisdiction  is  one  matter;  enforcing  it  another.  Enforcement,  which 
includes  the  gathering  of  evidence,  engages  the  issue  of  State  sovereignty.  In  seeking  to 
enforce  the  vertical  legal  relationship  with  its  own  citizens  (either  as  victims  or  offenders)  a 
State  imperils  its  horizontal  legal  relationship  with  another  State  (Shaw  1997:  99)  if  it  takes 
unilateral  enforcement  action  within  the  territory  of  the  other  State.  One  State  cannot  directly 
employ  its  own  criminal  procedures  within  the  territory  of  another  State  because  to  do  so 
Clive  Harfield.  -  Process  and  Practicalities Chapter  1:  My  do  States  need  mutual  legal  assLstance? 
would  infringe  the  sovereignty  of  the  foreign  State  in  the  territory  of  which  the  enforcement 
action  was  executed. 
Thus  it  is  necessary  for  a  State  seeking  enforcement  action  beyond  its  territorial 
borders  to  request  the  assistance  of  the  foreign  State  in  whose  territory  the  enforcement  action 
must  take  place.  This  is  mutual  legal  assistance  and  within  this  context  the  "authorities  of  the 
requested  State  act  only  on  behalf  of  the  requesting  authority  by  virtue  of  a  delegation  of 
powers"  (ECCP  1971:  44).  The  ECMA  "starts  from  the  idea  that  a  State  which  carries  out  a 
measure  necessary  to  criminal  proceedings  in  progress  in  another  State,  relinquishes  a  small 
part  of  its  own  sovereignty"  (ibid.:  13).  Such  a  relinquishment  will  only  be  conceded  if  the 
requesting  State  "considers  that  it  is  compatible  with  its  fundamental  concepts  and  that  it  does 
not  prejudice  its  essential  political  or  economic  interests"  (ibid.:  15). 
Mutual  legal  assistance  between  States  seeks  to  achieve  extra-territorial  enforcement 
actions  that  would  otherwise  be  unachievable  by  peaceful  and  lawfid  means.  The  assistance  is 
codified  in  agreements  between  nations  either  on  a  bilateral  or  multilateral  basis.  Such 
agreements  defme  procedures  to  be  followed  and  the  circumstances  in  which  such  procedures 
will  apply.  Such  instruments  do  not  create  substantive  offences,  being  only  procedural  in 
character,  yet  this  corpus,  which  has  expanded  exponentially  in  the  1990s,  has  come  to  be 
known  as  international  criminal  law  (Van  den  Wyngaert  2002:  225-239). 
What  is  the  status  of  a  mutual  legal  assistance  treaty  in  law? 
The  legal  characteristics  of  a  MLAT  fall  into  two  categories:  domestic  and 
international.  The  relationship  between  these  two  categories  is  complex  (Shaw  1997:  Chapter 
4;  see  also  Brown  1999:  16-20)  and  an  examination  in  detail  beyond  the  scope  of  this  chapter. 
In  summary  there  are  two  broad  theoretical  approaches  to  interpreting  the  relationship. 
The  first,  dualism,  "stresses  that  the  rules  of  the  systems  of  international  law  and 
municipal  [domestic]  law  exist  separately  and  cannot  purport  to  have  an  effect  on,  or 
overrule,  the  other"  (Shaw  1997:  100).  The  second,  monism,  holds  a  unitary  view  of  law  as  a 
complete  entity  and  therefore  perceives  a  direct  relationship  between  domestic  and 
intcmational  law  Qbid.:  101). 
These  different  approaches  have  individual  implications  for  the  application  of 
international  law  rules  within  the  domestic  context.  Countries  adopting  a  dualist  position 
(usually  Common  Law  States)  accept  with  it  the  doctrine  of  transformation.  Before  any  rule 
of  international  law  can  apply  domestically  "it  must  be  expressly  and  specifically 
transformed"  into  domestic  law  through  the  enactment  of  domestic  legislation  (ibid.:  105;  see 
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also  Bennion  1997:  523  for  a  further  tripartite  break-down  of  how  this  can  be  achieved). 
Within  the  context  of  UK  law  for  instance,  it  was  necessary  for  11M  Government  to  enact  the 
Criminal  Justice  (International  Co-operation)  Act  1990  [U(IQ  Act  1990]  to  give  effect  to 
UK  obligations  under  the  ECMA.  A  similar  legislative  process  was  required  to  give  effect  in 
UK  law  to  the  provisions  of  the  EUCMA:  the  Crime  (International  Co-operation)  Act  2003 
[C(IQ  Act].  The  logic  of  this  approach  argues  that  the  executive  within  a  State  should  not  be 
in  a  position  to  create  legislation  outside  the  legislature  (Shaw  1997:  110-111).  5  The 
interpretation  and  implementation  of  this  approach  is  something  with  which  UK  courts  have 
occasionally  struggled  (Brown  1999:  31-32). 
The  monist  approach,  familiar  within  Civil  Code  constitutions,  recognises  the 
automatic  incorporation  of  international  law  as  part  of  domestic  law  once  a  State  has 
signalled  its  intention  to  ratify  a  treaty  and  so  avoids  "the  interposition  of  a  constitutional 
ratification  procedure"  (ibid.:  105).  For  most  of  the  signatory  Parties  to  the  ECMA,  the 
provisions  of  that  MLAT  were  adopted  without  further  issue  as  soon  as  each  State  ratified  the 
treaty. 
International  treaty  law  concerns  the  relations  between  States,  or  occasionally 
between  States  and  international  organisations.  It  has  as  a  fundamental  principle  the  notion 
that  such  agreements  are  binding  upon  the  Signatory  Parties  and  must  be  observed  in  good 
faith.  Articles  31,46  and  69  of  the  International  Convention  on  the  Law  of  Treaties  1969  refer 
directly  to  good  faith.  6  If  an  agreement  does  not  create  legal  relations  or  binding  obligations, 
then  it  is  more  in  the  nature  of  a  political  statement  and  is  non-justiciable  (Shaw  1997:  635). 
From  this  comity  arise  issues  of  compliance  and  compulsion.  Treaty  provisions  may 
be  binding  but  within  a  peaceful  context  there  are  practical  and  political  limitations  on  what 
can  be  done  in  the  event  of  a  breach  of  a  treaty  by  a  signatory  Party.  The  International  Court 
of  Justice  [ICJ]  may  determine  or  advise  on  disputes  between  States  in  relation  to  their  treaty 
obligations  (ibid.:  749-776),  but  in  reality  it  has  no  mandatory  powers  of  jurisdiction  and  only 
limited  powers  through  the  UN  Security  Council  to  enforce  its  judgements  (Wheatley 
1996:  23).  A  fundamental  breach  may  automatically  terminate  a  treaty  but  this  would  be 
exceptional.  There  is  an  expectation  of  good  faith,  but  the  provision  of  mutual  assistance  in 
criminal  matters  cannot  meaningfully  be  enforced  against  the  will  of  the  requested  State. 
Mutual  legal  assistance  obligations  are  binding  but  ultimately  not  justiciable. 
5  In  the  UK  entering  into  international  treaties  is  a  prerogative  of  the  Crown  but  the  Crown  cannot 
legislate. 
6  Shaw  (1997:  634)  discusses  the  conventional  definition  of  a  treaty.  Treaties,  conventions,  protocols 
and  agreements  are,  for  all  intents  and  purposes,  synonymous.  For  convenience  in  this  present  work, 
'treaties'  will  be  used  to  describe  bilateral  agreements  and  'conventions'  used  for  multilateral 
instruments. 
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The  1950  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and 
Fundamental  Freedoms  [ECHR]  is  unique  among  international  conventions  in  providing  its 
own  permanent  justiciable  enforcement  mechanism,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  at 
Strasbourg.  States  in  breach  of  their  obligations  under  the  ECHR  may  be  brought  before  the 
Court  either  by  another  State  or  by  an  individual  citizen  (Articles  19  &  32  ECHR;  Starmer 
1999:  693-713).  There  is  no  equivalent  mechanism  within  any  mutual  legal  assistance 
conventions.  The  relationship  between  convention  and  citizen  is  different.  The  ECHR  protects 
individuals  and  so  there  is  a  direct  relationship.  The  ECMA  regulates  State  interaction  and 
engages  no  direct  relationship  with  the  citizen. 
The  continuing  development  of  the  EU  is  witnessing  the  gradual  establishment  of 
supranational  jurisdiction  and  this  is  enforced  through  the  European  Court  of  Justice  [ECJ] 
(Leonard  1998:  chapter  9).  The  ECJ  currently  has  limited  jurisdiction  over  JIIA  issues  within 
EU  Member  States  and  no  jurisdiction  whatsoever  over  law  enforcement  operational  matters 
(Article  35(l)  and  35(5),  Treaty  of  Anisterdam  1997  [ToA]).  The  ECJ  will,  however,  have 
jurisdiction  over  disputes  arising  from  interpretation  of  the  EUCMA  when  it  comes  into  force, 
and  this  extends  in  a  small  but  significant  way,  supranational  jurisdiction  in  the  arena  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  within  that  part  of  Europe  comprising  the  EU.  7 
What  assistance  may  be  sought  under  mutual  Imal  assistance  treaties  FMLATs1? 
MLATs  and  conventions  providing  for  mutual  legal  assistance  define  what  assistance 
States  are  prepared  to  afford  each  other.  Such  instruments  do  not  prohibit  individual  States 
from  providing  further  assistance  over  and  above  that  which  is  described  in  the  treaty  or  from 
concluding  supplementary  agreements  to  elaborate  upon  the  principal  treaty  rules.  Article 
26(3)  ECMA,  for  example,  makes  just  such  a  provision  and  within  its  context  EU  signatory 
Parties  to  the  ECMA  have  concluded  the  EUCMA  (House  of  Lords  2000:  5  paragraph  I& 
p.  19).  *  Multilateral  MLACs  frequently  include  Reservations  where  individual  signatory 
Parties  opt  out  of  specific  provisions  (see,  for  example,  the  UK  Reservations  to  the  ECMA  in 
Murray  &  Harris  2000:  225)  and  too  many  Reservations  can  neuter  the  effectiveness  of  the 
instrument,  a  concern  raised  by  rapporteurs  in  relation  to  Article  23  of  the  ECMA  which 
allows  for  such  Reservations  (ECCP  1971:  70;  as  of  August  2002  only  24  Commonwealth 
States  had  ratified  and  implemented  the  Harare  Scheme,  Kim  Prost,  Commonwealth  Mutual 
Legal  Assistance  Conference,  Oxford,  August  2002:  hereafter  the  Oxford  Conference). 
Treaties  also  provide  grounds  for  refusing  to  accede  to  a  request  (see,  for  instance,  Articles  2 
7  The  ECJ  has  no  jurisdiction,  of  course,  over  Council  of  Europe  treaties. 
'  In  the  preamble  to  the  EUCAIA  the  High  Contracting  Parties  "resolved  to  supplement"  the  ECAM  and 
other  conventions  in  force  in  this  area.  OJ  C  197/1,12  July  2000. 
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&  19  ECMA).  There  is,  then,  an  inherent  flexibility  that  further  distinguishes  the  horizontal 
relationships  of  comity  in  international  law  from  the  compulsory  vertical  relationships  in 
domestic  law. 
Key  areas  of  mutual  legal  assistance  treaties  concern  the  gathering  of  evidence  for  use 
at  trial  and  the  ECMA  provides  a  working  model  of  this.  9  Thus  interviewing  witnesses 
(under  oath  if  required)  and  searching  for  and  seizing  evidential  exhibits  are  provided  for 
(Art.  3  ECMA).  The  next  stage  of  the  process  is  to  secure  the  court  testimony  of  witnesses  and 
provisions  for  this  cover  both  witnesses  at  liberty  (Art.  10  ECMA)  and  those  who  are 
themselves  offenders,  convicted  and  imprisoned  (Art.  11  ECMA).  Hence  it  is  possible  to 
transfer  prisoners  in  one  jurisdiction  temporarily  to  another  in  order  to  give  evidence.  There  is 
no  compulsion  in  any  of  these  measures  (Art.  8  ECAM)  and  so  although  the  service  of  court 
process  documents  such  as  a  witness  summons  is  enabled  in  such  treaties,  it  cannot  be 
enforced.  The  requested  State  is  obliged  in  good  faith  to  serve  the  process  documents,  but 
witnesses  so  served  cannot  be  compelled  to  act  upon  them,  as  they  might  were  they  resident 
in  the  issuing  State. 
Some  practical  issues  concerning  how  a  witness  might  give  oral  testimony  to  a  court 
are  revisited  in  the  EUCMA  in  the  light  of  technological  developments  that  avoid  the  absolute 
necessity  for  witnesses  to  travel  abroad  (Articles  10  &  11  EUCMA).  That  which  is  possible 
may  not  always  be  acceptable  and  there  remains  a  preference,  particularly  in  Common  Law 
States  reliant  upon  the  adversarial  trial  model,  for  a  witness  to  testify  in  person  at  court  and 
not  via  a  live  electronic  link.  In  the  UK  a  body  of  statute  and  case  law  on  this  subject  is 
already  developing  apace.  10 
Where  particular  measures  involve  a  degree  of  coercion,  for  instance  in  search  and 
seizure,  protection  for  those  subject  to  search  is  provided  in  the  form  of  a  three-fold  criteria- 
based  requirement.  The  principle  of  double  criminality  applies  (the  offence  must  be  a  crime  in 
both  the  requesting  and  the  requested  States),  the  offence  should  be  one  for  which  a  suspect 
may  be  extradited  and  the  execution  of  the  request  should  be  consistent  with  the  laws  of  the 
requested  State  (Art.  5  ECMA). 
For  less  coercive  measures,  however,  these  restrictions  do  not  apply.  "The  principle 
adopted  is  that,  unlike  extradition,  the  execution  of  letters  rogatory  shall  not  be  subject  to  any 
basic  condition  other  than  the  general  conditions  governing  mutual  assistance  defined  in 
Articles  I  and  2  [ECAM].  It  is,  for  example,  unnecessary  for  the  offence  to  be  punishable  in 
9  Its  features  are  reproduced  in  the  suggestive  UN  Model  Treaty  intended  to  provide  a  template  for 
States  to  adopt,  it  not  being  itself  a  mutual  assistance  treaty  stricto  sensu. 
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both  the  requesting  State  and  the  requested  State"  (ECCP  1971:  15).  The  basic  condition 
provided  in  Article  I  is  that  the  offence  under  investigation  should  fall  within  the  proper 
jurisdiction  of  the  requesting  authorities.  Under  Article  2  the  requested  State  may  refuse 
assistance  where  it  deems  the  offence  under  investigation  to  be  political,  an  offence  connected 
with  a  political  offence  or  a  fiscal  offence,  or  where  the  execution  of  the  request  is  likely  to 
prejudice  its  own  sovereignty,  security,  ordre  public  or  other  essential  interests. 
The  requested  State  must,  at  the  express  request  of  the  requesting  State,  state  when 
and  where  the  request  is  to  be  executed.  The  requested  State  may  consent  to  "officials  and 
interested  persons"  being  present  at  the  execution  (Art.  4  ECAM).  11  This  clause  allows  agents 
from  the  requesting  State  to  be  on  hand  and  observe  proceedings.  Depending  upon  the 
approach  adopted  by  the  requested  authorities,  unforeseen  supplementary  issues  arising  from 
the  interview  of  a  witness  can  be  addressed  on  the  advice  of  the  observers  who  will  be 
conversant  with  facts  of  the  case.  Under  this  clause  it  is  also  possible  for  representatives  of 
the  suspect  or  the  accused  to  be  present  and  a  request  for  interview  could  be  fi-amed  in  such  a 
way  as  to  permit  these  representatives  also  to  suggest  supplementary  lines  of  questioning  to 
the  requested  authorities. 
Who  can  do  what  within  the  mutual  leizal  assistance  arena? 
The  possibility  of  observers  being  present  at  the  execution  of  a  mutual  legal 
assistance  request  (Art.  4  ECMA)  invites  further  consideration  of  who  can  ask  for  what,  who 
does  what  and  who  pays. 
The  latter  is  answered  relatively  easily:  unless  otherwise  agreed  between  the  States 
concerned,  costs  in  general  shall  be  bome  by  the  requested  State  (ECMA  Art.  20;  UN  Model 
Treaty  Art.  19).  The  EUCMA  preserves  this  principle  in  relation  to  some  activities,  for 
instance  the  transfer  of  prisoners  (Art.  9(5)),  but  sensibly  reverses  it  in  relation  to  costs 
incurred  by  telecommunications  operators  or  service  providers  in  assisting  investigating 
authorities  prescribing  that  these  costs  shall  be  paid  by  the  requesting  State  (Art.  21). 
(Authorities  in  the  State  in  which  the  service  provider  is  located  are  unlikely  to  undertake  any 
executive  actions  other  than  to  ensure  that  requests  to  such  service  providers  are  in 
accordance  with  the  local  laws.  ) 
The  ECAM  (Art.  l(l))  applies  to  "proceedings  in  respect  of  offences  the  punishment 
of  which,  at  the  time  of  the  request  for  assistance,  falls  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  judicial 
10  Sections  23,25  and  32  of  the  Criminal  Justice  Act  1988  concern  the  adducing  of  evidence  in  the 
physical  absence  of  a  witness.  Rv  Hurst  [1995]  Cr.  App.  R  82,  Rv  Castillo  [1996]  1  Cr.  App.  R  438  and 
Rv  Radak  [1999]  1  Cr.  App.  R  187  illustrate  the  interpretation  of  this  statute. 
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I 
authorities  of  the  requesting  Party.  "  Article  24  allows  a  contracting  Party  to  define  "what 
authorities  it  will,  for  the  purposes  of  the  Convention,  deem  judicial  authorities.  "  The 
reference  to  authorities  with  responsibility  for  imposing  punishment  seems  a  neat  device  to 
enable  English  participation.  The  issue,  as  introduced  above  (p.  2),  is  that  English 
investigative  authorities,  the  authorities  most  likely  to  be  seeking  assistance  at  the  pre-trial 
stage,  are  not  judicial  in  character.  And  indeed,  examination  of  the  UK  defulition  of  judicial 
proceedings  confirms  such  use  of  the  Convention  language.  "From  the  [LTK's]  perspective, 
any  proceedings  which  could  result  in  a  criminal  conviction  being  recorded  against  a  person 
will  be  treated  as  judicial  proceedings"  (Murray  &  Harris  2000:  8).  Nevertheless,  the  UK  did 
not  sign  the  Convention  until  21"  June  1991  (ibid.:  6)  by  which  time,  in  respect  of  police 
enquiries  at  least,  an  independent  prosecuting  authority,  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service 
[CPS],  had  been  established.  This  at  least  enabled  English  independent  prosecutors  to  make 
requests  to  prosecuting/investigating  counterparts  in  European  Civil  Code  States  who  hold 
judicial  office. 
After  the  enactment  of  the  U(IQ  Act  1990,  the  following  authorities  in  England 
(aside  from  a  Magistrate  or  Crown  Court  Judge)  were  designated  by  the  Home  Secretary 
(Statutory  Instrument  1991/1224)  as  authorities  able  to  issue  a  Commission  Rogatoire  (also 
known  as  an  International  Letter  of  Request  [ILOR])  to  request  mutual  legal  assistance  of 
their  own  volition  within  the  prescribed  circumstances:  the  Attorney  General  for  England  & 
Wales;  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  and  any  Crown  Prosecutor;  the  Director  of  the 
Serious  Fraud  Office  [SFO]  (or  anyone  designated  under  §1(7)  Cj  Act  1987,  the  legislation 
that  established  the  SFO);  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Trade  and  Industry;  and  the 
Commissioners  of  HM  Customs  and  Excise  (HOC  16/1997,  paragraph  34). 
The  CJ(IQ  Act  1990  does  not  presume  reciprocity.  This  echoes  the  ECMA  which 
does  not,  except  in  cases  of  coercive  action,  require  either  reciprocity  or  dual  criminality.  This 
approach  affords  flexibility  when  receiving  a  request  and  enables  the  UK  to  live  up  to  the 
requirement  in  Art.  1  ECMA  to  provide  the  widest  possible  measure  of  assistance. 
There  is  more  than  one  way  for  an  English  investigator  lawfully  to  secure  foreign 
evidence.  It  may  be  that  the  relevant  foreign  authority  does  not  require  a  request  to  be  made  in 
the  form  of  an  ILOR,  in  which  case  a  direct  approach  or  an  approach  facilitated  either  by 
Interpol  or  the  NCIS  will  be  lawful  for  the  purpose.  Direct  transmission  from  investigator  to 
foreign  authority  has  no  detrimental  effect  on  the  probative  value  of  the  evidence.  However, 
English  investigators  must  currently  be  able  to  demonstrate  three  requirements.  Firstly  that  a 
request  for  evidence  to  be  secured  abroad  was  proper;  secondly  that  the  evidence 
11  Austria  and  Greece  have  entered  Reservations  to  the  article  (ECCP  1971:  44). 
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subsequently  obtained  was  secured  lawfully  under  the  locus  regit  actum  principle;  12  and  that 
the  evidence  was  obtained  expressly  for  use  at  trial  (interview  Simon  Watkin,  then  deputy 
head  of  UKCA,  7  September  1998). 
If  the  requested  State  requires  an  ILOR  UK  investigators  must  follow  procedures  set 
down  in  §3  CJ(IQ  Act  1990.  Two  methods  of  obtaining  an  ELOR  are  available. 
§3(l)  provides  that  where  a  justice  of  the  peace  or  a  judge  is  satisfied  that  an  offence 
has  been  committed  or  that  reasonable  grounds  exist  for  suspecting  that  an  offence  has  been 
committed  and  that  proceedings  in  respect  of  the  offence  have  been  instituted  or  that  the 
offence  is  being  investigated,  he  or  she  can  issue  an  ILOR.  Application  is  made  to  the  courts 
by  a  prosecuting  authority  or  by  a  person  charged  with  an  offence  (§3(2)). 
In  the  second  (more  commonly  used)  method  designated  prosecuting  authorities  can 
issue  their  own  ILORs  Q3(3))  following  the  same  criteria  as  specified  in  §3(j).  13  The  CPS 
issue  IILORs  on  behalf  of  police  investigators. 
§3(4)  CJ(IQ  Act  requires  ILORs  generated  within  the  UK  to  be  "sent  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  transn-iissioif'  to  the  appropriate  foreign  authority.  The  UKCA  -  briefly  termed  the 
Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Section  [MLAS]  during  1999  -  was  established  for  this  purpose  to 
fulfil  the  Home  Secretary's  obligations  under  the  ECAM.  The  UKCA  also  receives,  and  then 
disseminates  to  the  appropriate  investigative  authority,  ILORs  sent  to  the  UK.  Investigators 
familiar  with  ILOR  procedures,  who  have  established  contacts  abroad  in  order  to  facilitate 
their  own  enquiries,  are  increasingly  sending  ILORs  direct  to  the  foreign  authorities 
informally  in  parallel  with  formal  transmission  via  the  LJKCA,  as  will  be  seen  in  Chapter  7 
below.  The  product  of  such  contacts  is  transmitted  back  formally  via  the  UKCA,  although 
there  appears  to  be  no  barrier  to  investigators  acting  upon  knowledge  of  the  product  or  its 
contents  before  it  is  formally  received  if  appropriate  to  do  so.  §8  CaC)  Act  2003  enacts  the 
EUCMA  provision  for  direct  transmission  of  requests  between  competent  judicial  authorities 
(Art.  6(l)).  Quite  how  this  is  going  to  work  in  practice  in  England  is  still  subject  of  debate 
and  consultation  (Home  Office  2004a)  but  the  structure  of  the  criminal  justice  system  in 
England  is  such  that  the  UK  has  insisted  that  all  requests  from  foreign  authorities  continue  to 
be  made  via  the  UKCA  (EUCMA  Art.  6(3)),  pending  the  ability  to  give  greater  effect  to  Art. 
6(l)  in  the  UK. 
12  This  principle,  enshrined  in  Art's  5(l)  and  13(2)  ECAM  for  instance,  requires  requests  to  be  executed 
according  to  the  law  of  the  requested  State.  It  is  a  principle  reversed  by  Art  4  (1)  EUCAM. 
13  The  Designated  Prosecuting  Authorities  are  the  Attorney-General  for  England  &  Wales,  the  Director 
of  Public  Prosecutions  and  any  Crown  Prosecutor,  the  SFO,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Trade  & 
Industry,  and  the  Commissioners  of  HM  Customs  and  Excise. 
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To  demonstrate  these  processes  let  it  be  assumed  for  sake  of  example  that  an  English 
police  officer  requires  a  witness  residing  in  France  to  be  interviewed.  The  CPS  will  issue  an 
ILOR  to  this  effect  which  is  then  transmitted  to  the  appropriate  (i.  e.,  local)  juge  dinstruction 
(prosecuting  or  investigating  magistrate)  in  France.  Thejuge  will  in  nearly  all  cases  delegate 
the  enquiry  to  a  suitably  qualified  officer  in  either  the  Gendarmerie  or  the  Police  Nationale. 
(These  two  agencies  have  different  geographical  areas  of  jurisdiction.  In  both  agencies 
officers  have  either  a  basic  level  of  investigative  powers  (Agent  de  Police  Judiciare)  or,  in  a 
minority  of  cases,  a  more  advanced  level  (Ojficier  de  Police  Judiciare)  which  carries  with  it 
the  equivalent  of  the  UK  power  of  arrest.  )  That  officer  will  then  conduct  the  enquiry,  perhaps 
with  a  UK  officer  attending  as  an  observer. 
In  the  reverse  circumstances  any  such  request  from  France  would  be  directed  to  the 
UKCA,  from  whence  it  would  be  forwarded  to  the  local  police  force  (or  other  agency  if 
appropriate)  for  execution.  Again,  an  officer  from  the  requesting  State  may  attend  as  an 
observer.  The  statement  would  be  taken  as  requested  and  returned  via  the  UKCA. 
These  examples  demonstrate  the  processes  involved  in  straightforward  enquiries. 
Constitutional  structures  in  Civil  Code  States  dictate  that  requests  must  be  generated  and 
received  by  judicial  bodies.  In  the  UK  Common  Law  special  arrangements  have  been  put  in 
place  to  enable  a  foreign  judicial  request  to  be  acted  upon  by  a  UK  non-judicial  agency.  14 
The  innovation  of  direct  transmission  (EUCMA  Art.  6(l))  is  intended  to  streamline 
this  process  within  the  EU  although  all  EU  Member  States  will  retain  a  central  authority  for 
the  transmission  of  requests  to  and  from  non-EU  States,  particularly  those  States  such  as  the 
US  that  insist  upon  a  central  authority  within  the  bilateral  MLATs  that  they  negotiate  (for 
example  Art.  2  of  the  UK/US  treaty  on  mutual  legal  assistance  between  the  US  and  the 
Cayman  Islands  1986;  Art.  3  of  the  Mexico-US  MLAT  1987;  and  Art.  2  of  the  UK/US  MLAT 
1994). 
Art.  13  EUCMA  takes  innovation  in  mutual  legal  assistance  procedures  a  stage  further 
with  the  introduction  of  joint  investigation  teams  [JITs].  "By  mutual  agreement,  the 
competent  authorities  of  two  or  more  Member  States  may  set  up  a  joint  investigation  team  for 
a  specific  purpose  and  a  limited  period  ... 
"  comprising  law  enforcement  officers  from  the 
States  participating  in  the  Jrr.  The  agreement  upon  which  any  given  Jrr  is  founded  will  be  in 
the  form  of  an  ILOF,  which  will  be  the  formal  authority  by  which  information  lawfully 
obtained  by  any  member  of  the  JIT  can  be  made  available  to  and  utilised  by  any  other 
member  of  the  JIT  (Article  13(10)).  In  practice  JITs  are  likely  to  be  established  only  for  the 
14  The  issue  really  lies  only  with  England  &  Wales.  The  role  of  Procurator  Fiscal  in  Scotland  provides  a 
suitable  judicial  recipient  of  direct  requests  that  are  transmitted  via  the  UKCA  to  the  Crown  Office  and 
so  to  the  Procurator. 
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most  serious  cases  of  transnational  crime.  Because  evidence  and  information  can  be  shared 
between  the  different  national  members  of  a  Jrr  on  the  basis  of  the  founding  IILOF,  much  of 
the  diplomatic  mutual  legal  assistance  process  is  thus  short-circuited  with  a  structure  more 
conducive  to  the  facilitation  of  international  law  enforcement  co-operation. 
This,  then,  is  the  current  evolving  state  of  mutual  legal  assistance  within  Europe,  the 
geographical  focus  of  this  research.  Taking  into  account  the  ECMA,  the  Harare  Scheme,  the 
UNDrugs  Convention,  and  various  individual  bilateral  arrangements  (Murray  &  Harris  2000: 
Appendices  Q,  T&  W),  there  are  not  many  countries  with  whom  the  UK  does  not  have  some 
form  of  mutual  assistance  arrangement.  "Mutual  legal  assistance  exists  to  provide  within 
jurisdiction  A,  a  service  farjurisdiction  B  connected  with  the  administration  ofjustice  in  B.  It 
does  not  necessarily  relate  to  the  investigation  of  serious  international  crime,  or  even  to  crime 
at  all.  At  its  most  simple,  it  may  consist  only  in  the  service  of  documents  from  a  court  in  one 
jurisdiction  to  an  individual  in  another.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  also  involve  complex 
evidence  gathering  operations  in  a  criminal  matter"  for  evidence  to  be  secured  that  can 
subsequently  be  used  in  judicial  proceedings  (Murray  &  Harris  2000:  5). 
Mutual  legal  assistance  exists  because  the  sovereign  rule  of  law  within  nation  States 
does  not  permit  one  State  unilaterally  to  enforce  its  domestic  laws  within  the  territory  of 
another  State,  yet  there  is  a  common  interest  in  ensuring  that  criminals  find  no  safe  havens 
and  cannot  ultimately  frustrate  justice  by  exploiting  international  boundaries.  It  provides  an 
official  mechanism  accepted  by  governments  for  sub-government  agencies  to  pursue  this 
common  interest  and  carry  out  their  regulatory  and  administrative  functions  within  a  foreign 
context  if  needs  be.  Above  all,  it  acts  rather  like  an  electrical  adapter  or  travel  plug, 
facilitating  the  interaction  through  mutual  legal  assistance  'treaty  law'  of  different  bodies  of 
substantive  criminal  law  and  different  bodies  of  criminal  procedure  law. 
The  relationship  between  mutual  legal  assistance  and  mutual  assistance 
It  is  worth  considering  further  the  relationship  between  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
mutual  assistance  (also  known  as  international  law  enforcement  co-operation).  This  is  a 
distinction  that  the  Home  Office  finds  useful  to  employ.  It  distinguishes  between  requests  for 
assistance  that  must  be  supported  by  an  ILOR  (mutual  legal  assistance)  and  assistance  that  is 
not  so  supported,  for  example  a  direct  contact  between  UK  investigators  and  their  foreign 
counter-parts  or  inter-agency  contact  established  through  a  third  party  such  as  Interpol, 
Europol,  the  Drugs  Liaison  Officer  (DLO)  or  the  Crime  Liaison  Officer  (CLO). 
These  lines  of  distinction  appear  decidedly  blurred  when,  as  is  so  often  the  case, 
mutual  assistance  prepares  the  way  for  subsequent  mutual  legal  assistance  or  when  mutual 
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assistance  lines  of  communication  are  used  to  facilitate  the  tr-ansmission  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  requests.  The  use  of  the  term  'legal'  in  the  one  phrase  seems  almost  to  imply  that 
mere  mutual  assistance,  if  not  actually  illegal  or  unlawful,  is  in  some  way  less  authoritative 
than  mutual  legal  assistance.  Is  this  true? 
An  ELOR  is  not  always  necessary  when  gathering  foreign  evidence.  Many  States, 
however,  will  not  provide  any  form  of  formal  assistance,  including  the  gathering  of  evidence, 
without  the  issuing  of  an  ILOR.  This  is  usually  the  case  when  one  or  both  of  the  States 
concerned  is  a  Civil  Code  State  although  it  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  of  informal 
preparatory  assistance.  There  have  been  examples  of  direct  assistance  between  law 
enforcement  agencies  in  Common  Law  States  providing  evidence  for  each  other  or  even 
allowing  each  other's  enforcement  agents  into  their  territory  to  gather  their  own  evidence 
unsupported  by  an  ILOR  (IHMCE  interview  28  July  1999,  National  Crime  Squad  interview  5 
July  1999;  Sussex  Police  interviews  3  August  1999). 
The  CJ(1Q  Act  provides  a  mechanism  for  using  ILORs  but  it  is  not  exclusive.  The 
question  arises  as  to  whether  an  ELOR  is  required  by  the  requested  State  or  the  requesting 
State.  It  does  not  follow  that,  having  concluded  a  treaty,  the  signatory  Parties  are  exclusively 
bound  by  its  provisions  (Gane  &  Mackarel  1996:  103).  The  legal  status  of  the  ECMA  is  such 
that  a  signatory  party  can  refuse  to  comply  with  an  ILOF,  or  it  can  render  evidential 
assistance  without  recourse  to  an  ILOR.  If  a  requested  state  does  not  require  an  ELOR  from 
English  investigators  then  the  CJ(IQ  Act  certainly  does  not  invalidate  any  evidence  obtained 
without  an  ILOR.  Nor  does  it  render  all  evidence  obtained  with  an  I]LOR  automatically 
admissible  (Beijer  et  aL  1995:  298;  see  also  Gane  &  Mackarel  1996:  103). 
The  ELOR  procedure  is  a  means  of  structuring  contact  between  agencies  that  would 
not  normally  have  contact  with  each  other.  Practitioners  testify  to  its  cumbersome 
bureaucracy  and  inadequacies  in  relation  to  the  proactive  policing  of  transnational  organised 
crime  (ECCP  1971;  National  Crime  Squad  interview  28  July  1999)  but  it  has  no  bearing  on 
the  authenticity,  or  legality  of  evidence  so  obtained.  Nevertheless  many  investigators  perceive 
that  foreign  evidence  is  inadmissible  without  the  support  of  a  properly  structured  ILOR  (Kent 
County  Constabulary  interview  22  October  1998;  National  Crime  Squad  interviews  27  May 
1999,17  June  1999  &5  July  1999)  even  though  this  communication  between  prosecuting 
authorities  would  seem  to  constitute  documentation  subject  to  legal  privilege  (§10(1)(b) 
PACE)  and  so  is  beyond  the  scrutiny  of  an  opposing  advocate  at  trial. 
Practitioner  interviews  have  revealed  that  routine  liaison  accounts  for  the  majority  of 
transnational  investigator  contact  (Harfield  1999).  This  constitutes  mutual  assistance  rather 
than  mutual  legal  assistance  but  it  is  contact  that  may  reveal  material  of  evidential  value  in  an 
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enquiry.  Should  courts  exclude  evidence  discovered  through  liaison  (mutual  assistance)  rather 
than  by  means  of  an  ILOR  (mutual  legal  assistance)  (Gane  &  Mackarcl  1996:  112)? 
Unanimously  law  enforcement  practitioners  indicated  that  under  such  circumstances,  within 
Europe,  an  ILOR  would  be  sought  in  order  to  secure  the  information  evidentially.  (Which  is 
consistent  with  the  advice  and  guidance  offered  by  the  Interpol  NCB  in  London,  November 
2002.  )  In  which  case  the  concern  of  Gane  and  Mackarel  would  not  arise.  Even  if  such 
circumstances  did  occur,  the  absence  of  an  ILOR  does  not  of  itself  appear  to  render  the 
evidence  inadmissible. 
Excluding  evidence  unlawfully  obtained  is  provided  for  in  English  trial  procedure 
Q78  PACE  Act  1984)  but  case  law  also  provides  that  relevant  evidence  may  sometimes  be 
admitted  not  withstanding  the  unlawfulness  of  its  acquisition  (Gane  &  Mackarel  1996:  109- 
111;  the  key  case-law  is  Rv  Sang  [1979]  2  All  ER  1222,  [1980]  AC  402).  To  seek  the 
exclusion  of  evidence  on  issues  surrounding  the  method  of  request  is  a  tactical  obfuscation. 
Acceding  to  such  an  argument  creates  a  danger  that  case  law  will  develop  that,  in  the  UK, 
elevates  a  diplomatic  procedure  to  the  status  of  the  law  of  evidence.  The  only  degree  of 
consistency  that  seems  to  emerge  from  this  complex  variety  is  that  a  particular  sample  of  UK 
law  enforcement  agents  would,  as  a  matter  of  routine,  seek  to  formalise  any  evidence  from 
other  European  States  that  came  into  their  possession  or  of  which  they  became  aware,  by 
means  of  an  ILOR.  But  that  is  only  to  be  expected  given  that  they  would  be  dealing  with  Civil 
Code  jurisdictions. 
There  are  some  key  issues  susceptible  to  further  research  (for  instance  through  case 
studies)  in  characterising  the  relationship  between  mutual  legal  assistance  and  mutual 
assistance.  At  what  point  do  investigators  resort  to  mutual  assistance,  and  on  what  criteria  do 
they  extend  this  to  mutual  legal  assistance?  At  what  point  does  mutual  assistance  need  to 
become  'legal'?  Perhaps  the  simplest  explanation  is  that  mutual  legal  assistance  activity  is 
defted  by  international  treaty.  Any  activity  that  falls  outside  the  strict  application  of  any 
given  mutual  assistance  convention  should  be  regarded  as  mutual  assistance  rather  than 
mutual  legal  assistance. 
How  then,  do  international  police  organisations  fit  into  this  relationship?  Of  relevance 
to  a  European-based  study  are  Interpol  and  Europol.  The  status  of  these  two  institutions  is 
rather  different  although  it  was  the  desire  for  facilitation  leading  to  improved  agency-to- 
agency  contacts  that  lay  behind  the  creation  of  them  both. 
Interpol,  although  recognised  as  a  public  intemational.  organisation  by  the  UN,  is  not 
founded  upon  any  intergovemmental  treaty.  Essentially  a  private  association  of  police 
organisations,  its  primary  purpose  is  to  facilitate  communication  between  law  enforcement 
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agencies  across  the  world  (Anderson  1989:  150;  Anderson  et  al.  1995  50-52).  As  such  its 
usefulness  is  recognised  in  the  EUCMA  which  provides  that  in  cases  of  urgency  requests  for 
mutual  [legal]  assistance  may  be  transmitted  via  Interpol  (Art  6(4)).  But  such  requests  would 
still  have  to  be  generated  by  a  domestic  judicial  authority  for  the  consideration  of  a  judicial 
authority  in  the  requested  State.  Interpol  would  merely  seek  to  provide  a  speedier  means  of 
transmission  that  might  be  achieved  through  diplomatic  means  or  via  Central  Authorities. 
The  same  article  provides  for  the  transmission  of  urgent  request  via  "any  body 
competent  under  provisions  adopted  pursuant  to  the  Treaty  on  European  Union"  and  this 
would  seem  to  include  Europol.  Having  been  created  initially  as  the  European  Drugs  Unit  to 
enable  the  exchange  of  intelligence  between  law  enforcement  agencies  about  drugs 
trafficking,  Europol  is  now  a  fully  adopted  institution  of  the  EU  (Title  VI,  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam  1997).  Hence  it  acts  with  the  authority  of  intergovernmental  agreement.  Indeed,  a 
co-ordinating  and  tasking  role  is  envisaged  for  Europol  under  the  Treaty  ofAmsterdam  (Art 
30(2))  and  when  the  EUCMA  comes  into  force,  there  will  exist  arrangements  by  which 
Europol  officials  may  participate  in  the  work  of  joint  investigation  teams  (Art.  13(12)), 
although  the  UK  government  opposes  Europol  staff  performing  'anything  more  than  an 
analytical,  support  function  in  such  ventures  (House  of  Lords  2000:  13,  paragraph  41). 
The  function  of  these  organisations  is  to  facilitate  in  their  different  ways,  mutual 
assistance.  They  both  have  a  recognised  role  to  play  in  what  the  Home  Office  would  term 
mutual  legal  assistance  but  only  in  limited  and  urgent  circumstances.  In  addition  to  these  two 
organisations;  there  is  in  UK  Embassies  around  the  world,  a  network  of  DLOs,  CLOs,  and 
some  Immigration  Liaison  Officers.  These  are  officers  seconded  from  their  UK  domestic  law 
enforcement  or  regulatory  agency  to  act  as  liaison  officers  for  all  UK  law  enforcement 
agencies  seeking  assistance  in  the  country  to  which  the  liaison  officers  have  been  posted.  Co- 
ordinated  by  the  NCIS,  they  present  an  alternative  means  of  facilitation  to  that  provided  by 
the  international  organisations.  The  relationship  between  these  individuals  and  the 
organisations  can  sometimes  be  characterised  as  competitive  (HMCE  interview  28  July  1999) 
with  individual  DLOs  expressing  dissatisfaction  if  a  UK-based  agency  leaves  the  DLO  'Out  of 
the  loop'  either  by  arranging  its  own  direct  contact  with  foreign  authorities  or  else  relying 
solely  on  either  Interpol  or  Europol.  The  jealous  guarding  of  channels  of  communication 
potentially  generates  the  counter-productive  raising  of  'Chinese  walls'. 
Channels  of  communication  are  not  the  only  closely  guarded  possession. 
Organisational  interests  likewise  are  increasingly  being  guarded,  often  through  broad 
interpretation  of  statutory  remits,  as  some  agencies  in  particular  seek  to  adjust  or  redefine 
their  roles.  The  size  of  Europol  may  not  be  a  threat  to  Interpol  but  the  constitutional  status 
may  well  be,  at  least  in  Europe.  The  tension  between  Europol  and  Interpol  was  recently 
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apparent  as  Europol  sought  a  mandate  to  seek  extension  of  its  convention  rcmit  into  the  area 
of  cyber  crime.  15  Since  cyber  crime  is,  almost  by  definition,  global,  the  view  was  expressed 
that  Europol  was  pitching  for  a  global  function  that  was  rightly  Interpol's. 
There  remains  one  further  aspect  of  the  relationship  between  mutual  legal  assistance 
and  mutual  assistance  that  deserves  comment:  the  role  of  the  political  action  plan. 
The  G8  (or  'Group  of  Eight)  is  a  political  association  (informal  in  that  it  is  not 
established  by  treaty  law)  of  leading  industrialised  democracies  that  was  originally  drawn 
together  as  a  group  of  five  nations  in  1975  at  an  economic  summit  convened  by  the  then 
French  President,  Giscard  d'Estaing.  As  the  group  has  increased  its  membership,  and  its 
summits  have  become  more  formalised,  so  it  has  expanded  its  areas  of  interest  beyond  the 
merely  economic.  In  1996  a  group  of  experts  brought  together  by  the  G8  heads  of  state, 
known  as  the  Lyon  Group,  was  commissioned  to  look  at  better  ways  to  combat  international 
crime  (Sussmann  1999:  482)  in  order  the  better  to  protect  legitimate  global  economic  markets. 
The  Lyon  Group  made  forty  recommendations  for  combating  transnational  organised 
crime  cfficicntly  (G8  communiqu6,  Paris,  12th  April  1996;  see  also  the  G8  communiqu6, 
Moscow,  19th-20'h  October  1999)  which  has  subsequently  been  revised  in  2002  (www.  g8j- 
i.  ca/english/docl.  htrnl,  accessed  October  2002).  Various  sub-groups  have  been  established  as 
part  of  the  Lyon  Group,  one  of  which  exists  specifically  to  consider  issues  arising  from  the 
use  by  criminals  of  IT  to  further  their  criminality.  The  G8  heads  of  state  have  adopted  ten 
principles  and  a  ten-point  action  plan  to  combat  high-tech  crime  (the  text  of  which  is 
reproduced  in  Sussmann  1999:  482  footnote  135).  "Essentially  an  international  template  for 
fighting  high-tech  crime  ...  It  is  the  first  time  a  group  of  powerful  world  leaders  have  jointly 
adopted  a  detailed  plan  for  fighting  computer  crime"  (ibid.:  484). 
It  is  not  the  first  time  that  groups  of  nations  have  formulated  an  action  plan.  The  EU 
published  its  own  Action  Plan  to  Combat  Organised  Crime  in  1997  (document  number 
7421/97)  and  has  since  followed  this  up  with  an  action  plan  to  implement  the  JHA  provisions 
of  the  ToA  (OJ  C  19,23d  January  1999,  pp.  I-  15).  Under  the  Finnish  Presidency,  a  European 
Council  meeting  was  held  at  Tampere  (I  5h-  I  6h  October  1999)  and  its  concluding  statement 
endorsed  previous  policy  work  and  promised  more.  The  Council  called  for  better  co-operation 
in  the  Union-wide  fight  against  crime  including  joint  investigation  teams  which  have  since 
been  provided  for  in  the  EUCMA.  (House  of  Lords  1999  HL  Paper  101;  for  the  Presidency 
Conclusions  see  http:  //europe.  eu.  int/council/off/conclu/oct99/oct99-en.  htm).  Regarding  the 
's  High-level  meeting  of  experts  in  cyber  crime,  Europol,  the  Hague  6h-7'b  November  2000.  Attended 
by  author  as  part  of  UK  delegation. 
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prevention  and  control  of  organised  crime,  an  EU  strategy  for  the  new  Millennium  has  been 
published  (OJ20001C  124/01). 
But  the  G8  action  plan  in  respect  of  high-tech  crime  has  gone  further.  A  network  of 
24  hour,  seven  days-a-week  contact  points  is  being  established  both  for  G8  States  and  other 
States  to  enable  speedy  investigation  of  high-tech  crime  (Sussmann  1999:  484).  This  policy 
agreement  sits  outside  conventional  international  law.  Its  very  purpose  is  to  by-pass  routine 
mutual  legal  assistance  communication  channels  in  the  fast  instance  to  ensure  that  evidence 
in  electronic  form  can  be  secured  as  quickly  as  possible  before  either  criminals  have  an 
opportunity  to  destroy  it,  or  it  is destroyed  routinely  under  data  protection  rules  and  Internet 
Service  Providers'  [ISP]  business  practices.  Once  preservation  is  secured,  the  production  of 
the  evidence  can  be  formally  requested  by  means  of  an  ILOR  through  normal  mutual  legal 
assistance  channels.  In  the  world  of  IT  crime,  mutual  legal  assistance  must  be  capable  of 
working  literally  at  the  speed  of  light  down  an  optic  fibre  cable.  Rather  faster  then  than  Home 
Office  civil  servants  and  indeed  law  enforcement  agencies  have  hitherto  been  used  to. 
Where  the  G8  leads,  in  this  area  the  Council  of  Europe  is following.  Its  Cyber  Crime 
Convention  2001  has  formalised  many  of  the  actions  advocated  by  the  G8  experts.  It  is 
recognised  that  mutual  legal  assistance  agreements  for  securing  evidence  in  a  manner  that 
does  not  infringe  national  sovereignty,  are  incapable  of  ensuring  the  preservation  of  certain 
types  of  evidence.  Enforcement  action  up  to  a  point  must  now  be  taken  on  trust  with  the 
scrutiny  ofjudicial  and  political  authorities  coming,  ipsofacto,  after  the  event. 
Political  action  plans,  particularly  those  emanating  from  the  EU  in  the  half  dozen 
years  either  side  of  the  millennium,  shed  new  light  on  mutual  legal  assistance  and  mutual 
assistance.  Where  once  national  leaders  placed  preservation  of  sovereignty  over  mutual 
(legal)  assistance,  now  the  recognition  that  crime  recognises  no  sovereignty  has  forced  the 
pace.  No  longer  are  States  primarily  concerned  about  capturing  fugitives.  The  emphasis  is 
now  very  much  on  protecting  their  own  citizens  and  economies  and  in  this  regard  the 
practicalities  of  mutual  assistance  are  beginning  to  take  priority  over  the  processes  of  mutual 
legal  assistance.  A  subtle  shift  may  be  detected  in  the  politics  of  policing.  So  much  so  that  it 
can  seriously  be  suggested  that  within  the  EU,  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
become  a  supranational  First  Pillar  issue  for  the  sake  of  enhanced  co-ordination  and  judicial 
supervision,  rather  than  remain  an  intergovernmental  Third  Pillar  matter  (Schalken  &  Pronk, 
2002). 
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Mutual  legal  assistance  and  domestic  police  primary  functions 
The  politics  of  policing  encompasses  a  further  aspect  of  work  arising  from 
consideration  of  the  wider  issues  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  A  Home  Office  official  recounted 
a  telling  vignette  (UKCA  interview  7  August  1998).  An  ILOR  from  a  foreign  State  was 
received  at  the  UKCA  and  duly  forwarded  to  the  police  force  for  the  area  in  which  the 
enquiries  had  to  be  undertaken.  Upon  completion  the  paperwork  was  returned  to  the  UKCA 
for  onward  transmission  to  the  requesting  authority.  As  the  request  had  filtered  down  the 
chain  of  command  in  the  police  force  concerned  to  the  person  ultimately  delegated  to  deal 
with  the  matter,  so  a  senior  police  officer  had  at  some  stage  scribbled  in  the  margin  of  the 
request  letter:  "this  has  nothing  to  do  with  my  policing  targets,  but  I  suppose  we  had  better  do 
it  anyway.  " 
Operational  discretion,  starting  with  the  Chief  Officer  and  within  the  parameters  set 
by  this  individual  afforded  to  the  constable  on  the  beat  also,  enables  the  UK  police  to  decide 
for  themselves  (within  the  broad  constraints  of  the  local  policing  plan  §  10(2)  Police  .  4ct  1996 
and  the  National  Policing  Plan,  Police  Reform  4ct  2002  Part  I)  what  criminality  is  to  be 
investigated  and  how  the  investigation  might  be  carried  out.  That  discretion  has  been 
considerably  focused  by  performance  targets  following  the  imposition  of  the  New  Public 
Management  philosophy  of  the  1980s  (Audit  Commission  1986,1994;  Butler  1992;  Flynn 
1993).  This  focus  has  been  reinforced  in  statute  with  provision  now  being  made  for  multi- 
agency  community  safety  strategies  required  by  law  (§5&6,  Crime  and  Disorder  Act  1998). 
If  providing  mutual  legal  assistance  on  request  is  vulnerable  to  concerns  about 
performance  figures  in  other  areas,  then  it  is  an  activity  that  may  receive  less  attention  that  it 
merits.  This  will  not  be  universally  true.  So  reliant  are  the  National  Crime  Squad  and  the 
National  Hi-Tech  Crime  Unit,  for  instance,  on  assistance  from  foreign  agencies,  any  in- 
coming  request  passed  to  these  agencies  for  execution  is  likely  to  receive  prompt  attention  on 
a  quid  pro  quo  basis.  The  same  is  true  for  the  NIS  16  and  its  counterparts.  Central  authorities 
are  provided  for  in  treaty  law  in  order  to  establish  a  single  point  of  contact  for  requesting 
States.  A  foreign  agency  can  hardly  be  expected  to  know  which  of  the  fifty  or  so  UK  police 
forces  it  should  contact  for  assistance  with  interviewing  a  witness.  Indeed,  the  proper 
authority  to  execute  such  a  request  may  not  be  a  police  force.  The  UKCA,  however,  plays  no 
role  in  assessing  the  quality  of  responses  to  requests  (UKCA  interview  7  August  1998).  It 
merely  transmits  the  paperwork  back  and  forth. 
16  National  Investigation  Service,  the  proactive  plain-clothes  investigation  department  of  HM  Customs 
&  Excise. 
Clive  Ifarfeld.  Process  and  Practicalities  21 Chapter  1:  ;  Ay  do  States  need  mutual  legal  assistance? 
The  quality  of  UK  responses  to  requests  for  assistance  received  is  an  issue  that 
appears  initially  to  have  escaped  any  UK  domestic  attention,  even  in  the  performance-focused 
culture  that  now  thrives.  (This  was  to  change  under  an  Union-wide  peer  evaluation  of  mutual 
legal  assistance  arrangements,  discussed  below  Chapter  4.  )  Yet  it  is  an  issue  that  impacts 
upon  the  quality  of  assistance  that  UK  agencies  might  themselves  receive.  High-level 
diplomatic  intervention  was  required  to  persuade  the  juge  dinstruction  at  St  Omer,  France, 
once  again  to  accept  UK  ILORs  after  he  refused  to  do  so  citing  poor  co-operation  from 
English  authorities  as  justification  for  his  unilateral  action.  Had  persuasion  not  worked,  he 
could  not  have  been  compelled  to  provide  the  requested  assistance  (Kent  County 
Constabulary  interview  22  October  1998). 
With  the  exception  of  the  NCIS  and  the  National  Crime  Squad  (§2(2)  &  §48(3) 
Police  Act  1997),  it  is  not  the  statutory  -  or  measured  -  function  of  UK  law  enforcement 
agencies  to  assist  foreign  counter-parts,  although  permissive  legislation  allows  local  forces 
the  discretion  to  do  so  subject  to  Home  Secretary  authority  (§26  Police  Act  1996).  UK  police 
forces  are  required  to  deliver  the  intentions  expressed  in  the  plans  of  local  police  authorities 
(§10(2)  Police  Act  1996).  An  assessment  of  attitudes  towards  FLORs  amongst  UK  law 
enforcement  agencies  would  be  an  interesting  balancing  exercise  to  the  largely  negative 
conclusions  of  Nicholson  &  Harrison  (1996)  concerning  the  effectiveness  and  value  of  mutual 
legal  assistance  to  UK-based  investigators. 
A  study  of  the  relationship  between  political  action  plans  at  the  international  level  and 
structures  for  delivering  policing  priorities  at  local  level  within  the  context  of  performance 
measurement  might  be  an  illuminative  exercise  but  there  is  also  another  facet  to  this  issue:  the 
relationship  between  national  and  supranational  provision.  Supranational  jurisdiction  arguably 
has  the  potential  to  render  redundant  the  need  for  mutual  legal  assistance  structures.  Both  in 
the  global  and  European  arenas  much  has  been  written  (on  supranational  jurisdiction  within 
the  EU  see  DonA  1998;  House  of  Lords  1999  HL  Paper  62;  Vervaele  1999;  Schomburg  2000; 
Schalken  &  Pronk  2002;  whilst  on  the  International  Criminal  Court  see  Stewart  1998,  Stevens 
1998).  There  may  yet  be  much  more  to  be  said  on  these  matters,  but  for  some  years  to  come 
such  discussion  will  remain  hypothetical  because  of  the  prevailing  political  contexts  (House 
of  Lords  1999  HL  Paper  62). 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  has  sought  to  identify  why  States  need  mutual  legal  assistance.  The 
simple  answer  is  that  it  allows  them  to  enforce  their  laws  without  geographic  restriction  but 
also  without  infringing  the  sovereign  rights  of  other  States.  It  is  also  the  only  practical  means 
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of  combating  transnational  organised  crime  that  has  become  a  significant  threat  to 
transnational  and  world  security  because  it  undermines  legitimate  economic  activity  and  fiscal 
revenues,  and  because  it  destabilises  embryonic  democracies  and  emerging  States.  Some 
subsidiary  issues  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  have  also  been  considered  to  help 
illuminate  the  context  within  which  mutual  legal  assistance  operates.  Having  thus  considered 
the  legal  issues  from  the  perspective  of  the  State  academic  theoretical  approaches  to  the  study 
of  mutual  legal  assistance  are  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 
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Chapter  2 
Models  of  mutual  assistance 
Models  of  jurisdiction  and  mutual  legal  assistance  provide  opportunities  of 
interpretation  and  there  are  a  variety  of  models  seeking  to  explain  different  aspects  of  the 
mutual  (legal)  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  arenas.  Some  focus 
on  the  relationships  between  national  and  supranational  policies,  others  on  the  relationslýiips 
between  jurisdictions  and  concepts  in  law,  yet  others  on  the  relationships  between  practitioner 
agencies.  What  follows  is  a  summary  of  the  principal  examples. 
At  the  strategic  conceptual  level  Gregory  identifies  "three  expressions  of  severity" 
within  the  international  criminal  law  arena  (2000:  10  1): 
"  war  crimes  and  crimes  against  humanity"; 
"acts  which  attract  universal  condemnation";  and 
offences  that  transcend  "domestic  law  sphere'. 
The  first  of  these  levels  of  criminality  lies  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
International  armed  conflict  not  only  generates  military  atrocities  but  also  undoubtedly  offers 
opportunities  for  transnational  organised  crime  groups  to  raise  revenue  and  expand  their 
business.  There  is  evidence  that  the  various  protagonists  in  the  recent  Balkans  conflicts 
engaged  with  criminals  in  a  number  of  ways  to  their  mutual  benefit  -  the  combatants  were 
supplied  with  resources,  the  criminals  with  new  markets  (Nick  Ridley,  Europol  presentation 
to  International  Law  Congress,  Nicosia,  April  2000).  Enforcement  action  against  such 
criminality  is,  during  the  period  of  hostilities  at  least,  an  international  military  issue  rather 
than  a  matter  for  domestic  law  enforcement  agencies  acting  either  individually  or  in  concert. 
%ilst  not  unimportant,  this  level  of  criminality  falls  outside  the  day-to-day  activity  of 
domestic  law  enforcement  agencies  under  consideration  in  this  thesis. 
The  other  two  expressions  identified  by  Gregory  capture  the  level  and  types  of 
activity  that  is  of  interest  to  agencies  charged  with  providing  mutual  legal  assistance  required 
in  criminal  investigations.  Trafficking  in  humans,  drugs  and  arms  have  all  attracted  universal 
condemnation  as  demonstrated  in  various  international  instruments,  whilst  any  given 
individual  offence  against  a  national  law  may  involve  evidence-gathering  abroad  now  that 
international  travel  is  so  frequent.  The  UKCA  regularly  receives,  for  instance,  commissions 
rogatoire  from  French  authorities  seeking  to  prosecute  UK  truck  drivers  for  traffic  offences 
committed  in  France  (Simon  Watkins,  UKCA,  interview  7  August  1998;  Serges  Roques, 
Prosecutor's  Office,  Dieppe,  interview  18  May  1999). 
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Approaches  to  dealing  with  these  degrees  of  severity  can  also  be  modelled.  The 
International  Criminal  Court  [ICC]  has  been  established  with  international  jurisdiction  to  deal 
with  the  first  of  these  (New  Law  Journal  25  September  1998  p.  138  1;  HL  Hansard  15  January 
2001  col.  924)  although  it  conception  has  provoked  vigorous  debate  amongst  jurists  (for 
opposing  views  see  Bassiouni  1999  (for)  and  Rubin  1999  (against)).  Politicians  equally  are 
divided.  President  Clinton  actively  supported  the  ICC  (Stevens  1998:  237)  and  signed  the 
Rome  Treaty  but  President  George  W.  Bush  has  "no  plans  to  send  it  forward  to  [the]  Senate 
for  ratification7'  (Colin  Powell,  US  Secretary  of  State  quoted  in  The  Independent  (Review) 
p.  10,20  February  2001)  and  has  actively  been  lobbying  other  States  such  as  Australia,  to 
'unsign'  the  ICC  treaty  ('Howard  sympathetic  to  US  on  international  criminal  court'  Sydney 
Morning  Herald  29  August  2002).  As  currently  established  the  ICC  has  no  jurisdiction  over 
the  types  of  criminality  and  enforcement  measures  under  consideration  here  for  which  mutual 
legal  assistance  measures  exist  in  lieu  of  international  jurisdiction. 
National  attitudes  to  jurisdiction  are  modelled  by  Heymann  who  proposes  two  models 
for  interpreting  international  law  enforcement  co-operation.  Where  States  share  a  trust  in  each 
other's  legal  systems,  a  similar  outlook  on  prosecution  and  are  prepared  to  tolerate  limited, 
non-intrusive  self-help  by  each  State  within  the  borders  of  the  other,  then  this  direct,  bilateral 
co-operation  constitutes  Heymann's  prosecutorial  model  (1990:  103).  This  characterises  the 
culture  of  direct  co-operation  between  investigators  of  any  given  agency  working  at  the  micro 
level,  sometimes  termed  the  philosophy  of  'practical  policing'. 
Heymann's  second  model  describes  a  scenario  founded  upon  broad  principles  such  as 
sovereignty  in  which  detailed  rules  are  provided  for  dealing  with  cross-border  contact 
between  law  enforcement  agencies.  Strict  observance  of  the  sovereignty  principle  inhibits 
contact  at  the  micro  level  that  is  unsupervised  or  uncoordinated  by  an  agency  at  either  the 
meso  or  macro  levels.  This  he  terms  the  international  law  model.  Heymann  concluded:  "no 
nation  adheres  to  either  [model]  in  its  pure  form!  ',  (ibid.:  105). 
Brown,  reflecting  on  these  two  theoretical  propositions,  considered  Europe  and  found 
both  models  applicable.  'Me  ECRA  falls  within  the  international  law  model  considered  by 
some  at  the  time  to  be  "revolutionary"  (1998:  5  1).  This  treaty  provides  an  intergovernmental, 
legal  structure  for  mutual  assistance  between  European  states.  Brown  contrasts  the  formality 
of  contact  required  by  the  ECMA  with  the  relative  informality  provided  by  the  Schengen 
Convention  1990  which  foreshadows  the  gradual  abolition  of  internal  borders  within  the  EU 
and  enables  under  certain  circumstances,  cross-border  surveillance  (article  40)  and  cross- 
border  pursuit  (article  41)  within  the  territories  of  contracting  parties. 
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Two  contrasting  models  arc  apparent  in  the  political  approaches  to  negotiating  mutual 
legal  assistance  instruments  (Harfield  2003  for  detailed  presentation  of  the  arguments; 
Harfield  2002  for  issues  arising  from  the  contrasting  approaches).  The  European  and  UN 
approaches  can  be  described  as  that  of  consensus.  Multilateral  instruments,  such  as  crime 
suppression  conventions,  are  negotiated  to  rcflect  the  basic  standards  that  the  signatory  parties 
are  prepared  to  adhere  to.  Often  there  is  scope  within  these  documents,  particularly  within 
those  of  the  EU,  for  more  extensive  bilateral  instruments  to  be  individually  negotiated  based 
on  the  minimum  common  standards  outlined  in  the  multilateral  convention  ('UK-Spain:  fast- 
track  extradition  agreement'  Statewatch  11(2),  pp.  8-9,2001).  But  the  principal  beneficial 
characteristic  of  multilateral  conventions  is  their  acceptability  to  as  many  States  as  possible 
and  thus  their  establishment  of  international  norms. 
The  downside  of  such  an  approach,  so  argue  many  American  commentators  and 
professionals  (interviews  with  Lystra  Blake,  Associate  Director,  Office  of  International 
Affairs,  Department  of  Justice,  Washington  DC,  16  May  2001;  and  with  Lance  Emory,  FBI 
Legal  Attach6,  U.  S.  Embassy,  London,  22  February  2000),  is  that  such  an  approach  only 
achieves  the  lowest  common  denominator  and  that  a  bilateral  instrument  can  be  tailored  more 
closely  to  the  needs  of  the  two  parties.  The  bilateral  approach  is  the  strong  preference  of  the 
US  administration  although  President  Clinton  did  note,  when  commending  the  multilateral 
Organisation  of  American  States  MLAC  to  Congress,  that  one  of  its  advantages  was  that  it 
saved  the  expense  and  effort  of  negotiating  bilateral  treaties  with  each  South  American  nation 
(Inter-American  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  Uith  Related  Optional 
Protocol,  Treaty  Doc.  105-25,105th  Cong.,  l"  Session  (1997);  ratified  by  the  USA,  May 
2001).  The  attraction  of  bilateral  treaties  to  the  US  administrations  is  that  the  power 
relationship  in  such  negotiations  is  asymmetrical,  to  the  extent  that  this  strategy  can  be 
modelled  as  a  control  model,  in  which  the  powerful  state  can  negotiate  treaties  that  suit  its 
own  needs  and  foreign  affairs  agenda,  and  does  not  necessarily  best  serve  the  interests  of  the 
less  powerful  party  (a  point  made  independently  by  a  number  of  foreign  law  enforcement 
liaison  officers  posted  to  Washington  DC  in  interviews  conducted  May-July  2001,  and  in 
Zagaris  1998:  1408).  Indeed,  through  the  judicious  deployment  of  bilateral  instruments 
between  partners  of  unequal  status,  the  control  model  can  be  used  to  promote  what  is 
essentially  a  disguised  form  of  unilateralism. 
Heymann's  models  and  the  control  and  consensus  models  proposed  here  are  not 
mutually  exclusive.  The  latter  complement  and  illun-dnate  the  former.  Heymann  illustrates 
how  attitudes  to  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  might  be  characterised,  whilst  the 
control  and  consensus  models  suggest  how  different  political  considerations  influence 
strategic  approaches  to  the  negotiation  of  MLATs  and  MLACs.  US  bilateral  relations  with 
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individual  EU  Member  States  are  complicated  by  the  EU  obligations  imposed  on  its 
Members.  Indeed,  concern  was  expressed  (interview  with  Lystra  Blake)  that  EU  multilateral 
arrangements  threatened  the  bilateral  relations  the  US  had  with  certain  European  States  (it 
does  not  have  bilateral  MLATs  with  all  EU  Member  States).  To  that  extent,  the  US  has  been 
exploring,  initially  in  complete  secrecy  but  post  9/11  at  least  with  some  public  awareness  that 
talks  were  taking  place,  with  the  EU  on  a  bilateral  basis  ('E.  U.  -U.  S.  secret  agreement  in  the 
making'  Statewatch  12(2)  pp.  1  -2,2002).  These  talks,  in  which  the  competency  of  the  EU  to 
negotiate  of  its  own  volition  in  JHA  matters  with  a  Third  Party  is  by  no  means  clear-cut,  did 
not  progress  as  well  as  the  US  might  have  hoped  (Home  Office  Mutual  Legal  Assistance 
Forum  6  December  2002)  since  none  of  the  four  goals  of  the  US  (three  of  which  concerned 
extradition  issues)  have  been  accepted  by  the  EU.  Although  an  EU-US  MLAT  has  been 
agreed  (OJ  L  181/34,19  June  2003),  to  supplement  existing  US  bilateral  treaties  with  EU 
Member  States,  privately  British  government  officials  have  indicated  that  it  is  poorly  drafted 
and  as  such  ineffective  in  what  it  seeks  to  achieve. 
Also  at  the  strategic  level,  the  formal  treaty-based  procedural  approach  to  mutual 
legal  assistance  (e.  g.  ECMA,  EUCMA)  can  be  contrasted  with  the  informal  schematic 
approach  (Harare)  that  promotes  suppression  within  a  given  framework  whilst  not 
necessarily  detailing  procedures  to  achieve  this  (e.  g.  the  Harare  Scheme,  the  UN  Drugs 
Convention  (1998)  and  UNTOC  (2000)).  In  the  former,  signatory  Parties  agree  defined 
actions  to  be  undertaken  in  given  circumstances.  In  the  latter,  nations  agree  to  criminalise 
specific  behaviours;  thereby  achieving  a  harmony  or  synchronisation  that  eliminates  safe 
havens  for  criminals.  The  former,  characterised  by  a  greater  degree  of  commitment  from  the 
signatory  parties,  is  typical  of  a  jurisdiction  philosophy  founded  upon  a  written  constitution 
and  comprehensive  criminal  code  such  as  exist  in  Civil  Code  countries  whilst  the  informal 
scheme  accords  more  closely  with  Common  Law  traditions. 
Parallel  to  this  simple  model  for  government  interaction  is  the  five-element  model  of 
transnational  enforcement  identified  by  Dirkzwager  (1999)  that  incorporates  the  relationship 
between  supranational  and  national  bodies.  He  identifies  in  relation  to  EU  customs  laws  the 
contrasting  options  of  direct  or  indirect  enforcement,  which  are  underpinned  by  three 
different  types  of  relationship  evident  in  the  EU:  horizontal  (Member  State  to  Member  State), 
vertical  (EC  to  Member  State)  and  diagonal  (enforcement  agency  in  one  Member  State  to 
judicial  authority  in  a  second  Member  State).  This  model  is  helpful  for  understanding  the 
possibilities  now  inherent  in  the  increasing  influence  of  EU  institutions  in  criminal  law  and 
the  operation  of  the  EUCAL4. 
Hebenton  and  Thomas  also  consider  supranational  issues  in  their  three-part  model. 
For  them  horizontal  integration  means  the  investigators  of  one  nation  being  authorised  to  act 
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in  another  country  whilst  vertical  integration  involves  the  creation  of  a  supranational 
enforcement  agency.  The  third  alternative  is  mutual  co-operation  (1995:  58-59).  All  three  of 
these  models  can  exist  within  a  formal,  treaty-based  context.  The  Schengen  Acquis  represents 
horizontal  integration  in  this  model  whilst  the  work  of  the  EU's  anti-fraud  investigative  unit  - 
the  Ojji'ce  de  lutte  antifraude  [OLAF]  -  represents  the  early  stages  of  vertical  integration. 
Agency-to-agency  mutual  assistance,  whether  ad  hoc  or  on  the  basis  of  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  [MoU]  fits  the  third  tier  of  the  model. 
Although  now  dated,  Hebenton  and  Thomas'  'co-operation  or  integration'  approach 
is  still  sound  in  principle  and  forms  the  historical  background  for  the  developments  of  other 
supra-  and  international  models. 
Atop  the  supranational  pyramid  is  a  global  solution,  the  ICC,  intended  to  deal  with 
Gregory's  first  degree  of  severity.  At  the  regional  supranational.  level  concepts  such  as  a 
supranational  criminal  code,  the  Corpus  Juris,  have  been  proposed  and  supranational 
enforcement  mechanisms  are  being  established  (see  Chapter  3  for  further  discussion  of 
Corpus  Juris  and  OLAF).  Schomburg  (2000)  views  supranational  responses  as  the  logical 
development  of  mutual  legal  assistance  measures  in  that  they  present  a  'level  playing  field' 
for  investigators  and  suspects  alike.  Joerges  &  Vos  (1999:  90)  suggest  that  the  EU's 
supranational  constitution,  as  expressed  in  the  ECJ  (Zuleeg  1999),  is  an  appropriate  vehicle 
by  which  criminal  justice  norms  can  be  established  at  this  level  of  interaction.  Pedersen  et  al. 
(1999)  have  already  begun  to  examine  the  relationship  between  EU  law  and  domestic 
criminal  sanctions  in  those  First  Pillar  areas  where  EU  law  and  municipal  law  coincide,  the 
former  having  primacy. 
Moving  from  models  of  supranational  enforcement  to  models  of  international  co- 
operation  Vervaele  argues  that  "the  future  of  European  integration  does  not  consist  in 
building  new  supranational  European  institutions  but  in  consolidating  and  intensifying 
integration  through  multi-level  government  structures  with  a  strong  multi-level 
interdependence  between  the  various  levels  of  political  institutions"  (1999a:  382).  Thus  he 
proposes  a  network  model  in  preference  to  a  truly  supranational  model.  For  trans-European 
enforcement  networks  to  become  multi-level  agency  structures  Vervaele  looks  to  the  US 
Federal/State  agency  hierarchy  model  as  a  way  to  proceed  (op.  cit.  383-7). 
An  alternative  way  of  approaching  this  same  issue  is  through  consideration  of  the 
continuum  that  runs  from  harmonisation  of  criminal  laws  to  mutual  recognition  of  court 
judgements.  At  one  end  of  the  continuum  lies  a  common  criminal  code  and  the  means  to 
enforce  it;  a  combination,  for  instance,  of  Corpus  Juris  and  OLAF.  At  the  other  end,  rather 
than  subscribe  to  a  common  criminal  code,  different  national  jurisdictions  agree  to  honour 
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each  other's  court  orders;  hence  a  search  warrant  issued  in  the  UK  would  be  valid  in 
continental  Europe  and  vice  versa.  In  between  these  two  extremes,  lies  the  approximation  or 
synchronisation  of  laws  such  as  is  envisaged  in  suppression  treaties.  Transnational  criminality 
can  be  addressed  by  ensuring  similar  crimes  and  investigative  powers  exist  among  the 
signatory  parties.  At  trial,  although  part  of  the  overall  criminality  may  occur  outside  the 
jurisdiction,  it  is  nevertheless  taken  into  consideration  through  judicial  recognition  of 
elements  such  as  conspiracy  for  instance. 
Cadoppi  notes  that  the  protection  of  human  rights  has  already  led  to  some 
harmonisation  between  different  European  jurisdictions  (1996:  6),  and  the  enacting  of  the 
Human  Rights  4ct  1998  in  the  UK  is  an  example  of  this.  As  much  as  80%  of  economic  and 
social  legislation  and  approximately  50%  of  all  other  legislation  enacted  in  municipal 
jurisdictions  "now  emanates  from  Brussels,  whether  via  directives  or  more  informal  political 
decisions  of  the  Council  which  have  no  legal  force  as  such  but  which  are  regarded  as  binding 
on  governments"  (Edwards  1996:  143).  This,  too,  is  a  harmonising  development  with  which 
national  parliaments,  including  that  of  the  UK,  are  complicit  (Carter  2000:  457). 
Nevertheless  Europe  is  far  from  achieving  real  harmonisation. 
"The  reality  of  the  diversity  of  legal  orders  and  of  regulatory  styles  poses  problems  for 
the  ambition  to  harmonize  regulatory  standards  in  the  EU.  They  complicate  the  uniform 
implementation  and  enforcement  of  EU  law.  The  national  differences  in  the  styles  of  rule 
formulation  and  in  the  nature  of  the  rules  affect  in  particular  the  legal  implementation,  the 
transposition  of  EU  regulations  and  directives  in  national  law.  The  national  differences  in  penal 
and  administrative  sanctions,  and  the  styles  of  rule  enforcement  affect  the  uniform  application  of 
the  law.  And  indirectly,  the  styles  of  rule  formation  do  as  well"  (Van  Waarden  1999:  116). 
At  the  other  end  of  the  continuum,  mutual  recognition  is  not  without  its  drawbacks. 
"...  it  hardly  seems  appropriate  to  rely  upon  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  as  a 
regulatory  instrument  to  overcome  the  differences  in  national  legislative  provisions  ...  as  a 
regulatory  instrument  [mutual  recognition]  fails  where  objectives  of  national  legislation  diverge  ...  it  has  faltered  in  the  face  of  the  member  states!  unwillingness  simply  to  accept  each  other's 
products"(Joerges  &  Vos  1999:  83). 
Models,  of  course,  can  be  used  to  predict  and  explain  failure  as  well  as  success.  The 
supranational  approach  is  predicated  upon  supranational  agencies  and  laws  and  requires  the 
commitment  of  nation  States  to  the  greater  good  of  the  international  community.  The 
international  approach,  on  the  other  hand,  relies  on  mutual  co-operation  between  States  but  is 
characterised  by  the  inherent  vulnerability  of  nations  unable  to  fulfil  or  meet  the  mutual 
obligations  and  by  the  absence  of  enforcing  compliance. 
So  much  for  strategic  level  models.  Theoretical  modellers  have  explored  the  tactical 
and  operational  levels  of  law  enforcement  activity  as  well. 
Anderson  (1989:  chapter  8)  &  Sieber  (1994)  both  consider  a  functional  continuum 
ranging  from  centralisation  to  decentralisation.  The  centralised.  element  of  Us  model  is 
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represented  by  a  national  unit  or  agency,  for  instance  the  NCIS,  co-ordinating  and 
transmitting  all  transnational  communication  from  the  national  law  enforcement  system  to 
representatives  of  another  national  system  or  an  inter-state  organisation  such  as  Interpol.  At 
the  opposite  end  of  the  scale,  in  a  decentralised  arrangement,  individual  law  enforcement 
agencies  communicate  directly  with  their  foreign  counterparts  and  any  national  agency 
operates  in  a  advisory  or  facilitation  capacity.  Gallagher  identifies  intermediary  stages  on  this 
continuunL  "Qualified  centralisation  refers  to  a  situation  where  two  levels  of  inter-police 
agency  linking  could  take  place.  One  would  be  via  a  national  co-ordinating  unit  and  the  other, 
in  special  circumstances,  via  direct  police  to  police  contact.  Qualified  decentralisation  allows 
direct  communication  between  police  forces  but  requires  reporting  of  these  communications 
to  a  national  co-ordinating  unit.  "  (1998:  82).  The  latter  describes  the  functioning  of  the  Kent 
police  European  Liaison  Unit  based  at  the  Folkestone  end  of  the  Channel  Tunnel. 
Benyon,  considering  the  overall  framework  for  police  co-operation,  has  identified  a 
three-tier  hierarchy  (1997:  107-108).  These  corTespond  to  the  strategic/tactical/operational 
hierarchical  model  used  by  law  enforcement  to  identify  functional  chains  of  command 
although  Benyon  has  chosen  the  labels  macro,  meso  and  micro  for  his  hierarchy.  The  macro 
level  comprises  the  setting  of  strategic  policy  expressed  in  constitutional  and  intemational 
agreements  or  the  harmonisation  of  laws.  The  ECMA  is  macro-level  instrument.  The  meso 
level  describes  structures,  practices,  procedures  and  technologies  that  exist  at  the  tactical 
level,  such  as  liaison  officer  networks  for  instance.  The  Cross  Channel  Intelligence 
Conference  [CCIC]  operates  at  this  level,  as  does  the  Drugs  Liaison  Officer  network  (Bigo 
2000).  The  micro  level  describes  the  operational  level  at  which  individual  investigations  take 
place;  the  prevention  or  detection  of  specific  criminality.  It  is  at  this  level  that  the  commission 
rogatoire  sits  for  instance. 
In  his  examination  of  the  driving  forces  behind  the  growth  of  cross-Channel  police 
co-operation,  Gallagher  proposes  a  frontier  zone  model  to  describe  the  interaction  dynamics 
of  border  policing  and  the  relative  levels  of  influence  from  local  centres  (units  or  force  HQ) 
and  national  centres  (government,  national  agencies).  "Borderlands  can  be  viewed  as  a 
network  of  tensions,  creative  as  well  as  destructive  in  their  purposes  and  effects.  Public 
intervention  by  a  sub-central  agency  such  as  the  police  can  be  interpreted  as  a  form  of  tension 
management"  the  outcome  of  which  "influences  attitudes  to  events,  the  general  characteristics 
of  policy  and  the  planning  for  activity  in  or  around  the  frontier"  (1998:  236).  This  model  is 
specific  to  true  frontier  zones  rather  than  international  co-operation  as  a  whole.  It  offers  an 
explanation  for  the  driving  forces  that  have  meant  Kent  police  are  relatively  advanced  in  their 
co-operation  mechanisms  compared  with  other  LJK  police  forces.  In  it  may  also  be  found  the 
seeds  of  explanation  for  the  establishment  (if  any)  of  local  units  because  national  agencies 
Clivellarfleld.,  Process  and  Practicalities  30 Chapter  2:  Models  ofmulual  assistance 
such  as  the  NCIS,  which  have  as  a  primary  function  international  liaison,  are  ill-suited  to 
provide  the  practical  day-to-day  functions  needed  at  the  frontier. 
It  remains  only  to  note  two  contrasting  models  of  legal  tradition.  The  distinction 
between  the  Common  Law  tradition  and  the  Civil  Code  tradition  of  administering  justice 
dictates  the  perception  and  probative  attitudes  to  different  types  of  evidence.  The  reliance  on 
oral  testimony  in  Common  Law  jurisdictions  inhibits  some  of  the  more  obvious  means  of 
achieving  practical  co-operation  in  adducing  evidence  from  abroad.  The  reliance  in  Civil 
Code  jurisdictions  on  judicial  (rather  than  police)  investigation  fi7ustrates  Common  Law 
enforcement  agencies  used  to  autonomous  investigation.  It  is  from  these  two  fundamentally 
different  cultural  foundations  that  MLACs  and  MLATs  are  negotiated  presenting  us  with  an 
instrumental  framework,  or  statutory  models,  of  mutual  legal  assistance. 
Having  looked  elsewhere  at  strategic-level  models  relating  to  mutual  legal  assistance 
(Harfield  2003),  the  present  research  will  focus  at  the  operational  level,  the  micro  level  within 
Benyon's  hierarchy  of  international  law  enforcement  co-operation,  by  examining  cross-border 
evidence  gathering  in  general  as  it  is  experienced  by  local  police  forces  in  England  and  by 
examining  specific  case  studies.  The  objective  is  not  to  test  the  validity  of  Benyon's  model 
but  to  test  the  effectiveness  of  the  model  of  mutual  legal  assistance  based  on  UK  legislation 
enacted  in  1990  and  yet  to  be  fully  replaced. 
Before  this  can  be  considered  however,  it  is  necessary  to  understand  how  the  current 
mutual  legal  assistance  infrastructure  within  which  English  investigators  operate,  developed. 
That  is  the  purpose  of  the  next  chapter. 
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Chapter  3 
The  development  of  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms 
Chapter  I  defined  mutual  legal  assistance  and  Chapter  2  presented  various  conceptual 
models  that  have  been  used  to  interpret  different  aspects  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation.  The  relationship  between  the  present  research 
and  the  theoretical  and  statutory  models  has  been  identified.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is 
explain  how  the  LJK  came  to  adopt  the  mutual  legal  assistance  statutory  regime  that  it 
established  in  1990  and  what  the  influences  were.  This  will  provide  the  starting  point  from 
which  consideration  of  research  gaps  and  methodology  can  be  presented. 
Mutual  (legal)  assistance  in  criminal  matters  is  largely  a  phenomenon  of  the  post- 
WW2  era.  Whilst  it  was  not  unknown  earlier  in  the  twentieth  century  -  Dr  Crippen  being  an 
early  and  much  publicised  example  of  a  transnational  arrest  secured  through  new  technology 
(Daily  Mirror,  I  August  1910,  p.  1)  -  when  Hinton  came  to  compile  an  early  guide  to 
gathering  evidence  abroad,  arrangements  were  very  much  ad  hoc  with  a  few  bilateral 
agreements  in  force  but  no  multilateral  treaties  (1930).  1  In  the  aftermath  of  WW2  the 
Council  of  Europe  commenced  work  on  a  number  of  treaties  with  the  overall  purpose  of 
securing  lasting  peace  and  security  within  Europe  (Cram  1996:  40;  Minogue  1995:  55-56). 
These  included  the  ECAIA,  which  came  into  force  in  1959.  Mutual  (legal)  assistance  in 
criminal  matters  has  received  additional  political  impetus  within  western  Europe  in  recent 
years  as  the  EU  has  broadened  its  sphere  of  interest  beyond  economic  affairs  (First  Pillar)  to 
Third  Pillar  issues  such  as  justice  and  home  affairs.  The  1997  ToA  (Title  VI)  and  the 
Presidency  Conclusions  arising  from  the  EU  Tampere  summit  amply  illustrate  this. 
Transnational  criminality  is  now  presented  (and  presumably  perceived)  as  a  major  threat  to 
the  EU  and  its  Member  States  (see  for  instance,  Europol  1999;  the  UK  Threat  Assessment 
published  annually  by  the  NCIS;  Europol  Annual  Reports;  Foreign  &  Commonwealth  Office 
2002:  15)  and  since  September  2001  it  has  been  linked  with  the  United  States'  'war  on  terror' 
(Conclusion  and  Plan  of  Action  of  the  Presidency,  Extraordinary  Informal  Meetings  of  the 
European  Council,  Brussels,  21  September  2001;  Harfield  2003:  234-6).  Consequently, 
international  co-operation  and  mutual  assistance  in  enforcing  national  criminal  laws  (in  the 
absence  of  an  international  criminal  code)  is  being  presented  as  the  way  to  combat  such 
criminality  and  the  justification  for  EU  interest  in  this  arena. 
1  The  UK  entered  into  bilateral  agreements  with  France  (1922),  Belgium  (1922),  Czechoslovakia 
(1924),  Germany  (1928)  and  Spain  (1929)  (Hinton,  1930:  14). 
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This  chapter  considers  whether  the  motivation  or  driving  force  for  mutual  legal 
assistance  has  been  practitioner-based  (bottom-up)  or  politically  driven  (top-down).  It  does  so 
in  order  to  provide  a  context  within  which  to  consider  the  key  research  questions  of  this  thesis 
outlined  below  (Chapter  4).  Because  of  the  geographical  and  temporal  scope  of  this  thesis,  the 
principal  focus  will  be  on  the  UK  and  Europe. 
Practitioners  as  a  drivina  force 
Those  who  directly  seek  and  provide  mutual  legal  assistance  (investigators)  are  not 
those  who  establish  the  mechanisms  for  mutual  legal  assistance  (politicians,  administrators). 
In  the  view  of  one  experienced  UK  investigator,  inter-governmental  negotiations  concerning 
mutual  assistance  suffer  from  the  lack  of  practitioner  participation  (Frank  Gallagher, 
interview  14  November  2000).  The  fact  that  administrators  withheld  from  practitioner  and 
public  comment  the  preliminary  text  of  the  Council  of  Europe's  proposed  cyber  crime 
convention  until  draft  no.  22  is  an  example  that  supports  Gallagher's  view.  An  actor  driving 
for  change  may  not  be  the  same  actor  who  then  implements  the  subsequent  changes.  In  other 
words,  bottom-up  drivers  may  not  have  definitive  influence  in  establishing  mutual  legal 
assistance  mechanisms. 
As  long  ago  as  1968,  the  need  for  mutual  assistance  mechanisms  was  felt  most  keenly 
amongst  UK  law  enforcement  agencies  by  Kent  County  Constabulary  which  had 
responsibility  for  the  cross-Channel  ports  of  Dover,  Folkestone  and  Ramsgate.  The  UK  had 
signed  but  not  ratified  the  ECMA  and  so  UK  authorities  engaged  in  transnational  enquiries 
had  at  their  disposal  only  the  (pre-ECAM)  customary  practice  of  international  law  as 
identified  by  Reuter  (195  8).  Requests  for  assistance  were  entirely  ad  hoc  and  formality  had  to 
be  invented  as  and  when  required  (for  just  such  an  example  see  a  'commission  rogatoire, 
drawn  up  by  a  Justice  of  the  Peace  for  the  Borough  of  Margate  18  October  1967,  Gallagher 
1998:  248). 
Illegal  immigration  was  a  significant  problem  common  to  authorities  on  both  sides  of 
the  Channel  in  1968  and  the  then  Chief  Constable  of  Kent  sought  to  establish  the  CCIC  with 
his  opposite  numbers.  This  initiative  was  pursued  in  the  absence  of  any  government 
assistance  and,  in  fact,  French  participation  was  constrained  by  French  government  resistance 
to  autonomous  actions  by  local  police  chiefs  (Gallagher  1998:  140),  a  position  consistent  with 
the  hierarchical  and  judiciary-based  investigation  system  operating  in  Civil  Code  France 
(Vogler  1996).  From  this  innovation,  in  which  the  practitioners  were  the  prime  movers,  there 
evolved  a  particular  form  of  mutual  assistance  based  on  the  frontier  zone  which  had  the 
Channel  ferry  routes  at  its  epicentre  (Gallagher  1998:  235-237).  Such  co-operation  and 
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transnational  linkage  was  essential  to  the  Kent  police  but  given  the  relative  autonomy  of  UK 
police  forces  (particularly  at  that  time),  there  was  no  appetite  within  government  for  any 
national  policy  or  initiatives  in  this  area.  In  the  absence  of  any  formal  government  support, 
the  Chief  Constable  proceeded  with  his  international  relations  on  the  basis  of  his  own 
authority  (Gallagher  1998:  234;  see  also  Walker  1993:  13  1). 
Clearly  this  was  mutual  assistance  driven  by  the  practitioners.  It  was  mirrored 
elsewhere  with  the  "establishment  of  informal  co-operation  between  chiefs  of  police  in  the 
border  region  of  Belgiun-4  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  in  1969"  (Mangelaars  1993:  72  citing 
Fijnaut  1992).  There  are  limits  even  to  a  Chief  Constable's  authority  and  in  negotiating 
international  agreements,  chief  officers  are  confined  to  the  level  of  inter-agency  Memoranda 
of  Understanding  which  fall  well  short  of  the  effects  that  can  be  achieved  through  inter- 
governmental  instruments.  Of  necessity,  Kent  police  continue  to  negotiate  and  update  agency- 
level  mutual  assistance  agreements  with  their  opposite  numbers,  without  the  formal 
participation  of  government  departments  (who  are  nevertheless  kept  informed  of 
developments  out  of  courtesy:  Frank  Gallagher  interview  14  November  2000). 
The  contrasting  autonomy  of  police  chiefs  in  England  and  France  during  the 
establishment  of  the  CCIC  illustrates  the  constraints  on  bottom-up  initiatives.  In  England  such 
an  initiative  could  be  established  relatively  easily  but  could  only  achieve  a  certain  level  of 
formalised  assistance,  whereas  in  France  such  an  initiative  is  inhibited  by  a  hierarchical 
decision-making  process  which  provides  very  little  lee-way  for  bottom-up  driving  forces  to 
succeed  of  their  own  volition.  Tbirty  years  on,  Gallagher  is  still  not  convinced  that 
administrators  in  the  Home  Office  fully  appreciate  front-line  mutual  assistance  needs  and  this 
is  reflected  in  their  discussions  of  some  of  the  issues  surrounding  implementation  of  the 
Schengen  Acquis  (Frank  Gallagher  interview  14  November  2000). 
Wanting  to  get  the  job  done  -  getting  arrests  and  convictions  -  may  not  be  the  only 
motivation  for  practitioners  wishing  to  play  a  part  in  promoting  and  securing  international 
agreements.  Whilst  domestic  politics  can  constrain  State  participation  in  international 
agreements,  "international  bargains  can  be  a  means  of  empowering  particular  domestic 
actors"  (Goldstein  1996:  562).  In  the  peace  dividend  from  the  Cold  War,  the  UK  Secret 
Intelligence  Service  has  found  it  expedient  to  establish  closer  links  with  HM  Customs  & 
Excise  in  the  furtherance  of  mutual  assistance  and  plans  to  combat  organised  crime  before  it 
reaches  UK  shores.  Meanwhile  the  Security  Service  has  instituted  closer  links  with  a  number 
of  police  agencies.  Feathers  were  ruffled  at  the  NCIS  when  staff  from  the  National  Crime 
Squad  were  invited  to  attend  an  international  conference  at  Europol  in  November  2000  to 
discuss  developing  approaches  to  investigating  cyber  crime.  The  NCIS  identifies  itself  as  the 
one-stop  gateway  for  international  investigation  enquiries  and  consultation  both  inward  to  and 
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outbound  from  the  UK,  2  yet  it  too,  is  primarily  an  intelligence  service  3  and  so  rarely 
participates  in  the  evidential  acts  of  investigative  assistance  that  fall  to  police  and  customs 
investigators. 
To  establish  a  role  with  a  formal  intemational  remit  may  be  of  value  to  a  domestic 
agency  within  a  domestic  political  context  regardless  of  whether  the  international  character  or 
the  specific  type  of  role  is  a  primary  function  of  the  agency  concerned.  "Tbe  domain  of 
international  police  co-operation  may  aptly  be  depicted  as  a  'crowded  policy  space'.  Agencies 
with  different  mandates,  political  allegiances,  philosophies  of  police  co-operation,  projections 
of  social  and  political  developments  and  vested  interests  co-exist  in  relationships  which  at 
best  amount  to  ad  hoc  mutual  aid  and  accommodation  and  at  worst  descend  into  open 
competition  over  scarce  economic  and  symbolic  resources"  (Walker  1993:  125). 
Practitioners  doing  it  for  themselves  is  broadly  the  rationale  behind  the  establishment 
of  Interpol  (www.  interpol.  int)  in  1923,  "developed  by  police  agencies  as  a  functional 
response  to  a  given  operational  need"  (Swallow  1996:  110).  Interpol  -  the  International 
Criminal  Police  Organisation  -  was  reconstituted  in  1956  with  the  aim  "to  ensure  and  promote 
the  widest  possible  mutual  assistance  between  all  criminal  police  authorities  within  the  limits 
of  the  laws  existing  in  the  different  countries  and  in  the  spirit  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of 
Human  Rights"'  (Interpol  Constitution,  Article  2(l)).  Its  fundamental  role  is  the  facilitation  of 
communication  between  different  police  agencies.  Its  name  and  raison  detre  as  articulated  in 
the  constitution  portray  the  organisation!  s  non-governmental  status.  In  repeatedly  stressing  co- 
operation  as  the  life-blood  of  the  organisation,  the  Constitution  makes  clear  the  inherent 
relative  weakness  of  Interpol. 
"Members  shall  do  all  within  their  power,  in  so  far  as  is  compatible  with  their  own 
obligations,  to  carry  out  the  decisions  of  the  General  Assembly"  (Art.  9). 
"In  order  to  further  its  aims,  the  Organisation  needs  the  constant  and  active  co- 
operation  of  its  Members  who  should  do  all  within  their  power  which  is  compatible  with  the 
legislations  of  their  countries  to  participate  diligently  in  its  activities*  (Art  3  1). 
Interpol  members  are  police  organisations  (Art.  4),  not  national  governments.  "The 
legal  basis  of  an  organisation  gives  an  indication  of  the  political  importance  attributed  to  it. 
An  international  treaty  in  which  signatory  states  accept  obligations  to  an  organisation  usually 
gives  it  more  status  than  tacit  acceptance  by  governments  of  co-operative  arrangements" 
(Anderson  1989:  57).  Nevertheless,  Interpol  has  entered  into  co-operation  agreements  with  the 
UN,  the  Council  of  Europe,  the  Universal  Postal  Union  and  the  World  Customs  Organisation 
(to  name  but  a  few)  whilst  a  number  of  international  conventions  make  reference  to  and  use 
2  The  national  bureaux  for  both  Europol  and  Interpol  are  located  at  NCIS  HQ  in  London. 
3  This  argument  was  the  basis  for  the  NCIS  exemptions  under  §23  Freedom  ofInformation  Act  2000. 
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of  Interpol's  transmission  role  including  the  ECMA  and  the  EUCMA.  4  It  has  a  presence  on 
the  world  stage,  a  potentially  significant  role  in  mutual  assistance  and  a  constrained  influence 
in  mutual  legal  assistance.  Interpol  exists  because  practitioners  needed  and  still  need  some 
mechanism  to  facilitate  communication  between  them  and  thus  it  represents  the  product  of  the 
practitioners'  driving  force.  Interpol  promotes  communication  and  co-operation.  But  it  can  do 
little  more  in  practical  terms  and  criticisms  voiced  at  a  recent  Interpol  conference  attended  by 
the  author  suggest  that  there  remains  much  room  for  improvement  in  achieving  even  these 
limited  aspirations  (6  December  2000).  With  the  role  of  Europol  being  enhanced  in  response 
to  the  terrorist  attacks  in  New  York,  11  September  2001,  (hereafter  referred  to  by  the 
colloquial  label  9/11:  Dubois  2002:  328-329),  Swallow's  prediction  that  Interpol  will  become 
increasingly  marginalized  seems  ever  more  prescient  (1996:  126). 
Consistent  throughout  this  brief  consideration  has  been  the  theme  of  'so  far  but  no 
further'.  Practitioner-driven  initiatives  appear  to  develop  in  the  absence  of  government 
intervention.  A  void  is  filled,  a  need  met.  There  appears  to  be  only  an  indirect  connection  with 
formal  MLAT  activity.  There  is  evidence  that  practitioners  have  little  or  no  opportunity  to 
contribute  meaningfully  to  the  establishment  and  drafting  of  MLATs  even  though  a  Home 
Office  discussion  paper  (1988:  2-3)  5  demonstrates  that  the  needs  of  practitioners  provided 
justification  for  the  policy-makers  to  enter  into  MLATs  which  provide  the  authoritative 
framework  within  which  mutual  assistance  can  be  legitimately  provided  in  a  regulated 
manner.  Conversely  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that,  regardless  of  criminal  justice  objectives, 
finding  a  role  within  the  MLAT  fi-amework  can  be  of  organisational  benefit  to  domestic 
agencies  in  enhancing  status  and  securing  futures;  activity  which  might  perhaps  be  regarded 
as  political,  bandwagon  support  rather  than  a  practitioner,  needs-based  driving  force  for  such 
initiatives. 
Practitioner-driven  initiatives  are  capable  of  addressing  immediate  co-operation 
issues  but  appear  capable  only  of  informing  generally  the  wider  mutual  legal  assistance 
debate  rather  than  driving  it  directly.  Which  leads  the  discussion  on  to  the  next  level  in  the 
hierarchy  of  motivation,  (non-practitioner)  political  agenda. 
Political  drivers  of  chanize 
That  transnational.  organised.  crime  and  mutual  assistance  are  now  fumly  on  various 
political  agenda  is  apparent  from  Gregory's  recent  summary  of  the  ways  in  which  the 
criminality  of  individuals  on  the  global  arena  is  now  becoming  the  concern  of  governments. 
4  For  full  details  see  www.  interpol.  int/Public/ICPO/LegaIN4aterials.  (Site  visited  21  December  2000) 
51  am  grateful  to  the  Home  Office  for  providing  a  copy  of  this  unpublished  internal  discussion  paper. 
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"The  list  of  private  criminal  actions  regarded  as  of  international  concern  has  increased  and  the 
organised  form  of  criminality,  and  the  corrupting  power  of  criminal  groups,  have  been 
recognised  as  additional  causes  for  conceriP  both  at  the  level  of  national  governance  and 
within  the  wider  international  community.  "States,  in  viewing  crime  as  an  element  in  their 
new  and  expanded  definition  of  security,  have  responded  by  emphasising  the  development  of 
well  established  modes  of  co-operation  such  as  extradition  and  mutual  legal  assistance, 
supplemented  by  additional  'suppression'  treaties"  (2000:  128). 
The  European  political  imperative  initially  focused  on  the  desire  to  enable  extradition 
of  criminal  fugitives  (Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Extradition  1957)  or  to  facilitate 
process-service  and  evidence-gathering  abroad  (ECAM  1959).  Unconnected,  individual 
investigations  have  always  been  undertaken,  particularly  in  frontier  zones,  but  have  not 
attracted  significant  political  support  either  within  senior  police  ranks  or  in  government 
(Soeters  et  aL  1995).  Thus  as  recently  as  the  mid-1980s  a  front-line  detective  in  England 
would  be  left  very  much  to  his  or  her  own  devices  in  securing  the  co-operation  of  foreign 
authorities  since  the  UK  government  had  yet  to  sign  the  ECMA  (Frank  Gallagher,  interview, 
14  November  2000). 
Attitudes  have  changed  as  offending  across  frontiers  has  become  more  systematic  and 
offences  more  serial  in  nature.  Individual  crimes  continue  to  be  committed  and  will  continue 
to  necessitate  foreign  enquiries  but  developments  in  licit  global  trade  have  been  mirrored  by  a 
growth  in  illicit  global  trade.  Transnational  organised  crime  thrives  on  exploiting  the 
combination  of  prohibitions  and  borders.  "The  power  and  potential  of  transnational  organised 
crime  is  rooted  in  the  vast  amounts  of  illicit  capital  raised  by  drug  and  anns  trafficking  and 
other  forms  of  smuggling,  as  well  as  penetration  of  legitimate  economic  sectors  via  money 
laundering.  This  base  is  enhanced  by  the  revolution  in  technologies  that  permits  capital  and 
people  to  move  around  the  planet  with  ease",  (Lupsa  1996:  26). 
And  whereas  individual  offences  are  almost  always  of  little  or  no  political 
consequence,  systematic  offending  undennines  social  and  economic  infrastructures  even  to 
the  extent  of  threatening  democratic  governments  and  destabilising  political  infrastructures. 
"The  enormous  sums  (hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars)  generated  by  the  illicit  drugs  traffic 
trade  have  concentrated  tremendous  economic  power  in  the  hands  of  drugs  lords  who  can 
corrupt  whole  governments.  The  drugs  lords  subvert  the  criminal  justice  system,  and  their 
nefarious  influence  corrodes  the  basic  values  of  society"  (UN  1989).  "Symbiotic  links  to 
government  officials  protect  criminal  operations  from  law-enforcement  initiatives"  (Godson 
&  Williams  1998:  68). 
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The  power  and  geographical  extent  of  transnational  organised  crime  are  phenomena 
that  state  structures  are  not  well-placed  individually  to  deal  with.  Moreover  these  are 
phenomena  characterised  by  the  capacity  for  rapid  evolution  (not  a  characteristic  of  either 
diplomacy  or  sound  law-making):  "global  organised  crime  is  evolving,  embracing  new 
markets  and  technologies,  and  moving  from  traditional  hierarchies  towards  more  flexible, 
network-based  forms  of  organisation"  capable  collectively  of  threatening  national  security 
resources  and  undermining  State  budgets.  Tools  such  as  secure  digital  cell  phones  and 
Internet  banking  are  "putting  unprecedented  power  into  the  hands  of  a  small  number  of 
people"  (Galeotti  2000:  10-11)  with  a  vested  interest  in  manipulating  State  structures  whilst  at 
the  same  time  as  far  as  possible  operating  entirely  outside  them. 
"States  have  become  almost  outmoded  organisations:  the  world  is  attempting  to  deal 
with  a  twenty-first-century  phenomenon  using  structures,  mechanisms  and  instruments  that 
are  still  rooted  in  eighteenth-  and  nineteenth-century  concepts  and  organisational  forms" 
(Godson  &  Williams  1998:  66).  Not  only  are  academics  arguing  this  apocalyptic  vision. 
Politicians  deliver  the  same  message,  albeit  in  sound-bite  form:  "law  enforcement  is  still 
using  nineteenth  century  mechanisms  to  fight  twenty-first  century  crime"  (Jack  Straw,  UK 
Home  Secretary,  16  October  1998).  6 
The  political  imperative  that  now  drives  assistance  initiatives  is  one  of  self-preservation 
through  mutual  protection.  States  can  only  tackle  transnational  organised  crime  effectively  by 
co-operating  with  each  other  (European  Union  1997:  paragraph  5(b))  and  by  creating  the 
necessary  instruments  of  co-operation.  This  is  the  political  reason  that  States  need  mutual 
legal  assistance. 
Potential  solutions  are  complicated  by  a  number  of  factors.  The  exact  nature  of  the 
threat  of  transnational  organised  crime  is  difficult  to  define  (Bruggeman  1998:  85-86;  House 
of  Commons  1995:  x-xi)  and  almost  impossible  to  quantify  (ibid.:  xii;  Europol  1999:  80  7).  The 
global  value  of  illicit  drugs  trafficking  was  estimated  in  1997  at  $400  billions  and  the  cost  of 
counterfeiting  to  legitimate  trade  at  $200  billions  each  year  (Godson  &  Williams  1998:  69). 
Such  headline-grabbing  calculations  demonstrate  the  need  for  strategies  but  assist  little  in 
determining  tactics  for  investigating  and  prosecuting  transnational  organised  crime.  Only  with 
a  full  understanding  of  the  phenomenon  and  its  interaction  with  legitimate  society  will 
effective  counter-measures  be  possible.  Understanding  the  problem  requires  as  much  mutual 
assistance  through  information  exchange,  as  does  gathering  evidence. 
6  Intergovernmental  seminar  on  'Combating  Organised  Crime  in  the  European  Judicial  Space,  held  at 
Avignon.  I  am  grateful  to  the  Home  Office  for  supplying  a  copy  of  the  text  of  Jack  Strav/s  speech. 
7  It  is  the  conspicuous  absence  of  hard  quantitative  data  from  this  source  that  supports  the  point  made 
here. 
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The  question  arises  are  mutual  legal  assistance  instruments  still  fit  for  purpose,  given 
such  change  in  transnatioml  criminality?  Instruments  that  existed  prior  to  2000  do  not  make 
provision  for  the  sorts  of  investigative  techniques  that  are  necessary  when  attempting  to 
police  sophisticated and  well-resourced  transmtional  criminality.  Here  the  political 
aspirations  of  governments  collide  with  the  increasingly  aware  political  expectations  of 
individuals.  Pre-dating  the  European-wide  moves  in  mutual  assistance  is  the  ECHR.  The  need 
for  intrusive  investigation  techniques  to  tackle  serious  and  organised  criminality  is  recognised 
and  generally  accepted  by  citizens,  but  it  is  their  expectation  that  such  enforcement  activity 
will  be  utilised  only  when  necessary  and  even  then  under  strictly  regulated  conditions  (ECHR 
Article  8).  The  mutual  legal  assistance  instruments  provide  specific  protection  for  human 
rights  really  only  in  relation  to  the  coercive  power  of  detention  and  extradition.  Avenues  of 
investigation  almost  unheard  of  in  the  late  1950s  are  now  available  to  enforcement  agencies 
'and  there  is  a  political  need  to  ensure  that  the  deployment  of  such  tactics  in  the  international 
fight  against  transnational  organised  crime  is  executed  in  a  manner  consistent  with  acceptable 
standards.  Mutual  legal  assistance  instruments  now  need  to  define  those  non-ns. 
Thus  it  can  be  seen  that  there  are  twin  political  drivers  promoting  the  need  for  States 
to  participate  in  mutual  legal  assistance.  The  twins  are  related  through  the  State  function  of 
protecting  the  citizen:  firstly  from  the  threat  and  damaging  consequences  of  transnational 
organised  crime,  and  secondly  from  the  risk  and,  arguably,  equally  damaging  consequences 
from  the  abuse  of  State  power  by  its  enforcement  agents. 
From  such  political  considerations,  as  much  as  from  the  legal  perspective  outlined 
above,  important  issues  arise  that  are  susceptible  to  fiu-ther  research.  These  issues  illuminate 
the  characteristics  and  relationships  inherent  in  mutual  (legal)  assistance.  Through  an 
examination  of  these  issues,  a  greater  understanding  of  the  future  role  and  form  of  mutual 
legal  assistance  should  be  achieved. 
At  a  general  level  then,  there  is  a  wide-spread  interest  in  combating  transnational 
organised  crime.  The  assortment  of  political  agenda  reflects  however,  the  variety  of  ways  in 
which  a  single  common  aim  may  be  achieved. 
Unilateralism 
As  a  bench-mark  for  identifying  political  motivation  and  driving  forces  in  this  arena, 
it  is  helpful  to  refer  to  a  philosophy  that  denies,  or  at  least  does  not  highly  rate,  the  value  of 
mutual  legal  assistance. 
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Unilateralism  contrasts  with  the  positive  international  law  emphasis  on  the  principle 
of  co-operation  (Dupuy  2000:  22-23)  which  is  echoed  in  the  founding  principles  of  the  UN. 
Law  enforcement  agencies  within  the  USA  demonstrate  a  history  (Nadelmann  1993)  8  and 
continuing  trend  (Manning  2000:  192)  of  unilateral  action  that  has  appeared  to  be  at  odds  with 
prevailing  co-operative  practices  elsewhere  in  the  world.  This  has  been  actively  presented  as  a 
global  colonisation  of  US  law  enforcement  philosophies  in  order  to  secure  compliance  with 
the  wishes  of  US  agencies  (Nadehnann  1993  &  1997).  Others  now  question  whether  the  US 
will  reorient  from  a  preference  for  dominance  and  deterrence  that  is  the  manifestation  of 
unilateralism  to  the  espousal  of  equity  and  reassurance  (Steinbruner  2000).  When  US 
practitioners  and  agencies  have  encountered  robust  resistance  to  their  preferred  modus 
operandi,  the  politicians  and  diplomats  have  had  no  option  but  to  enter  into  a  MLAT.  The  US 
became  the  first  Common  Law  State  "actively  to  explore  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  this 
form  of  international  co-operation7  (Gilmore  1995:  xvi;  see  also  xxj).  9  From  a  patriotic 
perspective  Nadelmarm  offers  a  slightly  different  yet  candid  spin:  "the  principal  incentive  for 
many  foreign  governments  to  negotiate  MLATs  with  the  United  States  was,  and  remains,  the 
desire  to  curtail  the  resort  by  US  prosecutors,  police  agents  and  courts  to  unilateral, 
extraterritorial  means  of  collecting  evidence  from  abroa&'  (Nadehnann  1993:  315). 
Here  the  discussion  returns  briefly  to  the  question  of  practitioner-driven  changes. 
Manning  argues,  citing  the  evidence  of  unilateralism  presented  by  Nadelmann  (1993),  that 
"transnational  agreements  for  mutual  assistance  between  law  enforcement  agencies  are  being 
ironed  out  in  the  wake  of  police  operations  both  successful  and  otherwise,  that  is:  police 
practice  sets  the  frame  for  legal  regulation,  rather  than  vice  versa"  (2000:  193).  If  Manning  is 
arguing  here  that  mutual  legal  assistance  arrangements  are  practitioner-driven,  then  this 
interpretation  does  not  stand  scrutiny.  Firstly,  as  has  been  demonstrated,  law  enforcement 
agencies  can  negotiate  of  their  own  volition  nothing  more  binding  than  inter-agency  MoUs, 
which  have  no  consequence  for  inter-goverriment  agreements.  Agencies  certainly  cannot 
negotiate  MLATs  nor,  as  has  been  seen,  do  those  in  the  UK  appear  to  have  much  influence  in 
their  drafting.  Secondly,  the  series  of  documents  and  instruments  arising  from  the  Cayman 
Islands  dispute  and  other  unilateral  acts  are  a  response  to  attempted  breaches  of  sovereignty 
by  judicial  authorities  or  investigator  mal-practice  rather  than  a  regularisation  of  lawful  and 
8  See  Anderson  1995  for  a  critique  of  Nadelmann  1993.  See  Feh6rvky  1997  for  a  discussion  of  the 
International  Law  Enforcement  Academy  [ILEA]  in  Budapest  established  by  the  US.  See  Paust  et  al. 
2000:  479ff  for  detailed  jurist  discussion  of  the  Alvarez-Machain  case:  an  example  of  unilateralism  that 
flagrantly  breaches  both  national  and  international  law  yet  which  survived  challenge  in  the  US 
Supreme  Court.  See  Gregory  2000:  115  &  Manning  2000:  192  for  summary  discussions. 
9  In  1973  -  before  the  UK  ratified  the  ECMA  it  had  signed  in  1959  -  the  US  negotiated  a  MLAT  with 
Switzerland  and  in  1986  concluded  a  MLAT  with  the  UK.  In  both  cases  US  authorities  had  tried  to  use 
US  laws  to  force  foreign  banks  to  violate  their  own  domestic  criminal  laws  regarding  the  disclosure  of 
information.  Nadelmann's  Appendix  E  (1993)  details  various  other  MLATs  of  a  similar  nature. 
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internationally  acceptable  practices.  Thus  the  Cayman  Islands  dispute,  to  take  one  example,  is 
more  a  catalyst  for  change  than  a  primary  driver  to  secure  a  MLAT,  the  latter  in  this  instance 
being  the  diplomats'  desire  to  regularise  international  relations. 
Even  in  their  negotiations  on  mutual  legal  assistance  the  US  government  appears  to 
prefer  unilateralism  to  reciprocity  if  this  can  be  achieved.  Prior  to  the  1986  treaty  between  the 
US  and  the  UK  concerning  the  Cayman  Islands  (Gilmore  1995:  280-297),  the  US  initially 
secured  a  provisional  agreement  that  allowed  US  authorities  unfettered  access  to  Cayman 
Island  documents  and  records  on  a  non-reciprocal  basis  and  without  the  discretion  to  refuse 
assistance  (Gilmore  1995:  xxi). 
Mutual  legal  assistance  developments  in  the  UK  and  Europe  at  the  end  of  the  20th  centu 
Prior  to  1990  the  UK  did  not  actively  engage  in  mutual  legal  assistance  developments 
elsewhere  in  Europe  although  it  had  entered  into  a  bilateral  MLAT  with  the  USA  concerning 
the  Cayman  Islands  (1986).  The  government  in  1959  saw  no  possible  benefit  to  the  UK  in 
participating  in  the  drafting  of  the  ECMA  for  instance,  preferring  to  rely  on  the  provisions  of 
the  1870  Extradition  Act  which  made  some  small  provision  for  magistrates  to  "obtain  the 
testimony  of  a  witness"  on  behalf  of  foreign  authorities  if  requested  (Report  of  the  Council  of 
Europe  Consultative  Assembly,  IOh  Ordinary  Session,  30  th  Sitting,  National 
Archives:  F0371/146282-V,  rUC  1651/6; Foreign  Office  Minute  dated  12  February  1959, 
National  Archives:  F0371/146282-WUC  1651/7;  §24  Extradition  Act  1870,  as  amended 
1873).  10 
The  unilateralism  (arguably  characteristic  11)  of  the  US  and  the  isolationist  preference 
(equally  characteristic)  of  the  UK  to  avoid  formality  that  might  bind  the  unwritten  domestic 
constitution  and  clash  with  the  adversarial  trial  system,  have  both  given  way  to  an 
increasingly  conventional  fi-amework  approach  for  mutual  assistance.  The  unpublished  Home 
Office  internal  discussion  paper  from  1988,  which  warrants  quotation  at  length  (Home  Office 
1988:  2-3),  illustrates  why  this  came  about  in  the  case  of  the  UK. 
"Until  very  recently  the  United  Kingdom's  policy  on  formal  agreements  for  mutual 
assistance  in  criminal  matters  was  that  such  arrangements  were  in  general  unlikely  to  be  of 
significant  use  to  us  because  the  insistence  of  our  law  on  oral  testimony  left  little  scope  for  the 
admission  of  witness  statements  and  other  documents,  which  form  the  bulk  of  traffic  under  the 
European  Convention  [ECMA] 
...  this  position  is  no  longer  tenable...  significant  steps  are  being 
10  There  is  no  published  discussion  of  UK  mutual  legal  assistance  policy  prior  to  1990.  For  a  detailed 
consideration  of  British  attitudes  both  to  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co- 
operation  between  1950  and  1990,  which  falls  outside  the  temporal  scope  of  this  thesis  but  which  is 
nevertheless  informative,  see  Appendix  A  below. 
11  See  Reisman  2000,  for  the  robust  assertion  that  'alleged'  US  unilateralism  is in  fact  multilateralism 
writ  large. 
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taken  to  enable  documentary  evidence  to  be  admitted  in  English  criminal  proceedings,  and  to 
make  it  easier  to  admit  evidence  taken  overseas.... 
The  United  Kingdom  is  at  present  seriously  hampered  in  providing  mutual  assistance, 
principally  because  of  the  limitations  of  existing  legislative  provisions.  These  powers  do  not 
provide  the  breadth  of  mutual  legal  assistance  which  is  regularly  provided  in  Western  Europe 
and  elsewhere.  The  United  Kingdom's  failure  to  participate  in  formal  mutual  legal  assistance 
arrangements  has  earned  us  a  poor  reputation  for  co-operation,  even  In  the  event  of  entirely 
reasonable  and  proper  requests.  It  has  also  caused  serious  problems  for  our  own  prosecuting 
authorities  as  other  states  may  refuse  to  render  assistance  because  of  lack  of  reciprocity...  there 
would  be  considerable  benefit  to  the  United  Kingdom  in  subscribing  to  broader  mutual  assistance 
arrangements  of  the  kind  contained  in  the  Commonwealth  [Harare]  Scheme  and  the  European 
*12  Convention. 
The  tradition  of  non-co-operation  (Harding  &  Swart  1995:  87)  then,  succumbed  to 
peer  pressure  within  the  comity  of  nations.  The  passage  begs  the  question:  what 
circumstances  created  the  peer  pressure? 
The  1988  Home  Office  discussion  paper  reveals  the  higher-level  driving  force  for 
mutual  legal  assistance:  the  political  need  for  the  State  to  secure  co-operation  from  other 
governments.  Within  domestic  UK  politics,  law  and  order  became  a  contested  party  political 
issue  in  the  1979  General  Election  campaign  (Downes  &  Morgan  1994:  184).  It  has  remained 
so  ever  since.  Inevitably,  as  crime  becomes  increasingly  international  in  character,  so  the  law 
and  order  debate  develops  accordingly,  albeit  with  little  publicity  outside  government  circles 
in  the  first  instance.  Law  and  order  and  the  nature  of  Britains  relationship  with  the  EU 
individually  attract  considerable  political  significance  within  the  UK.  In  combination  such 
significance  ought  to  be  enhanced,  yet  at  the  time  of  writing,  media  attention  (and  so  public 
awareness)  is  focused  on  whether  Britain  should  enter  the  single  currency  or  sign  the 
proposed  new  EU  Constitution  rather  than  the  nature  of  transnational  law  enforcement  within 
the  EU.  The  trend  in  January  2001  was  for  numerous  newspaper  and  website  opinion  polls  to 
invite  'vox  pop'  yes/no  votes  on  the  Euro  not  the  EUCMA,  the  signing  of  which  attracted 
relatively  little  UK  media  attention  not  least  because  it  took  place  on  a  UK  Public  Holiday  (29 
May  2000).  In  May  2004,  the  media  was  seised  of  the  promised  referendum  on  the  EU 
Constitution  rather  than  the  coming  into  force  of  key  parts  of  the  C(IQ  Act  2003,  giving 
domestic  effect  to  most  of  the  EUCMA. 
Thus  top-down  political  drivers  cannot  be  represented  as  a  response  to  a  popular 
movement.  Elected  representatives  are  relying  on  their  administrators  to  negotiate 
arrangements  for  the  general  good  of  the  public.  The  popular  mandate  is  not  entirely  silent  on 
the  issue.  The  'paternalist'  motives  of  the  politicians  are  closely  monitored  by  specialist  civil 
liberty  lobby  organisations  such  as  Statewatch  (www.  statewatch.  org)  and  Justice  (2000).  Both 
these  organisations  are  regularly  consulted  on  such  matters  by  the  Parliamentary  committee 
scrutinising  Government  action  in  this  area  (House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee, 
Note  by  Legal  Assistant  to  Sub-committee  E  (Law  &  Institutions)  dated  24h  October  2000, 
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E/99-OO/E  75.  )  But  the  fact  remains  that  in  the  field  of  mutual  legal  assistance  within  Europe, 
the  agendurn  is  that  of  the  politicians  rather  than  the  populace  or,  for  that  matter,  the  police. 
In  the  wider  European  context,  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters  was  seen  as  part 
of  a  package  of  measures  worthy  of  a  Council  of  Europe  treaty  in  the  post-war  movement  for 
wider  co-operation  between  European  nations  as  a  foundation  for  peace  and  achieving  greater 
unity  (Harding  &  Swart  1995:  88;  Cram  1996:  40).  With  the  exception  of  an  Additional 
Protocol  drafted  in  1978,  there  were  no  further  significant  political  developments  in  mutual 
assistance  within  the  Council  of  Europe  until  the  recent  negotiations  for  a  Second  Protocol. 
This  thesis  is  primarily  concerned  with  developments  post-1990,  the  date  when  the 
UK  at  last  engaged  fully  with  the  European  mutual  legal  assistance  movement  by  ratifying  the 
ECMA  (CJ(IQA  1990).  It  is,  however,  worth  bricfly  noting  the  foundations  laid  during  the 
1970s  and  1980s  for  the  developments  in  European  co-operation  after  1990.  In  1975 
Ministers  of  Home  Affairs  and  Justice  in  the  (then)  EEC  agreed  to  regular  consultation  on 
matters  of  internal  security  in  a  forum  called  the  Trevi  Group  (Anderson  et  al.  1995:  53-56).  " 
Primarily  focused  on  concerted  action  against  international  acts  of  political  terrorism 
prevalent  at  the  time,  the  Group  developed  four  sub-groups,  one  of  which  was  established  to 
consider  the  consequences  of  abolishing  internal  borders  within  the  European  Community. 
The  Single  European  Act  1986  defined  the  'common  market'  as  "a  space  without 
internal  Erontiers  in  which  the  free  circulation  of  goods,  persons,  services  and  capital  is 
secured"  (Article  8A,  SEA  1986).  This  political  and  economic  reality  was  to  be  achieved  by 
1993  (Harding  &  Swart  1995:  97)  and  would  bring  with  it  consequential  policing  issues. 
These  were  addressed  initially  by  a  separate  group  of  countries  that  included  nations  from 
within  and  without  the  European  Community  who  participated  first  in  the  Schengen 
Agreement  1985  and  subsequently  the  Schengen  Convention  1990.  These  agreements 
provided  for  mutual  assistance  between  "police  authorities": 
"...  in  compliance  with  national  legislation  and  within  the  limits  of  their  responsibilities 
... 
for  the  purposes  of  preventing  and  detecting  criminal  offences  insofar  as  national  law does  not 
stipulate  that  the  request  is  to  be  made  to  the  legal  authorities  and  provided  the  request  or  the 
Implementation  thereof  does  not  involve  the  application  of  coercive  measures  by  the  requested 
Contracting  Party"  (Article  39(l),  Schengen  Convention  1990). 
There  were  provisions  for  cross-border  pursuit  and  observation  operations,  controlled 
deliveries,  technical  co-operation  and  liaison  officers.  The  police  co-operation  chapter 
44  represents  a  unique  attempt  to  lay  down  rules  with  respect  to  international  co-operation  [Le 
12  1  am  grateful  to  the  UKCA  for  supplying  me with  a  copy  of  this  discussion  paper. 
13  According  to  Harding  &  Swart  (1995:  96)  TREVI  is  an  acronym  representing  Terrorisme, 
Radicalism,  Extrimisme  et  Violence  Internationale;  but  Frank  Gregory  reports  (pers  comm.  )  an 
alternative  origin  based  on  his  conversations  with  a  UK  Minister  involved  in  the  original  meeting, 
namely  that  the  group  is  called  after  the  famous  fountain  in  Rome. 
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mutual  assistance]  between  police  authorities"  (Harding  &  Swart  1995:  98).  The  chapters  on 
conventional  mutual  legal  assistance  matters  were  mainly  concerned  with  "achieving  equal 
standards  of  co-operation"  based  on  already  existing  MLATs  (ibid.  ).  With  the  collection  of 
agreements  known  as  the  Schengen  Acquis,  there  is  the  first  significant  attempt  to  develop 
common  standards  in  criminal  law  enforcement  on  a  regional  basis.  These  were  developments 
with  which,  at  the  time,  the  UK  government  felt  unable  to  join  in  because  of  political 
resistance  to  the  issue  of  open  borders  in  an  island  context  (House  of  Lords  2000). 
In  broad  ternis,  three  general  political  justifications  are  presented  for  increased 
international  police  co-operation  within  Europe  and  these  operate  at  both  national  and 
supranational  levels  (Walker  1993:  114). 
*  Greater  mobility  amongst  criminals  and  an  increase  in  international  criminal 
networks. 
9  The  need  to  compensate  for  the  relaxation  of  internal  border  controls  in  the  EU. 
e  Concems  for  the  security  of  the  extemal  EU  border. 
In  fact,  of  course,  there  are  many  agenda.  Peters  highlights  the  plots  and  sub-plots  at 
play  in  EU  agenda-setting  and  how  different  actors  may  or  may  not  influence  the  progress  of 
different  issues  (1996).  Put  simply  the  different  perspectives  in  relation  to  mutual  legal 
assistance  divide  into  two,  those  held  by  the  European  Commission  [EC]  in  relation  to  the  EU 
as  an  institution  and  those  held  by  individual  Member  States  concerning  national  priorities. 
The  Home  Office  discussion  paper  (1988)  illustrates  how  the  UK  government  came 
to  acknowledge  that  its  agencies  increasingly  needed  the  assistance  of  their  foreign  counter- 
parts  and  that  reciprocity  should  be  the  underpinning  principle.  It  was  a  conclusion  reached  in 
the  context  of  the  signing  of  the  1986  Single  European  Act  and  a  vigorous  UK  debate  about 
the  implications  for  domestic  policing  of  internal  freedom  of  movement  for  goods  and  people 
within  the  European  Community  (Gregory  1991).  In  some  areas,  such  as  the  interception  of 
communications,  the  UK  felt  (and  still  feels)  unable  to  offer  reciprocity  although  the  issue  is 
still  vigorously  debated  (hE  Hansard  19  June  2000  cols.  107-117).  14  Meanwhile,  as  is  clear 
from  the  Treaty  qfAmsterdam  1997  [ToA:  entered  into  force  I  May  1999],  the  EU  has  its  own 
priorities. 
"Without  prejudice  to  the  powers  of  the  European  Community,  the  Union's  objective 
shall  be  to  provide  citizens  with  a  high  level  of  safety  within  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and 
14  At  issue  is  the  statutory  prohibition  (s.  9  Interception  of  Communications  Act  1985,  s.  16  Regulation 
of  Investigatory  Powers  Act  2000)  against  the  evidential  use  of  communications  intercepted  by  UK 
authorities.  As  Rv  Aujla  (TLR  24  November  1997)  and  RvP  and  Others  (TLR  19  December  2000) 
have  determined,  UK  courts  are  happy  to  adduce  intercept  product  obtained  by  foreign  authorities.  A 
recent  White  Paper  (Home  Office  2004b)  now  proposes  adducing  intercept  product  as  evidence  at  trial 
in  England. 
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justice  by  developing  common  action  among  the  Member  States  in  the  fields  of  police  and 
judicial  co-operation  in  criminal  matters  and  by  preventing  and  combating  racism  and 
xenophobia.  '  (ToA,  Art.  29.  ) 
Because  of  different  hierarchical  priorities,  mutually  acceptable  arrangements 
negotiated  between  two  or  more  nation  States  of  equal  status  are  not  necessarily  going  to  be 
readily  reproduced  in  circumstances  in  which  member  States  are  subordinate  to  a 
supranational  institution.  At  a  general  strategic  level  the  criminal  law  enforcement  interests  of 
the  EU  and  its  Member  States  are  compatible.  At  the  tactical  and  operational  levels  of 
implementation,  however,  interests  may  diverge  as  is  reflected  in  the  different  national 
contributions  to  the  Organised  Crime  Situation  Report  (Europol  1999). 
Developments  in  the  EU  have  been  both  overt  and  indirectly  consequential.  The  bold 
declaration  of  Article  29  ToA  is  sustained  in  subsequent  Action  Plans  and  Joint  Actions.  "  Of 
particular  interest  is  the  enhanced  position  of  Europol  within  the  EU.  The  1995  Council  Act 
drawing  up  the  Europol  Convention  (OJ  C  316/1,27  November  1995)  16  provided  for  a 
relatively  limited  role.  Europol's  objective  was  outlined  in  Article  2. 
"...  to  improve,  by  means  of  the  measures  referred  to  in  the  Convention,  the 
effectiveness  and  cooperation  of  the  competent  authorities  in  the  Member  States  in  preventing 
and  combating  terrorism,  unlawful  drug  trafficking  and  other  serious  forms  of  international  crime 
where  there  are  factual  indications  that  an  organised  criminal  structure  is  involved  and  two  or 
more  Member  States  are  affected  by  the  forms  of  crime  in  question  in  such  a  way  as  to  require  a 
common  approach  by  the  Member  States  owing  to  the  scale,  significance  and  consequences  of 
the  offences  concerned.  * 
Article  3(l)  specified  the  tasks  that  could  be  undertaken  by  Europol. 
'To  facilitate  the  exchange  of  information  between  the  Member  States; 
to  obtain,  collate  and  analyse  information  and  intelligence; 
to  notify  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member  States  without  delay  via  the  national 
units  referred  to  in  Article  4  of  information  concerning  them  and  of  any  connections  Identified 
between  criminal  offences; 
to  aid  investigation  in  the  Member  States  by  forwarding  all  relevant  information  to  the 
national  units; 
to  maintain  a  computerised  system  of  collected  information  containing  data  in 
accordance  with  Articles  8,10  &IV 
Articles  29,30  and  32  ToA  go  further.  In  particular  Article  30(2)  states: 
"The  Council  shall  promote  co-operation  through  Europol  and  shall  in  particular,  Within  a 
period  of  five  years  after  the  date  of  entry  into  force  of  the  [ToA]: 
a)  enable  Europol  to  facilitate  and  support  the  preparation,  and  to  encourage  the  co- 
ordination  and  carrying  out  of  specific  investigative  actions  by  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
15  Relevant  EU  JHA  documents  can  be  accessed  at  http:  //europa.  eu.  int/pol/justice/index-en.  htm,  (site 
visited  6  May  2004). 
16  The  Europol  Convention  came  into  force  I  October  1998;  Europol  went  operational  on  I  July  1999. 
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Member  States,  including  the  operational  actions  of  joint  teams  comprising  representatives  of 
Europol  in  a  support  capacity; 
b)  adopt  measures  allowing  Europol  to  ask  the  competent  authorities  of  the  Member 
States  to  conduct  and  co-ordinate  their  investigations  in  specific  cases  and  to  develop  specific 
expertise  which  may  be  put  at  the  disposal  of  Member  States  to  assist  them  in  investigating 
cases  of  organised  crime; 
c)  promote  liaison  arrangements  between  prosecuting/investigating  officials  specialising 
in  the  fight  against  organised  crime  in  close  co-operation  with  Europol; 
d)  establish  a  research,  documentation  and  statistical  network  on  cross-border  crime.  ' 
Articles  6(4)  and  13(12)  EUCMA  respectively  give  effect  to  Europol's  developing 
capacity  (as  outlined  in  the  ToA)  to  initiate  requests  and  provide  representatives  on  joint 
investigation  teams.  Mutual  assistance  measures  seem  to  be  acquiring  the  more  formal  status 
of  mutual  legal  assistance.  On  the  one  hand  this  can  be  seen  to  be  bringing  the  otherwise 
relatively  autonomous  actions  of  law  enforcement  agencies  within  a  transnational  regulatory 
framework.  On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be  argued  that  a  supranational  institution  is  assuming 
for  itself  measures  more  properly  controlled  by  national  governments. 
Alongside  the  evolution  of  Europol's  position  in  mutual  assistance  between  police 
investigators,  there  is  the  creation  of  the  European  Judicial  Network  [EJN]  established  in  a 
Joint  Action,  29  June  1998  (OJ  C197,12  July  2000;  see  also  http:  //ue.  eu.  int/ejn/inten.  html). 
The  network  is  intended  to  provide  intermediary  facilitation  in  judicial  co-operation.  Working 
closely  with  the  EJN,  particularly  to  simplify  the  execution  of  commissions  rogatoire,  will  be 
Eurojust,  a  unit  to  comprise  national  prosecutors,  magistrates  or  police  officers  of  equivalent 
competence,  seconded  from  Member  States  in  the  same  way  that  policc  officers  are  seconded 
to  Europol.  Eurojust  will  "have  the  task  of  facilitating  the  proper  co-ordination  of  national 
prosecuting  authorities  and  of  supporting  criminal  investigations  in  organised  crime  cases" 
(Tampere  Presidency  Conclusions,  paragraph  46). 
The  EU,  through  intergovernmental  mechanisms  of  co-operation  within  the  Third 
Pillar,  is  assuming  for  itself  a  participating  (rather  than  third  party)  role  in  the  mutual  legal 
assistance  arena  that  originally  comprised  arrangements  between  individual  nation  States. 
Moreover,  it  is  establishing  EU  bodies  that  encompass  mutual  assistance  at  every  level  of 
enforcement  (investigators,  prosecutors  and  judiciary)  in  ways  that  the  ECMA  and  its  Protocol 
are  unable  to  address. 
The  Council  of  Europe  has  not  sat  idly  by  and  left  matters  to  the  EU  but  nor  is  it  in  a 
position  to  adopt  the  supranational  status  of  the  EU  in  respect  of  the  new  mutual  legal 
assistance  it  enacts.  A  Second  Protocol  to  the  ECMA  has  been  negotiated.  Its  text  deals  with 
some  of  the  issues  addressed  by  the  EUCMA  (ETS  182,8  November  2001).  Provision  is  to  be 
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made  for  hearings  by  video  and  telephone  conference,  17  the  presence  of  officials  from  the 
requesting  party  at  the  time  the  request  is  enacted,  the  deployment  of  cross-border 
observations,  controlled  deliveries  and  undercover  agents.  It  has  the  advantage  over  the 
EUCMA  that  it  will  be  open  to  all  43  Member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe,  although 
nothing  precludes  Third  Party  States  from  adopting  the  provisions  of  the  EUCMA  (Article 
29).  Member  States  of  the  Council  of  Europe  will  be  able  to  choose  whether  or  not  to  ratify 
the  Protocol  and  herein  lies  a  weakness  inversely  proportional  to  the  number  of  Contracting 
Parties.  The  situation  with  the  EUCAM  is  slightly  more  prescriptive.  Article  25  prevents 
Member  States  entering  reservations  to  the  EUCMA  other  than  those  expressly  provided  for  in 
the  text.  The  treaty  comes  into  force  90  days  after  eight  Member  States  have  ratified  it  and  for 
each  additional  Member  State  thereafter,  90  days  after  it  has  ratified  the  treaty.  For  new 
Member  States  however,  it  comes  into  force  automatically  on  joining  the  EU  (Art.  28).  Thus 
existing  Member  States,  who  have  a  choice  whether  or  not  to  ratify,  are  in  a  rather  more 
flexible  position  than  future  Member  States. 
The  mutual  legal  assistance  provisions  being  established  by  the  EU  not  only  have  the 
potential  to  assist  law  enforcement.  It  can  be  argued  that,  together  with  supranational 
institutions  (Cram  1996:  45),  they  are  a  vehicle  for  closer  political  integration  within  the  EU. 
The  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  European  Communities  was  clear  that  "the 
Convention  is  concerned  with  improving  co-operation  across  borders  in  the  investigation  and 
enforcement  by  national  authorities  of  their  criminal  law.  It  is  not  aimed  at  harmonising 
national  criminal  laws  and  procedures"  (HL  1998,  paragraph  52).  But  the  complex  inter- 
relationship  of  the  EU's  multiple  treaties,  Directives,  Framework  Decisions  and  Joint  Actions 
means  that  the  situation  is  not  quite  so  simple.  The  cumulative  direct  effect  of  Articles  48 
(free  movement  of  persons),  59  (provision  of  services)  and  7  (freedom  from  discrimination  on 
grounds  of  nationality)  in  the  1992  Maastricht  Treaty  of  the  European  Union  [TEU],  have 
been  argued  as  creating  the  obligation  on  Member  States  that  they  must  protect  from  crime 
citizens  from  other  Member  States  as  they  would  their  own  (Dine  1993:  251).  This  argument 
by  logical  extension  includes  undertaking  action  to  combat  transnational  organised  crime. 
Several  JHA  Framework  Decisions  were  enacted  into  UK  domestic  legislation  in  the  C(IQ 
Act  2003.  Framework  Decisions  have  "the  purpose  of  approximation  of  the  laws  and 
regulations  of  the  Member  States.  Framework  Decisions  shall  be  binding  upon  the  Member 
States  as  to  the  result  to  be  achieved,  but  shall  leave  to  the  national  authorities  the  choice  of 
form  and  method"  (Art.  34(2)  (c)  TEU,  quoted  in  paragraph  12  of  the  Explanatory  Notes 
accompanying  the  original  C(IQ  Bill,  19  November  2002).  The  EU  is  not  only  seeking  to 
17  A  proposal  also  being  enacted  in  the  UK  domestic  criminal  justice  system.  Glidewell  Implementation 
Planfor  Hampshire  and  the  Isle  of  Wight,  CPS/Hampshire  Constabulary,  (2000:  9). 
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promote  co-operation  mechanisms  on  transborder  crime,  but  is  also  trying  to  ensure  a 
common  standard  of  safety  and  security  across  the  Community. 
In  an  article  intended  to  be  a  'wake-up  call'  for  criminal  lawyers,  Baker  builds  on 
Dine's  lead  by  reviewing  influence  of  EU  law  on  domestic  criminal  law  post-Amsterdam. 
Written  particularly  from  a  defence  lawyer's  perspective,  Baker  demonstrates  (1998)  that  the 
interaction  between  EU  law  and  domestic  laws  in  Third  Pillar  issues  is  far  greater  than  many 
lawyers  currently  acknowledge.  Sieber  had  already  argued  that  "all  levels  of  analysis  of  the 
present  criminal  law  of  the  European  Communities  show  the  signs  of  a  still  feeble,  but  in  a 
historical  perspective,  rapidly  growing,  confederated  system  of  criminal  law"  (1994:  99). 
Scope  for  mutual  legal  assistance  between  enforcement  authorities  appears  to  exist  beyond 
the  provisions  of  MLATs. 
The  ECJ  has  no  immediate  jurisdiction  over  criminal  matters  within  a  Member  State. 
-The  Court  of  Justice  shall  have  no  jurisdiction  to  review  the  validity  or  proportionality  of 
operations  carded  out  by  the  police  or  other  law  enforcement  agencies  of  a  Member  State  or  the 
exercise  of  the  responsibilities  incumbent  upon  Member  States  with  regard  to  the  maintenance  of 
law  and  order  and  the  safeguarding  of  internal  security"  (ToA,  Art.  35(5)). 
But  the  ECJ  does  have  the  power  "to  give  preliminary  rulings  on  the  validity  and 
interpretation  of  framework  decisions  and  decisions,  on  the  interpretation  of  conventions 
established  under  [Title  VI  ToA]  and  on  the  validity  and  interpretation  of  the  measures 
implementing  thenf'  (ToA  Art.  35(l)).  This  affords  the  ECJ  a  more  significant  role  in  the 
application  of  domestic  justice  than  superficially  appears  to  be  the  case  because  the  court  is  in 
a  position  to  establish  justice  norms  within  the  EU  (Baker  1998:  380;  Joerges  &  Vos 
1999:  900)  and  at  the  same  time  claim  jurisdiction  over  rights  protection  (Baker  1998:  373ffi. 
So  whilst  the  ECJ  will  not,  as  currently  constituted,  hear  a  criminal  trial  brought  about  as  a 
result  of  an  investigation  facilitated  by  mutual  legal  assistance  measures,  nor  will  it  act  as  a 
court  of  appeal  per  se,  it  may  be  called  upon  to  judge  issues  arising  from  the  application  of 
such  measures. 
To  some  commentators,  taken  together  this  is  evidence  of  the  EU  eroding  national 
sovereignty  by  stealth  (Edwards  1996)  and  so  represents  the  not-insignificant  strengthening  of 
the  EU  vis-a-vis  Member  States.  Others  observe  that  the  reform  of  JHA  affairs  has  been 
achieved  only  at  the  cost  of  British,  Irish  and  Danish  opt-outs  which,  together  with  other 
devices  for  flexibility,  have  created  the  risk  of  fragmentation  in  what  is  supposed  to  be  a 
unified  approach  (Monar  1998). 
The  EU  has  both  the  means  (its  institutions  and  laws)  and  the  motivation  (political 
integration)  to  drive  developments  in  mutual  legal  assistance.  It  is  also  acquiring  its  own 
means  of  direct  intervention  in  parallel  to  mutual  legal  assistance  developments. 
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Of  particular  concern  in  recent  years  has  been  the  growing  amount  of  fraud 
committed  against  the  EU  (House  of  Lords  1989;  White  1998).  Ideas  as  how  best  to  tackle 
this  problem  have  included  the  controversial  concept  of  the  Corpus  Juris,  a  suggestion 
proposed  by  eight  academic  lawyers  intended  "to  provide  a  uniform  code  of  criminal  offences 
to  deal  with  fraud  on  the  Community  finances"  (House  of  Lords  1999:  paragraph  21;  see  also 
Dona  1998;  for  the  Corpus  Juris  text  see  Van  den  Wyngaert  2002).  Although  it  has  attracted 
much  hostile  attention  in  the  British  media  (www.  euroscep.  dircon.  co.  uk/corpusl.  htm,  visited 
9  July  1999),  the  idea  remains  essentially  an  academic  suggestion  and  has  not  been  formally 
adopted  as  an  EC  proposal. 
More  concrete  however,  has  been  the  evolution  of  the  Unit6  de  Coordination  de  la 
Lutte  Anti-Fraude  [UCLAF].  As  part  of  the  EC,  UCLAF  was  directly  concerned  with  the 
preparation  of  EU  legislative  proposals  and  the  co-ordination  of  national  enforcement 
authorities.  It  did  not  posses  judicial  powers  of  investigation  (Vervaele  1999a:  372-373) 
although  it  did  have  the  power  to  undertake  external  inspections  independently  of  Member 
States  (Vervaele  1999b:  337).  Within  EU  institutions  UCLAF  had  a  number  of  internal 
investigative  powers:  to  enter  EC  premises,  demand  information,  inspect  and  seize  data  and  to 
examine  witnesses  (Vervaele  1999b:  340). 
In  October  1998  the  EU  Parliament  approved  by  a  wide  majority  a  restructuring  of 
UCLAF's  role  and  position.  It  is  now  established  within  the  EU  institutions  as  an  anti-fraud 
office  [Office  de  lutte  antifraude  -  OLAF].  "All  UCLAF  competencies  have  been  transferred 
to  OLAF'  in  a  move  which  represents  "a  very  important  step  ...  towards  a  fully-fledged 
European  anti-fraud  agency"  for  which  far-reaching  supervisory  and  judicial  investigative 
powers  in  European  institutions,  Member  States  and  third  countries  have  been  suggested 
(Vervaele  1999b  343;  344).  There  seems  to  be  little  support  at  present  for  investing  OLAF 
with  full  judicial  investigative  powers  and  reference  is  still  made  to  co-operation  with  national 
authorities  (Vervaele  1999b:  344-345). 
Customs  regulations  have  also  seen  developments  in  mutual  administrative  assistance 
(Vervaele  1999a:  379;  Dirkzwager  1999).  Community  law  in  First  Pillar  issues  is  directly 
enforceable  through  the  ECJ  but  the  EC  primarily  relies  upon  national  agencies  to  investigate 
breaches  and  enforce  EU  law  in  these  areas.  Harmonisation  of  national  laws  (Vervaele 
1999a:  362)  and  the  EU  Community  Customs  Code  (Regulation  2913/92  OJ  L302  1992; 
Regulation  2454/93  OJ  L253  1993)  have  promoted  co-operation  between  the  EC  and  national 
enforcement  agencies  although  there  is  not  yet  a  truly  supranational  enforcement 
infrastructure  (Vervaele  1999a:  366). 
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Regulation  515/97  (OJ  L82  1997)  provides  a  mutual  assistance  framework  in 
administrative  matters  that  enables  the  exchange  of  enforcement  information,  hot  pursuit, 
cross-border  surveillance  and  controlled  deliveries  (Vervaele  199b:  377):  activities  subject  to 
mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal  matters  (EUCMA).  This  regulation  also  enhances  the  role 
of  the  EC  by  enabling  the  EC  to  request  mutual  legal  assistance  in  its  own  right,  a  right 
formerly  reserved  for  Member  States  (Dirkzwager  1999:  261).  Similarly  within  the  scope  of 
this  regulation,  the  EC  (and  so  OLAF)  can  demand  an  inquiry  be  carried  out,  have  officials 
present  when  the  enquiry  is  executed  and  acquire  access  to  documents  held  by  administrative 
authorities  in  Member  States  and  make  copies  thereof  (ibid.:  262).  Article  135  ToA  requires 
that  measures  be  taken  in  order  "to  strengthen  customs  co-operation  between  Member  States 
and  between  the  latter  and  the  Commission!  '. 
It  is  not  the  place  here  to  consider,  as  others  have  done,  whether  the  legal  framework 
and  judicial  controls  on  these  administrative  developments  are  adequate  (Dirkzwager 
1999:  266)  and  whether  or  not  the  once  distinct  lines  between  First  and  Third  Pillar 
enforcement  measures  have  become  blurred  and  even  circumvented  (Vervaele  1999a:  380). 
What  has  been  demonstrated  is  the  political  will  to  improve  mutual  legal  assistance  measures 
within  the  EU  in  a  variety  of  spheres.  The  debate  about  how  this  should  be  done  continues  but 
it  is  clear  that  the  EU,  through  the  enhancing  of  powers  held  by  EU  institutions  such  as  OLAF 
and  through  enforceable  MLATs  such  as  the  EUCMA,  is  now  a  significant  non-national 
political  entity  within  the  developing  mutual  legal  assistance  arena.  MLAT  activity  has  not 
ceased  with  the  EUCMA  or  the  administrative  regulations  illustrated  above.  A  supplementary 
MLAT  relating  specifically  to  financial  crimes  and  money  laundering  has  recently  been 
proposed  (House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  Note  by  Legal  Assistant  to  Sub- 
committee  E  (Law  &  Institutions)  dated  24  October  2000,  E/99-OO/E  75.  ) 
The  EU  has  the  opportunity  through  its  various  institutions  and  instruments  to  be 
more  dynamic  in  promoting  mutual  legal  assistance  than  either  individual  nations  or  the 
Council  of  Europe.  If  full  integration  is  not  the  long-term  EU  goal,  then  standardisation  of 
offences  and  responses  at  least  seems  to  be  the  objective.  Prosecutions,  of  course,  will  be 
difficult  to  standardise  given  the  two  fundamentally  different  models  of  jurisdiction  present 
within  the  EU. 
In  summary,  at  the  European  level  the  Council  of  Europe  is  updating  mutual  legal 
assistance  arrangements  first  agreed  in  1959  to  take  account  of  new  technologies.  Meanwhile 
the  EU  is  driving  changes  in  mutual  legal  assistance  that  have  the  potential  to  alter 
fundamentally  the  international  characteristics  of  work  undertaken  by  domestic  enforcement 
agencies.  No  longer  will  domestic  agencies  within  the  EU  merely  be  affording  each  other 
mutual  assistance  in  their  own  investigations.  There  is  increasing  scope  to  have  them 
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enforcing  EU  regulations  and  to  work  to  a  supranational  agenda  that  has  the  capacity  to 
request  and  co-ordinate  transnational  investigations,  regional  (rather  than  national)  protection 
of  the  citizen  being  the  justification. 
Commercial  drivers  for  change 
There  is  one  final  category  of  motivation  for  mutual  legal  assistance  that  must  be 
considered,  such  is  its  potential  influence.  In  the  field  of  international  commercial  law  there 
have  long  been  "cogent  arguments  and  strong  economic  pressure  for  co-operation  and 
harmonisation"  (Harding  &  Swart  1995:  87).  Indeed,  when  compared  with  civil  and 
commercial  matters  "progress  in  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters  can  fully  be  said  to  be 
half  a  century  behind"  (McClean  1992:  124),  despite  the  fact  that  commentators  were 
remarking  upon  the  ease  with  which  transnational  crime  could  be  committed  and  justice 
evaded  as  long  ago  as  1874  (Clarke  1874:  12).  In  1896  the  Hague  Convention  on  Civil 
Procedure  made  provision  for  mutual  assistance  by  way  of  commission  rogatoire  (Art.  6)  and 
so  established  a  multilateral  precedent  that  criminal  judicial  authorities  were  eventually  to 
adopt.  The  reason  for  the  differential  progress  is  simple.  There  has  always  been  profit  to 
commercial  enterprises  and  States  in  promoting  international  trade  assistance  and  its 
protection  but,  as  has  been  seen,  States  have  jealously  protected  their  criminal  jurisdictional 
sovereignty. 
Multinational  commercial  organisations,  whose  national  loyalties  are  nominal,  are 
global  customers  for  law  enforcement  protection.  Their  interests  no  longer  coincide  with 
those  of  the  geopolitical  state,  the  traditional  and  territorially-based  supplier  of  public  police 
protection  (Manning  2000:  182).  On  the  one  hand  willing  to  exploit  national  regulatory 
differences  to  promote  profit,  they  nevertheless  have  much  from  which  to  benefit  in  uniform 
standards  of  protection  from  criminality  wherever  their  commercial  concerns  are  situated. 
This  is  becoming  particularly  apparent  in  the  nascent  area  of  cyber  crime  (The  Economist,  13 
January  2001,  pp.  25-27),  a  new  policing  space  (Manning  2000)  in  which  law  enforcement  has 
only  recently  formulated  a  co-ordinated  response  (HC  Hansard  13  November  2000  col. 
531W). 
The  Internet  and  e-commerce  have  generated  their  own  legal  needs  that  sit  outside  a 
territorial  framework.  The  impossibility  of  effective  government  regulation  of  the  Internet  is 
seen  as  one  of  its  most  significant  attractions  in  many  quarters,  particularly  for  advocates 
freedom  of  speech  and  thought.  From  a  commercial  perspective  the  Internet  offers  a  gateway 
to  new  markets  that  were  previously  inaccessible.  But  by  the  same  token  these  facilities  also 
present  new  opportunities  to  commit  'traditional'  crimes  as  well  as  the  means  to  commit  new 
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types  of  crime.  The  ease  with  which  frauds  can  be  perpetrated  using  the  Internet  or  acts  of 
commercial  espionage  and  sabotage  is  of  particular  concern  to  business  interests  as  well  as 
individual  citizens  who  are  usually  secondary  victims  in  such  acts.  18  Persons  whose  electronic 
identities  are  stolen  to  effect  a  fraud  risk  losing  (and  never  regaining)  their  credit  rating. 
Workers  (and  their  families)  whose  employers  are  put  out  of  business  through  e-crime  have 
their  livelihoods  put  at  risk. 
The  voice  of  individual  and  indirect  victims  is  but  a  whisper  compared  with  the 
shouting  of  libertarian  lobbyists  and  profit-motivated  business  pe9ple  who  are  more 
successful  in  securing  the  ear  of  government.  And  as  the  concerted  opposition  to  the 
Regulation  ofInvestigatory  Powers  Bill  demonstrated,  even  libertarian  lobbyists  may  need  to 
recruit  and  co-ordinate  diverse  business  allies  (with  whom  they  might  not  normally  find 
common  ground)  in  order  to  advance  their  cause  (HL  Hansard  19  June  2000  cols  97,129- 
130).  During  the  pre-legislative  preparation  of  this  Bill,  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry 
officials  were  present  to  monitor  consultation  between  the  Home  Office  and  law  enforcement 
and  intelligence  agencies  to  ensure  (successfully  as  it  transpired)  that  industry  interests  did 
not  have  to  yield  to  crime-fighting  measures.  19  The  business  lobby  has  a  particularly 
powerful  voice  on  law  enforcement  issues  that  impact  upon  commercial  interests  and 
commentators  have  noted  with  irony  that,  having  opposed  Internet  regulation  so  vociferously, 
commercial  organisations  will  be  the  driving  force  behind  the  development  of  jurisdiction 
over  the  World  Wide  Web  (Manning  2000:  186);  jurisdiction  that  can  only  be  established  on  a 
multinational,  multi-agency  co-operative  basis. 
"What  was  supposed  to  be  an  anarchistic  and  liberating  technology  may  in  fact  make 
the  world  less  democratic,  by  forcing  a  huge  increase  in  legal  harmonisation.  This  will  mostly  be 
pursued  by  governments  and  vested  interests  banding  together  to  enact  multilateral  treaties, 
which  are  difficult  for  national  parliaments  to  scrutinise  or  change.  "  (The  Economist,  13 
January  2001,  p.  27). 
There  is  also  an  argument  to  suggest  that  increased  transnational  enforcement 
resources,  including  legislative  instruments,  are  more  likely  to  be  driven  by  commercial 
concerns  than  by  the  representations  of  enforcement  practitioners  because  businesses  are  now 
looking  to  the  criminal  law  to  protect  trade  advantage  (such  as  intellectual  property,  Manning 
2000:  182-187)  in  preference  to  Civil  Code  protection  (Craig  &  De  Bdrca  1998:  chapter  24). 
As  business  organisations  increasingly  come  to  see  synchronised  or  harmonised  criminal  laws 
as  a  commercial  benefit,  so  there  is  a  further  motivation,  within  Europe  at  least,  towards 
18  Manning  suggests  that  US  federal  law  enforcement  agencies  (as  well  as  intelligence  agencies)  are 
now  involved  in  such  espionage  as  a  protective  measure  for  state  interests  (2000:  193). 
'9  The  author  was  a  member  of  the  Home  Office  Standing  Consultative  Group  on  Part  1,  RIP  Bill  and 
also  advised  on  Parts  II  &  III.  Outside  this  foram  DTI  officials  declined  to  meet  personally  with  the 
author  and  accept  official  representations  on  behalf  of  the  National  Crime  Squad  on  those  elements  of 
the  RIP  Bill  drafted  by  the  DTI. 
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integration  similar  to  those  developments  in  non-criminal  integration  that  have  sought  to 
promote  economic  growth  (Craig  &  De  Bdrca  1998:  chapter  1). 
The  counter-terrorist  agenda 
Since  110'  September  2001,  the  day  on  which  two  aircraft  were  flown  into  the  World 
Trade  Center,  New  York,  and  on  which  the  Pentagon  also  came  under  attack  20 
-  attacks 
attributed  to  the  al-Quaeda  political  organisation  -  the  international  law  enforcement  co- 
operation  arena  has  been  complicated  by  the  so-called  'war  on  terrorism',  with  which 
combating  transnational  organised  crime  is  now  often  associated  (Conclusions  and  Action 
Plane  of  the  Presidency,  European  Council,  21  September  2001;  Communication  on 
Measures  to  be  taken  to  combat  terrorism  and  otherforms  of  serious  clime,  in  particular  to 
improve  exchanges  ofinformation,  European  Commission,  COM(2004)221  Final). 
In  what  is  indisputably  military  action,  armed  forces  have  invaded  Afghanistan  and 
Iraq  and  overthrown  the  existing  regimes.  In  conditions  that  conform  neither  to  the  Geneva 
Convention-based  rules  of  war  nor  the  due  process  principles  of  the  rule  of  law  and  mutual 
legal  assistance,  a  large  number  of  'suspects'  have  been  interrogated  in  what  has  been 
presented  as  both  an  intelligence  operation  and  a  criminal  investigation.  A  small  minority, 
apparently  selected  on  the  basis  of  nationality  or  ethnic  origin,  have  been  dealt  with  according 
to  established  domestic  laws  (Tritain  has  a  duty  to  ensure  the  Geneva  Conventions  are 
upheld'  The  Independent  15  January  2002,  p.  4;  'American  Taliban  flies  back,  but  not  to  the 
cages  of  Guantanamo  Bay,  The  Independent  23  January  2002,  p.  12;  'Straw  wants  British 
suspects  to  be  tried  in  UK'  Yhe  Independent  25  January  2002  p.  13).  The  fact  that  all  suspects 
repatriated  to  British  custody  from  Guantanamo  Bay  were  released  within  twenty-four  hours 
on  the  grounds  that  there  was  insufficient  evidence  to  charge  them  with  any  offences  confmns 
the  doubts  about  the  probative  value  at  trial  of  any  'evidence'  obtained  from  the  Guantanamo 
Bay  detention  centre  (Another  law  lord  criticises  detention  at  Guantanamo  Bay'  The 
Independent  28  January  2004  p.  4;  'A  black  and  white  case  of  US  injustice'  The  Independent 
27  April  2004  pp.  26-27). 
The  UK  has  always  treated  terrorism  as  a  crime  to  be  dealt  with  by  the  domestic 
regime,  not  least  by  insisting  that  familiar,  regular  and  incontrovertible  charges  such  as 
murder  are  tried  rather  than  any  attempt  being  made  to  legislate  for  an  offence  of  terrorism 
which  would  leave  open  the  possibility  of  courts  being  asked  to  adjudicate  on  defences  of 
political  motivation.  Not  all  States  share  this  approach.  As  intelligence  communities  around 
20  Meyssan  (2002:  chapter  1),  using  US  military  photographs  and  other  sources,  questions  the 
relationship  between  the  New  York  and  Washington  attacks. 
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the  world  engage  in  unprecedented  co-operation,  and  new  laws  are  rushed  through 
legislatures  focusing  on  measures  to  combat  the  newly  emphasised  common  evil  of  terrorism 
(John  MacFarlane,  Australia  National  University,  (former  Australian  Federal  Police  Officer 
and  former  Australian  Security  &  Intelligence  Organisation  Agent)  pers.  comm.  Canberra, 
October  2001;  for  example  the  US  Patriot  Act  2001  and  the  UK  Anti-terrorism  Crime  & 
Security  Act  2001  [ATCS]),  there  has  been  considerable  overlap  between  the  activities  of  law 
enforcement  investigators  and  intelligence  gatherers,  nowhere  better  illustrated  than  the 
merging  of  the  G8  Lyon  Group  (law  enforcement)  with  the  G8  Roma  Group  (counter- 
terrorism).  Intelligcnce  communities  have  sought  to  re-establish  their  roles  to  incorporate 
action  against  transnational  organised  crime  since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  ('Security  service 
turf  wars  hamper  war  against  crime',  The  Independent  28  August  2001,  pp.  1&  4),  and  the 
aftermath  of  the  9/11  attacks  have  invigorated  this  pursuit.  This  is  not  necessarily  to  the 
advantage  of  law  enforcement. 
Measures  sought  by  law  enforcement  to  tackle  transnational  organised  crime,  and 
previously  subject  to  concerted  political  opposition,  have  now  been  enacted  in  the  UK  by  the 
ATCS  Act  2001,  but  only  in  relation  to  terrorist  acts  that  threaten  national  security.  An  on- 
going  debate  with  government  and  communication  service  providers  being  patiently 
progressed  by  law  enforcement,  was  guillotined  by  a  knee-jerk  reaction  to  a  perceived 
intelligence  emergency.  Links  between  terrorism  and  transnational  organised  crime  have 
often  been  argued  -  and  there  is  an  obvious  market  for  gun-runners  in  supplying  weapons  to 
terrorist  groups  for  instance  -  but  the  majority  of  transnational  organised  crime  is  not 
undertaken  to  fund  terrorism.  It  therefore  has  to  be  tackled  using  conventional  criminal  and 
procedural  law.  Attempts  to  rush  into  UK  domestic  law  EUCMA  mutual  legal  assistance 
measures  through  the  unprecedented  vehicle  of  secondary  legislation  under  the  ATCS  Act 
Part  11,  failed  after  the  House  of  Lords,  recognising  the  significant  constitutional  implications 
of  such  a  move,  insisted  on  a  sunset  clause  for  the  measures  thus  setting  a  timetable  for 
implementation  that  the  Government  could  not  meet.  The  consequences  of  this  have  been 
numerous.  Attempting  to  meet  the  deadline  meant  suspending  the  on-going  mutual  legal 
assistance  review  instigated  in  response  to  the  EU  peer  review  exercise  (see  below  Chapter  4). 
The  failure  to  meet  the  deadline  meant  that  extra  space  had  to  be  made  in  the  Parliamentary 
Session  commencing  November  2002  to  accommodate  a  special  Bill,  the  C(IQ  Bill.  Because 
parliamentary  time  is  extremely  precious,  internal  Government  negotiations  meant  that  the 
C(IQ  Bill  could  be  framed  only  to  enact  EUCMA  measures  and  Schengen  measures.  A 
number  of  other  mutual  legal  assistance  issues  that  need  to  be  addressed  and  could  usefully 
have  been  addressed  in  a  comprehensive  Bill,  will  now  have  to  be  postponed  for  at  least  two 
parliamentary  sessions  (Home  Office  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum,  6  December  2002).  In 
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other  words,  attempts  on  the  basis  of  an  intelligence  community  agenda,  to  rush  through 
alterations  to  mutual  legal  assistance  measures  intended  to  assist  law  enforcement,  have 
ultimately  led  to  disruption  and  delay  in  reaching  possible  improvements  to  the  mutual  legal 
assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  framework  established  to  counter 
transnational  organised  crime. 
It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  to  explore  the  multitude  of  due  process  issues 
arising  from  the  investigation  of  the  New  York  attacks.  Nor  is  this  the  place  to  discuss  in 
depth  US-EU  relations  in  the  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  arena.  But  it  is 
worth  noting  that  the  steady  progress  within  the  EU  towards  greater  co-operation  between  the 
authorities  of  Member  States  in  JHA  initiatives,  has  been  disrupted  by  the  perceived  need  to 
work  closely  with  the  US  authorities  to  prosecute,  initially,  the  New  York  attacks,  and 
subsequently  a  war  against  Iraq.  Co-operation  between  intelligence  communities  may  well 
have  increased  since  September  2001,  but  the  fundamental  differences  between  US  and 
European  (particularly  UK)  approaches  to  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation  (identified  in  Harfield  2002  and  2003  for  instance)  remain,  and  it  is 
these  fundamental  differences  wbich  are  now  eroding  the  co-operativc  impetus  initially 
witnessed  in  the  autumn  of  2001  (Dubois  2002). 
Ultimately,  it  is  the  intelligence  practitioners  rather  than  the  law  enforcement 
communities  that  have  most  to  gain  from  post  9/11  co-operative  activity,  legislative 
enactments  and  policy  directions.  The  problems  that  beset  law  enforcement  engaged  in 
investigating  transnational  (organised)  crime  on  10  September  200  1,  still  exist  today,  and  the 
aftermath  of  the  New  York  attacks  has  brought  no  long-term  enhancement  to  daily 
investigation  of  'routine'  transnational  (organised)  crime. 
Conclusion 
Practitioners  drive,  and  will  usually  settle  for,  mutual  assistance  measures.  Politicians 
and  administrators  require  mutual  legal  assistance.  They  have  different  priorities. 
Investigators  are  seeking  the  quickest  and  most  efficient  means  of  gathering  information.  The 
politicians  and  diplomats  are  seeking  to  retain  control  over  actions  that  would  otherwise 
constitute  infringements  of  sovereignty.  The  drivers  and  models  discussed  above  highlight 
the  areas  of  tension  that  exist  between  these  differing  priorities  and  the  constraints  faced  by 
practitioners  and  policy-makers  in  pursuing  their  objectives.  Practitioners  habitually  complain 
about  the  burdensome  bureaucracy  inherent  in  mutual  legal  assistance  formalities  (senior 
investigating  officer  interview,  7  February  2001)  and  the  rationale  behind  the  EUCMA  is  to 
improve  ECMA  provisions  (HL  Hansard  12  June  2000  col.  1473).  But  against  the  pragmatic 
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approach  of  the  investigators  is  set  the  desire  of  policy-makers  to  preserve  sovereign  authority 
(Mitsilegas  et  al.  2003:  9),  often  through  the  vehicle  of  due  process  protections.  In  the  arena  of 
IT-facilitated  crime  the  tensions  have  now  reached  critical  levels  because  of  the  speed  with 
which  crimes  can  be  committed  and  the  evidence  destroyed.  Informal  practitioner 
mechanisms  such  as  the  G8  24  hour/7  days  a  week  contact  database  [24/7]  or  the  Interpol 
equivalent  can  only  achieve  so  much.  The  authority  invested  in  international  legal  instruments 
is  crucial  to  ensuring  successful  investigations  and  the  fact  that  the  Council  of  Europe 
published  more  than  two  dozen  sequential  public  drafts  of  its  Cyber  CHme  Convention  before 
consensus  was  reached  two  years  behind  schedule,  does  not  bode  well. 
The  cyber  crime  arena  magnifies  the  problems  and  principles  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  and  mutual  assistance  because  of  the  speed  and  geographical  capability  of  such 
criminality.  It  is  also  an  arena  in  which  there  are  vastly  different  levels  of  investigative 
capability  in  terms  of  technology  access,  investigator  skills  and  lawful  powers.  Such 
heightened  sensitivity  is  distracting  for  the  purposes  of  this  academic  study  and  the  whole 
cyber  crime  arena  is  worth  research  in  its  own  right. 
Having  thus  presented  a  multi-faceted  context  in  the  first  three  chapters,  the  thesis 
now  progresses  (in  Chapters  4  and  5)  towards  it  contribution  to  original  research  by  posing 
the  primary  research  questions  (about  whether  mutual  legal  assistance  achieves  what  is 
needed);  by  considering  how  the  effectiveness  of  mutual  legal  assistance  has  been  evaluated 
hitherto;  and  in  the  light  of  the  aforementioned,  by  identifying  the  research  gaps  and 
explaining  the  methodology  for  the  current  research. 
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Chapter  4 
Promoting  principles  into  practice: 
evaluating  the  effectiveness  of  mutual  legal  assistance 
Introduction 
The  theoretical  and  legal  principles  and  different  political  perspectives  of  mutual 
legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  having  been  discussed,  the 
foundations  have  been  laid  for  assessing  whether  these  concepts  work  in  practice  and  how 
they  might  be  evaluated  in  order  to  prepare  for  the  original  research  that  has  been  conducted 
as  part  of  this  study.  At  the  heart  of  this  research  lie  two  key  questions:  does  mutual  legal 
assistance  work,  and  are  the  politicians,  whose  increasing  interest  in  mutual  legal  assistance 
has  been  observed,  delivering  what  practitioners  need  in  order  to  make  mutual  legal  assistance 
work? 
Does  mutual  legal  aýsistance  work? 
So  does  it  work,  and  if  so  how  do  we  know?  Murray  &  Harris  who,  from  their 
perspectives  of  specialist  fraud  defence  and  SFO  prosecution  lawyers  respectively  offer  a  few 
brief  introductory  chapters  to  their  compilation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  instruments 
applicable  to  the  UK,  argue  yes.  1  "The  aims  of  the  committee  of  experts  were  to  produce  a 
convention  which  was  simple  and  flexible  enough  to  be  adopted  throughout  the  Member 
States  which  agreed  to  ratify  it,  while  laying  down  a  general  principle  that  mutual  assistance 
should  be  provided  where  at  all  possible  in  criminal  proceedings.  The  [ECMA]  has  been  the 
comer  stone  for  all  European  co-operation  since  1959,  and  has  proved  its  worth  in  achieving 
its  objectives"  (Murray  &  Harris  2000:  7).  In  the  rarefied  world  of  multi-million  pound 
business  fraud  they  have  between  them  amassed  more  experience  than  most  criminal  justice 
professionals  in  other  law  enforcement  arenas  in  using  the  various  available  instruments. 
But  this  acclaim  wan-ants  qualification.  As  long  ago  as  1971,  the  European  Committee 
on  Crime  Problems  reviewed  the  operation  of  the  ECMA  and  found  it  wanting.  What  it 
wanted  particularly  at  that  time  was  greater  take-up  amongst  the  nation  States  of  Europe. 
Opened  for  signature  in  1959  and  entering  into  force  in  1962  when  Italy,  Greece  and  Norway 
1  Loma  Harris  was  Head  of  the  UKCA  1999-2002.  Christopher  Murray  is  a  partner  at  Kingsley  Napley 
solicitors,  London  and  a  Recorder  of  the  Crown  Court. 
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were  the  first  States  to  ratify  it,  by  1971  the  ECMA  had  been  ratified  by  ten  Member  States  of 
the  Council  of  Europe  .2  It  had  also  been  acceded  to  by  two  non-member  States  (ECCP 
3  1971:  8,12). 
The  ECCP  Rapporteurs  struggled  to  balance  the  needs  of  investigators  against  the 
needs  of  national  administrations.  It  was  recognised  that  transmission  of  requests  via 
diplomatic  channels  was  cumbersome  and  slow.  "Mutual  assistance  will  never  achieve  the  full 
results  of  which  it  is  capable,  unless  its  operation  is  both  quick  and  easy.  Speed  is  imperative 
if  crime  is  to  be  fought  successfully"  (ibid.:  50-51).  Nevertheless  they  recognised  a  necessity 
for  governments  to  be  able  to  scrutinise  requests  before  executing  them  and  argued  that 
transmission  of  requests  through  justice  ministries  (or  equivalent  departments)  would  serve  to 
protect  national  interests  and  ensure  compliance  with  the  domestic  laws  of  the  requested 
State.  But  preserving  individual  ways  of  doing  things  can  impede  the  process  of  mutual 
assistance. 
The  exchange  of  information  concerning  conviction  of  a  national  from  one  State  in  the 
jurisdiction  of  another  (Art.  22  ECMA)  is  subject  to  a  restriction  if  the  individual  concerned  is 
a  national  of  more  than  one  State.  It  is  also  subject  to  several  individual  national  Reservations. 
Such  limitations  were  regretted  by  the  ECCP  in  1971  (ibid.:  54)  and  even  today  such  exchange 
is  observed  more  in  the  breach  (Interpol  interview  21.7.98).  Proper  mutual  recognition  of 
court  judgements  from  other  States  is  still  seen  as  potentially  a  major  future  contribution  to 
law  enforcement  co-operation  in  Europe  (Jack  Straw,  speech,  Avignon  16.10.98).  It  is 
regarded  by  the  UK  as  politically  more  acceptable  than  full  harmonisation  of  criminal  codes 
(Loma  Harris  interview  29  August  2000),  although  the  UK  has  neither  signed  nor  ratified  the 
Council  of  Europe  Transfer  of  Proceedings  Convention  (Chase  &  Leigh  1998:  198)  which 
might  be  regarded  as  an  associated  way  forward. 
The  number  of  Reservations  lodged  generally  by  the  twelve  States  up  to  1971  to 
various  Articles  was  subject  of  criticism  by  the  ECCP:  "the  unity  of  the  Convention  has  been 
fairly  considerably  impaired"  (1971:  70).  Israel  sought  more  inclusivity  by  arguing  that 
criminal  proceedings  under  Article  6  should  also  include  police  investigations  (ibid.:  87)  thus 
highlighting  a  practical  difficulty  for  Common  Law  States  which  the  UK  had  avoided  by  not 
becoming  Party  to  the  Convention.  Yet  on  the  other  hand  Israel  also  reported  that  it  had  had  to 
reject  certain  requests  because  it  would  not  recognise  examining  magistrates  and  prosecutors 
as  judicial  authorities  and  so  could  not  accept  ILORs  from  such  persons  (ibid.:  89). 
2  Denmark,  Switzerland,  France,  Sweden,  Austria,  the  Netherlands  and  Turkey  had  joined  the  first 
three  States. 
3  Israel  from  outside  Europe  (1967),  and  the  principality  of  Liechtenstein  (1969).  Murray  &  Harris 
(ibid.  6)  report  37  signatories  as  of  31  st  March  1999,  signature  not  necessarily  indicating  ratification. 
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These  points  illustrate  the  validity  of  one  Rapporteur's  conclusion  that  "despite  a 
number  of  improvements  [mutual  legal  assistance]  bears  the  marks  of  its  close  attachment  to 
the  legal  systems  of  various  the  States,  who  are  still  very  jealous  of  their  sovereignty" 
(ibid.:  56).  The  ECCP  report  concluded  that  "certain  rules  which  some  years  ago  represented 
the  best  solution  to  the  problems  raised  might  no  longer  appear  adequate"  (ibid.:  94). 
Even  the  inadequate  rules  remained  too  revolutionary  for  some.  Having  taken  no  part  in 
drafting  the  ECMA,  the  UK  argued  that  it  was  "unlikely  to  be  of  much  significant  use  to  us 
because  the  insistence  of  our  law  on  oral  testimony  left  little  scope  for  the  admission  of 
witness  statements  and  other  documents,  which  form  the  bulk  of  the  traffic"  (unpublished 
Home  Office  Discussion  Paper,  1988;  see  also  Brown  1998:  51  who  cites  an  earlier  draft 
version  of  the  same  document).  Despite  this  opposition,  two  years  later  the  UK  ratified  the 
Convention  because  of  the  growing  and  irreversible  need  for  UK  authorities  to  gather 
evidence  from  abroad.  Practicalities,  overcame  political  reservation. 
The  gradual  accumulation  of  signatory  Parties  has  overcome  one  weakness  noted  by 
the  Rapporteurs.  The  more  Parties  to  the  ECMA,  the  more  the  philosophy  of  mutual 
assistance  became  conventional,  international  political  wisdom.  Since  1971  there  has  been  a 
two-pronged  response  to  the  other  perceived  inadequacies:  protocols  amending  the  1959 
convention  (one  in  1978  and  another  currently  being  negotiated)  and  a  separate  Convention 
negotiated  amongst  EU  Member  States.  The  1978  Protocol  reduced  the  number  of  grounds 
for  refusing  assistance  in  relation  to  fiscal  offences  and  extended  the  provisions  for  the  service 
of  court  documents.  The  draft  Second  Protocol  currently  being  negotiated  is  more  expansive 
(an  early  version  of  the  draft  is  reproduced  in  Murray  &  Harris  2000:  Appendix  G).  Where  the 
1959  Convention  defined  policy,  the  draft  second  protocol  deals  in  more  detail  with 
practicalities.  Developments  in  communication  technology  have  generated  articles  concerning 
the  delivery  of  testimony  by  video  conference  and  telephone.  Increased  sophistication 
amongst  criminals  (within  the  context  of  the  parallel  development  of  human  rights 
philosophy)  has  given  rise  to  articles  concerning  specific  investigative  tactics  such  as  cross- 
border  observations,  controlled  delivery  of  goods  and  money,  the  use  of  undercover  agents 
and  the  exchange  of  data. 
Such  developments  within  the  treaty  law  of  the  Council  of  Europe  have  been  mirrored, 
elaborated  upon  and  already  enacted  -  and  some  would  argue,  unnecessarily  duplicated 
(Schomburg  2000:  58)  -  within  the  treaty  law  of  the  European  Union.  The  EUCMA  (the  text  of 
which  is  published  in  OJ  20OO/C  197/0  1)  "is  intended  to  improve  co-operation  against  serious 
and  organised  crime  by  improving  the  procedures  for  mutual  assistance"  (Lord  Bach,  HL 
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Hansard,  12  June  2000,  col.  1473)ý  Signed  on  29  May  2000,  it  will  come  into  force  when 
eight  Member  States  have  ratified  it  (Art.  27(3)  EUCMA).  It  will  be  open  to  new  Member 
States  as  and  when  theyjoin  the  EU  (Art.  28),  and  has  already  been  opened  to  certain  non-EU 
States  that  have  also  adopted  the  Schengen  Acquis  (Art.  29). 
The  1959  instrument,  whilst  not  perfect,  would  appear  to  be  regarded  by  politicians  and 
diplomats  as  sufficiently  sound  to  warrant  ad  ustment  rather  than  abandom-nent.  It  is  worth 
noting  that  the  provisions  of  the  EUCMA  and  the  draft  Second  Protocol  to  the  ECMA  both 
focus  on  specific  tactics  and  techniques.  Lord  Bach's  comments  during  the  House  of  Lords 
Committee  Stage  of  the  Regulation  of  Investigatory  Powers  Bill  quoted  above,  indicate  that 
the  generality  of  the  ECAM  in  respect  of  any  form  of  criminality  is  insufficiently  precise 
when  tackling  the  serious  and  organised  crime  that  is  of  particular  concern  to  the  EU.  Mutual 
legal  assistance  is  regarded  by  many  to  have  proved  its  worth  as  a  prevailing  concept  and  is 
now  evolving  to  take  account  of  developments  in  criminality  that  almost  certainly  were  not 
envisaged  in  the  late  1950s. 
Not  everyone  would  agree  with  the  perceived  rate  of  progress.  Schomburg  sounds  a 
voice  of  dissent.  "Tbe  interim  achievement  should  not  be  lost  sight  of.  much  has  undoubtedly 
been  simplified  and  improved,  while  important  new  instruments  have  and  will  be  created: 
only  the  result  in  Europe  seems,  given  the  most  varied  ingredients  of  the  most  varied  origin, 
to  be  an  unpalatable  cocktail  of  legal  assistance"  (2000:  56).  As  a  judge  called  upon  to  make 
sense  of  the  various  mutual  legal  assistance  instruments  now  employed,  Schomburg's  vision 
for  improvement  looks  beyond  the  (in  his  view,  outdated)  infrastructure  of  mutual  legal 
assistance,  focused  as  it  is  on  not  offending  national  sovereignty,  to  co-operation  based  upon  a 
uniform  EU  system  of  prosecution.  Regarding  a  harmonised  body  of  European  substantive 
criminal  law  as  neither  feasible  nor  desirable,  and  the  forced  harmonisation  of  procedural  law 
among  States  as  impossible,  for  Schomburg  progress  will  be  made  when  Eurojust  5  assumes 
the  role  of  legal  documentation  and  clearing  house  tailored  to  judicial  requirements,  just  as 
Europol  is  structured  to  suit  investigators  (ibid.:  57-59). 
His  nightmare  scenario  is  a  trial  in  which  a  number  of  charges  are  being  prosecuted 
simultaneously  under  a  variety  of  mutual  legal  assistance  conventions,  with  sometimes 
conflicting  rules,  some  requiring  the  investigators  to  observe  the  laws  of  the  requested  State, 
others  the  law  of  the  requesting  State  (ibid.:  55).  Taking  a  second  example,  both  prosecution 
4  Besides  reproducing  the  provisions  noted  in  the  draft  Second  Protocol  to  the  ECAM,  the  EUCAM  also 
rovides  for  international  joint  investigations  teams  and  a  co-ordinating  role  for  Europol. 
A  new  institution  announced  in  paragraph  46  of  the  Tampere  Presidential  Council  concluding 
statement,  Eurojust  is  the  prosecutors'  equivalent  of  Europol.  It  is  not  clear  that  Eurojust  will  assume 
quite  the  role  Schomburg  anticipates. 
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and  defendant  have  the  opportunity  to  go  "forurn  shopping"  (ibid.:  56):  each  party  utilising  the 
laws  and  procedures  of  different  States  to  their  own  advantage.  Transnational  criminality 
might  attract  better  prosecution  opportunities  in  State  A  than  State  B.  Alternatively,  a  suspect 
might  be  prepared  to  deal  with  authorities  in  State  C  because  the  (reduced)  risk  of  conviction 
carries  a  lesser  sentence  than  in  State  D.  Schomburg  argues,  persuasively,  that  both 
prosecutors  and  suspects  should  face  a  European-widc  level  playing  field,  and  that  in  certain 
areas  there  should  be  not  mutual  legal  assistance  between  national  jurisdictions  but  a 
supranational  jurisdiction  for  issues  that  transcend  national  interests. 
Observing  or  suggesting  improvements  upon  the  provisions  of  the  ECMA  is  one  way  of 
assessing  whether  or  not  mutual  legal  assistance  works  and  reveals  how  its  success  might  be 
measured  in  some  quarters.  But  it  is  not  the  only  way.  Conspicuous  by  its  absence  is  a 
sustained  qualitative  or  quantitative  appraisal  of  mutual  legal  assistance,  arguably  a  second 
means  of  measuring  success. 
The  findings  of  the  1971  Rapporteurs  are  delivered  anecdotally  and  do  not  betray 
whether  or  not  hard  data  were  gathered  during  their  work.  Schomburg's  work  is  theoretical 
(2000).  Murray  &  Harris  (2000)  are  concerned  primarily  to  explain  the  workings  of  the 
various  instruments  rather  than  assess  their  impact.  The  political  focus  on  investigative  tactics 
in  the  new  legal  instruments  recognises  that  such  tactics  are  necessary  to  investigate  modem 
very  sophisticated  higher  echelons  of  criminality  and  that  there  is  a  need  to  do  so  in  a 
legitimately  sanctioned  manner  in  which  human  rights  are  valued  and  properly  balanced  and 
in  which  national  sovereignty  is  respected.  By  implication  the  ECMA  could  not  provide  all 
that  was  required.  The  phenomenon  of  transnational  criminality  is  the  subject  of  considerable 
academic  attention  (for  a  flavour  of  this  work  see  the  various  volumes  of  the  journal 
Transnational  Organised  Crime;  the  thematic  issue  of  the  Howard  Journal  of  Criminal 
Justice  37(4)  (1998);  Martin  &  Romano  (1992);  Neapolitan7s  bibliography  and  source  book 
(1997);  Fiorentini  &  Peltzman  (1997);  Reuter  &  Petrie  (1998);  and  Van  Duyne  &  Ruggiero 
(2000)).  But  in  this  varied  abundance  of  legal,  political  and  criminological  academic  activity, 
very  little  appears  to  have  been  written  regarding  the  relationship  between  mutual  legal 
assistance  processes  and  successful  investigation. 
The  academic  perspective 
Anderson  and  others  have  written  authoritative  studies  on  the  development  of 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  (as  opposed  to  mutual  legal  assistance), 
particularly  within  the  EU  (1989;  1995;  et  aL  1995;  see  also  Benyon  1997;  Bigo  2000; 
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Hebenton  &  Thomas  1995;  Wrench  1998).  Such  descriptive  works  outlining  the  development 
of  Interpol,  the  Trevi  Group,  the  Schengen  Acquis,  Europol  and  other  co-operativefora  set  a 
trend  continued  in  recent  works  (see,  particularly,  papers  by  Ebbe;  Higdon;  and  Rauchs  & 
Koenig  in  Koenig  &  Das  2001  although  all  the  papers  in  Parts  I  and  11  of  this  anthology  fit  the 
trend).  They  are  works  that  chart  the  evolution  of  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
during  the  1990s.  Written  as  works  of  contemporary  description,  in  this  fast-moving  arena 
they  have  quickly  acquired  the  status  of  historical  records. 
Chatterton  takes  this  a  stage  further,  highlighting  the  need  to  move  away  from 
description  towards  analysis.  "By  concentrating  on  the  framework  of  laws,  protocols  and 
agreements,  and  so  forth  that  have  been  set  up  between  countries  to  help  their  law 
enforcement  agencies  to  work  together,  the  literature  on  police  co-operation  has  tended  to 
ignore  the  supporting  pillars  ...  We  have  very  limited  information  about  the  ways  in  which 
police  forces  in  Europe  operate  in  practice  and  even  less  about  how  they  actually  work 
together  to  investigate  cross-border  crime  and  prevent  crime  that  has  an  international 
dimensiore'  (2001:  324).  Pointing  out  that  co-operative  mechanisms  arc  a  means  to  an  end 
rather  than  an  end  in  themselves,  he  queries  the  extent  to  which  UK  police  forces  avail 
themselves  of  the  co-opcrative  mechanisms,  and  whether  UK  investigators  would  be  better 
off  working  on  their  own  rather  than  "investing  heavily  in  interagency  projects"  (ibid:  327).  6 
In  considering  these  and  related  questions  at  length,  Chatterton  appears  to  make 
insufficient  distinction  between  issues  of  policy  and  procedure  and  the  different  types  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  now  in  place.  Some  co-operative  mechanisms  - 
instruments  of  international  law  for  instance  -  are  indeed  ends  in  themselves:  they  are  the 
formal,  diplomatically-negotiated  palliatives  to  the  inhibitions  imposed  on  the  natural 
inclinations  of  investigators  by  the  laws  of  sovereignty.  The  ECMA  1959  and  the  EUCAM 
2000  provide  legal  mechanisms  to  be  used  by  investigators  seeking  evidence  from  abroad  of 
relevance  to  domestic  investigations.  Having  provided  practical  mechanisms,  these 
instruments  have  achieved  what  was  intended.  They  are  not  instruments  of  policy,  but  of 
procedure.  Agencies  and  authorities  will  avail  themselves  of  these  mechanisms  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  progress  individual  enquiries.  They  have  no  other  need  of  these  instruments  and 
are  not  guided  by  them  beyond  the  extent  necessary  to  ensure  evidence  is  gathered  lawfully. 
Thus  when  an  individual  agency  seeks  evidence  from  abroad  there  is  a  mechanism  in  place  to 
achieve  this. 
6  Chatterton  appears  to  be  talking  about  interagency  projects  in  terms  of  Interpol  and  Europol.  From  an 
operational  perspective  there  is  another  interpretation.  Is  it  more  effective  for  agencies  to  engage  in 
international,  joint  or  parallel  operations  such  as  Case  Study  2,  Chapter  7,  or  go  it  alone,  accepting  that 
a  given  operation  will  require  mutual  legal  assistance?  As  will  be  seen,  some  senior  investigating 
officers  incline  away  from  joint  or  parallel  operations  despite  the  introduction  of  the  Joint  investigation 
Team  concept. 
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Whether  international  law  has  provided  legal  mechanisms  that  are  fit  for  the  purpose 
is  a  separate  question  within  the  context  of  evaluating  the  effectiveness  of  the  treaty 
provisions.  The  Council  of  Europe  Experts  Committee  on  Crime  Problems  [ECCP]  reviewed 
the  ECMA  in  1970  and  found  it  wanting,  not  least  because  signatory  parties  had  yet  to  fully 
implement  the  provisions  and  ratifications  were  still  relatively  few  in  number  (Council  of 
Europe  1971:  93  J).  Have  matters  improved?  Are  investigators  able  to  obtain  the  evidence 
they  seek  using  the  procedures?  Is  it  being  successfully  adduced  in  court?  Studies  of  case-law 
and  practitioner  experience  will  begin  to  answer  these  questions. 
A  second  area  of  interest  lies  not  in  the  international  instnunents  and  the  legal 
provisions  thus  made  available  to  investigators  but  in  the  administrative  structures  established 
to  facilitate  those  provisions.  Is  it  still  the  case,  as  Soeters  et  alia  asserted,  that  "cross-border 
collaboration  in  the  Euregion  until  now  is  merely  a  matter  of  motivated  individual  police 
officers  in  various  forces,  each  developing  their  own  network  of  liaison  persons  beyond  the 
borders 
...  an  informal,  ad  hoc  activity  in  which  the  official  procedures  play  only  a  marginal 
role"  (1995:  9;  quoted  in  Chatterton  2001:  330)?  The  EU  has  recently  completed  an  evaluation 
in  respect  of  government  mechanisms  (Central  Authorities)  enabling  mutual  legal  assistance 
(see  below  p.  72j))  and  it  will  be  advocated  here  that  such  an  evaluation  can  be  complemented 
by  examining  the  practical  experiences  of  investigators  in  using  the  mechanisms  provided  to 
gather  evidence. 
In  a  further  type  of  mutual  assistance,  international  police  networks,  Chatterton 
widens  the  debate  by  detecting  tensions  between  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
and  UK  local  policing  objectives,  arguing  that  the  need  to  focus  finite  resources  on  delivery  of 
core  police  services  to  the  local  community  (pursuant  to  Police  Act  1996,  the  Crime  and 
Disorder  Act  1998,  the  Local  Government  Act  1999  and  now  the  Police  Refonn  Act  2002) 
militates  against  collaboration  and  investing  in  international  networks.  Local  police  managers 
"are  likely  to  view  national  -  and  international  -  initiatives  as  potential  threats  to  their  budget 
allocations"  (2001:  339).  "Commanders  are  concerned  first  and  foremost  with  the  performance 
of  their  units  and  how  effectively  they  deal  with  problems  that  affect  the  public  living  in  their 
areas.  There  is  growing  evidence  that  this  is  resulting  in  the  development  of  parochialism" 
(ibid.  340;  see  also  UKCA  interview  7  August  1998  discussed  in  Chapter  I  above,  p2l).  This 
calls  into  question  the  political  willingness  at  all  levels  to  engage  in  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation.  Again,  it  is important  not  to  confuse  participation  in  either  formal 
or  informal  networks,  and  the  resources  required  to  do  so,  with  the  daily  investigation  of  'core 
business'  crime  where  evidence  may  be  located  in  more  than  one  jurisdiction. 
The  ACPO  portfolio-holder  for  International  Affairs  accepted  that,  at  face  value, 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  is  not  a  priority  for  UK  chief  police  officers 
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because  the  Government  effectively  says  as  much  by  omitting  international  law  enforcement 
co-operation  from  Ministerial  Priorities  set  for  the  police  service  (interview  23  July  2002, 
hereafter  'ACPO  (IA)  interview').  However,  he  went  on  to  point  out  that  such  a  superficial 
interpretation  requires  qualification.  VVhilst  not  a  Ministerial  Priority  set  for  local  police 
forces  in  the  UK,  part  of  Home  Office  Aim  2  is  "to  reduce  organised  and  international  crime" 
and  this  is  reflected  in  the  National  Policing  Plan  2002,  Appendix  B.  Local  forces  are  at  the 
end  of  the  transnational  organised  crime  'food-chain'.  The  illicit  commodities  imported  by 
transnational  organised  crime  groups,  be  they  drugs,  firearms  or  human  beings,  end  up  on 
local  streets  in  the  UK  inevitably  fuelling  local  crime  and  creating  issues  of  local  public 
concern  that  do  feature  in  local  policing  priorities  (for  instance  burglaries  committed  to  fund  a 
drug  dependency  or  public  disorder  generated  as  a  result  of  a  mass  influx  of  immigrants).  It 
was  postulated  that  UK  forces  with  ports  of  entry  or  situated  along  the  national  borders  might 
have  more  need  of  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  than  land-locked  forces 
(ACPO  (IA)  interview),  but  this  view  itself  is  qualified  by  a  Midlands-based  Detective 
Superintendent  who  pointed  out  (pers.  comm.  7  August  2002)  that  the  dispersal  of  both  legal 
and  illegal  immigrants  across  the  UK  meant  that  any  force  was  bound  to  encounter  a  need  for 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  in  dealing  with  local  crime  which  incorporated  an 
immigrant  factor.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  policy  considerations  facing  the  Government's 
Project  Reflex:  an  inter-departmental  team  tackling  organised  human  trafficking  and  illegal 
7  immigration  which  includes  a  multi-agency  Immigration  Crime  Team  [ICT].  The  ICT  is 
currently  located  in  two  bases,  Heathrow  and  Gatwick  airports.  But  the  volume  of  enquiries 
being  undertaken  by  these  teams  in  the  Midlands  suggests  that  there  is  a  business  case  for 
establishing  a  third  branch  of  the  ICT  at  the  end  of  the  supply  chain  beyond  the  nexus  of  the 
immediate  ports  of  entry  (private  information).  The  point  regarding  land-locked  areas  having 
no  lesser  need  of  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  was  reinforced  by  a  chief  Crown 
prosecutor  for  a  neighbouring  area  who  observed  that  the  issuing  of  commissions  rogatoire, 
not  so  long  ago  the  rarefied  preserve  of  specialists,  is  now  a  daily  occurrence  for  all  his  staff 
in  his  similarly  land-locked  CPS  area  (Peter  Lewis,  presentation  to  the  Oxford  Conference,  28 
August  2002). 
Nor  is  it  necessarily  accepted  that  there  is  direct  competition  for  resources  that 
prevents  participation  in  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  (ACPO  (IA)  interview). 
The  EU  seeks  to  co-ordinate  a  number  of  pan-European  road-safety  initiatives  that  are 
delivered  within  the  context  of  local  force  priorities  regarding  traffic  policing.  This  involves 
not  competition  for  resources  but  the  incorporation  of  wider  priorities  and  initiatives  within 
7  Human  trafficking  is  defined  as  comprising  exploitation  of  those  trafficked,  for  instance  women  and 
children  transported  across  borders  to  work  in  the  sex  trade.  Illegal  immigration  defines  all  non- 
exploitative  unlawful  immigration.  (ACPO  (IA)  interview). 
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local  policing  plans.  The  terms  of  reference  for  the  ACPO  International  Affairs  portfolio  are 
"to  promote  effective  policing  within  the  United  Kingdom  and  abroad  by  co-ordinating  the 
provision  of  assistance  and  advice  to  overseas  countries  and  international  organisations"  and 
"to  ensure  that  the  United  Kingdom's  domestic  Police  Service  provides  appropriate 
professional  advice  to  Government  Departments  when  their  activities  affect  policing"  (ACPO 
(IA)  interview).  Intervention  (training  and  specialist  support  for  foreign  agencies)  and 
interdiction  (such  as  the  off-shore  operational  activity  now  a  priority  for  HM  Customs  & 
Excise)  are  seen  as  activities  that  both  directly  and  indirectly  contribute  to  the  local  policing 
aim  of  providing  safer  communities  by  reducing  levels  of  transnational  criminality  that  impact 
on  the  UK. 
Seen  from  a  wider  perspective,  all  UK  local  forces  have  a  vested  interest  in 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation,  even  if  local  chief  police  officers  expect  the  bulk 
of  daily  transborder  investigative  and  intelligence  activity  to  be  undertaken  by  the  specialist 
agencies  established  to  do  just  that;  namely  the  National  Crime  Squad  and  the  National 
Criminal  Intelligence  Service  (ACPO  (IA)  interview).  Chatterton  correctly  identifies  a  need  to 
ensure  that  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  procedures  and  mechanisms  are 
operating  effectively  -  this  area  of  law  enforcement  activity  should  be  as  accountable  as  any 
other  -  but  places  too  much  emphasis  on  a  perceived  tension  between  local  and  transnational 
policing  from  a  UK  force  perspective.  He  appears  not  to  take  proper  account  of  the  continuum 
of  criminality  and  response  along  which  sit  all  actors  in  law  enforcement  or  the  distinction 
between  resources  invested  in  international  liaison  activity  (police  networks  and  policy- 
development)  and  resources  invested  in  transnational  investigation,  (which  may  ultimately  be 
contributing  towards  meeting  a  local  force  performance  target  if  the  crime  is  located  in  the 
UK  but  has  transnational  elements).  This  point  is  important  because  in  evaluating  the 
effectiveness  of  structures  and  processes,  the  issue  is  not  whether  resources  needed  for  a 
transnational.  enquiry  are  in  competition  with  resources  needed  elsewhere.  Arguably  that  is  an 
eternal  debate  applicable  to  any  area  of  policing.  Invariably,  investigators  who  seek  evidence 
abroad  are  doing  so  pursuant  to  a  domestic  investigation  that  is  only  going  to  be  carried  out 
within  the  context  of  the  local  policing  plan  or  relevant  national  agency  plan.  The  issue, 
rather,  is  whether  the  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  mechanisms  in  place  are 
stream-lined  and  effective  so  that  resources  deployed  on  such  enquiries  arc  used  in  a  cost- 
effective  manner.  Are  investigations  or  prosecutions  abandoned,  for  instance,  because  it  is  too 
difficult  to  gather  and  adduce  vital  evidence  from  abroad?  Michael  Kennedy,  President  of 
Eurojust,  suggests  that  this  is indeed  the  case  and  that  prosecutors  have  hitherto  often  settled 
for  prosecuting  such  criminality  as  they  can  prove  entirely  within  their  jurisdiction  whilst 
ignoring  behaviour  that  comprises  transnational  criminality  (Oxford  conference,  29  August 
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2002).  An  example  would  be  charging  a  trafficker  with  possession  of  drugs  rather  than 
distribution  because  to  charge  the  latter  required  adducing  evidence  from  abroad  at  no  little 
expense  in  time  and  effort.  8 
Where  tensions  can  exist  is in  the  quid  pro  quo.  There  is  evidence  that  UK  agencies 
are  reluctant  to  assist  foreign  authorities  seeking  evidence  located  in  the  UK  because  such 
activity  diverts  resources  and  contributes  nothing  to  force  performance  indicators  (UKCA 
interview,  August  1998).  But  this,  too,  boils  down  to  the  proper  management  of  in-coming 
enquiries.  Simply  asserting  that  there  are  insufficient  resources  to  assist  foreign  authorities 
will  not  reduce  the  level  of  demand  for  such  assistance.  Further,  such  a  stance  will  inhibit  UK 
domestic  investigations  dependent  upon  mutual  legal  assistance  because  the  UK  will  be  seen 
to  be  reneging  on  its  international  treaty  obligations  and  failing  to  observe  the  courtesy  of 
international  comity.  The  lack  of  co-operation  from  UK  authorities  in  response  to  assistance 
requests  from  foreign  authorities,  and  the  animosity  thus  generated  which  consequently  led  to 
a  wide-spread  reluctance  to  assist  UK  authorities,  provided  the  policy  rationale  for  enacting 
the  Criminal  Justice  (International  Co-operation)  Act  1990,  by  which  the  UK  adopted  in 
domestic  legislation  the  provisions  of  the  ECMA  which  had  been  resisted  from  its  inception, 
reliance  having  hitherto  been  placed  on  the  Extradition  Act  1870  (as  amended  in  1873)  for  all 
matters  of  mutual  legal  assistance  (Foreign  Office  Minute  briefing  UK  representatives  at  the 
Council  of  Europe,  2  March  1959,  National  Archives:  F0371/146282:  WUC  1651/9;  Home 
Office  1988). 
Chatterton  has  noted  an  academic  lacuna  and  calls  for  further  research  that  records 
and  explains  outcomes  in  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  by  focusing  on  process 
evaluation  rather  than  simply  describing  structures  and  the  circumstances  under  which  they 
came  into  being  (2001:  343).  Evaluation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  is  not  new,  as 
the  1970  ECCP  exercise  demonstrates,  and  recent  developments  in  the  concept  will  be 
outlined  below.  But  nor,  as  it  is  currently  practised,  does  it  give  a  complete  picture.  There  are 
a  number  of  elements  within  the  arena  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation  that  can,  and  should,  be  evaluated  to  assess  their  effectiveness.  The 
1970  ECCP  programme  reviewed  the  adoption  and  ratification  of  a  specific  international 
instrument.  The  effectiveness  of  international  police  networks  formalised  into  NGOs  such  as 
Interpol  and  Europol  is  one  area  of  possible  research.  The  effectiveness,  from  a  government 
administrator's  perspective,  of  mechanisms  established  to  facilitate  co-operation  and  mutual 
8A  further  consequence  of  ignoring  transnational  criminality  in  pursuing  easier,  'domestic'  charges  is 
that  prosecution  and  conviction  rates  fail  to  reflect  accurately  the  level  of  transnational  organised 
crime,  a  notoriously  difficult  phenomenon  to  measure  at  the  best  of  times. 
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legal  assistance  is  another  area  amenable  to  assessment.  The  analysis  of  investigator 
experience  when  using  the  various  mechanisms  to  further  individual  investigations  is  a  third. 
Financial  investigation  and  the  genesis  of  modem  peer  evaluation 
The  idea  of  mutual  legal  assistance  evaluation  through  peer  review,  on  both  a 
unilateral  and  a  multilateral  basis,  has  become  well-established  in  financial  criminal 
investigation  and  preventive  action  to  inhibit  money-laundering.  US  authorities  regularly 
review  the  legislation  and  activity  of  other  nations  in  combating  international  corruption, 
bribery  and  also  drugs  trafficking.  A  US  Department  of  Commerce  review  of  the  corruption 
and  bribery  laws  of  other  States,  for  instance,  has  found  numerous  deficiencies  (from  the  US 
perspective)  in  UK  legislation  and  little  effective  implementation  of  the  OECD  anti-bribery 
convention  (2001).  9  The  US  also  reviews  anti-drug  measures  adopted  by  other  States, 
imposing  unilateral  economic  sanctions  if  the  measures  implemented  by  the  other  State  are 
deemed  by  US  officials  to  be  inadequate  (telephone  interview  with  Jonathan  Winer, 
Washington  DC,  I  June  2001;  also  Winer  1997:  59-60).  lo 
Given  the  adverse  consequences  to  the  market  economy  threatened  by  financial 
crimes,  the  G8  group  of  countries  (formerly  the  G7)  have  long  taken  a  multilateral  interest  in 
law  enforcement  in  this  particular  sphere.  The  1989  G7  Summit,  held  in  Paris,  established  the 
Financial  Action  Task  Force  [FATF],  an  intergovernmental  policy-making  body  "whose 
purpose  is  the  development  and  promotion  of  policies,  both  at  national  and  international 
levels,  to  combat  money-laundering"  (http:  //interdev.  oecd.  org/fatf/AboutFATF_en.  htm; 
accessed  8  August  2002).  Within  a  year  the  FATF  had  published  forty  recommendations 
outlining  action  necessary  to  prevent  and  reduce  opportunities  for  money-laundering  the 
proceeds  of  crime.  The  political  driver  for  this  initiative  was  protection  of  the  international 
economy  and  global  markets. 
Multilateral  monitoring  and  peer  review  are  among  the  tenets  upon  which  the  FATF 
was  founded.  Every  member  country,  twenty-nine  as  of  August  2002,  responds  to  an  annual 
questionnaire  that  assesses  the  extent  to  which  the  respondent  State  is  implementing  the  forty 
recommendations.  The  second  element  of  the  peer  review  comes  in  the  mutual  evaluation 
programme  during  which  each  FATF  Member  State  is  visited  in  turn  by  a  team  of  selected 
9  The  review  has  been  conducted  annually  since  1998  under  US  Federal  law:  Section  6,  International 
Anti-Bribery  and  Fair  Competition  Act  1998.1  am  grateful  to  Ms  Lorrie  Elder,  US  Congress,  for 
drawing  my  attention  to  this  source. 
10  Jonathan  Winer  was  the  Deputy  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Law  Enforcement  and  Crime, 
Bureau  of  International  Narcotics  and  Law  Enforcement  in  the  Clinton  administration,  a  counsel  to 
Senator  John  Kerry  1985-1993  with  particular  reference  to  transnational  organised  crime,  and 
investigated  the  BCCI  affair  on  behalf  of  US  authorities. 
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experts  appointed  by  the  FATE  11  Such  visits  are  intended  to  assess  the  "extent  to  which  the 
evaluated  country  has  moved  forward  in  implementing  an  effective  system  to  counter  money 
laundering  and  to  highlight  areas  in  which  fiather  progress  may  be  required"  (ibid.  ).  Although 
not  binding  in  international  law,  failure  to  implement  the  forty  recommendations  renders  the 
State  in  question  liable  to  counter-measures  from  compliant  FATF  members. 
Such  measures,  "which  should  be  gradual,  proportionate  and  flexible  regarding  their 
means  and  taken  in  concerted  action  towards  a  common  objective",  are  also  taken  against 
non-FATF  States  which  additionally  are  subject  to  unilateral  evaluation  by  FATF  Member 
States  against  twenty-five  criteria  defined  in  the  Non-Cooperative  Countries  and  Territories 
[NCCTs]  Review  Programme.  Fifteen  non-FATF  states  are  currently  so  proscribed  (FATF 
2002:  6;  19).  Of  these  only  one,  Nauru,  is  subject  to  counter-measures  (Patrick  Moulette, 
FATF,  Oxford  conference,  30  August  2002) 
The  current  mandate  for  the  FATF  expires  in  2004.  Given  that  steady  progress  in 
tightening  anti-money  laundering  regimes  is  being  claimed  -  Hungary,  Israel,  Lebanon  and  St 
Kitts  and  Nevis  were  all  declassified  as  NCCTs  in  2002  -  it  is  likely  that  the  FATF  will  be 
given  authority  to  continue  its  work,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  current  'war  on 
terrorism'  which  includes  action  against  terrorist  funding.  It  is  argued  by  the  FATF  that  pcer 
review  and  external  evaluation  in  this  particular  arena  has  produced  demonstrable  benefits. 
Both  the  UK  and,  following  II  September  2001,  the  US,  have  amended  their  domestic 
legislation  in  order  to  comply  more  closely  with  FATF  recommendations. 
A  drawback  of  this  concerted  action,  based  upon  defined  assessment  criteria,  is  that 
money-laundering  will  be  displaced  to  those  states  and  territories  lacking  robust  jurisdictions 
which  are  already  vulnerable  to  regime  infiltration  by  transnational  criminal  organisations 
[TCOs],  in  which  case  such  jurisdictions  may  well  find  it  harder  to  take  the  legislative  and 
enforcement  action  demanded  by  the  co-operative  and  compliant  international  community. 
There  is  also  considerable  disquiet  among  developing  and  smaller  states  about  the  selective 
use  of  the  evaluation  mechanism.  In  a  debate  between  Patrick  Moulette,  FATF,  and  Grace 
Perez-Navarro,  OECD,  for  the  regulators,  and  David  Ballantyne  and  Geoffrey  Rowland, 
respectively  the  Attorneys  General  for  Guernsey  and  the  Cayman  Islands,  for  the  regulated 
(Oxford  conference,  30  August  2002),  it  was  conceded  by  the  FATF  that  selection  for  NCCT 
review  was  at  the  whim  of  FATF  Member  States  based  on  their  experience  of  dealing  with  a 
given  jurisdiction  rather  than  against  defined  selection  criteria  or  strategic  threat  assessment. 
Thus  Guernsey,  whose  evaluation  against  the  FATF  forty  recommendations  proved  a  greater 
11  The  UK  and  the  US  were  assessed  against  only  twenty-eight  of  the  forty  recommendations  (Geoffrey 
Rowland  QC,  Oxford  conference,  30  August  2002).  The  UK  was  found  to  be  compliant  with  twenty- 
four  criteria  and  the  US  compliant  with  seventeen.  Both  states  have  since  taken  remedial  action  to 
improve  their  compliance. 
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adherence  than  could  be  demonstrated  by  either  the  US,  the  UK,  Luxembourg  or  Switzerland 
(all  FATF  Member  States),  was  nevertheless  further  selected  for  a  NCCT  review  at  the  cost  of 
lost  business  to  the  economy  until  the  additional  compliance  was  also  proved.  Likewise  the 
Cayman  Islands,  recognised  by  the  FATF  as  leading  the  way  in  the  global  fight  against 
financial  crime,  was  designated  as  a  NCCT  whereas  the  tax  havens  of  Luxembourg, 
Switzerland  and  Delaware  (USA),  all  much  used  by  TCOs,  have  not  been.  12 
It  was  further  conceded  that  the  FATF  had  conducted  no  studies  of  money-laundering 
before  or  after  the  review  and  listing  process  to  ascertain  whether  evaluation  really  did  result 
in  a  reduction  of  money  laundering.  The  reviews  were  paper-based,  looking  at  laws  and 
policies  rather  than  outcome-focused  based  on  the  level  of  money  laundering  activity  (Patrick 
Moulette,  FATF,  in  response  to  questions  from  the  audience,  Oxford  conference,  30  August 
2002). 
What  the  FATF  has  achieved  is  a  voluntary  blue-print  for  tackling  money-laundering 
and  an  evaluation  process  by  which  success  in  implementing  the  mechanisms  to  sustain  that 
blue-print  can  be  measured.  Within  this  model,  co-operation  is  manifest  in  common  action, 
rather  than  in  the  direct  actions  of  one  jurisdiction  fulfilling  the  assistance  request  of  another. 
The  case  for  the  benefit  of  evaluation  and  peer  review  is  made  out,  albeit  that  application  of 
this  model  is  vulnerable  in  certain  circumstances  to  criticisms  of  being  self-serving  and  of 
being  used  as  a  political  weapon  against  economic  competitors  in  the  financial  services  sector. 
More  recently,  the  Council  of  Europe  has  commenced  its  own  evaluation  programme 
in  connection  with  measures  to  combat  money-laundering  and  related  crimes  with  an 
Agreement  establishing  the  Group  of  States  against  Corruption  -  GRECO  (adopted  by  the 
Council  of  Europe  Committee  of  Ministers  5  May  1998  at  its  102nd  Session).  13  The 
programme  has  highlighted  another  potential  weakness  in  evaluation  as  a  concept. 
The  UK  was  the  eleventh  GRECO  member  to  be  examined  in  the  first  evaluation 
round  which  ran  throughout  2001  (GRECO  2001).  UK  authorities  responded  to  a 
comprehensive  questionnaire  prior  to  the  visit  of  the  evaluation  team,  26-30  March  2001.  The 
evaluation  team  comprised  a  law  enforcement  expert  (a  FBI  Assistant  Director)  '14  a  criminal 
justice  expert  (a  Hungarian  public  prosecutor)  and  a  general  policy  expert  (the  Director  of 
Audit  for  the  Auditor  General,  Eire).  Those  they  met  included  MPs,  officials  from  the  I  lome 
Office,  the  Lord  Chancellor's  Department,  the  Northern  Ireland  Office,  the  Scottish 
12  David  Ballantyne,  Attomey-General  of  the  Cayman  Islands,  was  moved  to  quip  that  no  self- 
appointed  regulators'  list  would  have  been  credible  had  it  not  included  the  Cayman  Islands  (Oxford 
conference,  30  August  2002). 
13  The  acronym  is  derived  from  the  French  translation  of  the  group's  title.  The  UK  was  not  among  the 
original  seventeen  CoE  Member  States  that  formed  the  group  but  had  joined  by  200  1. 
14  The  US  is  not  otherwise  involved  in  GRECO. 
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Executive,  the  Crown  Office  (Scotland),  the  Department  of  Environment,  Transport  and  the 
Regions,  the  Office  of  Government  Commerce,  the  National  Audit  Office,  the  Foreign  Office 
and  the  Cabinet  Office.  Regulatory  and  enforcement  agencies  represented  were  HMCE,  the 
Inland  Revenue,  the  Serious  Fraud  Office,  NCIS,  the  National  Crime  Squad,  the  Metropolitan 
Police  Service,  Strathclyde  Police  (Scotland),  HM  Inspectorate  of  Constabulary  and  the 
Police  Complaints  Authority  (ibid.  paragraph  2). 
A  positive  interpretation  was  placed  on  the  relative  paucity  of  data  demonstrating 
corruption  in  the  UK:  "while  the  UK  authorities  recognise  corruption  is  insidious  and  difficult 
to  measure,  it  is  not  generally  perceived  as  a  major  problem  in  the  United  Kingdom  ... 
according  to  the  latest  crime-statistics  figures  [sic]  for  England,  Wales  and  Northem  Ireland, 
in  the  period  between  1993  and  1999  the  number  of  convictions  for  corruption  in  these 
jurisdictions  remained  constantly  low,  "  (ibid.:  paragraph  8).  In  1999,  for  instance,  fifteen 
prosecutions  under  corruption  statutes  resulted  in  ten  convictions.  But  absence  of  evidence  is 
not  necessarily  evidence  of  absence.  Alistair  Brown,  representing  the  Cr-own  Office,  who  met 
with  the  evaluation  team  has  observed  publicly  that  a  lack  of  prosecutions  is  as  much 
evidence  of  indifference  to  the  issue  as  evidence  of  there  being  no  real  problem  (Oxford 
Conference,  27  August  2002).  The  success  of  evaluation  is dependent  upon  a  willingness  to 
be  evaluated.  From  his  own  experience  and  on  the  basis  of  UK  responses  to  the  questionnaire, 
Brown  concluded  that  UK  authorities  prefer  not  to  investigate  the  possibility  of  corruption 
within  the  UK  too  closely.  He  contrasts  this  "head  in  the  sand"  approach  with  the  outright 
obstruction  encountered  elsewhere.  Brown  was  due  to  have  been  a  member  of  the  evaluation 
team  to  be  sent  to  Moldova  but  for  two  years  the  Moldovan  authorities  procrastinated,  not 
least  by  refusing  to  appoint  someone  in  Moldova  to  correspond  with  the  GRECO 
administration  and  so  facilitate  the  visit.  With  the  appointed  evaluation  team  just  awaiting  a 
date  and  permission  to  travel,  Moldova  subsequently  requested  a  French-speaking  evaluation 
team  rather  than  an  English-speaking  team:  the  process  of  team  selection  and  date-setting  has 
commenced  all  over  again  with  no  more  notable  progress  than  over  the  past  two  years. 
For  Brown  the  simple  truth  is  that  in  the  UK  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  or  assessing 
how  much  corruption  is  taking  place,  therefore  GRECO  could  do  little  more  than  conclude 
that  "the  arrangements  for  the  fight  against  [corruption]  and  the  impact  thereon  of  existing 
immunities  are  not  easy  to  analyse  ...  This  state  of  affairs  necessarily  dictates  caution  in 
arriving  at  any  generalised  conclusions.  "  (GRECO  2001:  paragraph  99).  Such  serious 
corruption  as  was  conceded  was  identified  as  existing  within  the  UK  police  service:  it  was 
also  recognised  that  this  was  the  only  public  service  in  which  there  was  any  serious  attempt  to 
combat  internal  corruption  (ibid.:  paragraph  100). 
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In  a  report  that  was  generally  supportive  in  conclusion  but  critical  in  detail,  the  team 
that  evaluated  the  UK  made  comment  on  mutual  legal  assistance  arrangements  within  the 
jurisdiction  noting  that  "improving  the  legislation  for  the  seizure  of  corruption-related  assets 
will  be  an  exercise  in  futility  if  the  authorities  that  are  charged  with  providing  international 
legal  assistance  do  not  have  enough  resources  to  deal  with  the  corresponding  requests 
expeditiously.  "  This  was  supported  with  a  recommendation  that  permanent,  rather  than 
temporary,  extra  resources  should  be  allocated  to  the  UKCA  to  manage  requests  for  mutual 
legal  assistance  (ibid.:  paragraph  79,  see  also  28  and  102  (ii)).  For  Brown,  the  real  lessons 
leamt  were  that  political  will  could  not  be  legislated  for,  and  without  the  political  will  to 
enforce  laws,  no  amount  of  legislation  is  going  to  make  a  difference,  even  if  on  paper  it 
appears  the  necessary  instruments  and  mechanisms  are  in  place. 
The  FATF  and  GRECO  evaluations  have  demonstrated  that,  although  evaluation  to 
ensure  implementation  is  surely  necessary,  it  is  possible  to  manipulate  or  evade  review 
procedures  thereby  deriving  incomplete  or  misleading  evidence  upon  which  to  base 
conclusions.  These  are  lessons  that  future  programmes  would  do  well  to  recognise. 
Money-laundering  is  not  the  only  area  in  which  evaluation  of  co-opcrativc 
mechanisms  has  been  instigated  by  the  G8  nations.  In  1996  the  G8  issued  its  own  list  of  forty 
recommendations  to  tackle  transnational  organised  crime  following  its  Lyon  Summit  (which 
have  subsequently  been  revised  and  re-issued  as  sixty-three  recommendations,  May  2002). 
This  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  Lyon  Group  of  law  enforcement  experts  that  advises  G8 
ministers.  The  Lyon  Group  itself  has  three  sub-groups  looking  at  international  law 
enforcement  special  projects,  judicial  co-operation  and  the  specialist  arena  of  hi-tech  crime.  's 
In  1997,  following  their  Summit  at  Washington,  the  G8  ministers  issued  a  communiqud  (9-11 
December  1997)  outlining,  inter  alia,  progress  to  be  made  in  tackling  hi-tech  crime  (given 
that  so  much  global  economic  activity  is  computer-based).  Ten  guiding  principles  and  a  ten- 
point  Action  Plan  were  appended  to  the  communiqu6. 
Amongst  the  ten  actions  was  the  desire  to  establish  emergency  single  points  of 
contact  in  each  State  on  a  twenty-four  hour/seven-days-a-weck  basis,  so  that  hi-tcch  crime 
investigators  needing  assistance  in  gathering  transborder  evidence  could  contact  an  expert  in 
another  jurisdiction  who  could  take  the  necessary  steps,  subject  to  domestic  law,  to  preserve 
the  digital  evidence.  The  particular  need  in  the  case  of  digital  data  is  to  preserve  the  data 
pending  formal  evidential  requests  being  made  through  mutual  legal  assistance  channels.  The 
volatility  of  digital  data  is  such  that  it  will  probably  have  succumbed  to  either  malicious 
deletion  or  deletion  through  routine  business  practice  before  a  formal  mutual  legal  assistance 
15  The  Hi-Tech  Crime  Sub-Group,  hereafter  HTCSG. 
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request  can  be  executed.  The  primary  function  of  the  24/7  network,  as  it  is  termed  and  which 
is  voluntary  (all  G8  business  being  conducted  on  the  basis  of  consensus),  is  to  ensure  that  the 
evidence  is  preserved  in  order  for  it  to  be  formally  requested. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  terrorist  attacks  against  the  United  States  in  September  2001, 
concerted  efforts  have  been  made  to  expand  the  network  beyond  the  G8  Member  States.  As  of 
May  2002  twenty-five  nations  had  agreed  to  participate  and  it  is  a  concept  already  supported 
by  the  European  Union  (9193/01  CRIMORG  61,18  June  2001)  and  now  given  international 
legal  effect  in  the  Council  of  Europe  Cyber  Crime  Convention  2001  (Article  35).  The  network 
exists  but  does  it  function  as  intended?  Is  it  of  use?  To  find  out  the  UK  delegation  to  the 
HTCSG,  comprising  an  official  from  the  Home  Office  Hi-Tech  Crime  Policy  Unit  and  the 
present  author  representing  UK  law  enforcement,  formally  proposed  at  the  May  2002  meeting 
of  the  Lyon  Group  that  the  effectiveness  of  the  24/7  network  be  assessed  through  peer  review. 
The  proposal  was  adopted  and  a  number  of  pilot  evaluation  exercises  were  conducted  with  a 
view  to  reporting  back  at  the  next  HTCSG  meeting  in  October  2003  on  the  most  appropriate 
form  of  on-going  peer  review  and  areas  for  improvement.  Historical,  anecdotal  data  regarding 
the  operation  of  the  network  was  collated.  The  operation  of  the  network  was  systematically 
monitored  between  July  2002  and  September  2002,  a  global  'table-top'  exercise  tested  the 
network  in  June  2003,  and  random  'ping'  tests  were  carried  out  to  ensure  that  the  relevant 
expert  points  of  contact  are  indeed  contactable.  The  evaluation  pilot  was  restricted  to  the  G8 
Member  States.  The  'table-top'  exercise,  which  the  present  author  helped  to  devise  and  co- 
ordinate,  highlighted  a  number  of  disparities  between  promise  and  performance.  16 
The  24/7  network  represents  a  form  of  pre-cursor  mutual  legal  assistance.  Its 
effectiveness,  in  part,  is  constrained  by  the  domestic  legislation  of  the  requested  State.  A  US 
federal  agent  can  issue  a  Preservation  Notice  requiring  a  Communication  Service  Provider 
[CSP]  to  preserve  specified  data  for  ninety  days  (usually  long  enough  to  instigate  a  mutual 
legal  assistance  request).  A  UK  police  officer  currently  can  do  no  more  than  invite  the  CSP 
voluntarily  to  co-operate  in  preservation  pending  a  court  order.  17  The  purpose  of  the 
evaluation  exercise  was  not  to  overcome  these  discrepancies  in  domestic  legislation  (the 
fundamentally  divergent  attitudes  to  data  protection  either  side  of  the  Atlantic  currently 
16  The  detailed  results  of  the  test  are  confidential  and  by  consensus  the  issues  raised  were  presented  in  a 
sanitised  report  to  the  HTCSG  to  avoid  embarrassing  any  national  delegation  at  the  meeting. 
17  The  Anti-Terrorism,  Crime  &  Security  Act  200  1,  enacted  in  response  to  the  events  of  II  September 
2001,  makes  limited  provision  for  communications  data  preservation  orders  in  circumstances  in  which 
national  security  is  threatened  (ATCS  Act  Part  11),  and  even  then  compliance  is  voluntary  and  subject 
to  a  Code  of  Practice  which  has  yet  to  be  drafted,  let  alone  put  out  for  consultation  and  Parliamentary 
scrutiny.  This  provision  would  not  appear  to  satisfy  UK  obligations  under  the  CoE  Cyber  Crime 
Convention  to  legislate  for  US-style  preservation  notices.  How  this  is  to  be  achieved,  given 
considerable  industry  opposition  to  such  an  instrument  following  the  partial  coming  into  force  of  the 
RIP  Act  2000,  remains  problematic. 
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prohibit  any  such  statutory  synchronisation)  but  to  ensure  that  lines  of  communication  work 
properly  and  that  the  right  individuals  are  identified  as  the  appropriate  24/7  contact.  (Interpol 
operates  its  own  national  hi-tech  crime  contacts  list,  on  which  nearly  70  States  are 
represented,  but  accepts  that  the  designated  contact  may  be  a  government  official  rather  than 
an  investigator  and  may  not  be  available  on  a  full-time,  call-out  basis.  ) 
In  making  the  proposal,  the  UK  delegation  prayed  in  aid  the  EU  peer  review 
programme  for  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  at  government  level.  18  Like  the  FATF 
programme  to  ensure  appropriate  global  anti-money  laundering  laws,  the  EU  mutual  legal 
assistance  evaluation  programme  has  now  established  its  pedigree  and  can  point  to  specific 
improvements  derived  directly  from  peer  review  and  evaluation.  Unlike  the  FATF 
programme,  it  is  not  applied  outside  the  Member  States. 
The  EU  mutual  legal  assistance  evaluation  programme 
Pursuant  to  its  Action  Plan  of  28  April  1997  to  combat  organised  crime  (OJ  97/C 
251/01  15  August  1997),  the  EU  undertook  research,  including  peer  evaluation,  into  existing 
mutual  legal  assistance  practices  among  Member  States  with  the  aim  of  identifying  areas  for 
improvement  in  order  to  enhance  mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal  matters  within  the  EU. 
The  research  and  evaluation  programme  started  "from  the  assertion  that  judicial  co-operation 
needs  to  be  brought  up  to  a  comparable  level  to  police  co-operatiow'  (EU  2001a, 
Multidisciplinary  Group  on  Organised  Crime  [MDGI,  Final  report  on  thefirst  evaluation 
exercise  -  mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal  matters,  8648/01  CRIMORG  55,10  May 
2001:  6  [hereafter  Final  Report]).  19 
The  evaluation  programme  was  conducted  over  three  years  1999  to  2001  with  five 
Member  States  being  evaluated  each  year.  Individual  reports  on  each  member  state  were 
produced  in  addition  to  annual  reports  during  the  period  of  the  exercise  and  a  final  report. 
This  programme  is  envisaged  to  be  on-going  and  the  first  three-year  round  focused  on  "delays 
in  the  operation  of  the  system  for  mutual  legal  assistance  and  urgent  requests  for  the  seizure 
of  assets,  having  particular  regard  to  cases  which  involved  organised  crime"  (EU  1999, 
Multidisciplinary  Group  on  Organised  Crime  [MDG],  Joint  Action  on  Mutual  Evaluation, 
10972/l/99  CRIN40RG  131,6  October  1999:  1  [hereafter  First  Report]). 
The  procedure  for  the  evaluations  is detailed  in  the  First  Report  (EU  1999:  4-8).  It  is 
modelled  on  the  procedure  for  FATF  evaluations:  the  FATF  Secretariat  provided  assistance  to 
18  The  European  Commission  is  represented  at  G8. 
19  Michael  Kennedy,  President  of  Eurojust,  observed  that  this  motivation  also  under-pinned  the  creation 
of  Eurojust  (Oxford  Conference,  28  August  2002). 
Clive  Harfleld.,  Procen  and  Practicalifies  73 Chapter  4:  Promoting  principles  into  practice 
the  EU  in  launching  its  three-year  programme.  Each  Member  State  was  asked  to  nominate 
three  experts  with  substantial  experience  who  would  be  prepared  to  participate  in  one 
evaluation  exercise.  From  this  list  of  names  submitted  to  the  General  Secretariat  of  the 
Council,  the  Presidency  designated  teams,  each  of  three  experts,  to  evaluate  each  Member 
State.  No  expert  was  designated  to  a  team  evaluating  his  or  her  own  jurisdiction.  A 
questionnaire  was  drawn  up  by  the  Presidency,  with  the  assistance  of  the  General  Secretariat 
of  the  Council,  and  approved  by  the  MDG.  The  questionnaire  was  sent  out  to  the  Member 
States  to  be  evaluated,  allowing  time  for  completion  (and  in  some  cases  translation)  before  the 
evaluation  team  visited  the  jurisdiction.  The  answers  to  the  questionnaire  were  considered  in 
depth  and  supplementary  questions  drafted  as  appropriate.  Member  States  drew  up  draft 
programmes  of  visits  for  the  evaluation  team  to  meet  relevant  experts  including  political, 
administrative,  police,  customs  and  judicial  authorities.  The  evaluation  teams  had  the 
opportunity  to  request  additional  visits  or  meetings  having  considered  the  draft  programme. 
Each  visit  normally  lasted  four  days. 
Within  one  month  of  completing  the  visit,  each  evaluation  team  prepared  a  draft 
report  upon  which  the  evaluated  Member  State  was  invited  to  comment.  If  the  evaluation 
team  accepted  the  responses,  the  draft  report  is  amended  accordingly.  Where  there  was 
disagreement,  an  appendix  to  the  evaluation  teams'  report,  noting  the  Member  State's 
comments,  was  drawn  up.  The  aim  was  to  achieve  amicable  consensus  for  a  programme  of 
improvement  in  conjunction  between  the  Member  State  and  the  MDG.  To  that  end,  prior  to 
the  next  scheduled  MDG  meeting,  the  evaluation  tearn  met  with  officials  from  the  Member 
State  that  had  been  evaluated  "to  try  to  resolve  any  remaining  differences  between  the  experts 
and  the  Member  State  as  contained  in  the  Annex  to  the  draft  report"  (ibid.:  7).  The  report  was 
then  discussed  within  the  MDG.  Occasionally  with  minor  amendments,  the  report's 
conclusions  and  recommendations  were  then  adopted  by  the  MDG. 
The  whole  programme  generated  fifteen  individual  reports,  three  annual  reports  and  a 
final  report.  In  sum  this  portfolio  is  effectively  a  manual  on  mutual  legal  assistance  as 
practised  within  the  EU  together  with  recommendations  on  what  needs  to  be  done  to  enhance 
co-operation  between  the  Member  States.  The  work  pre-dates  post  9-11  initiatives  and 
reactions. 
The  Final  Report  on  the  threc-year  exercise  noted  six  findings.  The  first  was  one  of 
reassurance.  "While  mutual  assistance  does  not  have  the  level  of  perfection  and  reliability 
expected  by  many  practitioners,  it  does  not  operate  as  badly  as  some  clainf'  (Final  Report:  6). 
The  habitual  criticism  that  the  mutual  legal  assistance  process  is  "slow,  inefficient  and 
powerlese'  (ibid.:  3)  was  held  to  be  outdated.  Certainly  central  authorities  in  the  member 
states  have  worked  hard  to  reduce  the  amount  of  delay.  In  the  UKCA,  the  appointment  of 
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additional  staff  helped  reduce  the  back-log  of  many  months  achieving  a  target  turnaround  of 
less  than  ten  working  days  for  outgoing  requests  in  95%  cases  and  actioning  incoming 
requests  within  twenty  working  days  in  92%  cases  (UKCA  2001:  2,2002:  1).  This  means  that 
requests  are  being  processed  more  speedily  for  onward  transmission  to  the  executing 
authorities.  It  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  investigators  are  themselves  acting  expeditiously 
upon  receipt.  Ten  other  national  reports  commented  upon  some  aspect  of  delay  inherent  in 
mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  that  could  and  should  be  improved. 
The  second  finding  was  that,  despite  statistics  that  "are  not  totally  reliable",  it  was 
evident  that  in  any  given  Member  State,  between  75%  and  95%  of  all  mutual  legal  assistance 
transactions  are  with  another  EU  Member  State,  with  much  of  the  remainder  being  made  up 
by  transactions  with  candidate  States  seeking  admission  to  the  EU  (Final  Report:  7).  Due  to 
inconsistent  statistical  practices,  the  lack  of  common  data  sets  precludes  analysis  of  request- 
types  across  the  EU.  For  the  period  1997-99,80.8%  of  requests  received  by  the  UK  were 
from  EU  Member  States  (UKCA  2000a:  4).  For  the  same  period,  65.6%  of  outgoing  UK 
requests  were  transmitted  to  EU  Member  States  (UKCA  2000b:  4). 
The  Achilles  heel  of  international  co-operation  in  criminal  matters  was  evident  in  the 
third  finding:  "forty  years  after  adoption,  the  reference  Convention  -  [the  ECMA  1959]  -  is 
not  applied  in  a  uniform  manner  either  between  the  Member  States  or  within  a  Member  State 
(Final  Report:  7).  The  problem  is  not  unique  to  the  EU.  Only  25%  of  Commonwealth 
countries  have  implemented  the  Harare  Scheme  for  mutual  legal  assistance.  Thus  75%  of 
Commonwealth  countries  have  no  power  to  extradite  suspects  for  offences  of  major  concern 
to  the  world  today  (Kimberley  Prost;  Dianne  Stafford;  both  Commonwealth  Secretariat, 
Oxford  Conference  29  and  27  August  2002  respectively).  Of  sixty-one  Member  States  (out  of 
169)  that  responded  to  a  LIN  survey  on  mutual  legal  assistance,  77%  had  adopted  mutual  legal 
assistance  legislation:  by  definition,  therefore,  23%  had  not  (Andrew  Wells,  UNDCP,  Oxford 
Conference,  29  August  2001). 
The  fourth  general  finding  was  that  outdated  practices,  administrative  routines  and 
bureaucratic  hierarchies  added  unnecessary  complexity  to  legal  problems  arising  from  mutual 
legal  assistance  (Final  Report:  7). 
The  fifth  finding  was  that  ignorance  of  languages  significantly  impaired 
communication  between  requesting  and  requested  authorities,  to  which  the  only  solution  was 
improved  language  skills  amongst  mutual  legal  assistance  practitioners.  (Final  Report:  8). 
And  finally,  the  report  noted  that  in  this  arena  "there  is  one  certainty:  the  upward 
trend  in  requests  for  mutual  legal  assistance"  (ibid.  ).  The  first  quarter  of  2002  demonstrated  a 
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4.7%  increase  (over  the  previous  year)  on  the  number  of  requests  being  handled  by  the  UKCA 
(UKCA  2002:  1). 
A  number  of  noteworthy  facts  were  recognised  during  the  course  of  the  general 
discussion.  Indeed,  certain  identified  deficiencies  justified  the  drafting  of  protocols  to  existing 
conventions  to  address  the  issues  raised,  thus  demonstrating  the  added  value  of  the  evaluation 
exercise  (interview,  Yolanda  Galigo-Casilda,  14  May  2003,  European  Cominission, 
Brussels).  Mutual  legal  assistance  is  now  developing  within  the  context  of  an  increasingly 
judicial  framework.  Direct  communication  between  judicial  authorities  is  provided  for  both  in 
the  Schengen  Convention  1990  and  the  EUCMA  2000.  The  European  Judicial  Network  [EJN] 
exists  to  facilitate  that  communication  (Final  Report:  10).  Increased  judicial  involvement 
provides  protection  against  abuses.  Arguably  this  protection  hitherto  has'been  partially 
founded  upon  "cumbersome  bureaucratic  channele'  through  which  domestic  control  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  has  been  exercised  (Final  Report:  16;  see  also  23).  Such  bureaucracy 
appears  to  have  been  concerned  more  with  protecting  sovereignty  issues  than  suspect  rights 
and  did  little  to  manage  properly  or  indeed  facilitate  the  efficient  execution  of  requests.  Nor 
did  cumbersome  bureaucracy  prevent  the  development  in  some  cases  of  diverse  practices 
within  a  single  jurisdiction.  Such  internal  differences  of  interpretation  (found  in  the  UK 
amongst  other  Member  States)  cause  confusion  to  requesting  States  and  make  proper 
evaluation  difficult  (Final  Report:  21).  Direct  transmission,  where  it  is  already  practised,  has 
already  meant  that  "a  majority  of  requests  are  by-passing  the  central  authority"  (Final 
Report:  22).  Direct  transmission  calls  into  question  one  of  the  key  roles  of  the  central 
authorities,  their  clearing  house  function.  At  the  same  time,  central  authorities  are  the  obvious 
location  in  which  to  site  the  management  and  co-ordination  functions  recognised  as  necessary 
to  enhance  mutual  legal  assistance  performance.  The  evaluation  programme  has  demonstrated 
the  need  to  review  the  role  of  central  authorities  (ibid.  ). 
It  was  further  recognised  that  the  context  within  which  mutual  legal  assistance 
operates  has  changed  significantly  over  recent  years.  No  longer  a  tool  of  relatively  specialist 
and  minimal  use,  "greater  mobility  and  the  extension  of  the  economic  field"  has  led  to  an 
increase  in  offending  and  a  consequent  increase  in  need  for  mutual  legal  assistance;  an 
increase  in  demand  that  has  not  been  met  with  a  corresponding  increase  in  investment  in 
mutual  legal  assistance  infrastructure  and  personnel  (Final  Report:  25).  One  consistent  finding 
in  all  Member  States  was  that  investigators  visiting  the  requested  State  "contributed  to  the 
speed  and  relevance  in  executing  requests,  particularly  where  searching  or  interviewing  a 
witness  was  involved"  (Final  Report:  26;  a  finding  which  echoed  that  of  police  practitioners  in 
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20 
the  UK  in  1996,  see  below  p.  23ffi.  It  was  also  recognised  that  increased  mutual  legal 
assistance  traffic  was  placing  increased  demands  on  courts  of  first  instance  and  magistrates, 
for  whom  basic  training  in  mutual  legal  assistance  was  now  considered  essential  so  that  these 
officials  would  be  "in  a  position  to  practise  mutual  assistance  in  accordance  with  the 
international  and  national  instruments  in  force.  Otherwise,  the  international  instruments 
negotiated  and  the  new  laws  adopted  by  the  Member  States  will  remain  largely  a  dead  letter" 
(Final  Report:  26) 
Thirteen  areas  for  improvement  were  identified  (Final  Report:  3-4)  leading  to  twenty- 
two  recommendations  (Final  Report:  9-30;  the  recommendations  are  listed  Appendix  B).  The 
areas  for  improvement  were  as  follows: 
*  "Staff  and  material  and  budgetary  resources  are  insufficient  to  meet 
requirements  and  should  be  more  in  line  with  the  needs  of  today; 
insufficient  language  knowledge  remains  an  obstacle  to  improving  mutual 
assistance  and  to  direct  communication  between  judicial  authorities;  there  is 
considerable  need  for  training  in  this  area; 
there  is  also  a  considerable  burden  of  outdated  practice  and  pointless  red  tape 
and  hierarchical  complexity;  the  result  is  to  slow  down  the  transmission  and 
execution  of  international  requests;  the  solution  would  be  to  simplify  the 
channels  and  streamline  the  procedures; 
0  it  is  imperative  to  train  specialists  in  mutual  assistance; 
a  legal  complexity  arises  from  the  accumulation  of  international  and  national 
rules  to  be  applied  in  the  same  case;  basic  training  in  this  matter  for  those 
involved  in  mutual  legal  assistance  is  essential; 
there  are  major  discrepancies  between  the  Member  States  as  to  the 
application  of  Conventions;  a  better  policy  of  guidelines  (whatever  the 
method  of  establishing  them  and  whatever  their  legal  status)  should  be  put  in 
place; 
requests  for  mutual  assistance  based  on  offences  which  may  be  categorised  as 
tax  offences  give  rise  to  problems;  it  is  desirable  to  remedy  this  for  the  future; 
20  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  such  visits,  intended  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  requests  are  not  always 
welcome.  US  authorities  formally  queried  whether  visits  to  the  US  by  UK  officers  seeking  to  further 
their  investigations  were  really  necessary,  feeling  that  US  agencies  could  execute  many  requests 
without  a  UK  officer  being  present  (UKCA  200  1:  1). 
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0  conventions  sometimes  take  longer  to  ratify  than  is  justified  on  purely 
technical  grounds;  speedier  ratification  is  indispensable; 
double  criminality  remains  a  potential  ground  for  rejecting  requests  when  the 
measure  requested  is  coercive;  the  European  Union  should  continue  to 
discuss  this  matter; 
e  the  exercise  of  rights  of  appeal  should  not  be  able  to  be  used  for  delaying 
purposes; 
9  use  of  good  practice  should  be  implemented  carefully  in  the  Member  States 
and  should  be  monitored  by  the  European  Judicial  Network; 
0  statutes  of  limitations  under  the  law  of  the  requested  State  should  no  longer 
be  an  obstacle  to  the  execution  of  requests; 
and  finally,  as  a  general  lesson  to  be  drawn,  the  high  concentration  of  mutual 
assistance  within  the  European  Union  itself  should  encourage  further  use  of  a 
specific  approach  to  mutual  assistance  between  the  Member  States  in  the  area 
of  freedom,  security  and  justice,  in  particular  as  it  is  likely  that  this  aspect 
might  become  of  growing  importance  with  the  enlargement  of  the  European 
Union.  "  (Final  Report:  34) 
The  latter  proposition  is  of  particular  interest  given  that  it  coincides  with  the  concept 
of  mutual  recognition  that  renders  many  aspects  of  mutual  legal  assistance,  as  currently 
structured,  redundant  (Programme  of  measures  to  implement  mutual  recognition  OJ  2001/C 
12/02).  The  European  Arrest  Wan-ant  [EAW]  is  an  example  of  mutual  recognition  being 
implemented  (EU  2001b).  The  bulk  and  proportion  of  mutual  legal  assistance  traffic  between 
EU  Member  States  clearly  supports  arguments  in  favour  of  an  EU-specific  approach  but  this 
is  not  without  significant  consequences.  Mutual  legal  assistance  relationships  between  EU 
Member  States  and  Third  Parties  may  be  complicated  by  the  establishment  of  an  EU-specific 
regime.  Third  Parties  have  been  successftilly  incorporated  into  EU  arrangements  as  the 
accession  of  Iceland  and  Norway  to  the  Schengen  Convention  demonstrates  but  such 
accommodation  will  not  always  be  possible,  or  even  desirable. 
During  foreign  research  conducted  as  a  Fulbright  Fellow  in  2001,  the  present  author 
interviewed  a  number  of  US  law  enforcement  and  government  officials  in  Washington  DC 
who  demonstrated  a  frustrated  ambivalence  towards  Europe.  On  the  one  hand  US  authorities 
bemoaned  regional  consensus  and  EU  common  positions  that  interfered  with  the  US  strong 
preference  to  establish  a  framework  of  bilateral  MLATs  with  European  States  (which, 
depending  on  relative  political  and  economic  relationships,  can  be  individually-tailorcd  to  US 
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advantage).  On  the  other  hand,  the  same  authorities  were  equally  keen  to  be  admitted  to  the 
privileged  and  stream-lined  arrangements  proposed  within  the  EU,  such  as  the  EAW,  at  least 
as  far  as  securing  suspects  wanted  for  trial  in  the  US  was  concerned.  21 
Talks  regarding  mutual  legal  assistance  between  the  EU  and  the  US  were  being 
conducted  secretly  prior  to  the  terrorist  attacks  against  the  mainland  USA,  11  September 
2001.  Since  then  the  fact  that  such  negotiations  have  been  taking  place  is  more  widely  known 
although  the  details  remain,  at  US  insistence,  largely  undisclosed  (Statewatch  12(2),  EU-US 
secret  agreement  in  the  making,  March-April,  2002:  1-2.  ).  In  addition  to  these  talks,  US 
authorities  and  Europol  have  signed  an  agreement  to  work  more  closely  together 
operationally,  which  in  effect  means  more  sharing  of  information  since  Europol  strictly- 
speaking  undertakes  no  operational  function  (Europol  press  release  13/02,20  December 
2002).  Discussion  in  depth  about  these  issues  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  present  paper,  suffice 
it  to  make  two  points:  whatever  enhanced  mutual  legal  assistance  arrangements  are  arrived  at 
within  the  EU,  there  will  remain  a  need  to  conduct  mutual  legal  assistance  with  Third  Parties 
and  so  new  improved  mechanisms  within  the  EU  may  have  to  co-exist  alongside  traditional 
mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  (thus  creating,  defacto,  a  two-tier  mutual  legal  assistance 
environment).  And  secondly,  post  II  September  200  1,  there  has  been  an  added  impetus  to 
addressing  the  issues  raised  by  the  EU  internal  evaluation  process,  although  as  Dubois  has 
noted  (2002),  fundamental  differences  between  European  jurisdictions  and  the  US  regime  in 
philosophy  and  approach  mean  that  meaningful  and  significant  co-operation  and  co- 
ordination  remains  elusive  (see  also  Harfield  2003). 
Added  impetus  has,  nevertheless,  been  manifest  in  the  UK  reaction  to  its  own 
assessment.  The  report  on  the  UK  runs  to  eighty-six  pages  (EU  2001c,  [hereafter  the  UK 
Report]).  The  UK  was  the  final  Member  State  to  be  evaluated.  The  evaluation  team  met  with 
thirty-seven  UK  experts  including  civil  servants,  politicians,  customs  and  SFO  officials, 
departmental  lawyers  and  solicitors  in  private  practice  and  four  police  officers:  two 
representing  the  Interpol  and  Europol  bureaux  at  NCIS,  one  from  the  mutual  legal  assistance 
section  of  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service  Fraud  Department  and  his  opposite  number  from 
the  City  of  London  Police  Fraud  Department  (UK  Report:  61-62).  The  UK  expertise  made 
available  to  the  EU  evaluation  team  was  primarily  administrative  and  legal  in  character.  The 
relative  lack  and  limited  scope  of  investigative  expertise  meant  that  key  users  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  did  not  participate  in  the  evaluation.  The  decision  about  which  practitioners  met  the 
21  In  a  touching  display  of  confidence  that  perhaps  over-estimated  the  status  and  influence  of  his 
interviewer,  one  lawyer  from  the  Office  of  International  Affairs,  Dcpt  of  Justice,  Washington  DC, 
requested  the  present  author  to  intercede  with  the  British  Prime  Minister  on  behalf  of  the  US  authorities 
on  this  matter. 
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evaluation  team  was  a  matter  for  the  Member  States,  not  the  EC  (interview,  Yolanda  Galigo- 
Casilda,  14  May  2003,  EC,  Brussels). 
The  evaluation  team  made  eleven  UK-specific  recommendations,  three  of  which  had 
twenty-one  sub-clauses  between  them  (UK  Report:  58-60).  Arising  from  the  UK  review,  the 
evaluation  team  also  made  five  recommendations  of  EU-wide  relevance. 
In  summary,  inter  alia,  the  UK  was  invited  to  implement  fully  all  its  treaty 
obligations  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance;  to  make  various  legislative  changes  to 
overcome  existing  obstacles  to  full  co-operation;  to  consider  direct  transmission  of  evidence 
between  judicial  authorities;  enhance  the  role  of  the  UKCA  as  co-ordinator  of  all  aspects  of 
the  mutual  legal  assistance  process  (seven  separate  recommendations);  to  provide  increased 
resources  to  the  UKCA  and  all  agencies  in  order  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  requests;  to 
make  better  use  of  the  European  Judicial  Network;  and  to  standardise  approaches  to  the 
interpretation  of  urgent  requests,  application  of  the  U(IQ  Act  1990  on  this  issue  having  been 
found  to  be  inconsistent  across  England  and  Wales  (ibid.:  40  and  60;  the  recommendations  are 
listed  in  Appendix  B). 
The  publication  of  the  UK  report  in  March  2001,  together  with  the  UK  application  to 
accede  to  parts  of  the  Schengen  Convention,  the  signing  of  the  EUCMA  2000,  and  the  Second 
Additional  Protocol  to  the  ECMA  1959,  prompted  two  internal  consultation  exercises  seeking 
expert  and  practitioner  views  on  UK  mutual  legal  assistance  legislation  and  the  role  of  the 
UKCA  in  August  2001.  The  results  of  these  consultations  have  been  circulated  privately  by 
the  UKCA.  22  On  the  basis  of  replies  quoted,  consultation  with  the  police  service  appears  to 
have  been  confined  to  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service,  the  City  of  London  Police  and  the 
NCIS  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  legislation  (possibly  the  same  representatives  that 
met  with  the  evaluation  team),  and  extended  to  include  Kent  County  Constabulary  for  the 
consultation  in  relation  to  the  UKCA.  There  is  no  indication  that  ACPO  had  been  consulted. 
IIMCE  had,  in  a  number  of  instances,  provided  confidential  replies  for  UKCA  eyes  only;  the 
only  responding  agency  to  insist  on  this  (which  begs  questions  that  cannot  be  answered  here 
about  the  motivation  for  such  a  stipulation). 
There  were  clearly  differences  of  opinion  within  this  UK  mutual  legal  assistance 
community.  HMCE,  for  instance,  voiced  strong  reservations  about  the  implementation  of 
Joint  Investigation  Teams,  arguing  that  primary  legislation  would  be  required  to  allow  foreign 
22  1  am  grateful  to  the  UKCA  for  supplying  me  with  copies  of  the  two  questionnaires  upon  which  the 
consultations  were  based  and  the  tabulated  responses. 
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investigators  to  participate  in  investigations  within  the  UK.  23  It  is  difficult  not  to  conclude  that 
agency  political  agenda  informed  some  of  the  responses;  a  fact  that  makes  the 
unrepresentative  nature  of  the  police  service  consultation  all  the  more  concerning.  At  the  six- 
monthly  mutual  legal  assistance  forum  hosted  by  the  UKCA,  only  the  afore-mentioned  police 
agencies  and  the  National  Hi-Tech  Crime  Unit  are  represented,  not  ACPO.  Communication 
between  the  UKCA  and  police  forces  outside  London  is  via  the  International  Liaison  Officcr 
[ILO]  for  each  force,  a  role  usually  found  in  the  Force  Intelligence  Bureau  (or  equivalent)  that 
provides  a  contact  point  to  which  the  UKCA  can  forward  incoming  requests.  At  least  one 
Detective  Inspector  in  one  force  has  been  undertaking  the  functions  without  realising  that  he 
was  fulfilling  a  specific  and  designated  role,  and  was  theoretically  part  of  a  nationwide 
network  of  ILOs  (pcrs.  comm.,  September  2002,  Detective  Superintendent  from  a  Midlands 
force).  The  Interpol  NCB  at  NCIS  holds  an  annual  training  conference  for  ILOs  but  this  is  not 
a  network  through  which  the  UKCA  has  sought  to  consult  the  wider  police  service  on  the 
operation  of  mutual  legal  assistance. 
A  month  after  the  Home  Office  consultation  exercise  commenced,  the  terrorist  attacks 
against  the  US  took  place.  Consequently  extra  impetus  was  injected  into  the  mutual  legal 
assistance  debate  within  the  UK,  which  had  already  been  galvanised  by  the  evaluation 
programme.  The  impetus  however,  was  not  sustained.  Section  III  of  the  Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime  &  Security  Act  2001  made  provision  for  an  authorised  Minister  by  regulation  (therefore 
secondary  rather  than  primary  legislation)  to  implement  certain  JHA  instruments  including 
the  EUCMA.  This,  in  the  context  of  UK  legislation,  revolutionary  statutory  device  was 
constrained  by  a  dead-line  of  July  2002  which  was  not  met.  The  provision  lapsed  and  UK 
commitments  under  EUCAM  will  once  again  have  to  be  given  domestic  effect  through 
primary  legislation.  There  is  little  opportunity  for  this  given  the  current  government's 
legislative  ambitions.  Because  the  EU  was  committed  to  having  the  EUCMA  fully  in  force  by 
December  2002,  time  was  made  in  the  Parliamentary  Session  commencing  November  2002 
for  the  Crime  (International  Co-operation)  Bill  to  be  tabled  (19  November  2002,1  louse  of 
Lords).  Even  so,  this  Bill  did  not  become  law  before  the  EU  deadline.  Furthermore,  pressure 
on  Parliamentary  time  means  that  this  Bill  will  implement  only  UK  obligations  regarding  the 
EUCMA  and  will  not  overhaul  other  issues  raised  during  the  evaluation  exercise  and 
subsequent  consultation.  The  domestic  review  of  the  UK  mutual  legal  assistance 
infrastructure,  which  commenced  with  the  two  questionnaires  circulated  in  response  to  the 
evaluation  report,  ironically,  was  suspended  in  order  for  the  UKCA  staff  to  focus  on 
legislative  preparation  and  support  Ministers  during  the  Parliamentary  passage  of  the  Bill 
23  Although  this  was  perceived  as  a  problem  by  HMCE,  it  was  not  so  perceived  by  the  I  lome  Office. 
Just  such  a  measure  was  enacted  in  the  Police  Reform  Act  2002  (§  103)  a  year  in  advance  of  other 
EUCMA  provisions  that  were  enacted  in  the  C(IQ  Act  2003. 
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(UKCA,  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum  3  July  2002,  and  6  December  2002,  record  of 
meeting).  The  review  re-commenced  in  January  2004. 
The  EU  mutual  legal  assistance  evaluation  programme  has  high-lightcd  a  number  of 
issues,  particularly  within  the  UK.  It  partially  addresses  Chatterton's  concern  discussed  above 
that  institutions  and  mechanisms  are  created  without  their  effectiveness  ever  being  assessed. 
Clearly  the  EU  is  taking  steps  to  ensure  that  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  in  place  are 
fit  for  their  purpose.  But  in  focusing  on  the  government  administrators,  rather  than  the 
investigators  who  seek  and  provide  the  actual  mutual  legal  assistance,  the  EU  programme  still 
does  not  address  the  outcome  of  mutual  legal  assistance:  do  current  mechanisms  deliver 
evidence,  prosecutions  and  convictions?  The  evaluation  of  the  UK  structures  and  the 
responses  to  the  evaluation,  have  also  shown  that  the  Home  Office  is  content  to  rely  on  very 
specialist  views  from  the  police  service  when  seeking  a  practitioner  perspective  from 
investigators.  The  Interpol  and  Europol  bureaux  at  NCIS  do  not  carry  out  investigative 
casework  leading  to  prosecution,  being  rather  conduits  through  which  mutual  legal  assistance 
may  be  facilitated.  24  And  neither  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service,  27,000  officers  serving  a 
resident  population  of  seven  million,  nor  the  City  of  London  Police,  just  under  800  officers 
serving  a  resident  population  of  3,000,  can  be  considered  typical  of  UK  policing.  Both  have 
specialist  fraud  investigative  functions  consequent  upon  serving  the  business  cornmunities  in 
London,  which  no  other  force  replicates.  Indeed,  fraud  investigation  is  not  currently  a  policing 
priority  set  for  other  forces  by  the  Home  Secretary.  The  mutual  legal  assistance  experience  in 
the  London-based  fraud  squads  is  extensive,  but  very  specialised.  Neither  can  be  regarded  as 
legitimately  representative  of  policing  in  England  and  Wales  however  informed  their 
responses  to  Home  Office  consultation  might  be. 
There  thus  is  value  to  be  gained  in  researching  the  experiences  of  other  police  forces 
in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  in  order  to  respond  completely  to  the  challenge  set  by 
Chatterton.  Herein  there  is  considerable  scope  for  original  research:  this  area  has  hitherto 
attracted  very  little  research  interest.  That  work  which  has  been  undertaken  has  been  limited 
in  ambition  and  is  now  due  for  review  and  comparative  study. 
24  Police  staff  at  the  Interpol  NCB,  NCIS,  can  carry out  some  basic  enquiries  on  behalf  of  foreign 
authorities  (such  as  interrogation  of  the  Police  National  Computer  or  the  checking  of  commercial 
organisation  against  the  Companies  House  register  for  instance)  but  nothing  that  requires  coercive 
powers  or  the  taking  of  a  witness  statement  (per.  comm.,  Interpol  NCB,  NCIS,  26  July  2002). 
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Chapter  5 
Understanding  police  perspectives  on  the  effectiveness  of  mutual  legal  assistance 
Introduction 
The  experiences  of  police  forces  having  been  identified  as  a  fruitful  area  of  research 
into  mutual  legal  assistance,  this  chapter  outlines  such  limited  work  as  has  been  completed  in 
this  arena  and  identifies  how  the  present  resear-ch  complements  and  supplements  previous 
work.  It  also  outlines  how  the  present  research  has  been  undertaken. 
Previous  UK  evaluation  of  mutual  leizal  assistance  processgs 
In  1996  Nicholson  and  Harrison,  then  serving  officers  with  the  Devon  and  Cornwall 
Constabulary,  undertook  a  study  of  international  evidence  gathering  by  British  police  forces. 
The  study  was  sponsored  by  the  Police  Research  Award  Scheme  and  published  by  the  Home 
Office  (Nicholson  &  Harrison,  1996).  Interestingly,  the  UKCA  "felt  unable  to  participate  in 
this  research"  (ibid.:  46),  which  fact  undoubtedly  informed  the  critical  stance  taken  by  the 
authors  on  the  work  and  value  of  the  UKCA. 
The  principal  findings  of  the  1996  study  were  as  follows: 
*  Advanced  fee  fraud,  at  the  time,  was  the  most  common  type  of  offence 
category  requiring  collection  of  evidence  from  abroad; 
*  Experienced  investigators  obtained  evidence  from  abroad  more  quickly  than 
those  unfamiliar  with  the  process; 
*  From  1990  to  1996,  US  authorities  provided  the  quickest  average  response  to 
UK  requests,  Spain  the  slowest; 
Only  one  defendant  had  been  acquitted  as  a  result  of  time  delays  associated 
with  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad;  however,  sixty-nine  investigations  or 
prosecutions  had  been  abandoned  as  a  result  of  such  problems; 
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Obtaining  original  documentation  for  use  at  trial  (in  accordance  with  the  'best 
evidence  rule")  was  the  most  problematic  aspect  of  securing  evidence  from 
abroad; 
*  50%  respondents  felt  Interpol  needed  to  improve  both  its  performance  and  its 
image; 
e  There  were  a  number  of  minor  abuses  to  the  formal  system  reported  but  none 
of  these  was  commented  on  or  tested  in  the  courts; 
e  Between  1990  and  1996  the  requirement  for  UK  officers  to  travel  abroad  had 
increased  by  700%; 
*  The  vast  majority  of  respondents  involved  in  gathering  evidence  from  abroad 
found  it  both  bureaucratic  and  time-consuming; 
*  Few  forces  had  guidelines  or  instructions  on  international  evidence  gathering; 
*  Few  forces  consider  alternative  means  or  consider  the  effects  of  international 
evidence  gathering  in  their  case  acceptance  criteria; 
9  There  was  a  universal  desire  for  a  centralised.  database  of  information  about 
mutual  legal  assistance  procedures  and  contacts. 
(ibid.:  Executive  Summary) 
The  authors  identified  sixteen  key  points  and  made  two  multi-element 
recommendations  (listed  in  Appendix  Q.  Amongst  their  conclusions  they  promote  the 
concept  of  a  one-stop  shop  for  mutual  legal  assistance.  On  the  basis  of  their  discussion 
supporting  this  idea,  they  appear  to  have  laboured  under  a  fundamental  misunderstanding  of 
the  differences  in  constitutional  role  and  functions  between  the  UKCA  and  the  Interpol  NCB 
which  they  found  to  be  largely  duplicitous  (ibid.:  37).  It  may  well  be  that  the  UKCA,  in  not 
participating  in  the  research,  contributed  to  this  misunderstanding.  It  is,  nevertheless,  worth 
noting  that  on  the  basis  of  different  logic,  the  EU  evaluation  exercise  has  drawn  similar 
conclusions  about  the  need  better  to  co-ordinate  mutual  legal  assistance  effort  within  Member 
States.  This  is  reflected  in  the  Council's  general  suggestions  that  the  role  of  the  central 
authorities  within  each  Member  State  be  reviewed  and  that  domestic  bureaucracy  be  pruned 
wherever  feasible.  In  promoting  the  EJN,  the  EU  is  focusing  efforts  on  a  Union-wide  co- 
ordination  and  facilitation  body,  a  tier  in  the  infrastructure  that  Nicholson  and  Harrison  had 
little  reason  to  envisage  when  writing  their  own  report. 
1  "A  party  must  produce  the  best  evidence  that  the  nature  of  the  case  would  allow.  "  I  lardwicke  LC, 
Omychund  v  Barker  [1745]  lAtk2l,  49(26ER15). 
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A  practitioner's  review  rather  than  a  formal  academic  research  project,  the 
methodology  adopted  by  Nicholson  and  Harrison  nevertheless  was  guided  by  academic 
advice  (1996:  9)  and  employed  a  two-part,  self-completion  questionnaire.  The  first  element 
was  directed  at  police  managers  with  responsibility  for  managing  staff  who  gathered  evidence 
from  abroad;  the  second  element  was  directed  at  those  staff.  The  survey  was  piloted  through  a 
telephone  study  of  intended  respondents  that  identified  two  areas  of  concern  for  potential 
respondents.  Firstly,  the  large  size  of  the  questionnaire  and  the  time  it  would  take  to  complete 
was  considered  problematic.  Secondly,  there  was  concern  that  the  questionnaire  was  seeking 
management  information  for  the  years  1990-1995  in  relation  to  gathering  evidence  abroad, 
and  many  pilot  respondents  thought  that  such  information  would  not  be  available. 
The  concerns  were  noted  by  the  researchers  but  after  due  consideration,  they 
proceeded  as  planned  trusting  upon  the  good  will  of  police  colleagues  to  complete  the 
questionnaires,  and  accepting  that  an  absence  of  management  information  about  this 
particular  form  of  investigative  activity  would,  of  itself,  highlight  issues  in  the  management  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  (ibid.:  10). 
The  1996  study  was  targeted  primarily  at  Fraud  Squads,  ILOs  and  the  [then]  Regional 
Crime  Squads  and  sent  to  "fifty-six  police  forces  in  Great  Britain  and  the  Channel  Islands" 
(ibid.  ).  These  were  not  identified  in  the  study  and  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  be  certain  exactly 
which  forces  participated.  For  at  least  some  of  the  data  sets  accumulated  as  part  of  the  1996 
research,  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service  and  the  West  Midlands  Police  were  deliberately 
excluded  because  it  was  felt  the  likely  large  responses  from  these  forces  would  skew  the 
sample  (ibid.:  12).  It  is  not  apparent  from  the  report  of  the  study  whether  these  two  forces 
were  in  fact  excluded  altogether.  There  are  forty-three  forces  in  England  and  Wales,  2  eight  in 
Scotland  (thus  fifty-one  in  Great  Britain),  one  in  Northern  Ireland  (thus  fifty-two  in  the 
United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland),  two  in  the  Channel  Islands  and  one 
on  the  Isle  of  Man,  all  of  which  total  fifty-five.  There  were  initially  nine  Regional  Crime 
Squads  reducing  in  number  during  the  period  of  the  study  to  six.  The  arithmetic  does  not 
equate  and  so  it  is  not  clear  exactly  how  the  research  population  was  constituted.  The  authors 
assert  that  "three  United  Kingdom  forces  chose  not  to  respond"  (ibid.:  11)3  but  that  the  169 
responses  received  comprised  an  overall  response  rate  of  95%. 
2  The  forty-three  are  the  'Home  Office'  forces  delivering  local  policing,  maintained  under  §  1,2  & 
Schedule  I  Police  Act  1996.  Private  police  forces  with  limited  jurisdiction  (e.  g.  British  Transport 
Police,  MoD  Police,  British  Atomic  Energy  Authority  Police)  are  excluded. 
3  The  terms  Great  Britain  and  United  Kingdom  appear  to  have  been  used  synonymously  in  the  1996 
study. 
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In  general  terms  the  authors  were  highly  critical  of  the  UKCA  and  saw  an  enhanced 
role  for  both  the  CPS  and  Interpol  in  mutual  legal  assistance.  They  also  envisaged  an 
exponential  rise  in  the  need  to  acquire  evidence  from  abroad. 
It  is  worth  rehearsing  what,  of  significance,  has  changed  since  1996  in  this  arena. 
Nicholson  and  Harrison  appear  to  have  encountered  reluctance  bordering  upon  obstruction 
from  the  UKCA.  For  the  purposes  of  both  LLM  research  (concluded  in  1999)  and  this  present 
research,  this  author  has  enjoyed  nothing  less  than  full  co-operation  from  various  members  of 
staff  at  the  LJKCA  who  have  given  freely  of  their  time  and  facilitated  the  acquisition  of 
documents  that  might  otherwise  have  proved  elusive,  notwithstanding  their  status  as  being 
publicly  accessible.  In  1996  the  UKCA  protested  that  there  was  no  simple  way  of  answering 
the  management  information  questions  posed  by  Nicholson  and  Harrison.  Since  that  time  a 
new  computer  database  has  been  established  at  UKCA  and  staff  there  were  confident  that  any 
specific  research  queries  presented  by  this  author  would  be  amenable  to  scrutiny,  subject  to 
the  search  parameters  of  the  software.  Secondly,  the  Interpol  NCB  is  no  longer  located  within 
New  Scotland  Yard,  but  forms  part  of  the  International  Division  within  NCIS,  which  was 
created  as  a  stand-alone  institution  in  1998.  NCIS  has  published  a  guide  on  obtaining 
evidence  from  abroad.  Thirdly,  transnational  crime  now  enjoys  a  higher  political  profile  than 
it  did  in  1996.  All  current  EU  JHA  initiatives  can  effectively  be  traced  back  to  the  meeting  of 
a  EU  High  Level  Group  of  experts  on  transnational  organised  crime  held  at  Dublin  in  1996 
that  gave  rise  to  the  EU  1997  Action  Plan  to  Combat  Organised  Crime  (OJ  97/C  251/01  15 
August  1997).  Consequently  there  is  more  political  support  for  efforts  to  combat  such 
criminality.  Pursuant  to  this  higher  political  profile  is  the  fourth  significant  difference  since 
the  1996  study:  the  corpus  of  international  law  on  mutual  legal  assistance  has  increased 
significantly.  More  legislative  tools  are  being  made  available  to  investigators.  The  EUCMA 
and  Second  Additional  Protocol  to  the  ECMA  are  examples  of  this,  as  are  the  mutual  legal 
assistance  provisions  in  the  Council  of  Europe  Cyber  Crime  Convention  2001  and  the  UNTOC 
2000.  Within  the  EU,  there  is  a  growing  tendency  to  establish  co-operative  mechanisms 
through  the  implementation  of  Framework  Decisions  which,  for  all  intents  and  purposes,  are 
binding  on  Member  States. 
Peer  evaluation  is  another  significant  development  since  Nicholson  and  Harrison 
undertook  their  own  study.  Their  study,  although  focusing  on  a  different  perspective  in  the 
mutual  legal  assistance  panorama,  can  in  some  respects  be  considered  to  have  anticipated  the 
overall  aim  of  the  EU  three-year  programme:  a  desire  to  ensure  that  mutual  legal  assistance  is 
as  effective  as  possible.  EU  efforts  continue.  At  the  2385  th  Council  Meeting  on  16  November 
2001  discussing  Justice  Home  Affairs  and  Civil  Protection,  following  on  from  both  the 
completion  of  the  evaluation  programme  and  the  events  of  9-11,  the  effectiveness  of  mutual 
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legal  assistance  instruments  and  institutions  was  recognised  as  a  prevailing  key  issue  for  the 
EU  (13758/01  Presse  409).  Planning  for  future  initiative  now  includes  provision  for 
evaluating  implementation  (minutes  of  the  MDG  meeting  held  9-10  January  2002,  item 
concerning  implementation  of  the  EAW:  held  on  file  with  the  author).  The  commitment  to 
evaluation  within  the  EU  has  been  established. 
Indeed  the  enthusiasm  for  evaluation  and  review  is  evident  elsewhere  within  Third 
Pillar  programmes.  Alongside  the  three-year  mutual  legal  assistance  evaluation  programme  at 
the  administrative  level,  at  the  strategic  level  the  EU  has  evaluated  progress  in  implementing 
its  1997  Action  Plan  on  Organised  Crime  concluding  that  the  setting  of  priorities  and 
timescales;  under  the  Action  Plan  had  proved  "extremely  positive  and  successful"  (EU 
1999b:  10;  the  1997  Action  Plan  is  published  at  OJ  97/C  251/01,15  August  1997).  At  the 
Laeken  European  Council,  14-15  December  2001,  the  European  Council  reaffirmed  its 
commitment  to  the  JHA  policy  guidelines  and  objectives  defined  at  the  Tampere  European 
Council,  15-16  October  1999,  noting  that  whilst  some  progress  had  been  made  much 
remained  to  be  done  to  implement  all  the  Tampere  aspirations.  The  need  for  a  renewed  -  and 
sustained  -  impetus  was  noted  (Presidency  Conclusions  on  Justice  and  Home  'Iffairs,  Laeken 
European  Council,  paragraph  37).  Progress  at  the  strategic  level  really  can  only  be  measured 
in  terms  of  setting  up  new  institutions  and  drafting  new  instruments;  the  establishment  of 
Eurojust  is  a  case  in  point  (ibid.:  paragraphs  43  &  45).  It  is  at  the  level  of  operational 
implementation  and  utilisation  of  the  instruments  and  mechanisms  that  the  initiatives  can  best 
be  judged,  hence  evaluation  of  strategic  level  programmes  will  be  mentioned  only  in  passing 
during  the  course  of  this  research.  It  will  not  form  a  major  element  of  the  original  work  here 
proposed. 
Other  aspects  of  the  mutual  legal  assistance  arena  have  demonstrated  a  notable 
consistency  since  1996:  Nicholson  and  Harrison  remark  upon  the  lack  of  academic  comment 
about  mutual  legal  assistance  (ibid.:  6).  Their  observation  was  corroborated  by  Chatterton 
(2001:  343)  and  as  recently  as  March  2004  the  Home  Office  called  for  information  about 
barriers  and  inhibitors  experienced  by  practitioners  in  seeking  and  executing  mutual  legal 
assistance  (Home  Office  2004b:  20  but  see  also  16-19).  This  lacuna  prevails. 
Scope  and  methodology  for  further  research 
This  lacuna,  by  any  other  definition,  is  a  research  opportunity.  Notwithstanding  the 
difficulties  that  would  be  experienced  in  trying  to  mirror  Nicholson  and  Harrison's  study 
exactly,  it  is  worthwhile  revisiting  some  of  their  research  questions  in  a  structured  study  to 
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identify  comparative  trends.  To  this  end,  permission  was  obtained  from  the  Home  Office 
Policing  and  Reducing  Crime  Unit  (successors  to  the  Police  Research  Group  that  sponsored 
the  1996  study)  to  re-use  some  of  the  questions  from  the  1996  questionnaires. 
This  present  research  has  two  main  objectives.  Firstly  there  was  a  desire  to  make  such 
comparisons  as  were  feasible  with  the  general  awareness  research  published  in  1996. 
Assessing  the  level  of  general  awareness  within  police  forces  about  mutual  legal  assistance 
and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  mechanisms  and  procedures  is  a  valid  means 
of  evaluating  how  well  such  mechanisms  are  understood.  It  is  reasonable  to  hypothesise  that 
if  Nicholson  and  Harrison's  predictions  about  increased  frequency  of  evidcnce-gathering 
abroad  are  correct,  then  (through  experiential  learning  if  no  other  mechanism)  such  increased 
frequency  should  have  led  to  increased  familiarity  with  and  awareness  of  procedures.  The 
better  and  more  widely  understood  they  are,  the  more  effective  such  measures  are  likely  to  be. 
The  second  objective  was  to  examine  individual  case  studies,  with  a  view  to 
understanding  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  issues 
as  experienced  by  investigators.  Increasingly,  in  combating  transnational  organised  crime, 
investigators  are  adopting  proactive  strategies  and  tactics.  Investigating  continuous,  inchoate 
transnational  organised  criminality  up  to  the  point  when  appropriate  charges  can  be  laid  is 
rather  different  in  character  from  investigating  a  single,  historic  and  discrete  crime,  evidence 
of  which  just  happens  to  be  located  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction.  The  ECMA  195  9  was  geared  to 
providing  assistance  for  the  latter  circumstance.  At  the  outset  of  the  twenty-first  century,  what 
is  needed  are  mechanisms  that  facilitate  the  former  type  of  policing  since  it  is  now  on-going 
trarisnational  organised  crime  that  is  of  so  much  political,  social  and  economic  concern.  SIO 
interviews  should  demonstrate  this,  and  therefore  the  inadequacies  of  the  ECMA  in  the 
modem  era,  as  well  as  enabling  some  advanced  assessments  to  be  made  about  how  successful 
new  measures  introduced  in  the  EUCMA  and  the  Second  Protocol  to  the  ECMA  are  likely  to 
be.  Such  case-study  interviews  with  SlOs  do  not  appear  to  have  been  undertaken  before  and 
this  therefore  represents  a  new  source  of  data  to  be  explored. 
The  research  methodology  chosen  was  informed  by  these  two  principal  objectives. 
A  third,  subsidiary,  objective  was  to  identify  issues  of  concern  to  a  variety  of 
practitioners  engaged  in  different  aspects  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation,  in  order  to  provide  an  up-to-date  context  in  which  to  consider  the 
findings  from  the  first  two  objectives.  Personal  interviews  were  considered  to  be  the  most 
appropriate  means  of  obtaining  this  contextual  opinion  and  data. 
Accordingly,  a  self-completion  questionnaire  was  chosen  for  measuring  awareness  at 
force  level  of  mutual  legal  assistance  issues  pursuant  to  the  first  objective.  The  utility  of  such 
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an  approach  and  guidance  for  its  successful  undertaking  are  wcll-documented  (Ilibbard  & 
Bennett,  1990;  Blaxtcr  et  aL,  1996).  A  questionnaire,  taking  into  account  the  lessons  learnt  by 
Nicholson  and  Harrison  was  drafted  and  piloted  (for  ease  of  comprehension)  by  means  of 
review  by  independent  observers  who  would  play  no  part  in  the  actual  survey.  Once  refined, 
the  final  version  was  deployed  with  the  support  of  ACPO  (which  is  gratefully  acknowledged), 
directly  to  chief  officers  electronically  via  the  private  ACPO  extranet.  It  was  suggested  in  the 
accompanying  corTespondencc  that  force  ILOs  might  be  best  placed  to  respond  on  behalf  of 
the  chief  officer  but  identifying  individual  force  respondents  was  left  to  the  discretion  of  chief 
officers.  Respondents  were  invited  to  reply  either  electronically  or  in  hard  copy.  This  method 
was  chosen  because  it  represented  the  most  cost-effective  and  time-efficient  means  by  which 
a  single  part-time  researcher,  researching  alone  whilst  in  full-time  employment,  could  reach 
the  target  audience.  Personal  interviews  conducted  in  43  police  forces  across  England  and 
Wales  were  considered  not  to  be  feasible  simply  for  assessing  awareness.  It  was  recognised 
that  self-completion  questionnaires  do  not  always  enjoy  a  significant  response  rate  and  that 
such  responses  as  are  received  can  be  difficult  to  interpret  (Blaxter  et  aL,  1996:  160)  but  for 
the  purposes  of  measuring  how  general  awareness  at  force  level  had  progressed,  if  at  all,  since 
1996,  the  advantages  in  contacting  a  wider  audience  through  such  an  approach  were 
considered  to  outweigh  the  inherent  data  disadvantages. 
The  chief  advantage  that  personal  interviews  have  over  self-completion 
questionnaires  is  that  the  interviewer  has  the  opportunity  to  explore  responses  in  greater 
depth,  thus  producing  qualitative  data  that  can  be  set  alongside  the  largely  quantitative  data 
secured  through  self-completion  questionnaires  and  through  statistics  supplied  by  the  UKCA. 
The  relative  disadvantage  of  interviews,  given  the  circumstances  of  the  researcher  in  this 
study,  lies  in  the  fact  that  far  fewer  interviews  can  be  conducted  than  self-completion 
questionnaires  distributed.  Interviews  were  considered  more  appropriate  in  achieving  the 
second  general  research  objective;  detailed  case  studies  of  how  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  work  in  practice  from  the  perspective  of 
individual  investigations.  For  this  research,  semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with 
Senior  Investigating  Officers  [SIO]  from  a  variety  of  police  agencies  on  a  case-study  basis  to 
identify  particular  issues  concerning  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  mutual 
legal  assistance  that  arose  in  specific  investigations. 
Six  case-study  interviews  were  conducted  and  tape-recorded,  each  typically  taking 
two  hours  to  complete.  Anonymity  and  confidentiality  were  requested  in  some  cases  and  for 
the  sake  of  consistency  this  regime  has  been  applied  to  all.  This  armngemcnt  was  negotiated 
in  advance  with  university  authorities  and  a  sanitised  interview  log  has  been  produced, 
available  on  request  to  the  examiners  only,  in  order  to  protect  issues  of  operational  sensitivity. 
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Summarised  discussions  of  the  issues  raised  will  be  presented  here,  together  with  one 
published  case  study  so  as  to  make  available  comparative  material  that  is  in  the  public 
domain. 
Semi-structured  interviews  were  also  employed  when  conducting  the  strategic  and 
policy  interviews  with  policy-makers  and  ACPO  officers. 
All  interviewees  were  offered  the  opportunity  to  review  the  sanitised  interview  logs 
although  only  three  availed  themselves  of  this  opportunity,  none  making  amendments  to  the 
log  as  drafted.  It  is  acknowledged  that  the  researcher's  status  as  a  Detective  Inspector  then 
serving  in  the  National  Crime  Squad  (and  security-vetted  to  DV  level)  positively  influenced 
some  interviewees  in  their  decision  to  participate  in  the  research.  A  researcher  with  a  non- 
police  background  may  not  have  been  afforded  the  level  of  access  enjoyed  by  this  researcher 
and  it  is  certain  that  a  number  of  issues  discussed  as  contextual  background  would  not  have 
been  mentioned  to  other  researchers.  None  of  the  sensitive  material  provided  by  way  of 
context  is  discussed  below  but  the  data  that  is  discussed  is  presented  from  a  position  of 
informed  authority  that  might  not  otherwise  have  been  the  case.  For  this  privileged  access,  the 
author  is  gratefid. 
It  was  anticipated  that  these  data  would  allow  an  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  from  the  perspective  of  the  investigator  whose  tools  they 
are.  Such  research  supplements  the  findings  at  inter-governmental  and  administrative  levels 
derived  from  the  EU  evaluation  programme.  It  will  enable  some  initial  conclusions  to  be 
drawn  about  the  outcome  of  mutual  legal  assistance,  rather  than  just  the  outputs.  It  will 
contribute  towards  filling  the  knowledge  gap  identified  by  Chatterton  (2001). 
Conclusion 
Methodology  has  been  determined  by  the  two  principal  research  objectives: 
measuring  current  awareness  at  force  level  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation  structures,  and  identifying  specific  issues  that  have  confronted 
senior  investigators.  In  addition,  contextual  interviews  have  been  conducted  with  key 
practitioners  as  a  means  of  supplementing  the  literature  review  in  an  area  of  study  that 
hitherto  has  not  enjoyed  extensive  academic  scrutiny. 
The  fmdings  of  the  questionnaire  research  and  the  case-study  interviews  are  presented 
in  the  following  chapters. 
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Chapter  6 
Mutual  legal  assistance  in  practice:  current  force  perspectives 
The  original  research  data  presented  in  this  thesis  fall  into  three  categories: 
questionnaire  responses  from  officers  in  local  police  forces  in  England  and  Wales  that  have 
undertaken  routine  enquiries  conducted  overseas;  interview-based  case  study  material  from 
senior  investigating  officers  [SlOs]  and  prosecutors  who  have  worked  on  major  criminal 
investigations  of  a  transnational  nature;  and  interview  material  from  policy-makers  such  as 
European  Commission  officials  and  ACPO  officers  who  participate  in  international  strategic 
and  policyfora  in  relation  to  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  within  the  EU.  In 
this  chapter,  the  results  of  the  self-completion  questionnaire  are  discussed  following  a  general 
discussion  of  the  survey  methodologies  adopted. 
The  questionnaire  study:  dissemination  and  response 
In  the  autumn  of  2002,  a  self-completion  questionnaire  was  circulated  to  the  forty- 
three  local  police  forces  in  England  and  Wales  (as  defined  in  §I  and  Schedule  I  Police  Act 
1996:  the  questionnaire  is  reproduced  in  Appendix  D).  As  has  been  noted  above  (Chapter  5), 
this  drew  upon  a  previous  study  for  some  of  its  elements  whilst  at  the  same  time  introduced 
new  questions  relevant  to  the  prevailing  circumstances.  The  present  questionnaire  was  piloted 
with  UK  police  officers,  non-police  law  enforcement  professionals  also  engaged  in 
transnational  investigations,  and  with  academics.  As  a  result  of  this  pilot,  minor  revisions  to 
phrasing  to  ensure  clarity  were  made  prior  to  the  formal  circulation. 
The  survey  not  only  had  the  permission  of  the  Home  Office  to  rc-use  questions  and 
ideas  from  the  1996  study,  but  also  had  the  support  of  ACPO  and  with  the  authority  of  Chief 
Constable  Paul  Kemaghan  (Chair,  ACPO  International  Affairs),  together  with  an 
accompanying  letter  of  support  from  Kernaghan  and  a  letter  of  explanation  from  the  present 
author,  was  circulated  electronically  via  the  secure  ACPO  extranet.  As  a  matter  of  protocol 
the  questionnaire  was  addressed  to  Chief  Constables  with  the  request  that  the  matter  be 
referred  to  an  appropriate  staff  member  for  completion.  At  this  stage  of  the  research  it  was  not 
known  whether  or  not  there  would  be  a  dedicated  role  within  each  force  from  which  the 
information  sought  could  be  easily  obtained. 
Respondents  were  invited  to  respond  either  electronically  or  in  hard  copy.  The 
method  of  dissemination  determined  that  it  was  not  possible  to  send  stamped/addressed 
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envelopes  with  the  questionnaires  for  respondents  to  use  when  replying,  as  would  normally  be 
expected  with  a  self-completion  questionnaire  (Hagan  1993:  128-54;  Hibberd  &  Bennett 
1990).  It  was  anticipated  that  respondents  would  prefer  to  respond  electronically.  In  the  event, 
only  a  third  of  the  initial  respondents  chose  to  do  so,  the  remainder  responding  in  hard  copy. 
Of  the  forty-three  English  and  Welsh  forces  to  which  the  questionnaire  was  circulated, 
responses  were  received  from  twenty-three,  a  response  rate  of  53%. 
Whilst  these  initial  responses  were  being  returned  the  author,  through  a  combination 
of  on-going  research  and  professional  contacts,  became  aware  of  the  network  of  UK  police 
force  international  liaison  officers  [ILO]  established  in  conjunction  with  Interpol  NCB  in 
London.  This  is  a  network  of  single  points  of  contact  for  correspondence  between  Interpol 
NCB  in  London  and  UK  local  forces.  The  ILOs  are  also  the  formal  recipients  for 
correspondence  from  the  UKCA.  The  present  author  was  a  guest  presenter  at  a  closed  training 
session  for  UK  ILOs  held  by  NCIS/Interpol,  November  2002.  As  a  result  of  this  contact,  the 
author  was  able  to  identify  named  contact  points  (the  ILOs)  within  each  of  the  twenty-one 
non-respondent  forces.  At  the  conference  a  show  of  hands  revealed  that  eight  ILOs  had 
received  the  initial  transmission  of  the  survey. 
It  was  determined  using  this  information,  that  a  targeted  follow-up  strategy  would  be 
effected  to  encourage  participation  from  the  non-respondent  forces  and  so  enhance  the  data 
sample.  This  was  considered  appropriate  as  the  composition  and  characteristics  of  the 
respondent  sample  and  the  response  rate  were  not  in  and  of  themselves  significant  variables 
within  the  context  of  the  survey.  Any  additional  responses  achieved  through  this  follow-up 
strategy  would  increase  the  overall  data  sample  without  compromising  its  integrity.  This  was 
not  a  survey  in  which  the  response  rate  itself  was  a  variable  under  study.  Accordingly,  the 
SCQ  was  mailed  in  hard  copy  to  each  ILO  from  a  non-respondent  force,  together  with  a 
stamped  addressed  envelope.  This  method  of  transmission  was  adopted  because  not  all  ILOs 
had  recorded  an  email  address  within  their  contact  particulars. 
As  a  result  of  this  follow-up  strategy  a  further  nine  completed  questionnaires  were 
received.  Thus  the  total  respondent  sample  represents  thirty-two  forces  from  the  forty-three 
serving  England  and  Wales,  a  response  rate  of  74%.  1 
Nicholson  and  Harrison  reported  a  response  rate  of  95%  for  all  UK  forces  with  only 
three  forces  choosing  not  to  respond  (1996:  11).  Inconsistencies  with  their  data  sample  have 
already  been  highlighted  (see  above,  Chapter  5). 
1  Although  respondents  were  asked  to  identify  themselves,  one  force  from  the  follow-up  group  returned 
an  anonymous  response.  There  was  a  tenth  respondent,  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service,  bringing  the 
response  rate  to  76%,  but  for  reasons  discussed  below,  no  questionnaire  was  completed  by  this  force. 
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The  forces  that  responded  to  the  present  survey  are  listed  in  Appendix  E.  The  sample 
is  considered  sufficient  in  size  within  the  context  of  the  total  survey  population  to  be 
indicative  of  trends  and  general  understanding  about  mutual  legal  assistance  within  local 
police  forces.  The  geographical  spread  of  responding  forces  ranged  across  England  and  Wales 
from  north  to  south,  and  from  east  to  west  encompassing  both  urban  and  rural  forces  and  both 
large  and  small  forces.  This  reinforces  the  representative  nature  of  the  sample. 
The  issue  that  particularly  concerned  Nicholson  and  Harrison,  that  inclusion  of  the 
two  largest  forces,  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service  [MPS]  and  the  West  Midlands  Police, 
would  skew  the  sample,  did  not  arise  in  this  survey.  The  West  Midlands  Police  did  not 
respond,  and  the  MPS,  although  a  response  was  received,  did  not  participate. 
In  the  latter  instance,  there  are  numerous  specialist  units  and  departments  which  work 
with  a  level  of  autonomy  neither  feasible  nor  necessary  in  small-  to  medium-sized  forces. 
Consequently,  there  are  a  number  of  different  units  within  the  force  that  might  have 
responded  in  the  absence  of  a  single  point  through  which  to  channel  all  incoming  and 
outgoing  enquires.  Although  the  MPS  has  a  unit  assigned  solely  to  extradition  and  mutual 
legal  assistance  enquiries,  it  handles  incoming  requests  only.  The  various  specialist  units 
within  the  MPS,  such  as  the  fraud  squad,  or  murder  teams,  or  the  child  protection  teams,  that 
would  be  likely  to  initiate  out-going  requests  as  a  result  of  the  nature  of  their  work,  make  such 
requests  of  their  own  volition  and  by  their  own  arrangements.  In  the  absence  of  any  centrally 
collected  management  data  in  respect  of  mutual  legal  assistance  requests,  it  would  be  very 
difficult  to  obtain  any  coherent  response  and  any  response  based  on  the  work  of  just  one  unit 
or  department  would  be  unrepresentative  of  that  organisation. 
In  one  instance  it  is  clear  that  a  single  specialist  unit  has  responded  in  lieu  of  a  force 
2 
response.  The  respondent  for  the  City  of  London  Police,  the  Detective  Superintendent  in 
charge  of  the  fraud  squad,  made  the  point  that  he  was  responding  because  his  department 
dealt  with  the  vast  majority  of  the  force's  out-going  and  in-coming  requests  for  mutual  legal 
assistance.  The  minimal  number  of  requests  involving  other  investigating  units  within  the 
City  of  London  Police  was  considered  to  be  statistically  insignificant  for  the  purposes  of  this 
trend  analysis. 
2  With  an  establishment  numbering  only  777  (HC  Hansard,  31  March  2003,  col.  58  1  W;  0.6%  of  the 
total  local  force  establishment  in  England  &  Wales)  and  a  police  area  of  approximately  a  square  mile, 
in  September  2002  the  City  of  London  Police  was  the  smallest  of  the  I  lome  Office  forces,  but  one  with 
a  unique  victim/offending  profile  given  the  nature  of  the  community  it  serves:  relatively  few  domestic 
residents  and  a  very  high  proportion  of  commercial  -  mainly  international  financial  sector  - 
organisations  based  within  its  force  area.  Its  fraud  squad  deals  with  a  disproportionately  high  number  of 
cases  involving  mutual  legal  assistance. 
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As  described  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  1996  survey  contacted  more  than  one 
respondent  per  force.  Such  a  strategy  was  not  adopted  for  this  study  because  part  of  its 
purpose  was  to  explore  where  such  a  request  for  research  data  would  be  delegated  within  a 
force  rather  than  target  specific  individuals  or  departments  as  the  1996  survey  had  done.  Thus 
only  one  response  per  force  was  expected. 
The  hypothesis  being  tested  in  this  instance  was  that  a  research  request  for  mutual 
legal  assistance  data  would  follow  the  same  internal  contact  paths  initially  as  a  formal  request 
for  mutual  legal  assistance  itself.  The  purpose  of  this  was  to  discover  to  which  role  would  be 
delegated  responding  on  behalf  of  the  force. 
Respondents  were  asked  to  identify  themselves  and  provide  contact  details  in  the 
event  that  any  follow  up  clarification  was  necessary.  This  data  identified  that  sixteen 
respondents  (50%  of  respondents)  worked  in  their  force  intelligence  bureau,  two  in  a  fraud 
squad,  one  in  a  crime  operations  unit  and  one  in  a  crime  support  unit  (these  latter  two  labels 
may  well  be  local  terminology  that  in  fact  incorporates  the  functionality  of  what  elsewhere  is 
termed  a  force  intelligence  bureau).  One  was  located  in  the  force's  European  Liaison  Unit.  It 
was  not  apparent  where  the  remaining  respondents  were  located  within  their  respective 
organisations.  Three  respondents  cited  no  designation.  The  remainder  were  all  police  officers 
(three  Detective  Constables,  eight  Detective  Sergeants,  nine  Detective  Inspectors,  four 
Detective  Chief  Inspectors  and  one  Detective  Superintendent).  Question  3  of  the  survey 
sought  to  identify  if  there  was  a  designated  single  point  of  contact  within  the  force  for 
incoming  mutual  legal  assistance  requests.  Of  the  thirty-one  positive  responses  to  this 
question,  twenty-three  were  located  in  the  force  intelligence  bureau,  four  were  specifically 
described  as  the  ILO,  additionally  one  respondent  identified  the  single  point  as  the  ILO  in  the 
force  intelligence  bureau,  and  one  respondent  identified  the  force  single  point  of  contact  for 
incoming  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  as  being  the  fraud  squad. 
Thus  there  is  a  general  consistency  of  approach  adopted  by  most  forces  in  the 
organisational  positioning  of  the  staff  responsible  for  handling  or  managing  mutual  legal 
assistance  requests  channelled  to  or  from  the  force.  Twenty-three  of  the  responding  forces 
stated  they  had  no  dedicated  unit  either  for  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad  or  for  obtaining 
evidence  locally  in  response  to  an  in-coming  request.  Eight  had  assigned  the  function  of 
obtaining  foreign  evidence  to  designated  roles  but  only  two  had  similar  arrangements  for  the 
handling  of  incoming  requests.  3  Thames  Valley  Police  reported  that  both  these  roles  were 
undertaken  within  the  force  intelligence  bureau  whilst  West  Mercia  reported  that  obtaining 
foreign  evidence  was  the  preserve  of  the  force  intelligence  bureau  and  the  economic  crimes 
3  In  addition  to  these,  there  is  the  Extradition  and  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  unit  of  the  MPS 
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unit  but  that  there  was  no  specialist  unit  for  executing  requests  received  from  foreign 
agencies.  The  large  majority  of  forces  in  England  and  Wales,  no  doubt  with  a  view  to 
managing  heavy  demands  upon  scarce  resources,  prefer  to  manage  process  requests  and 
assign  evidential  tasks  individually  as  required  rather  than  maintain  a  specialist  unit  for  such 
purposes.  One  chief  constable  with  personal  knowledge  of  a  dedicated  international  enquiry 
team  maintained  by  a  Home  Office  force,  stated  that  such  were  the  demands  for  staff  to 
deliver  local  policing  objectives,  the  future  of  the  international  enquiry  team  was  effectively 
under  review  and  its  disbandment  a  real  possibility  (ACPO  (IA)  interview  23  July  2002). 
The  questionnaires  do  appear  to  have  been  delegated  for  completion  by  staff  who 
would  also  facilitate  mutual  legal  assistance  requests.  This  affords  some  confidence  in  the 
authority  of  the  data  supplied  as  a  result  of  the  self-completion  questionnaire. 
Data  available  within  forces  regarding  mutual  lezal  assistance  r2quests 
Twenty-four  respondents  reported  that  the  force  recorded  out-going  requests  (75%  of 
respondents).  Twcnty-eight  reported  that  the  force  recorded  incoming  requests  (87%  of 
respondents)  (Questions  I&  2).  But  a  number  of  respondents  contacted  the  researcher  in 
connection  with  these  questions  to  explain  that  their  records  were  effectively  correspondence 
registers;  a  means  of  monitoring  processes  rather  than  collating  management  data. 
Nevertheless,  all  thirty-two  respondents  responded  to  Questions  9  and  10  which  sought  to 
measure  frequency  trends  over  time  and  some  of  the  respondents  were  able  to  provide 
detailed  statistics  in  response  to  these  questions  (see  below  Tables  3&  4).  It  is  apparent, 
though,  that  there  is  little  in  the  way  of  comprehensive  management  data  held  within  forces 
about  the  resource  implications  of  mutual  legal  assistance  requests,  both  incoming  and 
outgoing.  Complementary  data  from  interviews  also  highlights  a  variable  not  immediately 
apparent  from  raw  statistics  but  significant  nonetheless.  Sometimes  an  ILOR  is  issued  for 
each  individual  item  of  evidence  sought,  and  sometimes  any  given  ILOR  will  incorporate  any 
number  of  different  individual  requests.  Which  course  of  action  is  preferred  depends  often  on 
the  personal  preference  of  the  SIO  concerned,  but  is  also  heavily  influenced  by  the  working 
relationships  established  with  the  requested  authorities.  Thus  a  simple  record  of  the  fact  that  a 
letter  of  request  was  received  or  issued  does  not  of  itself  necessarily  indicate  how  many 
requests  were  made  or  received  or  what  the  resource  implications  were,  although  it  will 
provide  at  least  a  minimum  indication  of  the  number  of  requests  made.  4 
4  The  number  of  requests  does  not  necessarily  correlate  with  the  number  of  cases  in  which  mutual  legal 
assistance  was  requested  because  any  given  investigation  may  generate  more  than  one  ILOR. 
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hif'ormation  available  to  investigators  needing  to  make  a  mutual  legal  assistancc  rc(iticst 
Out  of  the  1996  survey  arose  recommendations  that  there  should  be  a  onc-slop  shop 
approach  to  mutual  legal  assistance,  that  there  should  be  a  central  database  of'  intlonnation, 
contacts,  laws  and  relevant  working  practices  available  to  investigators  seeking  to  make  a 
mutual  legal  assistance  request,  and  that  the  Interpol  manual  on  obtaining  evidcncc  from 
abroad  should  be  incorporated  within  force  procedures  (Nicholson  &I  larrison,  1996:  41-43). 
It  was  discovered  that  "to  the  vast  majority  of  police  officers  the  prospect  of  obtaining 
evidence  from  abroad  is  a  daunting  one  and  whilst  each  force  has  its  own  Interpol  Liaison 
Officer  and  can  call  upon  the  expertise  of  specialist  personnel  very  few  forces  have  laid  (town 
procedures  or  guidelines"  (ibid.  4). 
In  tenns  of  guidelines  and  procedures  the  situation  seems  a  little  improved  in  2002 
(Questions  6&  7).  Of  the  thirty-two  responding  forces  fourteen  had  documented  guidelines 
for  making  a  request  (43%),  and  of  these,  eleven  also  had  sirmlar  guidelines  for  handling 
incoming  requests  (34%).  So  whilst  the  majority  of  officers  appear  to  have  no  florce  guidance 
to  assist  them,  that  majority  can  no  longer  be  described  as  vast.  Where  else  do  investigators 
go  to  seek  assistance  in  this  matter?  (Question  8:  Table  2.  All  respondents  answered  this 
question). 
Table  2:  Sources  of  advice  accessed  hy  respondingfiwees 
Source  ofadvice  Interpol  NCB  Other  NCIS  Crown  Prosecution  UKCA  Othel 
(iocated  at  NCIS)  department  Service  [CPS] 
Number  of 
respondents  using  29  10  26  Is  x 
each  source 
The  principal  sources  for  advice  are  reported  to  be  the  Interpol  NCB  located  at  NCIS 
and  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service  [CPS].  In  twenty-five  instances  the  respondent  cited  both, 
and  in  nine  cases  the  respondent  included  other  NCIS  departments  is  possible  sources  of' 
information  together  with  tile  NCB  and  the  CPS.  All  those  who  cited  the  IJKCA  as  a  sourcc 
ot'guidaiicc  also  cited  Interpol  NCB.  Given  that  evidential  requests  must  be  iransmiticd  via 
the  UKCA,  it  might  seem  surprising  that  more  respondents  did  not  identify  the  Central 
Authority  in  this  category.  But  its  relative  standing  is  consistent  with  both  its  position  within 
the  overall  process-chain  and  its  primary  function.  By  the  time  a  rc(lucst  is  rcady  to  be 
transmitted,  the  investigation  will  have  identified  that  evidence  exists,  in  which  activity 
Interpol  can  play  a  useful  facilitation  role,  and  the  ILOR  will  havc  bccn  draltcd  to  rc(lucst 
production  of  the  identified  evidence,  in  which  activity  the  CPS  might  well  oftcr  advice 
before  formally  presenting  the  ILOR  as  a  designated  judicial  authority  conilment  to  issuc 
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such  requests.  Investigators  will  therefore  be  far  more  likely  to  engage  with  the  Interpol  NCB 
and  their  local  CPS  offices  than  with  the  UKCA. 
Tluee  of  the  respondents  who  reported  'Other'  sources,  cited  the  Judicial  Co- 
operation  Unit  at  the  Home  Office  and  may  well  be  referring  to  the  UKCA  although  they  have 
named  the  department  within  which  the  UKCA  is  located.  Drugs  Liaison  Officers,  foreign 
embassies,  the  Home  Office  (again  possibly  meaning  the  UKCA),  HMCE,  the  Serious  Fraud 
Office  and  the  Foreign  &  Commonwealth  Office  were  also  cited.  The  Kent  European  Liaison 
Unit,  noted  for  its  very  close  links  with  judicial  authorities  in  France,  Belgium  and  Holland, 
cited  direct  contact  with  foreign  authorities  as  an  additional  source  of  guidance.  The  only 
other  source  reported  by  Kent  was  NCIS  (Other),  perhaps  reflecting  that  the  accumulation  of 
expertise  within  this  specialist  unit  negates  any  need  to  contact  the  Interpol  NCB  or  CPS  for 
advice. 
Neither  the  European  Judicial  Network  nor  Eurojust  were  cited  as  sources  of 
guidance  but  this  is  unremarkable  for  two  reasons.  Firstly  they  were  both  in  relative  infancy 
as  institutions  at  the  time  of  the  survey  and  so  were  not  yet  well  known,  and  secondly  their 
principal  clientele  are  intended  to  be  government  officials,  judges  and  prosecutors  rather  than 
investigators. 
Level  of  request  activity 
Questions  9  and  10  sought  to  measure  the  level  of  request  activity  as  far  as  existing 
force  management  data  would  permit,  with  a  view  to  identifying  trends  at  least.  All  thirty-two 
respondents  replied  to  each  question,  and  nine  were  able  to  provide  exact  figures  for  some 
years.  The  timing  of  the  first  circulation  of  the  survey  meant  that  figures  were  likely  to  be 
available  only  for  the  years  1997-2001.  The  timing  of  the  second  circulation  meant  that  some 
forces  were  able  to  include  figures  for  2002  as  well.  The  scaling  used  is  reproduced  from  the 
1996  survey. 
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Table  3:  Force  enquiries  necessitating  the  gathering  ofevidence  outside  the  UK 
No.  of  requests  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
0-5  6  7  6  4  5  - 
6-10  1  2  2  6  6 
11-20  1  3  2  3  4 
21+  6  7  10  9  13 
Don't  know  13  10  9  8  4 
Avon  &  Somerset  73  88 
Cheshire  6  14  20  27  - 
Devon  &  Cornwall  11  24  7  15  - 
Dorset  -  -  -  25  - 
Gloucestershire  38  18  21  32  30  - 
Humberside  -  44  47  45  64 
Thames  Valley  120  106  69  92  102 
West  Mercia  65  80  64  60  63 
Unidentified  1  0  9  6 
These  figures  are  not  directly  comparable  to  the  data  discovered  by  Nicholson  and 
Harrison  (1996:  15,  Table  3)  because  their  data  for  this  question  was  based  on  sixty-one 
departmental  responses  whereas  the  data  for  this  present  survey  is  based  on  thirty-two  force 
responses.  Nevertheless  some  changes  and  similarities  in  trends  are  worth  pointing  out.  For 
the  years  1990-1995,  Nicholson  and  Harrison  discovered  that  "the  vast  majority  of 
departments  who  deal  with  cases  necessitating  international  evidence  gathering  do  so  on  a 
yearly  basis  on  less  than  five  occasions",  (ibid.  ).  Indeed,  for  each  of  those  years  more  than 
50%  of  their  respondents  had  five  or  fewer  international  evidential  enquiries,  with  between 
2040%  of  respondents  between  1990  and  1993  reporting  that  they  had  no  data  with  which  to 
answer  the  question.  Thus  respondents  on  the  minimum  frequency  band  outweighed  all  the 
respondents  in  the  other  frequency  bands  and  the  "don't  knows". 
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Table  4:  Evidence  gathered  in  the  UK  on  behalrofforeignforces 
No.  of  requests  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
0-5  8  8  4  4  6  - 
6-10  2  2  3  4  4 
11-20  1  6  4  7  7 
21+  6  6  12  9  14 
Don't  know  10  7  6  5  1 
Avon  &  Somerset  -  -  57  64 
Cheshire  31  23  23  - 
Devon  &  Cornwall  14  14  6  10 
Dorset  -  28 
Gloucestershire  10  12  21  20  19 
Humberside  -  10  18  34  46 
Kent  26  29  37  38  102  101 
Thames  Valley  81  95  70  48  117  - 
West  Mercia  3  5  24  20  41 
Unidentified  -  0  11  12  34 
From  the  top  half  of  Table  4  above,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  pattern  had  changed  by  the 
second  half  of  the  1990s  with  far  more  forces  reporting  in  excess  of  five  instances  a  year  of 
having  to  obtain  evidence  from  abroad.  Those  with  five  or  fewer  instances  each  year  represent 
between  15-20%  of  the  respondents  compared  with  the  1996  survey  results  of  more  than  50% 
for  the  same  frequency  band.  Nicholson  and  Harrison  noted  a  reduction  over  time  in  the 
number  of  forces  responding  "don't  know"  due  to  an  absence  of  management  data.  The  same 
trend  was  evident  in  the  present  study. 
In  both  cases  the  general  police  service  trend  appears  to  be  for  an  increase  in  ILOR 
activity  over  the  period.  This  is  consistent  with  the  overall  picture  across  the  EU  (EU  200  1  a:  3, 
8).  The  number  of  forces  dealing  with  only  0-5  requests  annually  remains  stable  or  decreases 
whilst  the  number  dealing  with  21+  enquiries  increases.  Where  some  forces  have  been  able  to 
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provide  actual  statistics  fluctuating  patterns,  rather  than  a  stcady  increase,  are  apparent. 
Further  detailed  research  would  be  necessary  to  review  individual  force  activity  patterns. 
Police  forces  in  England  and  Wales  represented  in  the  sample  population  made  more 
requests  than  they  received.  Over  the  period  1997-2001  those  forces  that  were  able  to  Supply 
statistics  made  1,398  requests  to  foreign  authorities.  In  the  same  period  they  received  968 
incoming  requests.  5  Averaged  to  a  yearly  mean  for  each  force  this  equates  to  thirty-one 
outgoing  requests  made  against  twenty-one  incoming  requests. 
Table  5.  -  Total  number  of  requests  received  and  transmitted  h-v  UKCA  1997-2001  ' 
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Requests  made  by  UK  1111  1284  1495  1557  1641 
authorities 
(1163)  (1325)  (1532)  (1685)  (1767) 
Requests  received  by  UK  1033  1166  1  15S  1101  1335 
authorities 
(2593)  (2587)  (2455)  (2637)  (3222) 
A  direct  comparison  between  the  data  produced  by  the  SCQ  and  the  data  published  by 
the  UKCA  is  not  possible  but  Table  5  above  seeks  to  provide  a  context  within  which  to  view 
the  data  produced  by  the  SCQ.  In  Table  5  the  italicised,  bracketed  figures  are  for  Ilic  total 
number  of  requests  received  and  transmitted  by  the  UKCA,  which  of  course  serves  more 
public  authorities  than  just  the  police  forces  of  England  and  Wales.  The  total  tIgUrcs 
incorporate  all  types  of  requested  assistance  including  requests  11or  evidence  and  requests  for 
the  service  of  process.  The  un-bracketed,  plain  font  figures  show  only  requests  I'Or  evidential 
assistance,  the  same  criterion  upon  which  the  SCQ  respondents  were  asked  to  rcport. 
The  trend  apparent  from  the  UKCA  statistics  show  a  steady  increase  in  requests  Cor 
l'oreign  assistance  rnade  by  UK  authorities,  with  evidential  requests  florming  the  large 
majority  of  requests.  Incoming  requests  reveal  a  I'ar  higher  proportion  of  non-cv1dcnt1al 
requests  such  as  service  of  court  process  and  traffic  offence  enquiries.  The  national  picture 
based  on  UKCA  statistics  mirrors  the  SCQ  data  in  that  UK  authorities  are  (Icnionstrably 
7 
making  more  evidential  requests  than  their  foreign  counterpart  S.  Identifying  the  reasons  lor 
this  finding  warrants  further  detailed  future  study  beyond  the  scope  ofthis  thesis.  A  numbcr 
'  To  keep  the  sample  comparable,  requests  made  to  Kent  are  excluded  front  this  total  because  ojilv  the 
number  of  incoming  requests  were  available  from  this  force. 
6  These  statistics  are  compiled  from  data  published  in  the  UKCA  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  newsletters 
2  (April  2000),  3  (July  2000)  and  9  (January  2002). 
7  Once  non-evidential  requests  are  taken  into  consideration  the  picture  is  reversed  with  the  UK 
receiving  almost  twice  as  many  requests  as  it  makes.  Incoming  requests  for  2001  totalled  3222,  ;  in 
increase  of  22%  on  the  previous  year  whilst  total  outgoing  requests  cqUallCd  1763,  in  increase  of4"., 
on  the  previous  year. 
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of  possible  hypotheses  might  be  tested.  Firstly,  resource  issues  dictate  that  LJK  requests  are 
almost  exclusively  confined  to  investigations  of  serious  crime.  UK  authorities  are  less  likely 
to  resort  to  mutual  legal  assistance  merely  to  serve  court  process  or  follow  up  minor  matters 
regarded  elsewhere  in  Europe  as  administrative  matters,  hence  this  might  skew  the  figures  in 
favour  of  evidential  requests.  8  The  second  hypothesis,  not  unconnected  with  the  first,  is  that 
the  manner  in  which  evidence  is  adduced  in  the  adversarial  trial  process  generates  more 
evidential  requests  that  might  be  anticipated  in  a  Napoleonic  jurisdiction.  Thirdly,  as  new 
domestic  legislation  increasingly  pcn-nits  restraint  and  confiscation  of  assets  acquired  through 
criminality,  a  new  variable  has  entered  the  equation  and  future  studies  should  seek  to  identify 
the  extent  to  which  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  are  used  for  restraint  and  confiscation 
proceedings  as  well  as  for  acquiring  trial  evidence. 
Question  11  sought  to  identify  the  actual  or  estimated  annual  percentage  of  cases 
dealt  with  by  forces  in  England  and  Wales  between  1997  and  2001  that  necessitated  the 
obtaining  of  evidence  from  abroad.  The  purpose  of  this  question  was  to  provide  a  context 
within  which  to  understand  the  answers  to  Questions  9  and  10.  It  also  provided  an  alternative 
means  of  identifying  the  extent  of  the  need  for  foreign  evidence  in  the  event  that  forces  were 
unable  to  provide  suitable  data  for  Questions  9  and  10. 
It  came  as  no  surprise,  because  of  variety  of  case  management  systems  in  forces  and 
the  relative  absence  of  mutual  legal  assistance  management  data  already  noted,  that  fourteen 
respondents  replied  'not  known'  to  this  question.  The  lack  of  suitable  management  data 
regarding  mutual  legal  assistance  has  been  commented  on  in  the  UK  Parliament  (11C 
Hansard,  Standing  Committee  A,  10.06.03  col.  64;  12.06.03  col.  96)  and  during  the  three-year 
evaluation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  within  the  EU  (Final  Report  on  the  first  evaluation 
exercise,  CRIMORG  55,8648/0  1,  p.  7)). 
Of  the  eight  forces  that  were  able  to  provide  a  percentage  estimate,  the  City  of 
London  produced  the  highest  tally  reporting  that  between  60-70%  of  the  cases  they 
investigated  annually  during  this  period  warranted  the  use  of  mutual  legal  assistance  to  obtain 
evidence  located  abroad.  The  City  of  London  fraud  squad,  with  its  large  case-load  of 
international  white  collar  crime,  responded  on  behalf  of  the  force  to  the  SCQ,  stating  that  the 
rest  of  the  force  had  little  or  no  dealings  with  mutual  legal  assistance.  Certainly  the  response 
in  this  case  is  plausible.  Slightly  more  surprising  was  the  assertion  by  Cleveland  Police  that 
50%  of  all  their  cases  required  mutual  legal  assistance  in  order  to  obtain  evidence.  Suffolk 
(25%  annually)  and  Derbyshire  (10%  annually)  were  also  significantly  higher  than  the 
8  The  continental  European  concept  of  administrative  proceedings  caused  some  confusion  and 
misgivings  in  Parliament  as  the  C(IQ  Bill  was  debated.  The  UK  has  no  "equivalent  domestic 
proceedings":  Attorney-General  (Lord  Goldsmith).  HL  Hansard  25  February  2003,  col.  144-5. 
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remaining  positive  responses  which  reported  that  1%  or  less  of'  their  annual  case-load 
necessitated  the  use  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  It  is  possible  that  the  question  was  not 
properly  understood  and  that  actual  or  estimated  figures  rather  than  actual  or  estimated 
percentages  were  supplied  by  the  three  forces  in  question. 
The  Nicholson  and  Harrison  study  measured  the  average  proportion  ofcases  within 
police  departments  (rather  than  whole  forces)  that  required  evidence  from  abroad  to  progress 
an  investigation  (1996:  16).  From  29%  of  all  cases  in  1990,  the  proportion  rose  to  63%  ofall 
cases  in  1995.  Different  data  sample  characteristics  mean  that  the  1996  and  present  surveys 
cannot  meaningfully  be  compared  on  this  issue. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what  proportion  of  crime  investigations  in  the  UK 
result  in  requests  for  mutual  legal  assistance.  With  the  available  data  this  cannot  be  accurately 
calculated.  The  UKCA  records  the  number  of  requests  and  any  given  investigation  may  give 
rise  to  more  than  one  ILOR.  And  whilst  reported  crime  statistics  arc  available,  there  is  no 
separate  statistic  available  to  indicate  what  proportion  of  these  arc  actively  invcstigatcd.  The 
proportion  of  investigations  that  generate  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  is  a  more 
meaningful  piece  of  data  than  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  as  a  proportion  ofall  reported 
crime. 
Table  6.  -  The  number  of  cases  involving  mutual  legal  assistance  (is  a  percentage  ofreported  crimes  9 
1997  1998  1999  2(H)O  2001 
Avon  &  Somerset 
-  -  -  -  0040 
Cheshire  0.009  0.02  1  0.0  11  WS 
Devon  &  Cornwall  0.009  0.021  0.006  0,014 
Dorset 
-  -  -  -  OD45 
Gloucestershire  0.079  0.037  0.041  0.064  0,059 
Humberside 
-  0.033  0,09  Oý040  0054 
Thames  Valley  0.076  0.060  0.035  0.04H  0051 
West  Mercia  0.084  0.097  0.075  0,076  0061 
Nevertheless  an  attempt  at  a  rudimentary  calculation  was  made  using  the  av,  61.1b1c 
data  from  those  forces  that  had  supplied  actual  figurcs  for  the  years  1997-2001  ('I',  "I)lc  3). 
9  The  statistics  from  the  anonymous  return  have  not  been  included  in  this  table.  Nor  has  data  from  Kent 
which  provided  statistics  for  assistance  given  but  not  requests  made. 
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It  will  be  seen  from  this  self-selecting  sample  that  in  relation  to  all  reported  crimes, 
the  percentage  of  investigations  necessitating  the  use  of  mutual  legal  assistance  is  very  small. 
The  lack  of  numerical  significance  is  off-set  by  the  significance  afforded  to  the  seriousness  of 
the  crimes  for  which  mutual  legal  assistance  will  be  sought.  Available  data  did  not  enable  a 
calculation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  investigations  as  a  percentage  of  serious  crimes  only. 
Even  these  figures  are  merely  a  rough  guide.  Two  different  sources  had  to  be  used  to  discover 
the  total  number  of  crimes  recorded  annually  by  forces  during  the  five-year  period,  and  during 
that  period  the  method  of  counting  crimes  changed  (so-called  'ethical'  recording  led  to  a 
significant  increase  in  recorded  crimes)  as  did  the  year  against  which  statistics  were  collected 
(from  the  calendar  year  to  the  financial  year).  For  all  the  lack  of  precision,  the  basic  point  is 
made.  Mutual  legal  assistance  is  employed  only  in  serious  matters  and  is  generally  used  in 
rather  less  than  1%  of  all  crime  investigations  (Table  6).  10  As  will  be  seen  with  the  interview 
data,  despite  the  fact  that  the  need  for  mutual  legal  assistance  is  very  infrequent  when  viewed 
within  the  context  of  all  reported  crimes  for  which  evidence  is  investigated,  when  it  is 
utilised,  it  is  usually  vital  to  the  success  of  an  investigation. 
The  processes  employed  by  English  &  Welsh  police  forces  for  gathering  evidence  located 
abroad 
Questions  12,13  and  14  explored  the  processes  utilised  by  investigators  from  English 
and  Welsh  police  forces  in  obtaining  evidence  located  abroad. 
The  general  principle  of  international  law  (outlined  in  chapter  I  above)  is  that  agents 
of  one  State  cannot  exercise  their  jurisdiction  in  another  sovereign  State.  Pennission  can  be 
obtained  for  UK  officers  to  travel  abroad  to  observe  and  advise  the  foreign  authorities  acting 
on  behalf  of  UK  authorities  pursuant  to  an  ILOR.  In  very  limited  circumstances  some  States 
may  allow  unsupervised  witness  interviewing  abroad  by  UK  officers.  For  instance  Spain  will 
allow  ex-patriot  consenting  Britons  resident  there  to  provide  witness  statements  to  UK 
officers  in  Spain  without  there  needing  to  be  an  ILOR  in  place  (Mutual  Legal  Assistance 
Forum,  Home  Office,  30  June  2003).  By-passing  Federal  authorities,  some  English 
investigators  have  been  permitted  to  do  the  same  by  State  authorities  in  the  US  (SIO  interview 
3  August  1999;  prosecutor  interview  23  January  2004). 
Twenty-six  forces  responded  to  Question  12  which  explored  how  often  officcrs 
travelled  abroad  to  observe  the  execution  of  an  ILOR.  Two  replied  that  in  between  51-75%  of 
10  The  two  sources  used  as  a  basis  for  annual  crime  statistics  were  Criminal  Statistics:  England  and 
Wales  1999,  presented  by  the  Home  Secretary  to  Parliament  December  2000  (which  gave  figures  from 
1997  and  1998  as  well),  Table  2.4,  and  the  Report  of  Her  Majesty's  Chief  Inspector  of  Constabulary 
200112,  Appendix  IV. 
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foreign  evidence  cases,  officers  would  be  so  deployed.  One  force  replied  that  in  26-50%  of 
cases  it  had  done  so.  Twenty-one  forces  replied  that  this  was  done  in  between  1-25%  of  such 
cases.  The  other  respondents  did  not  place  a  figure  on  this  occurrence  but  indicated  it  would 
happen  if  the  case  merited  it.  It  is  the  author's  experience  from  working  in  the  National  Crime 
Squad  and  the  National  Hi-Tech  Crime  Unit  that  officers  frequently  travelled  abroad,  if  not  to 
observe  a  request  execution,  then  to  liaise  with  foreign  counter-parts  in  preparing  requests  and 
identifying  evidential  opportunities.  Given  the  international  remit  of  these  specialist 
investigators,  this  is  unsurprising.  This  preliminary  liaison  does  not,  of  course,  require  an 
ILOR. 
Whilst  there  are  advantages  in  travelling  to  observe  a  request  execution  -  being  able 
to  respond  immediately  to  new  evidence  and  lines  of  enquiry,  for  instance,  that  emerge  as  a 
result  of  the  requested  evidence  being  gathered  -  the  necessity  of  such  travel  is  debatable  and 
sometimes  unwelcome.  US  authorities  have  commented  unfavourably  on  an  alleged  rise  in 
requests  to  travel  to  the  US  at  around  Christmas  each  year  (Harfield  2002:  214)  and  formally 
notified  the  UK  government  of  US  government  concern  about  the  high  number  of 
unnecessary  requests  for  UK  investigators  to  travel  to  the  US  (UKCA  2001:  1).  As  will  be 
seen  below  (Chapter  7)  some  prosecutors  and  SIOs  regard  it  as  essential. 
Question  13  sought,  through  free  text  answers,  examples  of  instances  in  which  UK 
investigators  had  acquired  evidence  from  abroad  without  recourse  to  an  ILOR.  Of  twenty- 
seven  respondents,  nineteen  indicated  that  this  had  never  happened,  some  emphasising  that  it 
would  never  happen  because  procedure  was  always  to  request  evidence  via  an  ILOR.  11  One 
force  indicated  that  it  had  very  occasionally  obtained  evidence  from  Eire  with  the  aid  of 
Interpol  but  without  the  use  of  an  ILOR.  A  second  suggested  that  sometimes  foreign  agencies 
had  supplied  evidential  material  in  response  to  intelligence  and  information  enquiries.  A  third 
force  said  it  very  rarely  happened  but  had  been  possible  on  more  than  one  occasion  when 
dealing  with  Australia  and  the  USA,  which  corroborates  the  experience  of  one  senior 
detective  seeking  evidence  from  British  witnesses  resident  in  the  USA  to  a  murder  that  took 
place  in  Britain  (interview  3  August  1999). 
To  this  general  consensus  of  'never'  or  'very  rarely'  one  force  reported  routine 
exception.  "On  numerous  occasions  over  the  past  five  years",  officers  from  this  force  have 
interviewed  witnesses  and  obtained  statements  from  them  on  British  embassy  premises 
abroad  (and  therefore  within  British  diplomatic  jurisdiction)  or  had  brought  the  witnesses  to 
the  UK  for  interview  and  statements  to  be  taken  within  British  geographical  jurisdiction. 
11  This  figure  includes  one  force  which  responded  to  the  effect  that  it  never  used  ILORs  or 
Commissions  Rogatoire,  and  only  ever  used  "standard"  request  procedures,  which  contradiction 
suggests  confusion  upon  the  part  of  the  respondent  in  interpreting  either  the  question  or  mutual  legal 
assistance  procedures. 
Clive  Harfeld.  -  Process  and  Practicalities  104 Chapter  6.  -  Force  perspectives  on  MLA  in  practice 
Bringing  witnesses  to  the  UK  to  obtain  statements  from  them  was  an  option  that  an  SIO  in  a 
south  coast  force  had  also  utilised  (interview  12  Septeraber  2002). 
Given  that  there  is  currently  only  one  statutory  route  for  the  transmission  of  ILORs 
from  the  LJK  to  foreign  authorities,  via  the  UKCA  following  the  issuing  of  a  request  by  CPS, 
there  was  a  surprising  variety  of  answers  to  Question  14  which  asked  how  forces  transmitted 
their  requests  abroad.  There  were  thirty-one  respondents  to  this  question  of  whom  ten  replied 
that  they  always  sent  the  request  via  NCIS  and  another  ten  replied  that  they  always  sent  the 
request  via  Interpol.  Nine  stated  they  always  sent  the  request  via  CPS  and  four  said  they 
always  sent  the  request  via  the  UKCA.  It  would  not  have  been  surprising  if  all  thirty-one  had 
selected  either  or  both  of  these  latter  options. 
Even  more  interesting  were  the  routes  sometimes  employed  to  transmit  requests. 
Seven  respondents  stated  they  sometimes  send  requests  direct  to  the  foreign  authority  even 
though  at  the  time  of  writing  the  direct  transmission  of  requests  is  still  being  debated  as  a 
future  possibility.  Ten  sometimes  used  the  UKCA,  whilst  another  ten  sometimes  used  the 
CPS,  with  nine  sometimes  using  NCIS.  Five  reported  that  they  sometimes  sent  a  request  via 
Europol  and  eight  sometimes  used  Interpol  for  this  purpose.  A  small  minority  sometimes 
copied  requests  to  NCIS,  Europol  or  Interpol  having  used  another  route  for  the  formal 
transmission.  This  variety  might  be  interpreted  as  indicating  confusion  either  over  the 
question  as  posed  or  over  the  statutory  processes  for  making  a  mutual  legal  assistance  request 
to  a  foreign  authority. 
T  or  which  mutual  legal  assistance  is  employed  ypes  of  crimes  f 
Successive  senior  personnel  in  UKCA  have  indicated  to  the  author  on  a  number  of 
occasions  that  mutual  legal  assistance  is  only  ever  employed  for  serious  crime  investigations 
(see  also  Home  Office  2004a).  The  management  of  file-tracking  data  at  UKCA  does  not 
permit  analysis  of  requests  by  crime  type  and  so  Question  15  sought  to  identify  the  types  of 
crime  investigation  in  which  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  were  most  frequently  utilised.  A 
number  of  crime  types  were  suggested  and  respondents  asked  to  identify  those  which  most 
frequently  generated  mutual  legal  assistance  requests. 
In  1996  Nicholson  and  Harrison  found  that  various  types  of  fraud  accounted  for  the 
largest  number  of  requests  for  mutual  legal  assistance  from  UK  forces  to  foreign  authorities. 
The  number  of  fraud-related  requests  was  more  than  double  those  of  theft  investigations,  the 
next  highest  category,  behind  which  in  close  order  came  money  laundering  and  drugs  crime. 
Clive  Harfield.,  Procesi  and  Practicalities  105 Chapter  6.  -  Force  perspectives  on  ML4  in  practice 
Table  7  below,  detailing  the  results  of  the  present  survey,  indicates  that  fraud 
generated  the  highest  number  of  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  in  five  forces,  the  second 
highest  number  in  six  forces  and  the  third  highest  nurnber  in  three  forces.  Across  the  sample 
of  twenty-two  respondents  to  this  question,  it  emerged  that,  as  in  the  years  1990-1995,  fraud 
investigations  had  generated  the  highest  number  of  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  followed 
by  murder  enquiries.  Neither  of  these  offences  features  in  current  government  priorities  for 
local  police  forces  as  outlined  in  the  National  Policing  Plan  which  focuses  on  crimes  that 
generate  the  greatest  fear  within  local  communities:  dwelling  burglaries,  street  and  domestic 
violence  (although  arguably  this  might  incorporate  murders),  vehicle  crime  and  drugs  crime. 
This  begs  the  question  whether  or  not  scarce  local  policing  resources  should  be  devoted  to 
complicated  transnational  investigations  into  crimes  that  are  not  considered  a  political  priority 
for  local  forces.  Which  in  turn  invites  consideration  of  whether  current  structures  in  England 
and  Wales  for  local  policing  and  the  investigation  of  organised  crime  are  the  most  effective 
for  investigating  transnational  criminality  in  general. 
Such  questions  must  be  considered  within  the  context  of  the  EU  evaluation  of  mutual 
legal  assistance  mechanisms  within  the  UK  which  remarked  upon  the  lack  of  resources 
devoted  to  mutual  legal  assistance  and  responding  to  requests  generally  (EU  2001  c:  paragraph 
4.6),  recommended  that  all  agencies  be  invested  with  sufficient  resources  "to  fulfil  the  UK's 
international  commitments"  (ibid.,  para.  5.1.4),  and  urged  UK  authorities  to  respect  the  needs 
of  the  requesting  authorities  when  prioritising  requests  in  relation  to  other  activity  (ibid.,  para. 
5.1.6).  It  has  been  recognised  in  UK  political  circles  that  reciprocity  pays  dividends  in 
ensuring  that  one's  own  requests  are  respected.  The  message  'reciprocity  is  key'  was 
reiterated  thirteen  times  during  Parliamentary  consideration  of  the  C(IQ  Bill  (HL  Hansard  27 
January  2003  col.  GC136;  29  January  2003  col.  GC225;  03  February  2003  cols.  GC6,  GC7; 
25  February  2003  col.  GC190;  03  March  2003  col.  669;  HC  Hansard  01  April  2003  cols.  802, 
807,810,813,834;  19  June  2003  col.  SCA283.  ) 
Table  7  below  lists  the  crime  types  below  together  with  the  number  of  forces  for 
which  each  crime  type  was  either  the  first  (column  A),  second  (column  B)  or  third  (column  Q 
most  frequent  source  of  mutual  legal  assistance  requests. 
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Tahle  7.  -  Types  qf'crime.  for  which  mutual  legal  assistance  is  most  fi-equenfli,  sought 
Offence  qpc  A  B  C  Total 
Fraud,  including  advance  fee  fraud  5  6  3  14 
Murder  5  3  3  11 
Drugs  trafficking  6  3  1  10 
Vchiclc  theft  (including  caravans)  2  1  6 
An  other  type  of  assault  3  1  4  8 
Child  abusc  (excluding  possession' 
exchange  of  pacdoph  i  lic  niatcriýll) 
1  4  2  7 
Immigrant  trafficking  0  3  1  4 
Asset  confiscation  0  4  4 
Theft  of  property  other  than  vehicles  0  2  1  3 
Traffic  offences  (including  collision 
investigation) 
I  1  1  3 
Money  laundering  0  0  2  2 
Exchange  &  possession  of 
paedophilic  material 
0  1 
Computer  hacking  1  0  0  0  0 
What  works  and  what  does  not  work  in  mutual  leval  assistance  vrocesses 
The  final  group  of  questions  from  the  survey  sought  to  identify  pcrccptions  ofwhat 
works  and  what  does  not  work  within  the  mutual  legal  assistance  arena.  Forces  were  first 
asked  (Question  16)  to  indicate  whether  any  of  the  consequcriccs  in  TabIc  S  bclow  had 
occurred  in  the  last  five  years. 
Tahle  8.  -  Solutions  adopted  where  adducing.  f6reign  evidence  was  (in  issue 
Action  Forces  in  A  hich  this 
Illks  happened 
Investigation  not  undertaken  or  abandoned  because  evidence  was  located  outside  the  (  JK  7 
Investigation  /  prosecution  discontinued  because  ofdelay  in  obtaining  evidence  from  outside  the  LIK  3 
Prosecutions  discontinued  because  foreign  witnesses  wouldlcould  not  appear 
Video  link  used  at  trial  to  avoid  the  necessity  ofa  witness  travelling  it)  the  LJK  to  give  evidence 
Documentary  evidence  admittLd  in  lieu  ofthe  witness  having  to  attend  the  UK  to  give  evidcrice  in 
person 
3 
Lesser  charge  preferred  in  order  to  avoid  having  to  obtain/rely  on  evidence  fn)tn  outside  the  UK  2 
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There  were  fourteen  respondents  (43%)  to  this  question  none  of  whom  selected  three 
other  answer  options:  that  evidence  was  excluded  from  trial  in  England  and  Wales  because 
the  manner  of  its  gathering  by  foreign  authorities  was  challenged;  because  the  transmission  of 
the  request  was  challenged;  or  because  the  defence  did  not  have  the  opportunity  to  be  present 
when  the  evidence  was  gathered  abroad.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  there  had  been  instances 
in  half  the  respondent  forces  in  which  investigations  had  either  not  been  initiated  or  had  been 
abandoned  because  evidence  was  located  abroad.  And  that  nearly  half  the  respondents  had 
experienced  prosecutions  being  discontinued  because  either  witnesses  could  be  neither 
persuaded  nor  compelled  to  attend  a  trial  in  England  and  Wales  or  because  evidence  requested 
from  abroad  had  not  arrived  in  time  for  the  trial. 
Between  1990  and  1995,28%  of  respondents  to  the  Nicholson  and  Harrison  study 
reported  that  problems  encountered  in  obtaining  requested  evidence  had  had  an  adverse 
impact  upon  the  investigation  and/or  trial.  There  were  eleven  instances  of  evidence  being  lost 
in  transit.  With  their  different  respondent  sample,  Nicholson  and  Harrison  counted  the  number 
of  cases  (1996:  28,  Table  14)  rather  the  number  of  forces  as  in  Table  8  above.  Despite  the 
incompatible  respondent  samples,  both  the  1996  study  and  the  present  research  have 
demonstrated  that  the  most  likely  consequence  of  problems  encountered  due  to  evidence 
being  located  abroad  is  that  the  investigation/trial  will  be  abandoned  or  otherwise  curtailed. 
Unlike  other  areas,  there  has  been  no  discernable  improvement  in  this  aspect  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  between  the  early  and  late  1990s.  For  the  criminal  operating  across  borders  this  is 
good  news:  the  old  adage  that  national  borders  frustrate  effective  prosecution  and  are  a  friend 
to  the  criminal  (HL  Hansard  13.01.03  col.  GC36)  is  quantiflably  proved. 
Case  management  procedures  within  the  CPS  do  not  permit  comprehensive  analysis 
of  any  of  these  questions  from  the  CPS  perspective,  so  incident  reporting  by  police  forces  is 
the  only  alternative  means  of  assessing  the  investigation  attrition  rate  arising  from  the 
difficulties  in  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad.  The  data  harvested  from  this  research  provides 
substantive  evidence  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  transnational  criminals  are  able  to  exploit 
jurisdiction  borders  as  a  disruption  tactic  to  frustrate  law  enforcement  (HL  Hansard  13.01.03 
col.  GC36;  HC  Hansard  0  1.04.03  col.  801). 
Questions  17-19  invited  free  text  answers  to  three  questions: 
"at  are  the  criticalfactors  in  ensuring  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  succeed 
in  securing  evidencefrom  outside  the  UK?  (Question  17) 
fflat  problems  are  encountered  with  current  mutual  legal  assistance  structures? 
(Question  18) 
0  "at  works  well  in  current  mutual  legal  assistance  structures?  (Question  19) 
Clive  Harfeld.  -  Process  and  Practicalifies  108 6.  -  Force  perspectives  on  AfLA  in  practice 
These  three  questions  are  essentially  three  differcm  approaches  to  discovcring  good 
practice.  The  tactic  of  encouraging  respondents  to  explore  the  same  issue  front  till-cc  dit'I'crent 
angles  was  employed  to  maximise  learning  as  an  instinctive  and  immediate  rcsponse  to  it 
question  posed  one  way  might  overlook  relevant  factors  that  would  have  been  drawn  out  had 
the  question  been  phrased  slightly  differently.  By  and  large  this  tactic  seenis  to  have  achieved 
the  desired  result  although  one  respondent  did  reply  to  Questions  17  and  19  by  reterring  the 
reader  to  the  answer  given  to  Question  18.  The  emergence  ofsonic  recurring  flicines  from  the 
data  was  to  be  expected  (for  instance  the  length  of  time  it  takes  to  initiate  and  respond  to 
mutual  legal  assistance  requests),  but  the  raising  of  issues  outside  the  general  themes  justifies 
this  three-pronged  approach  to  identifying  good  practice  for  the  reasons  discussed  abovc. 
The  data  is  presented  below  as  direct  quotes  from  the  response  sheets.  These  quotes 
have  been  categorised  subsequently  by  the  present  author  into  the  common  theincs  in  which 
they  are  presented.  In  two  instances  a  single  answer  has  been  split  between  two  themed  boxes 
because  it  was  appropriate  to  do  so. 
What  are  the  critical  factors  in  ensuring  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  succeed  in 
securing  evidence  from  outside  the  UK?  (Question  17) 
There  were  twenty-two  respondents  to  this  question.  The  critical  success  factors  were 
identified  as  timeliness,  direct  liaison  with  opposite  numbers  and  knowledge  based  on  training 
and  acquired  expertise. 
"Prompt  drafting  qfrequests  by  CPS,  -  prompt  processing  by  UKCA;  regular  liaison  with  CPS  &  UK 
ýegarding  progress;  liaison  between  UKCA  &  requested  state.  " 
overridingjactor  in  any  requestfor  mutual  legal  assistance  is  the  time  it  takesfor  any  response  to  be 
md,  parlicularlyfrom  certain  European  countries.  Police  to  police  intelligence  enqla  . ri  . es  can  be  achieved 
t  immediately  but  any  official  reply  takes  months  &  sometimes  is  never  received.  " 
Ys  -  enquiries  have  often  been  delayed  and  havefnistrated  investigations  in  this  regard.  Common 
in  terms  of  quality  leading  to  the  ability  to  make  best  use  of  the  evidence  gathered.  " 
Mechanisms  should  ensure  prompt  action  &  reply.  " 
It  is  important  that  the  reque-vt  is  promptly  dealt  with  by  Interpol,  and  then  swiftly  trarumitted  tofi)rriýgn 
,  Lv  then  hoped  that  1heforeign  country  deals  with  it  asspeedily  as  possihle.  At  this  sukge  it  is  beyond  our 
'here  are  instances  where  no  reply  is  ever  received.  " 
'Timeliness  and  accuracy.  " 
A  contrast  is  drawn  between  the  speed  and  c11'ectivcncss  of'  invcstigator-to- 
investigator  enquiries  and  the  exchange  of  information  and  iiitclligciicc  and  the  time  its  lakcs 
to  conduct  a  formal  mutual  legal  assistance  request.  The  implications  ot'tllcsc  rcsponscs  arc 
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that  delays  are  inherent  throughout  the  entire  process  at  every  stage.  '['here  is  evidence  that 
some  investigation  requests  receive  no  response  and  that  others  do  not  receive  a  response  in 
sufficient  time  to  be  of  use.  Such  findings  are  consistent  with  the  views  ofpractitioncrs  across 
the  EU  (EU  2001a:  23).  The  problems  with  delay  have  frequently  led  to  abuse  ofthe  'urgency' 
provisions  within  mutual  legal  assistance  structures  which  ultimately  is  only  leading  to  further 
delay  (ibid.:  20). 
The  first  response  quoted  above  also  highlights  the  need  f'()r  regular  liaison  bctwccii 
CPS  and  the  UKCA  to  monitor  progress.  The  issue  here  is  monitoring  progress  rather  than 
who  should  be  responsible  for  monitoring.  CPS  might  argue  that  monitoring  progress  is  tile 
responsibility  of  the  investigator  and  the  UKCA  might  argue  that  they  have  no  control  over 
the  handling  of  a  request  once  it  has  been  transmitted.  Nevertheless,  the  management  of' 
mutual  legal  assistance  and  the  monitoring  of  progress  was  also  highlighted  its  an  issue  in  tile 
EU  survey  (EU  2001a:  24-26).  As  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  9,  the  newly  created  role  of 
liaison  magistrate  has  a  key  contribution  to  make  in  terins  of  monitoring  progress. 
"Effective  communication;  recognised  points  of  contact;  clear  understanding  of  what  is  required.  " 
"An  ability  to  have  personal  contact  with  investigating  officers  abroad  and  an  opportunity  to  ewplain  exactly  it 
is  required.  " 
"Establishment  ofdirect  link  between  investigators  &  service  to  which  Comrog  allocated,  leading  to  briefing  & 
presence  of  investigators  vvhen  acts  carried  out 
"Early  liaison  between  CPS  &  Interpol.  " 
"Good  working  relationships  with  our  sister  agencies  e.  g.  CPS,  NCS  &  Europol. 
"Early  initial  advice  and  involvement  of  NCIS  (Interpol)  and  or  UKCA. 
"Support  of  CPS  crucial.  " 
"Close  co-operation  between  regionalforces  and  NCISIInterpok  when  possible  a  con(hiitforfet,  ti-bat-k.,;  hotiltI 
established  in  order  that  an  exchange  of  ideas  and  views  can  take  place.  " 
"Thesefactorsfall  within  the  compass  of  CPS  and  110  UKCA.  If  theforce  ILO  is  approached,  the 
recommendation  is  always  to  consult  with  CPS  at  the  earliest  point  of  an  in  vestigation. 
'SPOC  [Single  point  of  contact1for  each  section.  " 
Liaison  with  all  relevant  parties  was  Identified  as  critical  by  ten  respondents  to  this 
question,  with  three  highlighting  in  particular,  the  need  to  be  able  to  convey  exactly  what  is 
required  by  way  of  product.  A  well  drafted  ILOR  should  be  ablc  to  convcy  exactly  what  is 
required  but  it  is  the  nature  of  dynamic  investigations  that,  no  matter  how  well  drafted,  a 
request  cannot  cater  for  unforeseen  developments  arising  out  oftlic  gathering  ol'cvidcncc,  for 
instance,  the  emergence  of  a  new  line  of  enquiry  as  a  result  of'  questioning  a  witness.  Such 
new  lines  might  require  a  prompt  response  which  could  be  frustrated  it'  requesting 
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investigators  learnt  of  the  opportunities  only  when  the  product  had  wended  its  way  back 
through  routes  of  fort-nal  transmission.  Direct  liaison  helps  clarify  any  misunderstanding 
about  the  nature  of  a  request  and  is  a  means  by  which  the  product  can  be  responded  to  in  a 
timely  fashion.  Direct  liaison  also  is  a  means  to  educate  the  requesting  authorities  as  to  what 
is  feasible.  Much  of  this  liaison  already  takes  place  on  an  invest  igator-to-investigator  basis 
prior  to  an  ILOR  being  initiated  amongst  those  agencies  familiar  with  mutual  legal  assistance 
and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation.  It  is  a  lesson  to  be  shared  with  agencies  for 
whom  mutual  legal  assistance  is  only  an  occasional  activity.  Again,  corroboration  for  this 
perspective  comes  from  practitioners  elsewhere  within  the  EU:  "reports  obtained  during 
evaluations  from  those  active  in  this  area  all  concurred  on  one  point:  visits  to  the  requested 
State  contributed  to  speed  and  relevance  in  executing  requests,  particularly  where  searching 
or  interviewing  a  witness  was  involved",  (EU  2001a:  26). 
Box  3-  Training  &  expertise  in  correct  procedures 
"Using  correct  procedures  via  UKCA  or  Interpol  NCB.  " 
"  Use  ofcorrect  procedures:  i.  e.  ILOR  sought  via  CPS  where  appropriate  andforwarded  via  correct  channels; 
clear  requestfor  information  through  goodpreparation  e.  g.  what  witnesses  need  to  beseen?  What  evidence  can 
they  provide?;  the  presence  ofan  UK  officer  in  appropriate  cases.  " 
"Training:  the  ILO  should  have  knowledge  of  what  can  and  cannot  be  done. 
"Compliance  with  protocols.  " 
"Comprehensive  reports  with  as  much  detail  as  possible. 
"Ensure  all  requests  contain  all  the  salient  points  and  are  devoid  ofambiguily  thereby  preventing  the  Q&  answer 
situation  before  the  enquiry  can  be  allocated.  " 
"Having  looked  to  answer  this  questionnaire,  it  is  clear  to  me  that  proper  protocols  need  to  exist  and  clearly 
documented  processesfor  eachforce  or  agency  to  access  such  requests  [sic].  This  equally  applies  to  receivin_g  and 
effectively  dealing  with  requests  from  foreign  law  enforcement  agencies.  It  is  clear  that  [the  force's]  record 
keeping  appears  to  be  historically  quite  poor,  this  has  not  been  helped  by  a  succession  ofpost-holders  in  FIB. 
Equally  it  appears  that  certain  Areas  and  Depts  within  the  Force  have  actioned  enquiries  without  reference  to  the 
FIB  and  there  are  little  or  no  records  of  this.  " 
"Need  to  securefinancial  aspects  of  obtaining  evidence  prior  to  request  being  made;  sufficient  time  available  to 
obtain  the  evidence  (e.  g.  custody  time  limits,  court  imposed  deadlines). 
Knowledge  of  and  adherence  to  correct  procedures  can  clearly  have  an  impact  upon 
the  speed  and  clarity  with  which  a  request  is  executed.  The  responses  quoted  immediately 
above  reinforce  this.  Thorough  preparation  is  identified  as  a  critical  success  factor  in  the 
second  response.  The  Nicholson  and  Harrison  study  identified  a  significant  training  need 
amongst  UK  investigators  with  a  great  many  respondents  found  to  be  unaware  of  basic 
legislation  and  Home  Office  guidance  relating  to  mutual  legal  assistance  (1996:  21). 
The  penultimate  response  above  indicates  that  the  questionnaire  itself  has  prompted  at 
least  one  force  to  review  its  approach  to  managing  mutual  legal  assistance.  The  final  answer 
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expands  the  discussion  beyond  procedural  awareness  into  managerial  awareness.  Resource 
implications  occasioned  by  custody  time  limits  and  funding  available  to  translate  ILORs  and 
product,  for  instance,  can  influence  investigation  strategy  to  the  extent  that  lesser  charges  are 
preferred  to  avoid  having  to  resort  to  mutual  legal  assistance.  Two  respondents  indicated  as 
much  in  response  to  Question  16  (Table  8  above),  and  that  this  practice  is  employed  was 
confirmed  during  a  case  study  for  this  research  (interview  20.08.03). 
What  problems  are  encountered  with  current  mutual  legal  assistance  structures?  (Ouestion  18) 
It  was  reasonable  to  anticipate  that  problems  encountered  with  current  mutual  legal 
assistance  practices  would  mirror  those  issues  identified  as  critical  success  factors.  Whereas 
six  respondents  identified  timeliness  as  a  critical  success  factor  in  response  to  Question  17 
(27%  of  respondents  to  that  question),  the  delay  inherent  in  bureaucracy  was  identified  as  a 
current  problern  by  eleven  (42%)  of  the  twenty-six  respondents  to  this  question. 
4-  Bureaucogy 
,v&  lengthy  procedures  both  with  UK  &foreign  procedures.  Slow  reactionlawareness  of  investigators  & 
on  correct  procedures  -  lots  of  'local  confacts'used  to  short-cut  procedures.  - 
"The  system  is  totally  archaic  and  hampers  rapid  investigation;  particularly  in  thefinancial  crime  cases.  Officer, 
should  in  2002  be  able  to  travel  immediately  toforeignjurisdictions,  particularly  within  the  EU  -  confirm  to  an 
examining  magistrate  the  nature  of  the  offence  and  be  allo  wed  to  interview  key  witnesses  in  the  presence  of  a  loco 
police  officer  or  the  examining  magistrate.  Ae  present  system  delays  investigation  andfn4strates  the  CIprocess. 
"None  -  other  than  it  is  quite  bureaucratic.  - 
"Bureaucratic  and  very  slow.  This  leads  to  direct  approaches  in  more  seriouslimportant  cases. 
"Bureaucracy  creating  unnecessary  delay.  " 
"The  mostfrustrating  aspect  of  the  current  system  is  the  length  of  time  it  takes  to  get  the  authority  to  travel  and 
conduct  the  relevant  enquiries.  We  have  recently  has  a  case  where  it  took  in  excess  of  /  year  to  obtain  the 
authority  to  travel  to  the  Netherlands.  " 
"Lengthy  process.  - 
"The  main  problem  in  obtaining  mutual  legal  assistance  is  that  the  it-hole  process  is  very  bureaucratic  anti  is  ver: 
time  consuming.  " 
"Overly  bureaucratic  process  adds  to  the  perception  that  seeking  evidencefroin  abroad  is  onlyswitablefor  those 
cases  that  we  consider  'serious,  -  timeliness  is  also  a  big  issuelproblem;  the  structurelprocess  has  not  kept  pace 
with  technological  advances  e.  g.  we  can  quickly  get  agreement  with  a  complainant  or  witness  vie  email  only  then 
to  befaced  with  a  lengthy  process  tofor7nalise  the  actual  obtaining  of  the  evidence.  " 
"Getting  the  CPS  to  agree  to  extradition  proceedings,  without  knowing  where  the  subject  is.  Foreign  countries 
will  not  lookfor  a  subject  without  confirmation  of  the  willingness  to  extradite.  So  we  are  left  with  stalemate.  " 
"  The  need  to  burden  CPS  and  the  court  ivith  requestsfor  ILOPs  will  inevitably  lead  to  some  matters  not  being 
pursued;  ILORs  inevitably  take  time  to  be  prepared  and  we  have  suffered  delay  in  receiving  permissionfrom 
foreign  agencies  to  travel;  the  related  issue  of  extradition  makes  many  investigations  unworkable;  the  rigid 
wording  of  the  ILORs  can  cause  dijficulty  if  additional  enquiries  need  to  be  made  at  short  notice.  " 
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Five  respondents  to  this  question  raised  timeliness  as  a  problem  rather  than  specify 
bureaucracy  per  se.  Thus  sixteen  respondents  identifying  current  problems  have  highlighted, 
in  one  or  another,  the  length  of  time  it  takes  using  mutual  legal  assistance  procedures  to 
obtain  evidence.  In  combination  this  equals  61  %  of  respondents  to  this  question. 
"The  lime  that  some  enquiries  lake.  " 
the  requisite  evidenced  within  legal  time  constraints. 
delayfrom  initiation  to  receipt  of  infonnation.  " 
"Time  scale  -  lost  ILORs;  not  using  SPOC,  -  insufficient  trainingfor  officers  engaged  in  international  enquiries 
inadequate  awareness  of  legislation  and  policy.  - 
Lengthy  delays  in  obtaining  information  andlor  evidence.  Also  there  are  occasions  where  information  has  been 
assed  via  another  route  in  advance  of  the  procedures  commonly  adopted.  " 
The  Nicholson  and  Harrison  study  found  that  86%  of  all  respondents  "felt  that  the 
obtaining  of  evidence  from  abroad  was  either  extremely  time-consuming  or  unnecessarily 
bureaucratic"  (1996:  23). 
This  perception  of  undue  bureaucracy  is  not  unique  to  UK  investigators.  The  EU 
evaluation  survey  of  mutual  legal  assistance  within  the  Member  States  discovered  similar 
complaints  across  the  union.  "Practitioners  in  several  Member  States  were  of  the  opinion  that 
requests  that  go  through  ministries  or  other  channels  create  significant  delays  and  that  direct 
transmission  or  requests  considerably  improve  practical  co-operation"  (EU  2001  a:  23;  see  also 
16,18).  It  reflects  the  fact  that  diplomatic  mechanisms  devised  in  the  immediate  post-war 
period  are  no  longer  sufficient  to  deal  with  the  demands  of  transnational  criminal 
investigation  in  a  very  different  socio-econornic,  political  and  technological  context.  The 
desire  to  promote  direct  transmission  of  requests  between  prosecuting  authorities,  rather  than 
transmit  requests  via  central  authorities  is  a  direct  response  to  the  need  to  reduce  bureaucracy 
and  the  time  taken  to  execute  requests  (EU  2001  a:  22). 
Just  as  knowledge  and  awareness  of  procedures  was  identified  as  a  critical  success 
factor,  so  lack  of  expertise  and  understanding  was  identified  as  a  problem.  This  was  expressed 
in  a  number  of  different  ways. 
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Box  6-  Lack  of  expertise 
"Lack  of  understanding  of  different  procedures. 
"Updates.  11 
"Lack  of  auareness  at  all  levels  of  the  processes.  Processes  not  beingfollowed. 
"Lack  offeedback  " 
"Because  officers  go  direct  to  CPS,  which  could  mean  dealing  with  any  number  ofsoliciiors,  no  statistical  data 
maintained  by  either  CPS  or  police.  " 
A  need  is  identified  for  information  about  good  practice  (and  possibly  investigation 
progress)  to  be  fed  back  to  investigators.  Lack  of  procedural  understanding  is  relevant  equally 
to  domestic  procedures  and  to  the  procedures  of  requested  States.  The  EJN  and  Eurojust  have 
been  established,  in  part,  to  address  those  issues.  The  final  response  in  this  theme  raises 
concerns  about  the  need  for  expertise  to  be  available  not  just  within  the  police  service  but 
amongst  prosecutors  as  well,  and  since  the  circulation  of  this  SCQ  the  CPS  have  been  actively 
addressing  this  issue  through  publication  of  its  updated  internal  manual  of  guidance,  and  a 
comprehensive  training  programme.  12 
There  was  a  fourth  category  of  responses  to  Question  18  that  were  not  inverse  images 
of  Question  17  responses.  Although  there  is  certainly  overlap  between  the  responses  in  Box  7 
below  and  some  of  the  responses  cited  in  Boxes  1-6  above,  what  distinguishes  the  fourth 
category  of  Question  18  responses  is  the  suggested  underlying  cause:  differences  in  attitudes 
towards  mutual  legal  assistance  among  requested  States. 
The  process  in  this  country  is  bureaucratic  but  workable.  Once  the  enquiry  transmitted  to  the  host  country  it  is 
utside  of  the  control  of  Interpol  and  seems  tofall  into  a  black  hole.  The  urgency  ofthe  enquiry  makes  no 
"Some  countries  appear  to  have  a  elifferent  system  ofprioritising.  This  leads  to  delays  on  certain  enquiries. 
"Diffierentfrom  country  to  country  but  the  main  problems  encountered  are  thefailure  to  obtain  a  resullfOr  which 
no  explanation  is  ever  received;  not  having  any  target  dates  to  work  to  so  as  to  be  able  to  reassure  the  010.  - 
"The  advice  given  by  Interpol  helps  informulating  the  request  in  a  way  that  they  stand  the  best  chance  ofgetting 
heforeign  country  to  respond  to  them.  " 
"Some  countries  their  time  in  in  vestigations  takefar  too  long  example  rapefindecent  assault  ofyoung  girl  in 
Greece  2000  still  ongoing  little  [?  ]  of  outcome.  " 
Attitudes  to  a  request  frorn  a  loreign  authority  will  be  influenced  by  tile  extent  to 
which  the  requested  executing  authority  itself  is  dependent  upon  inutual  legal  assistance  for 
12  1  am  grateful  to  Bill  Wheeldon,  CPS  HQ  London,  for  providing  me  with  information  in  relation  to 
this  and  for  the  opportunity  he  gave  me  to  comment  on  relevant  draft  sections  of  tile  CPS  manual.  The 
latter  is  a  restricted  document  outside  the  public  domain. 
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the  successful  completion  of  its  own  investigations.  An  investigative  agency  which  itself  has 
regular  recourse  to  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  is  likely  to  view  an  in-coming 
foreign  assistance  request  more  favourably  than  an  agency  for  which  domestic  priorities 
dictate  the  allocation  of  resources.  Police  forces  in  England  and  Wales  respond  to  the  political 
expectations  expressed  in  the  National  Policing  Plan  (§  I  Police  Reform  Act  2002)  and  to  the 
performance  aspirations  devised  by  the  local  police  authority  (§7-8  Police  Act  1996). 
Responding  to  foreign  requests  is  not  regarded  as  a  priority  function  for  police  forces  in 
England  and  Wales  (UKCA  interview,  7.8.98).  It  should  hardly  come  as  a  surprise  to  such 
forces  that  the  same  is  true  of  foreign  police  agencies,  with  some  of  whom  the  English  and 
Welsh  forces  have  a  poor  reputation  for  responding  promptly  to  requests  (Mutual  Legal 
Assistance  Forum,  Home  Office,  30.6.03). 
"An  apparent  lack  of  interest"  on  the  part  of  requested  authorities  was  also  cited  in 
the  1996  survey  as  a  reason  for  slow  responses  to  UK  requests  for  assistance  (Nicholson  and 
Harrison  1996:  24). 
What  works  well  in  current  mutual  legal  assistance  structures?  (Question  19) 
Having  been  invited  to  identify  critical  success  factors  and  current  problems,  the 
panorama  of  good  practice  perspectives  was  completed  by  asking  the  respondents  to  report  on 
what  currently  works  well  in  the  mutual  legal  assistance  arena.  Of  this  set  of  three  questions, 
this  question  attracted  the  least  number  of  responses:  eighteen.  They  were  broadly  categorised 
into  two  themes  which  correlated  directly  with  two  of  the  themes  identifying  critical  success 
factors,  thus  corroborating  the  identification  of  such  factors  as  critical. 
The  availability  of  training  and  expertise  were  identified  through  Question  17  as 
being  critical  success  factors.  Respondents  to  Question  19  reported  that  the  current 
accessibility  of  advice  and  guidance  was  welcome  with  Interpol  NCB  at  NCIS  warranting 
particular  mention  (Box  8  below).  The  next  best  thing  to  knowing,  is  knowing  where  to  ask. 
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guidance  provided  by  InterpoL  " 
A&ice  &  guidancefrom  Interpol  when  requested  is  always  timely  and  appropriate  and  in  many  instances  has 
aved  lime  &  resources.  " 
"Interpol  staff  very  helpful.  CPS  geuing  there.  " 
ability  to  be  able  to  discuss  the  request  with  a  case  worker  when  submitted,  -  ability  to  send  requests 
"I  have  alwaysfound  the  staffal  NCISlInterpol  most  helpfid  and  readily  give  advice.  " 
Advicefrom  NCB  InterpoL  " 
ncies  involved  as  acting  as  conduits  tofacilitale  such  requests  appear  knowledgeable  and  supportive. 
are  prompt  with  enquiriesfrom  ECU.  lfFIB  telephone  NCIS  with  an  urgent  enquiry  they  do  their  best  to 
ire  always  approachable.  " 
Just  as  Question  17  identified  liaison  and  contact  with  investigators  overseas  who 
would  be  executing  the  request  as  a  critical  success  factor,  so  effective  communication  was 
identified  as  factor  that  works  well,  at  least  in  the  experience  of  some.  To  this  effective 
communication  can  be  added  effective  communication  processes  (Box  9  below). 
There  seems  to  be  divided  opinion  between  whether  a  single  point  of  contact  is 
preferable  to  allowing  individual  investigators  to  contact  their  opposite  numbers  directly.  But 
this  division  may  lose  its  significance  if  a  distinction  is drawn  in  the  minds  of  the  respondents 
between  a  process  for  initial  contact  and  request  and  the  liaison  necessary  to  sustain  a  live 
operation  in  real  time. 
The  positive  reception  to  enquiries  authorised  and  directed  by  CIIIS  seems  to  indicate 
tacit  approval  for  a  more  active  role  for  prosecutors  in  mutual  legal  assistance;  a  view 
seemingly  reinforced  by  the  welcoming  of  the  Eurojust  initiative.  The  two  contrasting  views 
of  UK  success  in  achieving  good  practice  to  date,  as  revealed  in  the  final  two  responses, 
highlight  the  diversity  of  perception  that  exists  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation. 
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'Effective  communication;  Recognised  points  ofconfact. 
'Personal  contact.  - 
'System  ofcontact  at  NCIS  &  UKCA. 
"Once  counterparts  have  been  identified  -  the  ability  to  communicate  directly. 
"A  single  point  of  contact  is  preferential  [sic].  This  survey  has  highlighted  that  there  are  occasions  when  this 
oute  is  bypassedfor  the  purpose  of  undertaking  an  enquiry  in  the  most  efficient  manner  e.  g.  personally  seeing 
, Iitness  located  overseas.  Nevertheless  it  would  be  useful  to  be  aware  of  these  occasions  in  orderfor  best  praci 
)  be  collated  and  disseminatedfor  the  benefit  of  all  investigating  officers.  " 
'Enquiries  authorised  and  directed  by  CPS,  -  enquiries  authorised  by  the  court. 
'Time  evidence  obtained  -  having  come  through  the  Comrogprocess  -  is  admissible,  providingyou  can  persuade 
he  witness  to  attend  in  person  (should  the  defence  require  it)  The  network  via  Interpol  is  extensive.  " 
"All  incoming  requestsfrom  HO  UKCA  are  received  by  the  ILO.  They  are  logged  and  sent  to  divisions  or  depts 
br  allocation  with  a  covering  report  clarifying  anypotentially  difficult  areas  -  usually  caused  by  indýfferent 
ranslations.  The  reply  is  quality  controlled  by  the  ILO  before  being  returned  to  the  HO.  " 
"Introduction  of  Eurojust  team  within  the  EU  is  a  valuable  avenueforfast-tracking  and  checking  progress  of 
7pplications.  Apartfrom  that  the  whole  system  is  outmoded,  bureaucratic  and  ludicrous  in  operation  -  but  of 
.  ourse  the  UK  is  the  worst  offender  in  the  whole  processR 
'Alone  come  to  mind.  The  system  works  well,  certainly  UK  encl. 
Summary 
The  free  text  answers  raise  some  key  issues. 
0  It  takes  too  long  for  requested  evidence  to  be  produced,  partly  because  of  the 
bureaucracy  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  partly  because  of  the  attitudes  of 
the  requested  authorities. 
0  More  training  and  a  higher  level  of  expertise  generally  are  perceived  as 
necessary  but  it  is  acknowledged  that  advice  and  guidance  are  already 
accessible. 
0  Investigators  believe  that  the  best  results  are  to  be  achieved  when  they  can 
liaise  directly  with  their  opposite  numbers  who  will  be  executing  the  request. 
To  these  can  be  added  the  key  points  that  emerged  from  other  sections  ofthe  SCQ. 
There  is  an  overall  lack  of  management  data  in  relation  to  mutual  legal 
assistance. 
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9  Available  data  point  to  an  increase  in  mutual  legal  assistance  activity. 
Most  forces  in  England  and  Wales  have  some  form  of  internal  process  for 
managing  ELORs,  even  if  it  is  only  a  single  point  of  contact  through  which  to 
receive  a  request.  As  such  there  appears  to  be  a  moderate  level  of  awareness 
at  force  level  within  the  LJK. 
The  experience  and  perceptions  of  central  authority  practitioners  and 
government  officials  across  the  EU  are  mirrored  amongst  their  police 
colleagues  in  England  and  Wales.  This  is  a  useful  corroboration  of  the  EU's 
findings  from  a  group  of  practitioners  largely  excluded  from  the  three-year 
EU  evaluation  exercise. 
There  has  been  some  improvement  in  force  mutual  legal  assistance  awareness 
since  1996,  but  many  of  the  same  problems  remain,  and  both  the  present 
survey  and  its  predecessor  have  confirmed  that  exploiting  international 
borders  remains  an  effective  tactical  option  for  criminals  seeking  to  evade 
prosecution. 
To  this  landscape  snap-shot  at  a  geneml  level  must  now  be  added  the  portrait  detail 
available  from  individual  case  studies.  From  an  examination  of  the  processes  in  place,  this 
study  now  moves  to  the  particular  and  the  experience  of  making  the  processes  work  in 
practice. 
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Chapter  7 
Mutual  legal  assistance  in  practice:  case  studies 
The  practicalities  and  processes  surrounding  the  management  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  at  local  force  level,  as  illustrated  in 
chapter  six  above,  provide  only  part  of  the  picture.  To  understand  the  mechanics  of  mutual 
legal  assistance,  case  studies  have  been  gathered  which  highlight  investigative  issues  from  the 
perspectives  of  senior  investigating  officers  [SIOs]  and  prosecutors. 
Case  study  source  material 
There  is  very  little  in  the  way  of  published  material  about  criminal  investigations 
involving  the  utilisation  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  Law  books  tend  to  discuss  either  the 
framework  of  international  instruments  (for  instance  Shaw  2003)  or  else  compare  procedures 
and  laws  across  different  jurisdictions  (for  instance  Delmas-Marty  &  Spencer  2002).  Studies 
describing  police  co-operation  within  Europe  (such  as  Anderson  et  al.  1995  or  Occhipinti 
2003)  have  tended  to  be  works  of  political  commentary  about  infrastructures.  As  Chattcrton 
has  pointed  out  (2001),  there  has  been  no  research  to  examine  how  the  structures  of 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  actually  work.  Hence  the  research  strategy 
adopted  for  the  present  study  of  interviewing  SIOs  and  prosecutors  to  build  up  specific  case 
studies  through  which  the  operation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  -  one  such  structure  of  co- 
operation  -  can  be  illustrated.  One  published  source  has  been  used.  Its  limitations  are 
discussed  below. 
A  semi-structured  interview  template  was  devised  and  is  reproduced  in  Appendix  F. 
It  was  adapted  on  each  occasion  with  additional  questions  to  suit  the  particular  circumstances 
under  discussion  but  the  same  generic  questions  were  used  for  all  SIO  interviews. 
Subsequently  it  was  determined  to  interview  prosecutors  as  well,  for  which  a  second  template 
was  devised  (Appendix  G).  The  decision  to  extend  the  case  study  strategy  to  prosecutors  as 
well  as  SlOs  was  taken  when,  through  both  academic  and  professional  contacts,  it  became 
apparent  that  these  two  groups  of  practitioners  had  different  perspectives  on  the  problems 
surrounding  mutual  legal  assistance  and  adducing  evidence  gathered  overseas  at  trial  in 
England  and  Wales.  Interviewees  were  drawn  from  local  police  forces  in  England  and  Wales, 
national  agencies  involved  in  the  investigation  of  transnational  organized  crime,  and  from  the 
CPS.  The  case  studies  comprise  a  range  of  criminality:  the  trafficking  of  drugs,  human  beings, 
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arms,  and  images  of  child  sexual  and  physical  abuse,  and  contract  murder.  Common  to  all  the 
case  studies,  of  course,  was  the  transnational  nature  of  the  investigation. 
Semi-structured  interviews  with  practitioners  conducted  for  this  research  have 
provided  material  not  previously  available  and  give  an  insight  into  some  common  issues  faced 
by  both  investigators  and  prosecutors  when  utilising  mutual  legal  assistance.  The  recur-ring 
themes  are  identified  below: 
"  Different  use  oVattitudes  towards  ILORs 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
"  Working  relationship  with  foreign  colleagues 
"  Collaboration  with  prosecutors  (including  debriefing) 
"  Domestic  agency  rivalry 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  testimony 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  intelligence  handling 
"  Different  procedural  laws 
"  Disclosure  issues 
"  Loss  of  evidence  /  timeliness  problems 
"  Forced  spontaneous  tactical  changes 
"  ILOR  management  information  available 
The  data  is  presented  in  sanitised  form  in  accordance  with  the  agreed  interview 
regime  (also  explained  in  Appendix  F)  which  dictates  that  original  interview  material  for  this 
study  will  not  be  made  publicly  available. 
Case  study  I 
To  assist  the  reader,  publicly  available  material  has  been  used  for  one  case  study.  The 
material  from  this  case  is  not  ideal  in  that  it  differs  significantly  in  character  from  the 
interview  material.  Attempts  were  made  to  discover  other  published  material  that  could  be 
used  for  case  studies  but  no  other  suitable  material  was  found  (thus  reinforcing  Chatterton's 
point  about  the  dearth  of  analysis  in  this  arena).  ' 
There  are  numerous  biographies  of  notorious  career  criminals  of  which  the  career 
biography  of  Curtis  Warren  (Barnes  et  aL  2000)  is  just  one.  2  Like  other  such  works  from  this 
genre,  the  study  on  Warren  is  a  work  of  journalism  rather  than  of  academic  criminology.  It  is 
11  am  particularly  grateful  for  the  extensive  endeavours  of  staff  at  Bramshill  Police  Library  who  went 
to  some  lengths  to  assist  me  in  the  ultimately  fruitless  search  for  additional  suitable  published  material. 
2  Warren  did  not  participate  in  the  writing  of  this  book,  nor  did  he  grant  interviews  to  the  authors. 
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no  less  useful  for  that  but  it  does  not  seek  to  answer  research  questions,  nor  does  it  observe 
academic  conventions.  It  does  not,  of  course,  examine  the  issues  surrounding  mutual  legal 
assistance  in  the  same  way  as  the  semi-structured  interviews.  References  to  such  issues  as 
legal  assistance  are  incidental  to  the  main  theme  of  the  book,  and  as  such  it  is  of  limited 
comparative  value  for  this  study.  Nevertheless  it  provides  a  useful  description  of  a 
transnational  organized  crime  network  and  how  it  operates,  and  for  readers  unfamiliar  with 
such  criminality  it  is  to  be  commended  for  that  alone.  It  also  illustrates  how  transnational 
criminality  directly  affects  and  interacts  with  local  communities  in  England. 
Curtis  Warren  has  been  convicted  by  Dutch  courts  of  drugs  smuggling  and 
manslaughter  in  The  Netherlands  where  he  is  currently  in  prison.  Although  the  offences  for 
which  he  has  been  convicted  took  place  in  The  Netherlands,  they  formed  part  of  his  global 
enterprise  that  principally  brought  illicit  drugs  into  the  UK.  At  the  time  of  his  arrest  and 
conviction  in  The  Netherlands  he  was  under  active  investigation  by  UK  authorities  working 
closely  with  their  Dutch  counterparts.  The  extent  of  his  global  drugs  trafficking  operation  is 
illustrated  in  Barnes  et  al.  (2000:  7,8,72,87,95,110,200  &  210).  Although  it  was  not  their 
main  focus,  Barnes  et  al.  illustrate,  as  and  when  it  had  direct  bearing  on  their  story,  how 
mutual  legal  assistance  operated  in  this  investigation.  As  such,  this  provides  a  useful  back- 
drop  against  which  to  study  the  interview  material. 
Co-operation  between  different  national  investigating  and  prosecuting  authorities  is 
key  to  tackling  transnational  organized  crime  successfully.  A  number  of  English  investigators 
have  commented  on  the  immediate  barrier  to  co-operation  they  face  because  mutual  legal 
assistance  is  structured  around  the  provision  of  assistance  between  judicial  authorities,  which 
in  continental  Europe  include  Napoleonic  Code  prosecutors,  which  immediately  tends  to 
exclude  English  investigators  because  they  are  police  officers  and  customs  officers  rather  than 
prosecutors.  Yet  lack  of  co-operation,  rather  like  its  antithesis  charity,  begins  at  home,  as 
evident  in  the  rivalry  and  lack  of  trust  between  police  officers  and  customs  officers.  It  is  a 
recurring  theme  throughout  the  investigation  of  Curtis  Warren  and  has  a  long  pedigree 
(ibid.:  111-12;  114;  125;  136).  An  associate  of  Warren's,  Brian  Carrington,  had  been  a 
primary  target  for  HMCE.  After  a  lengthy  transnational  investigation,  they  arrested  and 
charged  him  with  importation.  Charges  were  dropped  following  an  unprecedented  political 
intervention  made  on  behalf  of  Cleveland  Police  by  Tim  Devlin  MP  to  the  Attorney-General, 
Sir  Nicholas  Lyell,  because  Carrington  was  a  police  informer  who  could,  potentially,  provide 
vital  information  and  evidence  against  Warren.  3  In  a  subsequent  investigation  against 
WarTen,  it  was  determined  to  establish  an  elite  joint  police-customs  team  working  to  a 
3  The  intervention  was  discovered  by  a  free-lance  reporter,  John  Merry,  and  exposed  by  the  News  ofthe 
World  when  Devlin  sought  to  suppress  the  story  (Barnes  et  al.  2000:  114). 
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documented  protocol.  In  essence  it  was  a  prototype  for  the  sort  of  co-operation  model  now 
being  envisaged  for  Joint  Investigation  Teams  (EUCMA  Article  13).  It  worked  well  for  the 
final  investigation  against  Warren  (Barnes  et  al.  2000:  137;  145)  but  the  temporary  goodwill 
was  not  sustained  (ibid.:  297).  Despite  there  being  a  willingness  to  co-operate  publicly 
expressed  at  the  highest  levels,  4  at  operational  team  level  relations  are  still  considered  to  be 
poor  in  some  areas  as  "old  habits  die  hard",  (Butterfield  2003:  paragraph  10.8). 
Part  of  the  mistrust  emanates  not  only  from  different  organizational  cultures  but  also 
from  different  working  practices  that  exist  despite  all-embracing  criminal  procedural  laws 
such  as  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984  and  the  common  purpose  of  investigating 
transnational  organized  crime.  Although  the  reputation  enjoyed  by  HMCE  investigators  has 
often  surpassed  the  reputation  and  respect  enjoyed  by  their  police  colleagues  (Bames  et  al. 
2000:  125;  Butterfield  2003:  paragraph  10.11),  police  investigative  methods  have  often  proved 
to  be  better  practice  than  those  of  I-IMCE  (Bames  et  aL  2000:  145;  Butterfield 
2003:  paragraphs  10-85-10.86). 
English  investigators  have  on  occasions  expressed  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
working  methods  of  their  foreign  colleagues  and  the  practices  of  the  jurisdictions  in  which 
they  work,  which  must  militate  against  the  building  of  a  trusted  working  relationship 
(Nicholson  &  Harrison  1996:  Chapter  6).  If  trust  and  confidence  do  not  exist  between 
domestic  agencies  working  in  a  common  language  and  a  single  jurisdiction,  how  much  more 
difficult  must  it  be  to  establish  trust  and  confidence  with  foreign  colleagues  when  lack  of  a 
common  language  and  different  jurisdictional  traditions  present  barriers  to  optimal  co- 
operation.  Yet  the  responses  to  Questions  17-19  of  the  SCQ  discussed  in  chapter  six  above 
clearly  indicate  the  value  placed  on  trust  established  through  direct  liaison  and  working 
relationships  and  the  role  that  trust  and  understanding  play  as  critical  success  factors  in 
trarisnational  investigations;  a  point  also  brought  out  in  the  research  into  the  operation  of 
Anglo-French  border  zone  policing  (See  Gallagher  1998  Chapter  5  for  an  account  of  valuable 
and  continuing  personal  relationships  that  helped  Kent  police  to  establish  and  sustain  cross- 
Channel  law  enforcement  co-operation). 
Different  national  laws  impose  their  own  restrictions  on  the  management  strategy  of 
transnational  investigations,  alongside  the  cultural  differences  identified  above.  This  is 
illustrated  in  Warren's  case  by  the  differences  concerning  the  use  of  intercepted  telephone  call 
evidence.  Warren's  Dutch  associates  were  subjects  of  lawful  telephone  interception 
conducted  by  the  Dutch  police.  Dutch  law  requires  that  the  subjects  of  telephone  interception 
be  advised  of  the  fact  of  the  interception  six months  after  the  interception  takes  place.  They 
4A  general  operational  protocol  has  now  been  agreed  between  the  National  Crime  Squad  and  HMCE. 
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must  be  provided  with  transcripts  of  the  intercepted  conversations.  This  legal  requirement 
essentially  imposed  a  time  limit  both  on  the  investigation  of  Warren  and  the  parallel 
investigation  of  Elmore  Davies,  a  Merseyside  Police  Detective  Chief  Inspector  suspected  of 
having  entered  into  a  corrupt  relationship  with  Warren  or  his  associates  (Barnes  et  aL 
2000:  246;  262).  Disclosure  of  the  intercept  transcripts  to  the  Dutch  suspects  prior  to  the  arrest 
of  the  English  criminals  would  compromise  the  English  operations.  This  was  an  additional 
factor  that  the  English  SlOs  in  these  cases  had  to  take  into  account  in  their  planning. 
Ultimately,  once  a  matter  has  come  to  trial  and  evidence  has  been  adduced, 
defendants  learn  the  investigation  methodology  which  brought  them  to  justice.  Even  where  it 
is  possible  to  protect  certain  sensitive  techniques  or  sources  (under  the  English  court  rules  of 
public  interest  immunity  for  instance;  see  Choo  1998:  537-8,548-63),  defendants  may  be  able 
to  draw  inductive  conclusions  based  on  circumstance.  The  trial  in  which  Carrington  had  been 
involved  saw  Warren  acquitted,  but  not  before  the  latter  had  heard  and  read  a  considerable 
amount  of  evidence  about  the  investigative  techniques  that  had  resulted  in  his  being  charged. 
Each  trial  educates  the  criminal  through  the  exposure  (even  if  only  partial)  of  law 
enforcement  method  (ibid.:  124).  In  cases  where  there  are  conspirators  being  tried  in  different 
jurisdictions  but  upon  largely  the  same  evidence,  investigators  have  to  take  account  of  how 
the  trial  practices  of  a  foreign  court  might  expose  matters  that  would  otherwise  be  protected  in 
England.  This  further  complicates  mutual  legal  assistance  and  the  use  of  the  evidential 
product  it  facilitates. 
If  the  criminals  learn  from  the  investigators,  by  equal  measure  so  the  investigators 
learn  from  the  criminals.  In  building  a  case  against  Warren  and  his  associates,  it  soon  became 
apparent  that  diversity  paid  dividends.  Being  prepared  to  be  flexible  in  the  commodities 
trafficked  means  that  criminals  are  not  tied  to  a  single  source  of  profit  (ibid.:  147;  255).  This 
might  complicate  matters  when  planning  the  use  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  But  whether  the 
commodity  illicitly  being  trafficked  is  narcotics,  alcohol,  tobacco  or  human  beings,  the 
common  factor  is  the  trafficking.  Where  suspects  maintain  a  sterile  corridor  between 
themselves  and  the  trafficking,  then  disruption  of  the  transport  network  is  the  best  available 
intervention  option  for  the  authorities.  This  influences  both  proactive  and  reactive  use  of 
mutual  legal  assistance.  The  suspect  usually  has  the  initiative,  to  which  the  investigators  have 
to  respond.  Warren  often  took  decisions  and  courses  of  action  that  wrong-footed  those 
investigating  him  (ibid.:  141).  Mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  may  inhibit  the  strategic 
flexibility  required  to  keep  pace  with  a  major  transnational  criminal  able  to  exploit  a  number 
of  different  criminal  options.  And  if  tackling  the  transport  network  was  not  an  option,  then 
there  remained  only  the  tracing  of  the  money  (ibid.:  147).  Since  the  9/11  New  York  terrorist 
attacks  there  has  been  a  considerable  amount  of  international  effort  committed  to  enhancing 
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international  financial  investigations.  Although  financial  investigation  into  money  laundering, 
along  with  extradition,  are  aspects  of  mutual  legal  assistance  that  lie  outside  this  thesis,  their 
importance  can  be  seen  in  the  Warren  case  where  his  criminal  assets  were  valued  at  up  to  f  18 
millions,  including  270  houses  generating  rental  income,  the  funding  of  a  housing 
development  scheme  in  Liverpool  and  a  number  of  pubs  and  retail  outlets  in  Liverpool. 
Warren  disputed  these  estimates  but  volunteered  the  surTender  of  E5  millions  in  order  to  reach 
a  deal  with  the  Dutch  prosecutors  seeking  confiscation  of  his  assets  (ibid:.  314-15). 
The  Dutch  prosecution  relied  to  a  significant  extent  upon  evidence  from  England. 
One  particular  line  of  attack  by  the  defence  lawyers  in  The  Netherlands  was  to  question  as  an 
abuse  of  process,  information  and  evidence  obtained  in  England  by  the  English  authorities 
although  not,  interestingly,  the  evidence  obtained  by  Dutch  police  allowed  to  travel  to 
England  and  interview  witnesses  directly  (ibid.:  269;  272).  Although  their  strategy  was 
unsuccessftd,  it  was  nevertheless  a  tactic  that  any  defence  team  might  consider.  If  tackling  the 
transport  network  of  a  crime  syndicate  is  the  easiest  intervention  option  for  the  authorities, 
attacking  the  transfer  of  evidence  across  borders  is  the  simplest  way  open  to  the  defendant  of 
muddying  the  waters. 
Whilst  not  studying  mutual  legal  assistance  per  se,  Barnes  et  al.  indirectly  highlight  a 
number  of  relevant  issues,  more  often  than  not  being  impediments  to  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation.  But  they  also  illustrate  one  particular  success  arising  from  the 
emerging  framework  of  new  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  JHA  initiatives. 
At  one  stage  in  the  investigation  one  of  Warren's  English  drivers  sought  to  evade  Dutch 
surveillance  by  crossing  the  Belgian  border  (ibid.:  248),  unaware  that  the  Schengen 
Convention  allowed  the  Dutch  officers  to  cross  the  border  with  him.  In  a  litany  of  lessons  for 
law  enforcement,  this  particular  episode  demonstrated  that  pragmatic  progress  is  being 
achieved  in  enhancing  the  capability  of  investigators  to  prosecute  transnational  organized 
crime. 
The  key  themes  that  emerge  from  this  case  study,  to  which  discussion  will  return  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter,  are: 
"  Working  relationship  with  foreign  colleagues 
"  Domestic  agency  rivalry 
"  Different  procedural  laws 
Having  set  the  scene  with  this  external  view  of  some  of  the  issues  surrounding  mutual 
legal  assistance,  the  remaining  case  studies  present  the  internal  perspectives  of  investigators 
and  prosecutors. 
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Case  study  2  (interview  7  February  2001) 
This  was  an  investigation  into  a  criminal  network  of  at  least  180  members  operating 
5  in  at  least  twenty-one  national  jurisdictions.  The  network  communicated  and  committed  their 
crin-dnality  via  the  Internet  using  this  medium  to  create  and  exchange  within  their  closed 
community,  images  of  child  sexual  and  physical  abuse.  The  nature  and  extent  of  the 
criminality  were  such  that  it  was  determined  that  the  investigation  should  culminate  in  the 
simultaneous  execution  of  arrests  and  search  warrants  in  as  many  of  the  twenty-one 
jurisdictions  as  were  able  to  participate.  Each  participating  jurisdiction  would  then  be 
responsible  for  the  prosecution  of  offenders  identified  within  their  jurisdiction.  To  achieve 
this  outcome  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  was  initially  of  greater  importance 
than  mutual  legal  assistance  but  the  latter  was  necessary  to  introduce  into  each  of  the 
domestic  trials  the  evidence  that  any  given  offender  had  been  involved  in  a  global  enterprise. 
English  investigators  relied  upon  mutual  assistance  from  eighteen  other  jurisdictions 
for  the  exchange  of  intelligence  and  requested  mutual  legal  assistance  from  five  jurisdictions. 
The  number  of  requests  was  not  recorded  and  the  SIO  indicated  that  a  review  of  the  case  files 
would  be  required  in  order  to  draw  up  a  tally  of  the  number  of  requests.  (It  was  not  possible  to 
do  this  for  the  purposes  of  this  research.  )  Mutual  legal  assistance  was  requested  in  order  to 
detain  suspects,  obtain  witness  statements  and  search  for  and  seize  property.  It  achieved  the 
introduction  of  evidence  into  trial  in  England  that  would  otherwise  not  have  been  available: 
for  instance,  foreign  interception  product  obtained  through  mutual  legal  assistance  persuaded 
an  English  suspect  to  plead  guilty  thus  negating  the  necessity  for  a  lengthy  contested  trial. 
All  requested  assistance  was  provided  but  there  were  issues  of  timeliness.  The 
English  investigations  had  been  completed  some  time  before  the  research  interview  was 
conducted,  but  only  a  few  days  before  the  interview  a  bundle  of  relevant  evidence,  which 
required  translation,  arrived  from  a  foreign  jurisdiction  -  too  late  for  use  at  trial. 
The  11LORs  for  the  English  investigation  were  all  issued  by  the  same  CPS  senior 
prosecutor  and  were  all  transmitted  via  the  UKCA.  The  early  allocation  of  a  prosecutor  to 
advise  on  this  investigation  was  of  bencfit  to  the  SIO  and  ensured  an  informed  and  consistent 
approach  to  the  drafting  of  requests.  English  officers  were  occasionally  present  when  a 
request  was  executed.  Such  deployment  was  utilised  only  where  it  was  deemed  beneficial  to 
have  an  investigator  present  to  respond  immediately  to  evidential  developments.  In  this 
operation,  due  to  the  existence  of  parallel  investigations  across  the  world,  there  was  a  good 
5  The  sophistication  with  which  the  offenders  sought  to  protect  themselves  Eroin  investigation  and 
prosecution  means  that  it  is  possible  that  some  offenders  and  jurisdictions  may  have  gone  unidentified. 
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understanding  amongst  all  investigators  about  precisely  what  their  foreign  counter-parts 
needed  when  requests  were  made.  This  probably  enhanced  the  quality  of  response  and  the 
commitment  to  executing  mutual  legal  assistance  requests,  at  least  amongst  investigators. 
The  proactive  and  covert  nature  of  the  investigations  meant  that  suspects  were  not 
made  aware  of  the  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  nor  offered  the  opportunity  to  be  present 
when  requests  were  executed.  From  recollection  the  SIO  indicated  that  the  majority  of  ILORs 
were  individual:  a  single  request  per  ELOR.  Only  occasionally  would  an  ILOR  itemise  more 
than  one  request.  No  requested  State  accepted  a  single  ELOR,  couched  in  general  tenns,  as  the 
basis  for  all  subsequent  requests. 
In  this  enquiry  mutual  assistance  -  police-to-police  exchange  of  intelligence  for 
instance  -  was  frequently  a  precursor  to  mutual  legal  assistance.  Investigators  identified  to 
each  other  what  information  or  evidence  they  required.  This  would  be  gathered,  or  the 
opportunities  to  acquire  it  identified,  and  then  on  the  basis  of  this  intelligence,  informed  and 
targeted  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  would  be  made.  Although  the  actual  mutual  legal 
assistance  process  was  not  subsequently  challenged  by  defence  lawyers,  issues  of  continuity 
were  raised  so  that,  having  obtained  a  key  lengthy  statement  on  behalf  of  the  English 
investigators  a  foreign  counterpart  frequently  had  to  be  re-contacted  to  make  a  statement 
about  the  way  in  which  the  evidence  had  been  gathered  on  behalf  of  the  English  authorities,  in 
order  to  'prove'  the  mutual  legal  assistance  process. 
There  were  no  contested  trials  in  the  LJK  in  relation  to  this  matter  so  whilst  the  use  of 
video  or  telephone  links  to  hear  the  evidence  of  witnesses  located  abroad  was  considered,  it 
was  not  necessary  to  undertake  this  course  of  action.  It  is  likely,  however,  that  the  prosecution 
would  have  prefer-red  to  have  the  prosecution  witnesses  testify  in  person.  It  would  have  been 
possible  to  adduce  the  evidence  of  a  number  of  witnesses  (but  certainly  not  all)  on  a 
documentary  basis  thus  negating  the  necessity  of  them  travelling  to  England  to  testify.  The 
determining  factor  dictating  personal  testimony  would  have  been  the  likelihood  of  their 
evidence  being  disputed  by  the  defence. 
The  objective  of  this  investigation  -  the  global  co-ordination  of  simultaneous 
intervention  -  is  a  relatively  rare  phenomenon,  certainly  on  the  scale  on  which  it  was 
attempted  here.  It  brings  to  this  case  some  unique  features  which  nevertheless  generate 
universal  learning  points. 
Interpol  played  a  limited  but  key  role  in  facilitating  early  meetings  between  the 
various  jurisdictions.  Once  agreement  in  principle  had  been  reached,  there  was  little  more  that 
Interpol  could  assist  with  and  the  practical  detail  of  the  co-ordinated  intervention  was 
discussed  on  a  mutual  assistance  basis  directly  between  the  SIO  and  his  opposite  numbers. 
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One  of  the  particular  problems  that  had  to  be  overcome  was  the  absence  of  dual  criminality  in 
one  jurisdiction  where  the  behaviour  being  investigated,  although  criminal  in  all  the  other 
participating  jurisdictions,  was  not  illegal  in  this  particular  jurisdiction.  (The  jurisdiction  in 
question  has  subsequently  amended  its  criminal  code  as  a  direct  consequence  of  this 
investigation.  )  It  provided  all  requested  assistance  notwithstanding  the  absence  of  dual 
criminality  and  made  arrests  and  gathered  evidence  in  response  to  mutual  legal  assistance 
requests  from  England. 
A  further  complicating  factor  which  could  not  so  easily  be  overcome,  lay  in  the 
timing  of  execution  for  search  warrants.  This  was  to  lead,  to  the  fi7ustration  of  the  SIO,  to  one 
of  the  participating  jurisdictions  fast  dictating  the  timing  of  the  entire  global  operation  around 
its  laws  and  then,  just  a  few  hours  before  the  appointed  hour,  seeking  the  postponement  of  the 
whole  operation.  The  English  SIO,  with  overall  responsibility  for  co-ordinating  the  action, 
refused  the  postponement  on  several  grounds:  that  action  had  already  been  postponed  for  a 
month  at  the  behest  of  this  particular  jurisdiction;  that  lives  were  believed  to  be  at  stake  in  a 
number  ofjurisdictions  and  so  police  had  a  duty  to  act;  and  that  it  was  going  to  be  impractical 
to  postpone  the  operation  at  such  short  notice  because  whilst  it  might  still  be  the  beginning  of 
the  day  in  this  particular  jurisdiction,  in  other  jurisdictions  it  was  already  the  middle  of  the 
night  and  intervention  teams  could  not  be  contacted  until  they  assembled  to  execute  the 
warrants.  With  a  certain  amount  of  frustration  on  both  sides,  the  SIO  informed  the  authorities 
in  this  jurisdiction  that  the  operation  would  go  ahead  with  or  without  them.  In  the  event  it 
went  ahead  with  fourteen  other  jurisdictions,  including  the  one  which  had  sought  the  late 
postponement. 
The  SIO  in  this  case  did  not  understand  why  the  short-notice  request  for  a 
postponement  had  been  made.  Despite  the  preparatory  meetings  that  had  involved  the  various 
participating  jurisdictions,  there  had  never  been  a  similar  debriefing  meeting.  As  far  as  the 
SIO  was  concerned,  the  jurisdiction  in  question  had  proved  unreliable  but  as  it  did  manage  to 
participate  no  long-term  damage  had  been  caused  to  the  operation.  Ile  had  not  sought  further 
explanation  but  was  now  wary  of  ever  again  working  with  that  jurisdiction. 
The  jurisdiction  in  question  was  the  United  States,  which  should  more  properly  be 
described  as  fifty-two  jurisdictions  (LaFave  et  al.  2000:  3-6);  6  wherein  lay  the  problem.  From 
the  SIO's  perspective,  he  was  dealing  with  one  nation,  a  national  Department  of  Justice  and, 
as  far  as  he  was  aware,  a  federal  jurisdiction.  Although  the  criminality  in  question  fell  within 
the  ambit  of  federal  jurisdiction,  thus  avoiding  the  confusion  inherent  in  engaging  fifty-one 
6  Each  of  the  fifty  states  has  its  own  criminal  jurisdiction.  In  addition  to  these  there  is  a  federal  criminal 
jurisdiction  and  a  separate  jurisdiction  for  the  District  of  Columbia,  in  which  the  federal  capital 
Washington  is  located,  which  is  not  constitutionally  part  of  the  United  States. 
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other  criminal  codes,  even  federal  jurisdiction  is  not  as  simple  as  it  might  at  first  appear 
7  because  of  the  variety  of  procedural  rules  that  may  apply  (ibid.,  3946). 
The  opportunity  arose  for  the  present  author  to  interview  the  US  Department  of 
Justice  lawyer  who  co-ordinated  the  US  end  of  this  operation.  This  interview  illustrated  some 
of  the  local  issues  that  might  be  faced  when  English  investigators  make  a  request  (interview, 
US  Dept.  of  Justice,  Washington  DC,  19  June  2001). 
Federal  rules  dictate  the  times  at  which  a  search  wan-ant  should  be  executed.  Special 
permission  had  to  be  sought  to  execute  warrants  in  the  Eastern  Standard  Time  [EST]  zone 
after  2200  hours  EST.  Had  this  not  been  granted,  suspects  located  in  the  EST  could  not  have 
been  arrested  and  their  premises  searched  at  the  same  time  as  every  other  intervention  was 
taking  place  across  the  globe.  8  These  timing  issues  were  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that 
although  the  federal  rules  of  criminal  procedure  and  evidence  provide  a  basic  standard,  it  is 
open  to  district  courts  in  any  one  of  the  ninety-four  federal  court  districts  to  establish  local 
procedural  rules  to  supplement  the  federal  rules.  So  for  example,  where  the  federal  rules 
dictate  that  no  search  warrant  be  executed  after  2200  as  the  minimum  standard,  a  federal 
district  court  might  additionally  determine  that,  within  its  district  for  the  enhanced  protection 
of  citizens'  rights,  no  search  may  be  conducted  after  2100.  Thus  the  presence  of  thirty-two 
suspects  located  in  twenty-two  federal  districts  across  the  continent  complicated  the  logistics 
for  the  US  authorities  in  ways  that  the  English  SIO  could  not  imagine.  9  The  request  for 
postponement  had  been  made  because  Department  of  Justice  officials  in  Washington  were 
still  trying  to  convince  federal  district  judges  in  some  areas  to  permit  the  execution  of  search 
wan-ants  outside  stipulated  times  and  contrary  to  local  rules.  In  the  event,  in  at  least  one 
instance  the  judge's  signature  was  apparently  still  wet  on  the  wan-ant  when  officers  raided  the 
suspect's  house. 
The  US  lawyer  concurred  with  the  English  SIO  about  the  value  of  the  facilitation 
undertaken  by  Interpol  in  helping  the  English  authorities  obtain  commitments  of  support  to  a 
joint  operation.  Unlike  the  English  authorities  (who  were  obliged  to  issue  a  separate  ILOR  for 
each  requested  item  of  evidence),  the  US  authorities  in  this  investigation  were  able  to 
negotiate  with  the  Italians,  the  use  of  a  single,  open-ended  generic  ILOR  to  cover  all 
investigative  initial  and  subsequent  actions  that  the  US  authorities  might  need  the  Italians  to 
7The  English  equivalent  instrument  to  the  federal  rules  of  criminal  procedure,  in  very  general  terms, 
would  be  the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984  and  its  Codes  of  Practice. 
8  The  strike  time  was  0400  GMT.  Taking  into  account  daylight  saving  time,  this  equated  to  midnight  in 
the  EST  and  2  100  on  the  west  coast. 
9  There  could  even  be  different  sets  of  rules  within  a  single  State  if  there  is  more  than  one  federal 
district  per  state.  For  instance  whilst  the  East  federal  district  in  Washington  State  adheres  simply  to  the 
federal  rules  as  given,  the  West  federal  district  in  Washington  State  has  supplemented  the  federal  rules 
with  its  own  court  rules. 
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undertake  on  their  behalf  in  relation  to  the  US  suspects  (interview,  Department  of  Justice, 
Washington  DC,  19  June  200  1). 
In  the  post-arrest  phase  of  this  investigation,  mutual  legal  assistance  has  generally 
been  confmed  to  securing  witness  attendance  at  foreign  trials.  Although  there  was  no 
contested  trial  in  England  arising  from  this  investigation,  that  was  not  true  elsewhere  and 
English  officers  have  had  to  make  regular  trips  abroad  to  testify  in  foreign  trials. 
For  the  English  SIO  in  this  case,  a  general  reflection  in  summary  on  what  works  and 
what  does  not  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  touched  upon  a  theme  already  familiar 
from  the  data  considered  in  chapter  6  above.  Although  mutual  interest  in  this  operation,  as 
described  above,  had  enhanced  the  quality  of  response  between  investigators,  such  active  co- 
operation  was  not  evident  from  bureaucrats  involved  in  the  process. 
"For  investigators  the  key  issues  are  timeliness  in  getting  the  request  in  with  the  UK 
officialdom  to  the  relevant  authority  overseas.  ...  There  were  a  number  of  occasions  when  I've  given 
countries  mutual  assistance  in  terms  of  giving  them  information  for  intelligence  purposes  only  in  the 
knowledge  that  a  request  was  almost  simultaneously  madefor  theformal  remit.  Holland,  for  example, 
came  with  a  prosecutor.  We  did  it  all  byfax  and  by  phone  on  the  day  he  was  here.  Three  months  later  I 
get  a  phone  call  saying  'where  is  it?  'I  and  it  [the  incoming  request]  was  still  in  the  Home  Office.  It 
hadn't  even  come  out  of  the  Home  Cffce. 
... 
We  must  be  careful  when  we  criticise  other  people 
because  our  own  house  is  not  in  order,  and  that's  happened  a  couple  oftimes.  " 
He  also  commented  on  the  inflexibility  of  the  ELOR  instrument  as  interpreted  by 
some  jurisdictions.  In  a  different  investigation  he  had  encountered  very  strict  interpretation 
from  foreign  authorities  when  executing  an  ILOR.  On  more  than  one  occasion  precisely  what 
was  requested  in  the  ELOR  and  no  more  was  provided.  This  interpretation  means  that  when 
further  clarification  was  required  of  the  evidence  provided  pursuant  to  an  ILOR,  a  further 
ILOR  had  to  be  raised.  There  was  no  scope  for  ensuring  clarification  at  the  time,  or  under  the 
authority,  of  the  initial  ILOR.  In  the  global  case  under  review  here,  as  has  been  seen,  English 
officers  were  occasionally  deployed  to  observe  the  execution  of  a  request  and  try  to  seek 
immediate  clarification  when  the  need  was  identified.  The  fact  that  the  other  jurisdictions 
involved  had  their  own  prosecutions  arising  from  this  matter  may  have  fostered  a  greater 
willingness  on  the  part  of  requested  authorities  to  accede  to  requests  to  send  observers.  But 
for  this  SIO  the  processes  by  which  foreign  evidence  might  be  adduced  in  English  courts  was 
not  sufficiently  dynamic  to  support  ongoing  investigations. 
"We  are  in  danger  oflosing  evidence  because  ofthe  bureaucratic  nature  ofthe  system.  " 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  despite  the  success  of  this  case  study  operation,  other 
SIOs  have  taken  from  it  the  lesson  that  multiple-jurisdiction,  co-ordinated.  intervention 
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operations  are  by  their  nature  too  large  and  too  cumbersome  to  be  worth  the  trouble.  Smaller- 
scale  operations  with  fewer  partners  are  preferred  by  other  SlOs  being  simpler  to  manage  and 
less  vulnerable  to  the  vagaries  of  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  the 
bureaucracy  of  mutual  legal  assistance  across  numerous  jurisdictions.  '  0 
The  key  themes  that  emerge  from  this  case  study,  to  which  discussion  will  return  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter,  are: 
"  Different  use  of/attitudes  towards  ILORs 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
"  Collaboration  with  prosecutors  (including  debriefing) 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  testimony 
"  Different  procedural  laws 
"  Loss  of  evidence  /  timeliness  problems 
Case  study  3  (interview  12  September  2002) 
Parallel  investigations  are  also  a  feature  in  the  third  case  study.  The  case  involved  the 
smuggling  of  illegal  immigrants  from  the  Far  East,  through  continental  Europe  and  into 
England.  The  investigation  was  initiated  upon  the  discovery  in  England  that  deaths  had 
occurred  amongst  a  group  of  immigrants  whilst  in  transit.  In  this  instance  there  were  two 
different  English  investigations  and  a  foreign  investigation  based  in  Europe:  in  England  there 
was  a  coroner's  investigation  into  the  deaths  seeking  to  identify  the  victims,  alongside  a 
criminal  investigation  into  suspected  homicides.  In  another  EU  jurisdiction  (State  A),  "  there 
was  a  criminal  investigation  into  organized  human  trafficking  that  touched  upon  the  network 
responsible  for  bringing  this  group  of  immigrants  to  England.  The  two  criminal  investigations 
were  covered  by  the  terms  of  the  ECMA  1959  and  previously  negotiated  Memoranda  of 
Understanding  [MoU]  between  the  English  police  and  their  foreign  counterparts.  The 
coroner's  investigation,  involving  a  separate  team  of  officers  from  the  same  English  police 
force  and  the  authorities  in  the  Far  Eastern  State  (State  B),  was  conducted  on  the  basis  of 
diplomatic  comity  in  the  absence  of  any  bilateral  or  multilateral  MLAT  between  the  two 
nations.  During  the  course  of  these  investigations,  English  officers  were  deployed  on 
enquiries  to  both  State  A  and  State  B,  and  officers  from  both  these  States  were  deployed  to 
England.  The  strategic  decision  to  treat  the  comer's  investigation  into  the  cause  of  death  and 
10  Such  was  the  philosophy  adopted  by  the  SIO  for  an  operation  in  which  the  present  author  was 
involved  against  similar  transnational  criminality.  11  For  reasons  of  sanitisation,  letters  will  be  used  to  signify  different  States  in  the  following  examples. 
The  sequence  re-commences  with  each  new  case  study  and  so  the  State  designated  A  in  this  case  study 
is  not  the  same  State  designated  A  in  subsequent  case  studies. 
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victim  identity  entirely  separate  from  the  criminal  investigation  into  persons  suspected  of 
being  responsible  for  the  deaths  was  based  on  a  number  of  factors  some  of  which  dictate  that 
for  this  thesis  only  the  assistance  provided  between  the  parallel  criminal  investigations  can  be 
discussed. 
The  deaths  were  discovered  shortly  before  midnight.  By  0800  hours  the  next  day 
English  investigators  had  established  contact  with  their  opposite  numbers  not  only  in  State  A 
but  with  two  other  EU  States  (States  C&  D)  which  had  a  secondary  interest  in  the  case,  and 
an  ILOR  had  been  exchanged,  couched  in  very  general  terms,  establishing  agreement  between 
the  English  authorities  and  the  criminal  investigation  team  in  State  A  to  share  and  exchange 
intelligence  in  relation  to  their  two  enquiries  which,  it  was  already  obvious,  over-lapped.  By 
1200  hours,  officers  from  State  A  were  working  in  the  incident  room  in  England.  By  contrast, 
in  trying  to  establish  a  working  relationship  with  State  B,  it  took  six  weeks  of  diplomatic 
negotiation  before  officers  from  that  State  were  deployed  to  assist  with  the  coroner's  enquiry. 
There  were  a  number  of  lines  of  enquiry  for  the  English  investigators  for  which  they 
required  co-operation  from  States  A,  C&D.  These  included  tracing  the  exact  route  of  the 
immigrants;  searching  for,  and  seizing  evidence  from,  places  where  the  group  had  rested  en 
route;  seizing  CCTV  footage  covering  known  parts  of  the  journey;  and  interviewing  crew 
members  from  a  cross-Channel  ferry  (which  was  registered  in  one  country  but  crewed  by 
nationals  from  another).  Where  possible,  witnesses  were  interviewed  and  statements  taken  in 
England,  with  the  permission  of  foreign  authorities  where  foreign  nationals  were  involved. 
English  officers  were  also  permitted  to  conduct  witness  interviews  in  State  A.  A  magistrate  in 
State  C  requested  that  officers  from  State  A  and  England  be  deployed  to  conduct  his  enquiries 
in  State  C  to  ascertain  whether  any  criminality  had  occurred  in  State  C  in  relation  to  this 
matter  (the  group  of  immigrants  had  travelled  through  State  Q.  When  his  request  was 
declined,  for  resource  reasons,  the  magistrate  in  question  provided  no  further  assistance  to 
either  English  investigators  or  those  from  State  A.  From  the  perspective  of  the  English 
investigators,  evidence  from  State  C  was  not  vital  to  the  success  of  a  prosecution.  That  from 
State  A  certainly  was  and  when  investigators  in  State  A  discovered  a  location  at  which  they 
suspected  the  immigrants  had  been  housed  temporarily,  forensic  officers  from  England  were 
invited  to  search  the  premises  because  State  A  regarded  forensic  scene  examination  in  the  UK 
to  be  of  a  higher  standard  than  their  authorities  had  yet  attained.  DNA,  footprints  and 
fingerprints  were  recovered  during  the  ten-day  deployment  of  scenes-of-crimc  officers  to 
State  A.  Consistent  with  what  is  now  an  increasing  trend,  mutual  legal  assistance  was  also 
sought  from  US  authorities  for  the  preservation  and  production  of  computer  transaction 
records. 
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Mutual  assistance,  as  a  precursor  to  formal  requests,  was  relied  upon  in  tlýiis 
investigation.  The  initial  ILOR  established  a  mutual  agreement  to  exchange  intelligence  and 
information.  As  and  when  evidential  requirements  were  identified,  so  additional  ILORs  were 
issued  to  cover  the  specific  items  of  evidence  sought.  A  total  of  392  statements  and  other 
documents  were  received  by  the  English  investigators  from  State  A.  Physical  evidence  for 
forensic  examination  was  also  shared  pursuant  to  ILORs,  occasionally  travelling  back  and 
forth  between  England  and  State  A  because  the  same  items  of  evidence  were  relevant  to  both 
the  homicide  and  trafficking  prosecutions.  The  success  of  this  arrangement  was  derived  from 
the  fact  that  good  working  relationships  already  existed  between  investigators  in  England  and 
State  A,  and  an  understanding  of  each  other's  roles  and  requirements  had  been  previously 
documented  in  a  MoU.  ILORs  were  transmitted  in  duplicate:  the  formal  route  of  transmission 
from  central  authority  to  central  authority  was  always  utilised  for  procedural  integrity,  but 
simultaneously  the  requests  were  transmitted  direct  to  the  relevant  prosecutors  to  ensure 
prompt  enactment.  This  fail-safe  process  proved  invaluable.  It  ensured  that  evidence  was 
available  to  be  adduced  at  trial.  At  the  time  of  the  research  interview,  some  months  following 
the  conviction  of  persons  involved  in  the  trafficking  and  the  homicide,  there  were  formal 
evidential  requests  from  the  English  investigators  addressed  to  the  authorities  in  State  A,  still 
awaiting  transmission  from  the  UKCA. 
Exact  figures  were  not  available  at  interview  but  in  excess  of  twenty  ILORs  were 
issued  to  different  countries  by  English  investigators  for  this  investigation.  Some  were 
lengthy  and  covered  multiple  requests.  One  ILOR  covered  sixteen  separate  requests  including 
witness  location  enquiries,  organizing  ID  parades  and  identifying  press  officers  for  the 
purposes  of  disclosure  rules  in  the  UK.  Proving  the  'continuity'  of  the  evidential  chain  was 
problematic  because  of  differing  attitudes  to  the  recording  of  police  actions.  Police  officers  in 
State  A  tend  to  be  believed  at  court.  They  are  almost  never  required  to  prove  their 
investigation  methods  as  well  as  the  evidence.  A  difference  in  attitudes  and  procedures  was 
also  evident  in  the  handling  of  exchanged  documents.  English  investigators  shared  full 
documentation  with  their  colleagues  in  State  A.,  including  details  of  'unused'  material  that 
would  not  normally  be  disclosed  to  the  defence  in  England.  12  State  A  investigators  failed  to 
observe  the  'use  for  intelligence  only'  request,  which  was  in  any  case  inconsistent  with  their 
own  rules  and  procedures,  so  all  the  material  was  lodged  in  the  court  file  to  which  the  defence 
in  State  A  had  pre-trial  access.  Having  thus  accessed  confidential  material,  the  defence  in 
State  A  then  published  it  in  the  foreign  press,  there  being  no  contempt  of  court  issues  in  State 
A.  In  the  words  of  the  English  deputy  SIO  who  had  responsibility  for  mutual  legal  assistance 
12  An  explanation  of  'unused'  material  serves  no  purpose  for  this  thesis.  For  a  full  explanation  the 
reader  is  directed  to  the  Codes  ofPractice  for  the  Ctiminal  Procedures  and  Investigations  Act  1996. 
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issues  in  this  investigation,  "we  wouldn't  do  it  again.  "  The  overall  philosophy  of  mutual  co- 
operation  which  governed  the  assistance  provided  between  the  parallel  investigations  did  not 
overcome  differences  in  judicial  and  organizational  cultures  that  existed  between  the  two 
jurisdictions. 
Arrests  were  made  at  the  time  of  discovery  and  shortly  afterwards.  Nevertheless  the 
defence  team  in  England  were  not  afforded  observer-status  to  the  execution  of  ILORs.  They 
do  not  have  a  right  to  such  access  but  to  reduce  the  number  of  contested  issues  at  trial,  such 
access  has  sometimes  been  granted  (interview  CPS,  12'h  April  2001).  As  far  as  the  SIO  was 
aware,  the  defence  team  in  England  sought  no  ILORs  for  their  own  case  preparation.  No 
challenges  to  the  mutual  legal  assistance  process  were  made  at  trial  in  England. 
The  defence  team  from  the  parallel  investigation  in  State  A,  however,  did  request 
mutual  legal  assistance.  They  wished  to  conduct  their  own  interviews  of  English  investigators 
and  officials  as  well  as  interviewing  direct  witnesses  located  in  the  UK.  These  interviews  took 
the  form  of  depositions  made  before  magistrates  at  Horseferry  Road  Magistrates  Court,  the 
central  court  used  for  the  majority  of  mutual  legal  assistance  issues  in  England  and  Wales. 
The  signed  depositions  were  then  transmitted  to  the  court  in  State  A  via  the  central  authorities 
in  each  State.  This  process  took  about  a  week.  The  foreign  defence  team  subsequently 
submitted  further  requests  for  witness  depositions  which  were  granted  by  the  UKCA. 
However  these  secondary  requests  were  little  more  than  fishing  trips  which  the  UKCA  had 
failed  to  spot,  and  which,  through  disclosure  in  a  foreign  court,  could  have  seriously  damaged 
or  even  thwarted  a  prosecution  in  England.  English  officers  attended  Horseferry  Magistrates 
Court  as  required  but  refused  to  answer  any  of  the  questions  put  to  them.  They  were 
represented  by  a  barrister  to  ensure  that  public  interest  immunity  issues  were  protected. 
Evidence  given  by  video  or  telephone  link  was  not  a  consideration  in  this  case.  Six 
foreign  witnesses  were  brought  to  the  UK  at  CPS  expense  to  give  testimony  at  trial. 
Vulnerable  witnesses  were  permitted  to  give  their  evidence  from  behind  a  screen.  All  foreign 
evidence  adduced  in  this  case  was  obtained  through  the  ILOR  process,  it  being  the  firm  belief 
of  the  SIO  that  this  ensured  that  the  gathering  of  the  evidence  could  not  be  challenged. 
A  debrief  of  the  operation  took  place  between  the  two  investigation  teams.  A  limited 
debrief  took  place  between  the  English  investigators,  the  CPS  and  the  UKCA.  All  sides 
agreed  that  the  co-operation  had  worked  particularly  well  because  of  the  personal 
relationships  which  were  quickly  established  and  for  which  the  MoU  had  prepared  the 
ground.  Effective  personal  relationships  enabled  most  difficulties  to  be  overcome  quickly. 
Both  investigation  teams  quickly  got  in  the  habit  of  telephoning  their  opposite  numbers  to  ask 
-  'this  is  what  we  want,  how  do  we  ask  for  iff,  thus  ensuring  that  ILORs  were  well-informed 
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and  easily  executed.  One  key  to  success  was  good  communication  between  the  two 
investigation  teams,  made  all  the  easier  by  the  English-language  skills  of  the  investigators 
from  State  A.  None  of  the  English  investigators  spoke  the  language  of  State  A.  Throughout 
the  investigation  it  had  been  necessary  to  translate  ILOR  product  from  three  foreign 
languages,  at  a  cost  in  excess  of  L20,000.  Police-approved  interpreters  had  been  fully 
employed  for  weeks  in  translating  material. 
The  English  SIO  found  that  having  two  parallel  investigations  into  related  but 
different  crimes,  meant  that  there  were  awkward  disclosure  issues  that  had  not  previously 
been  anticipated.  Custody  time  limits  were  also  an  issue  for  English  investigators  as  they  had 
only  a  limited  time  in  which  to  prepare  the  court  file  and  present  the  case.  There  were  also 
differing  investigation  priorities  but  these  do  not  appear  to  have  hampered  either  investigation 
seriously,  although  the  potential  for  impediment  existed  had  there  not  been  such  a  positive  co- 
operative  spirit  between  the  two  teams  of  investigators. 
The  key  themes  that  emerge  from  this  case  study,  to  which  discussion  will  return  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter,  are: 
"  Different  use  oVattitudes  towards  ILORs 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
"  Working  relationship  with  foreign  colleagues 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  testimony 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  intelligence  handling 
"  Disclosure  issues 
"  Loss  of  evidence  /  timeliness  problems 
Case  study  4  (interview  II  September  2002) 
Of  all  the  case  studies  under  review  here,  this  investigation  lasted  the  longest  period 
of  time  (two  years)  and  encountered  the  widest  variety  of  issues.  In  the  words  of  the  SIO, 
"everything  and  anything  that  could  make  it  more  complicated  happened.  " 
The  criminality  in  question  concerned  the  trafficking  of  illicit  commodities  across 
Europe  into  the  UK.  Initially  the  commodities  smuggled  by  this  TCO  were  drugs  but  their 
operation  was  expanded  to  include  arms  trafficking.  For  various  operational  reasons,  the 
investigators  decided  to  concentrate  their  efforts  against  the  arms  trafficking  side  of  the 
criminal  enterprise.  Under-cover  officers  [UCOs]  were  deployed  and  established  that 
criminals  from  central  southern  Europe  claimed  to  be  intermediaries  able  to  supply  on  behalf 
of  others,  amongst  other  items,  tanks,  rocket  launchers,  small  arms,  explosives  and 
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undetectable  plastic  land-mines  of  a  variety  banned  by  the  UN.  A  meeting  on  neutral  territory 
was  suggested  for  each  side  to  assess  the  other's  capability  to  deliver  and  pay. 
Based  on  a  previous  working  relationship,  the  UK  investigators  proposed  State  A  as 
the  neutral  venue  and  Raised  with  the  local  police.  In  doing  so  the  UK  investigators  were 
prepared  to  risk  a  potential  breach  of  protocol  by  working  with  the  local  force  rather  than  the 
national  agency:  roughly  the  equivalent  action  of  a  foreign  law  enforcement  agency  seeking 
to  fight  transnational  organized  crime  in  partnership  with  a  local  English  police  force  rather 
than  the  National  Crime  Squad.  The  English  SIO  wanted  to  work  with  people  with  a  proven 
record  of  trust  rather  than  have  to  build  new  working  relationships. 
When  meetings  took  place  in  State  A  between  the  UCOs  and  the  criminal  suspects, 
the  local  police  were  able  to  provide  comprehensive  assistance  to  the  English  investigators, 
including  the  covert  acquisition  of  evidence  not  just  intelligence.  The  UCOs  established  new 
contacts  with  further  suspects  including  one  who  held  diplomatic  status,  all  of  whom  were 
acting  as  intermediaries.  Eventually  the  suspects  offered  to  demonstrate  their  good  will  with  a 
weapons  test  to  be  carried  out  in  another  European  jurisdiction,  State  B. 
Liaison  between  the  English  SIO  and  the  authorities  in  State  B  was  arranged  through 
the  UK  DLO  stationed  in  State  C,  there  being  no  direct  UK  law  enforcement  liaison  in  State 
B.  The  authorities  in  State  B  agreed  to  provide  evidential  assistance  and  provided  a  UCO  to 
work  alongside  the  UCOs  already  deployed  from  England  and  State  A.  It  appeared  to  the  SIO 
that  the  UCO  supplied  by  State  B  may  have  come  from  that  jurisdiction's  intelligence 
community  because  the  individual  in  question  was  neither  based  at,  nor  seemed  to  know,  any 
of  the  law  enforcement  officers  based  at  the  HQ  of  State  B's  anti-organized  crime  unit.  This 
called  into  question  whether  State  B  was  serious  about  providing  evidential  assistance  and 
whether  or  not  State  B  might  have  a  political  agenda  in  relation  to  this  issue. 
When  the  UCOs  met  the  vendors  in  State  B,  one  of  them  proved  to  be  a  high-ranking 
military  officer  from  State  B.  The  weapons  test  took  place  under  the  covert  armed 
surveillance  of  the  authorities  from  State  B.  The  evidence  obtained  through  this  sub-operation 
of  the  main  investigation  proved  high-level  corruption  amongst  officials  from  State  B  that 
would  cause  considerable  political  embarrassment  not  only  to  State  B  but  also  to  international 
allies  championing  support  for  State  B.  The  authorities  in  State  B  engaged  in  administrative 
disruption  tactics  that  prevented  the  proposed  sale  of  the  arms.  Had  the  UCOs  attempted  to  re- 
engage  the  vendor  after  the  disruption,  there  was  a  danger  that  they  could  have  been  acting  as 
agents  provocateur,  so  this  element  of  the  operation  was  terminated. 
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Back  in  England,  the  UK-resident  criminals  continued  to  make  offers  to  supply  arms 
(thirty  container-loads)  from  elsewhere,  including  State  D.  A  second  'buy-bust'  operation  13 
was  decided  upon  avoiding,  if  at  all  possible,  liaison  with  the  authorities  in  State  D  as  there 
were  grounds  for  greater  concern  in  State  D  than  there  had  been  in  State  B. 
There  was  considerable  debate  about  payments  methods  both  between  the  UCOs  and 
the  suspects  and  between  the  SIO  and  the  UKCA.  The  suspects  wanted  to  employ  a  standard 
business  technique;  an  escrow  payment  in  which  the  money  was  paid  to  a  third  party  pending 
delivery  of  the  goods.  Upon  customer  satisfaction,  the  third  party  would  pass  the  payment 
onto  the  vendors.  This  would  have  included  use  of  a  letter  of  intent  which  could  potentially 
have  been  used  by  the  suspects  to  gain  credit  or  defraud  other  individuals,  so  a  cash  payment 
was  eventually  negotiated.  'Flash  money'  was  arranged  and  deposited  in  a  safe  deposit  box  in 
London.  14  This  was  intended  to  bring  the  suspects  into  English  territorial  jurisdiction. 
The  suspects  proposed  delivery  by  air  from  State  D  to  an  airport  of  the  UCO's  choice. 
The  SIO  once  again  enlisted  help  from  State  A.  On  this  occasion  it  was  refused.  The 
authorities  in  State  A,  on  the  grounds  of  public  safety,  would  not  allow  an  illegal  arms 
shipment  to  be  flown  over  their  jurisdiction  and  into  one  of  their  airports.  15  The  SIO  was 
therefore  forced  to  negotiate  an  alternative  delivery  mechanism  with  the  suspects.  A  sea- 
shipment  to  Liverpool  was  agreed  but  because  of  the  greater  risk  of  seizure  this  involved  to 
the  vendors,  they  wanted  their  money  in  advance  of  delivery  and  were  not  prepared  to  risk 
collection  in  the  UK.  There  could  be  no  question  of  the  suspects  being  given  cash  prior  to  the 
seizure  of  the  weapons.  The  SIO  had  to  improvise  a  new  payment  method. 
It  was  agreed  that  the  cash  would  be  deposited  in  a  safety  deposit  bank  in  State  A. 
The  UCOs  would  meet  the  vessel  carrying  the  anns  in  international  waters  and  board  in  order 
to  verify  the  consigriment.  Payment  was  dependent  upon  verification  by  phone  from  the 
UCOs.  This  offered  intervention  and  arrest  opportunities  in  State  A  and  international  waters 
and  avoided  the  need  to  involve  authorities  from  State  D. 
Securing  such  opportunities  in  State  A  was  unproblernatic.  Securing  such 
opportunities  in  international  waters  required  resources  to  which  the  SIO  did  not  have  ready 
access.  The  Ministry  of  Defence  was  approached  for  assistance  and  made  available  one 
frigate,  a  unit  of  the  Special  Boat  Service,  one  AWAC  surveillance  aircraft  and  intelligence 
13  An  operation  in  which  the  authorities  use  under-cover  officers  to  purchase  the  illicit  commodity  to 
p!  ove  the  offence  of  dealing  and/or  trafficking,  and  then  immediately  arrest  the  suspects. 
"  Cash  purporting  to  be  a  ransom  or  other  payment  that  is  shown  to  criminals  by  undercover 
investigators  as  an  act  signifying  good  intent.  Agencies  have  arrangements  with  financial  institutions  to 
borrow  such  cash  simply  to  be  able  to  show  to  suspects  if  required  during  evidence-gathering  of  a 
crime  in  action. 
15  No  legal  objections  were  raised  against  the  request,  but  the  health  and  safety  considerations  were 
significant. 
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sources  located  in  State  D.  Authorities  in  State  E  were  approached  should  there  be  a  need  to 
off-load  the  boat  before  it  reached  UK  territory.  The  authorities  in  State  F  were  approached  in 
case  the  vessel  tried  to  escape  to  the  territorial  waters  of  State  F.  State  F  placed  a  specialist 
organized  crime  judge  on  stand-by  together  with  a  law  enforcement  agency  with  a  maritime 
intervention  capacity.  The  range  of  contingency  plans  was  vast.  For  simplicity  sake,  it  was 
eventually  decided  to  intercept  the  suspect  vessel  inside  the  territorial  waters  of  State  F.  The 
vessel  was  owned  in  State  G  and  captained  by  a  citizen  of  that  State.  It  was  crewed  by  citizens 
of  State  H  and  was  registered  in  State  J.  State  J  was  approached  and  granted  permission  for 
authorities  from  the  LTK  and  State  F  to  board  the  vessel. 
To  summarise:  English  authorities,  assisted  by  authorities  from  States  E  and  K  were 
now  in  a  position  to  intervene  in  a  proposed  illegal  arms  shipment  from  State  D  which 
involved  a  criminal  network  whose  participants,  it  was  anticipated,  would  be  present  in  the 
UK,  State  A  and  the  territorial  waters  of  State  F  at  the  moment  of  the  planned  intervention. 
UK  personnel  were  deployed  to  States  E,  K  and  H.  Simultaneous  translation  into  four 
languages  was  required  in  order  to  utilise  the  live  technical  surveillance  that  had  been 
deployed.  The  operation  was  being  controlled  from  the  UK. 
Matters  then  became  complicated. 
Technical  surveillance  revealed  criminal  sub-plots  not  previously  evident  when  the 
UCOs  were  physically  present  with  the  suspects.  The  suspects  were  essentially  sub-divided 
by  function;  facilitators  and  suppliers.  The  facilitators  had  not  revealed  the  new  payment 
an-angements  to  the  suppliers  who  remained  under  the  impression  that  they  would  receive 
payment  before  the  vessel  set  sail.  The  facilitators  evidently  felt  confident  that  they  could  ride 
out  the  storm  that  would  occur  when  the  suppliers  found  out  they  would  have  to  wait  for  their 
money. 
The  suppliers  had  their  own  sub-plot  in  anticipation  of  being  double-crossed.  Through 
technical  surveillance  it  was  discovered  that  the  suppliers  planned  to  request  that  a  facilitator 
attend  their  premises  in  State  D  to  oversee  transportation  of  the  shipment  from  the  arms 
factory  to  the  vessel.  They  planned  to  hold  the  facilitator  representative  hostage  and  kill  him  if 
the  money  was  not  paid  in  advance.  It  was  apparent  that  this  was  no  idle  threat  and  knowledge 
of  this  intention  imposed  a  duty  of  care  upon  the  English  SIO  in  relation  to  the  safety  of  the 
criminal  facilitator  concerned.  He  could  not  co-ordinate  planned  enforcement  action  that  was 
likely  to  lead  to  the  murder  of  the  facilitator  without  taking  steps  to  protect  him. 
The  SIO's  plan  was  again  adapted.  The  facilitator  travelled  to  State  D  with  airline 
tickets  and  spending  money  and  an  invitation  to  the  vendors  to  attend  the  bank  in  State  A 
where  they  would  be  paid  in  advance.  Two  high-ranking  officials  from  State  D,  related  to  the 
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head  of  state,  duly  arrived  in  State  A  to  receive  payment.  They  were  immediately  arrested.  At 
the  same  time,  the  UCOs  in  State  F  contacted  the  captain  of  the  vessel  and  the  facilitator  who 
had  been  sent  to  State  D  and  was  still  there,  told  them  of  the  arrests  and  suggested  fleeing  to 
State  F.  The  captain  abandoned  his  ship  and  crew  and  sailed  by  alternative  means  to  State  F. 
The  facilitator  flew  to  State  F.  Both  were  arrested  on  arrival.  The  weapons  never  left  the 
factory  in  State  D.  Extradition  was  sought  by  the  UK  authorities  for  the  suspects  now 
detained  in  States  E  and  K  although  State  F  was  also  prepared  to  prosecute  the  whole  matter, 
including  the  suspects  resident  in  the  UK. 
The  complications  continued  post-arrest. 
E1.2  million  'flash  money',  borrowed  from  English  financial  institutions,  had  been 
exchanged  into  the  currency  of  State  A  and  deposited  into  a  bank  there.  It  was  held  there  for 
the  seventeen  days  it  took  to  complete  the  operation  from  the  moment  of  deposition.  During 
that  time  exchange  rates  altered  and  by  the  time  the  'flash'  money  was  changed  back  into 
sterling,  the  SIO's  agency  had  to  return  f.  100,000  more  than  had  been  borrowed. 
To  progress  the  extradition  request,  the  authorities  in  State  A  required  service  of 
evidence  and  the  intelligence  reports  that  gave  rise  to  the  operation.  The  intelligence  report 
was  shared  and  explicitly  marked  'not  for  disclosure'.  To  the  SIO's  annoyance  and  despair, 
"they  accidentally  served  that  on  the  defence".  Whilst  remanded  in  custody,  the  suspects  in 
State  A  were  thus  able  to  read  exactly  how  they  had  come  to  be  arrested.  They  also  learnt  the 
true  identity  of  the  individual  who  had  originally  turned  informant  against  them. 
All  the  suspects  were  extradited  to  stand  trial  at  the  Central  Criminal  Court,  London. 
The  matter  never  went  to  trial:  a  pre-trial  voir  dire  hearing  called  into  question  the 
integrity  of  the  original  informant  -  who  had  played  no  part  in  the  investigation  since  passing 
on  the  original  information  about  the  drugs  smuggling  -  and  the  case  was  thrown  out  because 
of  something  entirely  unconnected  that  had  happened  four  years  before  the  investigation 
started.  16 
Such  were  the  pertinent  facts  of  this  investigation  relevant  to  this  thesis.  Formal 
mutual  legal  assistance  requests  were  made  to  four  States  in  the  pre-arrest  phase,  and  two 
States  in  the  post-arrest  phase  of  the  operation.  No  exact  count  of  the  requests  was  available 
to  the  interviewer.  There  were  some  requests  that  were  refused.  Authorities  in  State  A  refused 
on  the  grounds  of  public  safety  to  allow  an  airborne  shipment  of  illicit  arms  to  be  flown 
16  A  voir  dire  hearing  enables  a  judge  to  examine  a  potential  witness  to  evaluate  the  truth  of  what  the 
witness  is  saying  and/or  the  competence  of  the  witness  to  testify.  The  problematic  issue  only  became 
known  to  the  SIO  at  the  voir  dire.  Had  the  SIO  known  of  the  issues  earlier,  a  management  strategy  to 
address  this  issue  could  have  been  put  into  place  but  there  would  have  no  question  of  not  proceeding 
with  the  investigation  to  disrupt  the  trafficking  and  prosecute  the  offenders  if  possible. 
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across  their  territory  and  to  land  there,  and  authorities  in  State  D  refused  to  allow  any  of  their 
officials  to  travel  to  England  to  testify.  Mutual  assistance  was  a  precursor  tactic  employed  to 
liaise  with  the  local  authorities  in  State  A  up  until  the  stage  was  reached  when  all  material 
was  going  to  be  evidential  at  which  point  mutual  legal  assistance  was  employed  for  all 
requests.  The  same  CPS  branch  in  England  issued  all  ILORs  and  all  contained  multiple 
requests  rather  than  one  request  per  ILOR.  Investigators  had  be  as  flexible  as  the  TCOs  in 
order  to  keep  pace  with  the  ever-changing  scenario.  Individual  ILORs  would  have  been 
entirely  impracticable  in  this  operation.  This  technique,  and  the  mutual  assistance  that 
preceded  it,  ensured  that  results  were  achieved  more  quickly  and  the  investigators  were  able 
to  respond  to  the  "very  rapidly  changing  scenario".  Speed  was  of  the  essence  in  this 
investigation.  Authorities  in  States  E  and  K  both  opened  preliminary  prosecution  files  at  early 
stages  of  their  involvement  and  were  prepared  to  proceed  with  prosecutions  in  their  own  right, 
taking  into  account  the  criminality  from  England.  The  locus  for  trial  was  determined  only  at 
the  post-arrest  phase  and  the  SIO  observed  that,  with  hindsight,  it  might  have  been  better  to 
have  brought  the  prosecutions  under  a  different  jurisdictional  tradition  given  the  outcome 
within  the  Common  law  system  that  allowed  challenges  that  might  not  have  carried  the  same 
or  any  weight  elsewhere  (for  instance  the  voir  dire  issue). 
The  proactive  nature  of  the  operation  meant  that  no  defence  representation  was 
feasible  at  the  execution  of  any  of  the  requests.  As  the  matter  never  went  to  trial,  no 
procedural  challenges  were  raised  to  the  mutual  legal  assistance  in  respect  of  evidential 
matters  but  there  were  challenges  made  to  the  extradition  requests  on  the  grounds  that  some 
of  the  suspects  had  been  enticed  into  State  F  because  it  was  believed  by  the  investigators  that 
17 
extradition  from  there  would  be  easier  than  from  State  D.  This  defence  argument  failed. 
Investigators  had  also  given  consideration  to  possible  future  challenges  when  considering 
whether  or  not  to  let  the  vessel  sail  to  the  UK  before  intervention  was  made.  Given  that  the 
vessel's  movements  were  being  monitored,  it  was  suggested  that  it  could  not  be  allowed  to 
travel  unchallenged  through  the  territorial  waters  of  State  F  in  order  to  proceed  to  the  UK  but 
had  to  be  intercepted  within  the  waters  of  the  first  State  willing  to  mount  a  prosecution.  The 
investigation  strategy  had  been  altered  to  take  into  account  this  possible  legal  challenge. 
Had  the  trial  gone  ahead  there  were  a  number  of  witnesses  located  abroad  who  would 
have  been  required  to  testify  in  person  and  there  were  no  plans  to  use  video  links  for  this 
purpose.  The  SIO  thought  that  "there  may  have  been"  some  statements  that  could  have  been 
adduced  as  documentary  evidence  in  lieu  of  personal  testimony.  All  foreign  evidential  matter 
was  supported  by  an  IILOR. 
17  See  Rv  Horsefeny  Rd  Mags  ex  p.  Bennett  [1994]  1  A.  C.  42,  where  the  courts  ruled  against 
investigators  who  carried  outjust  such  a  process. 
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An  operational  debrief  was  held  in  England  for  all  the  proactivc  investigative  and 
intelligence  authorities  involved  but  the  CPS  was  not  invited  to  participate  in  this  debrief. 
There  was  also  an  informal  debrief  with  the  authorities  from  State  A.  After  these  initial 
responses,  the  SIO  during  the  interview  subsequently  returned  to  this  issue  and  elaborated  that 
CPS  had  not  been  involved  in  the  process  of  debriefing  because  the  matter  had  not  gone  to 
trial.  18 
Such  participation  may  have  helped  to  resolve  one  of  the  international  law  issues  left 
unresolved  at  the  end  of  this  operation.  The  legality  of  British  authorities  boarding  the  vessel 
in  intemational  waters  had  been  questioned  by  lawyers  for  the  Royal  Navy  (whose  clients 
would  have  had  to  effect  the  interception  and  boarding).  There  was  clear  legislation  allowing 
such  boarding  where  piracy  was  suspected  (Shaw  2003:  234)  or  a  British  ship  was  being  used 
to  traffic  drugs  (CJ(IC)  Act  1990  §18-21)  but  not  in  circumstances  where  arms  were  being 
transported  since  it  is  not  unlawful  to  convey  arms  by  sea.  This  particular  question  went 
unanswered  both  because  authorities  in  State  F  volunteered  to  intercept  the  vessel  in  their 
waters  and  because  the  rapidly  changing  scenario  meant  that  this  soon  became  "yesterday's 
problem"  for  the  SIO. 
On  the  more  general  point  of  jurisdiction  in  international  waters,  although  the 
circumstances  are  very  different  and  involve  a  completed  action  rather  than  an  inchoate 
offence,  the  Lotus  case  (Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  Series  A,  no.  10,1927;  see 
also  Shaw  1997:  460)  might  have  provided  some  general  precedent  for  the  British  authorities 
acting  (in  the  absence  of  suitable  domestic  legislation)  rather  than  the  authorities  of  State  G 
where  the  vessel  was  owned  or  State  J  where  the  vessel  was  registered.  As  a  precaution, 
formal  permission  to  intervene  was  requested  from  authorities  in  State  J  although  there  was 
no  precedent  for  this  nor  any  obvious  mechanism  for  doing  so.  The  desired  outcome  was 
achieved  via  the  British  Ambassador  in  State  J.  Had  it  been  necessary  to  execute  such  an 
interception  in  international  waters  and  had  the  matter  ultimately  come  to  trial,  perhaps  there 
would  have  been  a  procedural  challenge.  It  was  anticipated  that  the  precautionary  measures 
put  in  place  would  be  sufficient  to  resist  any  procedural  challenge,  but  the  issue  highlights  the 
number  of  possible  permutations  that  had  to  be  catered  for  in  planning  the  intervention  phase 
of  the  operation. 
18  It  appeared  to  the  interviewer  that  the  SIO  had  not  given  consideration  to  involving  the  CPS  in  the 
debrief  until  the  question  was  put  in  the  research  interview.  The  delayed  justification  was  interpreted  by 
the  interviewer  as  an  attempt  to  provide  a  professional  rationale  for  the  lacuna.  Given  the  extensive 
involvement  of  the  CPS  in  the  active  investigation  of  this  operation,  with  the  formulation  of  ILORs  and 
advice  about  investigation  strategies  in  the  light  of  on-going  mutual  legal  assistance  issues,  there  would 
appear  to  be  very  good  reason  to  involve  prosecutors  in  the  operational  debrief. 
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In  terms  of  what  worked  well:  significant,  high-quality  evidence  was  obtained  in 
State  A  and  State  B  through  mutual  legal  assistance  founded  upon  precursor  mutual 
assistance.  The  standard  of  this  evidence  and  its  acquisition  was  such  that  the  SIO  felt  "quite 
comfortable  that  the  process  we  were  allowed  to  employ  in  both  these  jurisdictions  would 
have  stood  scrutiny  within  our  court  system.  " 
But  there  were  areas  for  improvement  identified  as  well.  Post-arrest  communication 
broke  down  between  the  authorities  in  England  and  those  in  State  A,  leading  to  the 
catastrophic  disclosure  of  raw  intelligence  to  the  defence.  The  case  was  of  sufficient 
complexity  to  warrant,  in  the  view  of  the  SID,  a  dedicated  member  of  staff  at  UKCA  to 
oversee  the  transmission  of  all  the  11LORs  to  ensure  consistency  of  approach  and  co-ordinated 
management  of  the  request  processes.  On  a  further  process  note,  he  observed  that  being  able 
to  arrange  for  facilities  such  as  'flash'  money  on  a  mutual  assistance  basis  rather  than  risk 
significant  amounts  of  money  in  the  vagaries  of  the  international  monetary  exchange  rate 
system,  would  be  desirable.  Whilst  it  might  be  possible  to  reach  agreement  on  this  as  a 
common  tactic  within  Europe  (similar  to  the  use  of  controlled  deliveries  of  JITs  now  provided 
for  in  international  and  domestic  law),  EU  partners  might  equally  be  of  the  view  that  adoption 
of  the  Euro  across  the  EU  would  remove  such  a  financial  risk  for  UK  investigators. 
For  the  SIO,  this  case  was  "the  most  spectacularfailure  I've  ever  been  involved  in". 
Nevertheless  it  highlights  a  number  of  different  issues  confronting  SIOs  grappling  with  the 
practicalities;  of  proactive  transnational  investigation  and  raised  a  number  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  questions. 
The  key  themes  that  emerge  from  this  case  study,  to  which  discussion  will  return  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter,  are: 
"  Different  use  of/attitudes  towards  ILORs 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
"  Working  relationship  with  foreign  colleagues 
"  Collaboration  with  prosecutors  (including  debriefmg) 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  testimony 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  intelligence  handling 
"  Forced  spontaneous  tactical  changes 
Case  study  5  (interview  20  Auaust  2003) 
This  investigation  concerned  the  trafficking  of  illicit  drugs.  Amongst  other  issues 
raised,  it  illustrates  the  impediments  of  operational  overlap.  The  primary  investigators  from 
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the  perspective  of  the  prosecutor  interviewed  for  this  case  study,  belonged  to  agency  1,  team  I 
(hereafter  I(l)).  This  team  was  investigating,  using  the  usual  menu  of  covert  techniques,  the 
following  targets: 
"  Target  1  (T  I)  -  head  of  suspected  drugs  cartel 
"  Target  2  (T2)  -right  hand  man  to  TI 
"  Target  3  (D)  -  brother  of  TI 
"  Target  4  (T4)  -  son  of  TI 
There  were  criminal  links  between  T2  and  the  target  of  drugs  investigation  being 
conducted  in  State  A.  There  were  also  criminal  network  links  between  these  targets  and  other 
individuals  who  were  variously  being  investigated  by  agency  I,  teams  2,3  and  4,  and  agency 
II,  teams  1,2,3  and  4.  In  other  words,  seven  other  teams  of  investigators  from  two  different 
agencies  in  the  LJK  and  another  team  in  State  A  all  had  tangential  operational  interest  in  the 
targets  of  I(I).  At  various  times,  the  targets  from  any  one  of  these  nine  different  operations 
were  encountered  in  the  surveillance  arena  of  every  other  operation. 
The  investigation  conducted  by  I(l)  resulted  in  the  arrests  of  T2,  T3,  T4  and  four 
foreign  nationals  following  the  shipment  of  ten  kilograms  of  heroin  from  London  to  Liverpool 
in  September  2002.  TI  remains  at  large,  believed  to  be  abroad,  wanted  on  warrant  with  an 
Interpol  international  arrest  notice  issued  against  him.  Upon  detention,  his  extradition  to  the 
UK  will  be  sought.  At  the  time  of  the  interview  the  investigation  in  State  A  was  ongoing,  as 
were  confiscation  proceedings  in  the  UK  in  respect  of  T2,  T3  and  T4.  At  the  time  of  writing, 
much  of  these  matters  remain  subjudice  and  discussion  here  is  necessarily  constrained. 
Although  the  investigations  being  carried  out  by  teams  I(l)  and  1(2)  were  entirely 
separate,  the  connections  between  their  various  targets  led  to  complicated  disclosure  issues  as 
a  result  of  prosecution  obligations  under  the  Criminal  Procedure  and  Investigations  Act  1996 
[CPIA]. 
The  operation  being  conducted  by  l(l)  was  already  well  in  progress  when  prosecutors 
were  first  contacted  to  assist  investigators  with  the  issuing  of  an  ILOR  to  authorities  in  State 
A.  Pre-arrest  assistance  provided  by  prosecutors  to  investigators  from  I(l)  consisted  of  four 
ILORs  issued  and  advice  given  on  the  deployment  of  specific  covert  tactics  within  the  UK. 
The  four  ILORs  all  contained  multiple  requests  and  sought  assistance,  inter  alia,  in  obtaining 
surveillance  evidential  product,  interception  evidential  product  and  proof  of  arrests. 
As  a  result  of  links  between  the  operation  in  State  A  and  that  being  conducted  by  1(2), 
the  investigators  from  1(2)  fed  information  in  to  the  I(l)  investigation  that  authorities  in  State 
A  might  have  information  of  interest  and  relevance  to  the  I(l)  investigation  but  only  after  the 
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I(l)  team  had  arrested  their  targets.  No  further  details  were  provided  by  1(2)  to  I(I).  I(I) 
subsequently  identified  this  material  of  possible  assistance  as  intercept  product  that  would  be 
vital  to  their  case  and  which  they  would  wish  to  adduce  in  evidence  at  trial,  taking  advantage 
of  R  vAujla  (1998  2  CrApp  R 16).  19 
For  reasons  about  which  the  interviewee  could  only  speculate,  the  1(2)  team 
vigorously  opposed  the  use  of  this  intercept  product  by  I(I).  Even  if  1(2)  had  sound  and 
reasonable  cause  to  object  to  the  evidential  use  of  the  intercept  product  from  State  A  by  I(I), 
the  fact  that  I(l)  now  knew  of  the  existence  of  the  product  meant  that  they  had  to  reveal  it  to 
the  prosecution  who  in  turn  had  to  decide  whether  or  not  it  had  to  be  disclosed  to  the  defence 
(CPIA  §3).  It  may  be  that  investigators  from  1(2)  had  given  assurances  to  their  colleagues 
from  State  A  that  certain  material  would  not  be  used  in  the  UK,  in  which  case  they  were  not 
in  a  position  to  make  such  assurances  because  they  could  not  override  the  statutory 
obligations  imposed  on  prosecutors  in  England  and  Wales. 
To  resolve  the  difficulties,  prosecutors  and  investigators  from  the  various  I  teams 
travelled  to  State  A  to  discuss  the  issues.  It  gave  prosecutors  in  the  different  jurisdictions  the 
opportunity  to  talk  directly  to  each  other.  In  State  A  prosecutors  controlled  and  directed  the 
criminal  investigation,  whereas  in  England  and  Wales  prosecutors  can  present  only  the 
prosecution  case  at  court.  In  talking  to  their  counter-parts,  the  English  prosecutors  were  able 
to  explain  the  issues  around  disclosure  and  arrived  at  a  strategy  that  would  facilitate  the 
continued  investigation  whilst  at  the  same  time  ensuring  that  disclosure  issues  were  properly 
addressed.  It  was  agreed  that  English  investigators  would  monitor  intercepted  conversations 
in  State  A  based  on  the  known  dates  when  T2  was  travelling  to  State  A  to  meet  the  target 
under  investigation  by  the  authorities  in  State  A.  Prosecutors  working  with  I(l)  were  able  to 
provide  their  counter-parts  in  State  A  with  a  shopping  list  of  intelligence  and  evidential  gaps 
that  needed  to  be  filled,  which  enabled  the  authorities  in  State  A  to  filter  that  which  was 
relevant  to  the  I(I)  investigation  from  the  whole  corpus  of  intercept  product.  This  strategy 
addressed  disclosure  issues  satisfactorily  because  it  was  impractical  and  undesirable  for 
English  prosecutors  to  have  to  listen  to  the  entire  intercept  product  from  State  A  when  only  a 
small  part  of  it  related  to  the  I(l)  investigation.  An  understanding  and  accord  was  reached  that 
would  not  have  been  possible  between  English  investigators  and  foreign  prosecutors. 
English  prosecutors  also  succeeded  in  negotiating  a  regime  acceptable  to  the 
authorities  in  State  A  whereby  surveillance  officers  from  that  State  were  permitted  to  attend 
court  in  England  and  give  personal  testimony,  which  they  were  prohibited  by  law  from  doing 
19  Although  the  Interception  of  Communications  Act  1985,  now  succeeded  by  the  Regulation  of 
Investigatory  Powers  Act  2000,  prohibits  intercept  evidence  obtained  in  the  LJK  being  adduced  at  trial, 
Rv  Auila  established  that  there  is  no  lawful  impediment  to  intercept  product  obtained  in  foreign 
jurisdictions  being  used  at  trial  in  the  UK. 
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in  their  own  jurisdiction.  The  interviewee  was  convinced  that  these  successfW  outcomes 
would  not  have  been  achieved  on  a  police-to-police  basis  or  on  an  English  police  to  State  A 
prosecutor  basis  because  of  the  different  jurisdictional  traditions  and  the  differences  in  roles 
and  relationships  disguised  by  the  use  of  common  nomenclature. 
All  the  documentary  and  physical  evidence  requested  from  State  A  was  provided  but 
in  the  event  the  intercept  product  did  not  arrive  in  time  for  use  at  the  trial  in  England.  The 
reason  for  this  highlights  another  important  issue  arising  from  the  practicalities  and  processes 
involved  in  bringing  suspects  to  trial  in  England. 
Second  only  to  disclosure  as  a  headache  for  prosecutors  is  the  issue  of  custody  time 
limits.  Once  a  suspect  has  been  charged  before  the  court  and  remanded  in  custody,  the 
prosecution  has  180  days  to  bring  its  case  to  trial.  The  l(l)  team  were  not  informed  about  the 
existence  of  intercept  evidence  by  1(2)  until  after  the  targets  had  been  arrested  and  remanded 
in  custody  to  await  trial.  So  the  clock  was  already  ticking.  There  were  then  delays  as  working 
relationships  between  English  investigators  and  the  authorities  in  State  A  were  repaired  and 
relationships  between  prosecutors  in  the  different  jurisdictions  established.  Once  this 
groundwork  was  completed,  it  took  time  to  negotiate  suitable  access  to  the  intercept  product 
in  a  manner  that  satisfied  CPI  Act  obligations  and  to  secure  attendance  at  trial  of  surveillance 
officers  from  State  A.  Once  this  "log-jam"  was  cleared,  and  despite,  exceptionally,  being 
granted  an  extension  to  the  custody  time  limit  by  the  trial  judge,  the  court  order  process  in 
State  A,  by  which  the  intercept  product  obtained  there  could  lawfully  be  released  for  foreign 
use,  could  not  be  completed  before  the  English  trial  began. 
Although  there  was  nothing  in  the  intercept  product  that  undennined  the  prosecution 
case  or  assisted  the  defence  case  in  any  way,  and  although  the  defence  team  in  England  were 
given  a  general  indication  of  what  the  intercept  product  would  prove,  in  the  event  the  decision 
was  taken  by  the  English  prosecutors  not  to  adduce  the  product  because  it  arrived  after  the 
trial  had  started  and  they  felt  confident  in  the  case  they  had  to  present  even  without  the 
conclusive  inclusion  of  intercepted  conversation  betweens  the  defendants  and  others.  20  All 
other  foreign  evidence,  obtained  through  the  use  of  ILORs,  was  adduced  without  being 
challenged  by  the  defence  team.  At  the  trial  T4  was  found  to  have  no  case  to  answer  and  T3 
was  acquitted  together  with  two  foreign  defendants.  The  jury  was  irreconcilably  split  over  a 
third  foreign  defendant  who  was  vulnerable  to  deportation  on  other  matters  and  so,  having 
been  deported,  avoided  a  re-trial.  T2  and  other  principal  offenders  were  all  convicted  as 
charged. 
20  The  intercept  product  is  available  for  use  as  evidence  at  trial  against  TI  when  that  individual  is 
located,  arrested  and  brought  to  trial. 
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For  the  prosecutor  in  this  case  there  were  a  number  of  learning  points  to  be  derived. 
Early  collaboration  between  investigators  and  prosecutors  is  viewed  as  a  critical  success 
factor.  Earlier  involvement  of  prosecutors  in  discussions  regarding  the  investigation  strategy 
in  this  case  could  have  avoided  the  "log-janf'  identified  above,  or  at  least  resolved  it  sooner 
thus  facilitating  the  transmission  of  the  intercept  product  in  time  for  it  to  be  used  at  trial.  "We 
would  have  had  the  material.  We  could  have  used  it  at  trial.  It  may  possibly  have  made  a 
difference  to  thejury's  verdict.  " 
Part  of  the  issue  for  investigators  in  involving  prosecutors  is  perceived  to  be  the 
organizational  culture  of  'need  to  know':  the  principle  of  information  security  that  is 
fundamental  to  the  ethos  of  agencies  investigating  serious  and  organized  crime  in  England. 
Prosecutors  would  argue,  particularly  on  the  experience  of  this  case,  that  they  need  to  know  in 
order  to  turn  a  complicated  investigation  into  a  successful  prosecution. 
Where  foreign  surveillance  evidence  is  available,  inevitably  the  disclosure  issues  will 
be  complex  and  the  involvement  of  the  prosecutor  at  the  earliest  possible  stage  will  ensure 
that  all  disclosure  issues  are  properly  catered  for  as  the  case  progresses,  thus  avoiding  the  risk 
of  subsequent  procedural  challenges  and  technical  acquittals.  Even  material  supplied  on  an 
'intelligence  only'  basis  is  subject  to  disclosure  although  suppression  for  reasons  of  public 
interest  immunity  may  be  appropriate.  The  number  of  different  agencies  and  investigation 
teams  with  an  interest  in  these  suspects  led  to  logistical  complications  because  each  separate 
vested  interest  had  its  own  disclosure  issues.  Only  the  prosecutor  was  in  a  position  to  co- 
ordinate  the  different  disclosure  issues  as  they  arose,  some  of  them  during  the  trial  as  a  result 
of  flexible  defence  tactics.  There  was  no  operational  co-ordination  between  the  different 
agencies  and  investigation  teams  interested  in  the  targets  for  this  case  study,  and  some 
suggestion  that  policies  of  non-co-operation  were  being  pursued  to  preserve  individual 
investigations  that  might  be  disrupted  or  reduced  in  significance  if  certain  targets  were 
charged  as  a  result  of  other  investigations. 
A  way  forward,  suggested  the  interviewee  in  this  case,  would  be  to  have: 
A  strategy  to  avoid  'blue-on-blue'  (i.  e.  operational  overlap  between  different 
investigating  teams  leading  to  conflicting  interests); 
eA  strategy  to  manage  disclosure;  and 
A  strategy  to  share  evidence,  where  appropriate,  between  different 
investigations 
At  a  time  when  the  government  was  circulating  discussion  papers  amongst  a  closed 
circulation  list  of  interested  agencies  for  comment  on  proposals  for  a  new  Organized  Crime 
and  Fraud  Agency  possibly  to  replace  and  amalgamate  functions  currently  undertaken  by  the 
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NCS,  NCIS,  HMCE  and  the  Inland  Revenue,  this  interviewee  felt  that  proper  co-ordination 
was  the  key  and  that  this  might  not  necessarily  be  achieved  by  the  establishment  of  a  single 
agency.  21  If  the  amalgamation  of  investigating  agencies  was  perceived  as  not  guaranteeing 
any  advantage,  the  establishment  of  a  single  independent  prosecution  agency  servicing  all  the 
investigation  agencies  (including  those  agencies  that  currently  prosecute  their  own  cases  with 
in-house  legal  teams),  was  seen  to  be  a  progressive  step.  Not  the  least  advantage  would  be  in 
establishing  a  consistent  interpretation  of  disclosure  obligations  to  replace  the  current 
disparity  evident  between  different  agencies  and  their  various  legal  advisors.  Remitting  all 
HMCE  prosecutions  to  the  CPS  would  be  a  simple  way  of  achieving  this  outcome.  In  fact, 
this  possible  route  towards  co-ordination  is  not  being  adopted:  instead  a  second  independent 
prosecution  service  is  being  established  to  service  HMCE  (HM  Treasury  Press  Notice  131/03, 
5  December  2003). 
The  key  themes  that  emerge  from  this  case  study,  to  which  discussion  will  return  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter,  are: 
"  Collaboration  with  prosecutors  (including  debriefmg) 
"  Domestic  agency  rivalry 
"  Different  attitudes  towards  testimony 
"  Different  procedural  laws 
"  Disclosure  issues 
"  Loss  of  evidence  /  timeliness  problems 
Case  study  6  (interviews  23  Januajy  2004  &I  March  2004122 
The  final  case  study  illustrates  as  much  what  can  be  achieved  without  recourse  to 
mutual  legal  assistance  as  well  as  demonstrating  uses  to  which  mutual  legal  assistance  has 
been  put. 
V  (the  victim  in  this  case)  was  a  businessman  locally  (rather  than  nationally) 
prominent  who,  amongst  his  various  legitimate  and  illicit  activities,  participated  in  drug 
importation  and  distribution  as  a  middle-ranking  dealer.  V  was  suspected  of  creaming  off 
profits  from  the  drugs-dealing  by  higher-ranking  dealers  from  whom  V  received  his  supply. 
The  higher-ranking  dealers  commissioned  the  principal  suspect,  T  I,  to  murder  V.  TI  enlisted 
21  The  Government  subsequently  published  a  VVhite  Paper  proposing  a  new  Serious  Organised  Crime 
Agency  with  investigation  powers  (to  replace  the  NCS,  the  NCIS  and  IIMCE)  but  retaining  the 
separation  of  investigation  and  prosecution  functions  (Home  Office  2004b). 
22  A  follow-up  interview  with  a  second  interviewee  was  conducted  to  clarify  points  about  which  the 
first  interviewee  was  uncertain.  Quotes  are  from  the  first  interviewee  only. 
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the  help  of  four  others  (T2-T5)  in  doing  this.  V  was  lured  to  a  rendezvous  at  which  he 
expected  to  conduct  an  illicit  deal  involving  wrist  watches.  "He  was  imprisoned,  abducted, 
then  taken  to  afarm  [ 
.. 
j  where  he  was  executed.  "  V's  body  has  never  been  found. 
At  the  time  of  this  offence  TI  and  his  associates  were  the  subject  of  a  separate 
proactive  investigation  being  conducted  by  a  national  agency.  Electronic  and  human 
surveillance  had  been  deployed  against  TI  and  his  associates  during  the  course  of  that 
investigation,  and  the  day  after  the  murder  of  V  took  place,  quite  coincidentally  T1  was 
arrested  in  connection  with  these  other  matters.  T2  made  good  his  escape.  T3  was  arrested 
with  TI  and  in  interview  surprised  the  investigators  by  giving  them  as  much  detail  as  he  knew 
(he  had  been  asked  to  provide  the  means  with  which  to  dispose  of  the  body)  of  the  murder 
that  had  taken  place  the  previous  night.  Although  not  an  eyewitness  to  either  the  murder  or 
the  disposal  of  the  body,  T3's  account  was  corroborated  in  numerous  ways  by  other  evidence 
and  was  considered  sufficient  to  mount  a  prosecution  for  murder. 
With  TI  and  others  already  in  custody,  it  remained  only  to  locate  and  arrest  T2  who 
had,  by  this  time,  fled  the  country. 
T2  was  trailed  across  various  jurisdictions  in  Western  Europe  through,  amongst  other 
information,  his  use  of  bank  cash  machines.  He  used  a  number  of  false  identities  and  took 
long-haul  flights  which  he  then  double-backed  upon  to  try  to  confuse  the  investigators.  The 
information  that  finally  located  him  in  State  A,  however,  came  not  from  mutual  legal 
assistance  or  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  but  from  domestic  enquiries.  T2  put 
property  up  for  sale  in  England  with  his  parents  acting  as  agents  for  the  sale.  Undercover 
investigators  posed  as  potential  buyers  and  during  a  viewing  of  the  property,  casually 
enquired  of  the  parents  where  their  son  was  now  living. 
Having  thus  located  T2,  extradition  proceedings  (a  separate  branch  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  outside  the  scope  of  this  study)  were  commenced,  with  the  British  DLO  posted  in  a 
neighbouring  state  being  instrumental  in  helping  to  establish  some  of  the  direct  police-to- 
police  relationships  between  UK  investigators  and  their  counter-parts  in  State  A.  Eventually 
fourteen  English  investigators  and  prosecutors  attended  court  in  State  A  to  testify  at  the 
extradition  hearings.  Evidential  enquiries  were  also  necessary  in  States  B,  C  and  D. 
V  often  travelled  to  State  B  and  had  previously  disappeared  from  the  UK,  only  to 
reappear  some  time  later  having  been  in  State  B  for  a  while.  To  negate  suggestions  that  V  had 
not  been  murdered  but  had  in  fact  disappeared  again  to  State  B,  assistance  was  sought  from 
State  B  in  searching  passenger  flight  manifests  to  cross-check  information  from  UK  manifests 
and  then  tracing  for  elimination  purposes  all  persons  with  the  same  name  as  V  who  had 
travelled  from  the  UK  to  State  B.  It  proved  very  problematic  for  the  English  officers  to  secure 
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permission  to  travel  to  State  B.  The  UK  DLO  stationed  there  played  a  crucial  role  in 
establishing  contacts  between  the  Interpol  NCB  in  State  B  and  the  English  investigators.  Once 
the  contacts  had  been  established,  an  ILOR  was  transmitted  accompanied  by  English 
investigators  who  then  received  fulsome  assistance  from  the  local  authorities,  being  allowed 
to  interview  witnesses  in  the  presence  of  local  authorities  who  arranged  all  accommodation 
and  internal  travel  for  the  English  officers. 
Evidential  enquiries  were  also  necessary  in  State  C,  identified  as  the  sole 
manufacturing  source  of  a  particular  type  of  cabling  that  linked  the  suspects  to  the  murder 
scene.  English  investigators  attended  State  C  and  conducted  their  own  enquiries  without  prior 
recourse  to  an  ILOR.  23  Attempts  had  been  made  before  making  the  trip  to  conduct  business 
through  the  Interpol  NCB  in  London  but  this  proved  very  slow  and  cumbersome  and 
eventually,  in  order  to  make  any  progress,  the  English  investigators  made  direct  contact  with 
the  local  law  enforcement  authorities  in  the  part  of  State  C  where  they  had  to  make  enquiries. 
The  local  authorities  provided  full  co-operation.  The  Interpol  NCB  in  State  C  was  kept 
appraised  of  developments  as  they  took  place  and  provided  retrospective  permission  for  the 
trip.  No  ILOR  was  issued  in  respect  of  these  enquiries. 
The  enquiries  took  the  English  investigators  to  a  number  of  places  before  they  were 
able  to  locate  the  witness  they  needed  to  see.  The  witness  voluntarily  made  a  statement  and 
agreed  to  attend  the  English  trial  to  testify  (both  for  the  original  trial  and  the  subsequent 
appeal).  Being  able  to  follow  up  developing  enquiries  in  real  time  and  being  able  to  form  a 
relationship  of  trust  with  the  witness  were  the  principal  benefits  of  this  course  of  action.  An 
outcome  was  achieved  in  a  period  of  days  that  could  otherwise  have  lasted  years  had  a  series 
of  individual,  sequential  requests  been  pursued  through  formal  channels.  Equally,  without  the 
direct  relationship  established  between  the  investigators  and  the  witness,  it  is  entirely  possible 
that  the  witness  would  not  have  responded  to  a  witness  summons  which,  under  mutual  legal 
assistance  treaty  law  and  domestic  law,  is  unenforceable  (see,  for  instance,  Art.  8  ECMA  1959 
the  provisions  of  which  are  essentially  reinforced  by  Art.  5(5)  EUCMA  2000;  §1(3)  and  1(4) 
CJ(IQ  Act  1990;  and  §2(2)  C(IQ  Act  2003;  for  expression  of  this  principle  outside  Europe 
see,  for  instance,  Ait.  10  of  the  1994  UK/US  MLAT). 
Enquiries  in  State  D  were  complicated  by  the  prevalence  of  corruption  there.  To 
overcome  some  of  the  potential  problems  an  officer  from  the  police  in  State  D  (already 
known  to  UK  authorities  and  trusted)  first  attended  the  UK  to  meet  the  English  investigators. 
Once  reliable  contacts  had  been  established,  English  investigators  then  attended  State  D 
23  In  relation  to  State  C  this  was  not  an  uncommon  occurrence.  State  C  has  subsequently  formally 
approached  the  UK  government  seeking  to  stop  such  actions  and  channel  all  evidential  requests 
through  the  respective  central  authorities,  pursuant  to  mutual  legal  assistance  treaties. 
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where  a  suspect's  house  was  searched  under  a  locally-issued  warrant.  It  is  not  known  how  the 
local  warrant  in  State  D  was  obtained  and  no  ILOR  was  issued  from  the  UK. 
At  trial  TI  and  T2  were  convicted  of  murder.  A  third  defendant  was  convicted  of 
false  imprisonment  and  conspiracy  to  cause  grievous  bodily  harm.  Two  others  were  acquitted. 
TI  &  T2  appealed  and  lost.  At  no  stage  did  the  defence  challenge  the  processes  or  manner  in 
which  any  evidence  from  abroad  had  been  identified  and  adduced. 
The  prosecutor  interviewed  for  this  case  study  was  involved  in  the  investigation  from 
the  outset  and  personally  issued  all  ELORs  in  relation  to  the  case  (although  without  immediate 
access  to  the  archived  files,  he  was  unable  to  enumerate  how  many  ILORs  had  been  issued). 
A  number  of  problems  had  been  encountered  with  mutual  legal  assistance  during  this 
investigation. 
"It  was  [Statc  A]  that  really  caused  us  someproblems.  It  didn't  really 
matter  what  we  put  in  any  letters,  or  in  any  extradition  request,  or  in  any 
telephone  conversation.  The  fact  was  they  didn't  seem  to  get  a  grip  of  what 
we  were  asking  them  to  do  and  how  we  were  asking  them  to  do  it.  I  don't 
think  it  was  through  any  lack  of  willingness  to  help.  Yheyjust  didn't  seem  to 
do  business  in  the  same  way  that  we  did.  ... 
"at  was  evident  to  me  is  that 
what  was  effective  there  was  nothing  at  all  to  do  with  any  letters  which  we 
wrote  but  was  the  liaison  which  the  police  had  with  their  counter-partsface- 
to-face.  They  clearly  got  a  good  deal  of  co-operation.  " 
The  value  of  police-to-police  co-operation  and  of  sending  investigators  to  accompany 
and  observe  the  execution  of  an  ELOR  was  a  point  to  which  this  interviewee  returned  time  and 
again. 
"The  most  productive  stuff  was  when  they  [the  investigators]  were 
dealing  directly  with  police  officers.  " 
"Unless  officers  actually  go  out  there  to  execute  them  [ILORS],  you 
never  get  anywhere.  " 
The  second  interviewee  corroborated  this  perception.  The  police  in  State  A  were 
found  to  be  very  willing  to  assist  but  failed  to  provide  much  in  the  way  of  substantial 
assistance  partly  because,  in  the  opinion  of  the  second  interviewee,  they  did  not  appear  to 
know  what  they  were  doing.  In  the  execution  of  the  various  ILORs,  the  judicial  investigators 
would  only  agree  to  execute  certain  of  the  requests  and  would  never  follow  up  evidential 
developments  that  spontaneously  emerged.  Often  a  request  received  just  a  one-word  response 
which  was  of  little  or  no  use  to  the  English  investigators.  English  investigators  were 
prohibited  from  conducting  their  own  enquiries.  Property  was  seized  in  evidence  but  no 
statements  of  seizure  and  continuity  (required  for  the  English  trial  process)  were  forthcoming 
Clive  Harfeld.,  Process  and  Practicalities  149 Chapter  7.,  Mutual  legal  assistance  in  practice  -  case  studies 
from  the  authorities  on  State  A.  English  investigators  were  only  supplied  with  copies  or 
photographs  of  the  physical  evidence  seized.  The  original  evidence  was  never  released  to 
English  investigators.  In  a  pragmatic  response  to  this  lack  of  full  assistance,  the  copies  were 
accepted  at  trial  in  England.  24 
It  is  the  practice  of  the  prosecutor  interviewed  in  this  case  to  issue  ILORs  in 
duplicate,  with  formal  transmission  via  the  UKCA  and  with  a  copy  in  both  English  and 
translation  for  the  investigators  to  take  with  them  to  the  requested  state  (having  first  sought 
from  the  requested  state  authority  to  travel,  which  can  be  facilitated  by  Interpol).  "That  is  how 
you  get  results.  " 
It  was  the  general  experience  of  this  interviewee  that  evidence  returned  via  formal 
channels  pursuant  to  an  ELOR  could  take  up  to  two  years  to  reach  the  investigation  team.  In 
fact  he  asserts  that  he  has  received  no  more  than  half  a  dozen  evidential  replies  via  formal 
channels,  which  he  attributes  to  pragmatism  on  the  part  of  the  requested  foreign  authorities. 
Because  in  the  cases  he  handles  English  investigators  take  a  copy  of  the  ILOR  with  them 
when  they  attend  the  requested  state,  they  usually  are  able  to  bring  the  required  evidence  back 
with  them.  So  when  the  formally  transmitted  copy  of  the  request  arrives,  it  has  usually  already 
been  executed  and  there  is  no  need  on  the  part  of  the  requested  authorities,  formally  to 
respond.  He  has  never  had  an  ILOR  formally  refused  but  he  has  had  plenty  that  were  just 
ignored. 
The  investigation  strategy  regarding  the  use  (or  non-use)  of  ILORs  in  this  case  was 
heavily  influenced  by  this  prosecutor's  attitudes  and  interpretation. 
"You  only  should  send  a  letter  of  request  ifyou  are  asking  the  local 
police  to  use  compulsive  powers  ofsearch  and  seizure  or  seeing  people  who 
don't  want  to  see  you.  The  theory  behind  this  is  that  ifyou've  got  a  willing 
witness  albeit  in  aforeign  jurisdiction,  there  is  no  reason  why  you  shouldn't 
go  across  and  see  them.  I  know  we  sometimes  go  through  the  device  ofsaying 
we'll  meet  them  at  the  British  embassy  or  something  of  this  nature  but  its  not 
actually  necessary  is  it?  " 
His  understanding  reflects  the  permissive  nature  of  the  interpretation  and  guidance 
offered  to  prosecutors  in  the  mutual  legal  assistance  sections  of  the  CPS  Manual  of 
Guidance.  25  This  practical  attitude  to  evidence-gathering  based  on  what  is  not  specifically 
prohibited  nevertheless  can  be  constrained  by  circumstance.  In  any  given  State,  that  which  is 
24  The  defendant,  now  imprisoned  in  England,  has  repeatedly  approached  English  investigators  for  the 
return  of  the  original  documents  and  exhibits  seized  from  him,  given  that  copies  were  used  in  trial.  The 
authorities  in  State  A  have  not  responded  to  any  requests  to  release  the  material  and  English 
investigators  are  unable  to  make  any  progress  in  relation  to  this. 
25  The  manual  is  not  a  public  document  and  so  cannot  be  quoted  here.  I  am  grateful  for  the  opportunity 
afforded  to  me  by  the  CPS  to  comment  on  early  drafts  of  the  mutual  legal  assistance  sections. 
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legally  possible,  may  not  always  be  politically  desirable.  Where  any  given  State  insists  upon 
the  use  of  formal  request  procedures,  even  where  no  coercive  powers  are  necessary,  the 
political  preference  must  be  complied  with. 
The  key  themes  that  emerge  from  this  case  study,  to  which  discussion  will  return  at 
the  end  of  this  chapter,  are: 
0  Different  use  ofattitudes  towards  ILORs 
0  Different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
0  Working  relationship  with  foreign  colleagues 
Post-script:  Italian  prOsecutor's  perspective 
An  unanticipated  opportunity  arose  to  explore  the  experience  of  an  Italian  prosecutor 
in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  (interview  14  May  2004,  Brussels).  Although  not  part  of 
the  original  research  plan  and  not  conducted  to  the  same  level  of  detail  as  the  case  studies 
above,  the  data  from  this  additional  interview  is  worth  including  here  because  it  echoes  some 
of  the  points  brought  out  by  the  case  studies,  which  in  itself  illustrates  that  the  issues  raised 
have  general  applicability  and  are  not  necessarily  confined  to  English  investigators  and 
prosecutors.  All  Italian  prosecutors  can  issue  ILORs,  but  mafia  and  terrorist  investigation  is 
reserved  for  special  regional  and  national  prosecutors'  offices.  Public  prosecutors  direct  the 
police  and  are  independent  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  They  can  issue  search  wan-ants.  Juges 
d'instruction  issue  arrest  wan-ants  which  are  required  in  all  cases  where  the  offender  is  not 
detained  inflagrante  delicto.  Before  becoming  a  judge,  the  interviewee  was  a  prosecutor 
involved  in  directing  many  transnational  investigations,  two  of  which  involved  the  British 
Islands. 
In  1994  he  was  investigating  Italian  organized  crime  involvement  in  the  importation 
of  out-of-date  poultry  meat  from  State  A,  a  South  American  country.  The  criminals  were 
falsifying  the  veterinary  and  other  documents  to  make  it  appear  as  if  the  meat  came  from  Italy 
and  was  still  in  date,  and  then  exporting  the  meat  to  innocent  importers  in  the  UK.  (There  was 
no  link  with  UK  organized  crime  groups.  )  The  interviewee  led  a  team  of  Italian  customs 
police  to  the  UK  where  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Food  [MAFF]  had  agreed 
within  hours  to  execute  the  ILOR,  speed  of  response  being  necessitated  by  the  public  health 
implications.  26  Searches  were  executed  across  England  and  Wales  and  the  meat  eventually 
located  at  a  warehouse  near  Blackpool.  The  NCIS  assisted  in  the  co-ordination  of  this  work 
26  The  advantage  of  having  a  central  authority  to  direct  incoming  requests  lies  in  its  role  as  a  clearing 
house  to  identify  which  enforcement  authority  is  the  most  suitable  to  assist.  In  this  case,  it  was  not  the 
English  police. 
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and  the  interviewee  experienced  very  good  co-operation  from  MAFF  veterinary  inspectors. 
Assistance  in  this  case  was  provided  pursuant  to  the  1959  ECMA. 
The  case  could  not  be  pursued  in  South  America  because  Interpol  NCB  Rome  was 
unable  to  secure,  from  NCB  State  A,  the  identity  of  the  appropriate  authority  with  whom  to 
liaise.  The  interviewee  speculated  that  the  response  might  have  been  different  if  the  issue  had 
been  drugs-related  but  that  the  illegal  export  of  out-dated  poultry  meat  was  possibly  too 
embarrassing  for  the  authorities  in  State  A  to  investigate. 
The  second  case  involved  a  money  laundering  investigation  with  the  Isle  of  Man  in 
1998.  Again  the  NCIS  facilitated  the  operation  and  the  Attorney  General  on  the  Isle  of  Man 
was  very  co-operative  in  relation  to  the  ELOR  execution. 
In  both  cases  the  interviewee  was  assisted  and  accompanied  by  the  judicial  police 
(which  include  carabineri  and  customs).  Italian  prosecutors  frequently  accompany  ILORs. 
The  interviewee  has  also  been  to  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  on  a  drugs-trafficking  case 
which  included  being  allowed  to  interview  suspects  held  on  remand  in  German  prisons.  And 
to  Belgium  investigating  the  counterfeiting  of  pharmaceutical  products. 
As  has  been  seen  elsewhere,  the  critical  success  factors  from  this  interviewee's 
perspective  included  good  working  relations  with  the  requested  authorities  and  accompanying 
the  ELOR  to  advise  on  the  relevance  of  discovered  material  to  the  prosecution  case.  The 
limitations  of  Interpol  as  a  facilitating  agent  (as  opposed  to  an  enforcement  agent)  were 
exposed  in  the  South  American  case. 
Conclusion 
If  the  plural  of  anecdote  is  data  and  if  a  mass  of  data  can  obscure  the  significance  of 
the  singular,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  value  of  the  serni-structured  interview  data  presented  here 
lies  in  the  way  the  individual  case  studies  illustrate  specific  problems  faced  by  investigators 
when  conducting  transnational.  investigations:  specific  problems  that  are  not  necessarily 
recognised  in  larger  and  more  general  data  studies  such  as  the  SCQ  survey  presented  in 
Chapter  6.  Nowhere  before  has  such  fundamental  operational  experience  been  collated. 
Besides  the  particular  the  data  from  the  case  studies  illustrate  a  number  of  recurring 
themes  worthy  of  further  consideration  (Table  9).  These  themes  are  discussed  below  (Chapter 
8)  and  are  contrasted  with  the  themes  that  emerged  both  from  the  SCQ  survey  of  local  forces 
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in  England  and  Wales  and  the  peer  review  of  mutual  legal  assistance  within  the  EU.  This  will 
not  only  be  a  means  of  cross-referencing  the  learning  from  the  three  research  exercises  but 
will,  through  identification  of  the  common  themes,  help  identify  the  importance  and  relevance 
of  the  singular  learning  revealed  through  the  case  studies. 
Table  9:  Key  issues  iden  ffmed  through  practitioner  interviews 
Issue  Case  study 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Different  use  qj7dititudes  towards  ILORs  10, 
Different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co- 
operation 
Working  relationship  withforeign  colleagues 
Collaboration  with  prosecutors  (including  debriefing) 
Domestic  agency  rivalry 
Different  attitudes  towards  testimony 
Different  attitudes  towards  Intelligence  handling 
Different  procedural  laws 
Disclosure  issues 
Loss  of  evidence  /  timeliness  problems 
Forced  spontaneous  tactical  changes 
ILOR  management  information  available 
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Chapter  8 
The  emerging  picture  of  mutual  legal  assistance  in  practice 
The  three  surveys  contrasted  here  are  significantly  different  in  character.  The  EU 
survey  was  conducted  at  government  level  primarily  amongst  civil  servants.  Of  the  37  persons 
interviewed  by  the  evaluation  team  that  inspected  the  UK  mutual  legal  assistance 
mechanisms,  only  four  were  police  officers:  two  of  these  were  seconded  to  the  Interpol  NCB 
in  London  and  the  other  two  came  from  the  Metropolitan  and  City  of  London  fraud  squads 
respectively.  The  SCQ  survey  appears  to  have  been  responded  to  by  a  variety  of  post-holders 
across  numerous  ranks  but  common  to  all  these  responses  was  the  perspective  of  the  local 
force:  a  perspective  characterised  mainly  by  reactive  investigation  into  reported  crimes  rather 
than  proactive  investigation  into  crimes  in  action.  And  whilst  some  of  the  case  studies  were 
also  reactive  investigations,  the  principal  reason  for  seeking  serni-structured  interview  data 
was  to  capture  valuable  lessons  from  proactive  investigations.  Thus  at  one  level  this  is  not  a 
comparison  of  like  with  like.  But  what  is  of  value  is  the  contrasting  of  three  different 
perspectives  because  such  comparison  provides  the  foundation  for  answering  the  research 
questions  identified  in  Chapter  4  above:  does  mutual  legal  assistance  work  and  are  the 
bureaucrats  providing  what  the  practitioners  need  from  a  mutual  legal  assistance 
infi-astructure? 
There  are  a  number  of  different  ways  in  which  the  comparison  could  be  undertaken. 
Any  one  of  the  surveys  could  have  been  used  as  the  basis  against  which  to  compare  the  other 
two.  Chapter  7  concluded  with  the  assertion  that  the  value  of  the  practitioner  interview  data 
lay  in  the  significance  of  the  singular.  To  build  on  this  assertion  it  was  determined  to  use  the 
common  themes  from  the  semi-structured  interview  data  as  the  basis  for  comparison  here. 
Each  of  the  common  themes  as  identified  in  Table  9,  Chapter  7,  is  briefly  discussed  together 
with  such  cross-referencing  of  results  from  the  other  surveys  as  is  relevant.  Then  the 
significant  results  from  the  other  surveys  that  cannot  be  cross-referenced  will  be  discussed.  A 
table  illustrating  the  areas  of  correspondence  and  non-correspondence  is  presented  in 
Appendix  H.  Some  issues  were  common  to  all  three  research  exercises  (even  if  perspectives 
differed  about  each  issue).  However  there  is  more  non-correspondence  than  correspondence 
which  illustrates  the  different  ways  in  which  practitioners  and  administrators  approach  mutual 
legal  assistance. 
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Different  inteipretations  about  the  application  of  ILORs 
International  treaties  define  the  content  of  ILORs  (Art.  14  ECAM).  Domestic  laws 
defmc  how  an  ILOR  may  be  issued  if  required  (§  3  CJ(IQ  Act  as  amended  by  §7  &8  C(IQ 
Act).  But  where  no  offence  is  caused  to  the  authorities  in  a  foreign  state,  and  where  the 
provision  of  evidence  is  achieved  on  a  voluntary  basis,  there  may  be  no  need  to  issue  a  formal 
request  in  order  to  obtain  the  foreign  evidence.  Four  of  the  case  studies  indicate  differing 
understandings  of  how  and  when  to  use  ELORs. 
In  case  study  [CS]  2  the  SIO  was  of  the  view  that  it  was  good  practice  to  issue 
individual  ILORs  for  individual  items  of  evidence  and  only  very  rarely  did  he  include  more 
than  one  request  per  ELOR.  Operating  on  the  basis  of  a  generic  ELOR  to  which  supplementary 
requests  were  added  was  not  possible  for  this  SIO.  Yet  another  national  jurisdiction  involved 
in  the  same  multi-national  investigation,  which  insisted  upon  separate  ILORs  from  the  UK, 
was  for  itself  able  to  arrange  with  a  third  State  also  involved  in  the  joint  operation  a  single, 
initial  generic  11LOR  which  was  considered  to  cover  all  subsequent  investigator  requests  for 
material.  In  CS3  initial  co-operation  was  secured  with  a  generic  ILOR  issued  in  the  very  early 
stages  of  the  investigation  which  enshrined  in  principle  the  framework  for  mutual  co- 
operation  in  two  parallel  investigations.  This  was  supplemented  subsequently  with  follow-up 
ILORs  listing  a  number  of  specific  requests  in  each  letter  to  secure  specific  evidence.  In  CS4 
the  need  for  flexibility  to  respond  to  an  ever  fluid  situation  meant  that  individual  ILORs  for 
each  item  of  evidence  was  not  a  practical  proposition  and  so  all  ILORs  contained  multiple 
requests.  The  prosecutor  in  CS6,  wherever  possible,  sought  to  avoid  becoming  embroiled  in 
mutual  legal  assistance:  "it  is  a  particularly,  in  the  twenty-  first  century,  cumbersome  way  of 
getting  evidence  (sic)"  (interview  23  January  2004).  In  this  investigation  enquiries  were 
conducted  in  one  foreign  state  without  any  ILOR  being  issued,  whilst  numerous  ILORs  were 
issued  to  another  state  largely  to  no  avail.  To  this  variety  of  strategies  for  issuing  ILORs  can 
be  added  the  variety  of  attitudes  evident  in  executing  ILORs. 
In  CS2,  although  different  attitudes  to  the  use  of  ILORs  are  evident  amongst  the 
various  jurisdictions  involved  in  the  joint  operation,  it  remained  the  case  that  each  national 
investigation  team  had  a  good  understanding  of  the  context  for  each  request  and  so  request 
products  were  always  of  high  quality.  The  SIO  for  CS2  had,  on  a  different  investigation, 
encountered  a  very  strict  interpretation  of  ILORs  by  the  requested  foreign  authority  to  the 
extent  that  precisely  what  was  requested  was  provided  and  no  more.  This  necessitated  a  large 
number  of  follow-up  IILORs  which  injected  significant  time-delays  into  the  investigation. 
Other  SlOs  and  prosecutors  were  asked  if  they  had  ever  encountered  a  similar  attitude  and  it 
Clive  Harfield.  Process  and  Practicalities  155 Chapier  8:  Emergingpicture  ofmutual  legal  assistance  in  practice 
was  a  common  experience  that  occasionally  such  an  attitude  was  encountered.  The  prosecutor 
in  CS6  asserted  that  he  had  never  encountered  such  pedantry  because  of  the  way  in  which  he 
worded  his  ILORs  to  cater  for  any  follow  up  enquiries  that  might  become  necessary.  However 
it  was  the  recollection  of  the  SIO  in  CS6  that  precisely  this  attitude  had  been  encountered  in 
one  foreign  authority  from  which  assistance  was  sought  in  that  enquiry.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  a  prosecutor  and  SIO  involved  in  the  same  case  could  have  such  different 
recollections. 
Further  confusion  is  to  be  found  in  an  example  of  a  State  insisting  on  the  use  of  ILOR 
procedures  where  they  were  not  necessary,  or  possibly  even  lawful,  was  provided  by  a 
prosecutor  (interview  23  January  2004).  English  police  were  investigating  the  sudden  death  of 
a  foreign  national  temporarily  in  the  UK.  Officers  went  to  the  deceased's  home  country  to 
complete  certain  enquiries  for  the  coroner  having  concluded  from  their  investigation  that  the 
deceased  had  committed  suicide.  It  not  being  a  criminal  matter,  the  officers  did  not  seek  prior 
authority  from  the  foreign  state  and  travelled  without  an  ]LOR  requesting  the  required 
information.  Authorities  within  the  foreign  State  refused  to  assist  the  English  officers, 
possibly  because  it  was  felt  that  diplomatic  protocols  had  not  been  observed,  and 
subsequently  insisted  that  assistance  be  sought  through  forinal  channels  via  an  ILOR.  The 
officers  then  requested  CPS  to  issue  an  ILOR  but  it  was  rightly  pointed  out  to  the  officers  that 
there  was  no  power  to  do  so  because  there  was  no  offence  and  the  investigation  did  not 
constitute  criminal  proceedings  for  which  an  ILOR  could  have  been  issued  (§3  CJ(IQ  Act 
1990).  An  ILOR  was  eventually  drafted  couched  in  terins  that  allowed  for  the  possibility  that 
evidence  of  crime  might  be  discovered  in  order  to  overcome  the  hurdles  put  in  the  way  of 
investigators  by  the  foreign  authorities. 
The  format  for  ILORs  is  dictated  by  international  conventions  to  achieve  a  standard 
instrument,  recognisable  in  all  jurisdictions.  And  yet  interpretations  for  the  use  of  this 
international  norm  vary  greatly,  even  within  individual  jurisdictions.  The  practicalities  of 
time-critical  transnational  enquiries  may  well  impose  an  informal  norm  for  the  interpretation 
and  use  as  well  as  the  format  but  whether  or  not  this  can  be  achieved  will  to  some  extent  be 
determined  by  the  developments  in  the  second  variable  evident  from  the  case  studies: 
attitudes  to  international  law  enforcement  co-operation. 
Free  text  answers  from  the  SCQ,  relevant  to  this  issue,  are  recorded  in  Box  4,  Chapter 
6  (p.  1  12  above).  Although  Box  4  data  focuses  on  delays  and  bureaucracy,  these  are  symptoms 
of  attitudes  towards  IILORs  as  instruments  of  co-operation. 
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Different  attitudes  towards  intemational  law  enforcement  co-operation 
In  relation  to  the  successful  execution  of  ILORs,  it  was  identified  in  CS2  above  that 
knowledge  of  the  circumstances  of  the  request  amongst  the  requested  authorities  facilitated  a 
more  informed  execution  of  requests.  Another  feature  of  CS2  was  that  one  requested  State 
provided  assistance  even  though  the  behaviour  under  investigation  was  not,  at  that  time,  a 
crime  in  the  requested  State.  Nevertheless  the  requested  authorities  took  the  view  that  the 
nature  of  the  behaviour  was  such  that  assistance  should  be  provided.  This  requested  State 
subsequently  passed  a  new  law  criminalizing  the  behaviour.  Such  a  positive  attitude  towards 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  was  not  always  apparent  in  the  case  studies. 
The  English  investigators  in  CS3  encountered  a  variety  of  attitudes  towards  co- 
operation.  From  one  State  they  received  the  best  possible  co-operation  and  as  much  help  as 
they  could  have  wished.  A  second  State  approached  for  assistance  demanded  that  the 
resources  to  execute  the  request  be  provided  from  the  English  agency  concerned.  When  it  was 
explained  that  these  would  not  be  possible  (indeed  it  was,  in  the  experience  of  this  research,  a 
unique  response),  the  requested  authorities  asserted  that  no  assistance  would  be  provided. 
In  CS4,  where  a  number  of  States  were  approached  throughout  the  course  of  a  long 
investigation,  attitudes  towards  the  provision  of  co-operation  were  clearly  dictated  by  political 
agenda  and  professional  experience.  The  English  investigators  demonstrated  this  themselves 
in  seeking  to  work  in  one  State  with  foreign  colleagues  they  had  worked  with  before,  rather 
than  a  more  appropriate  agency  in  that  State.  In  another  requested  State,  assistance  came  in 
the  form  of  staff  who,  there  was  reason  to  believe,  were  not  the  law  enforcement  officers  they 
purported  to  be.  In  respect  of  this  State,  assistance  was  provided  in  the  context  of  seeking  to 
suppress  internal  corruption  and  public  awareness  of  this,  rather  than  in  the  context  of  true  co- 
operation. 
In  CS6,  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  were  found  to 
differ  between  different  agencies  within  a  single  State.  In  one  of  the  requested  States  police 
officers  provided  considerable  significant  assistance  but  at  prosecutor  level  the  same 
willingness  to  overcome  obstacles  was  not  apparent.  In  a  second  requested  State,  again  at 
investigator  level,  a  willingness  to  assist  a  fellow  investigator  far  exceeded  the  English 
investigators'  expectations  but  the  channels  of  formal  assistance  failed  to  deliver  what  was 
needed  because  there  did  not  appear  to  be  a  willingness  to  drive  matters  forward. 
In  terms  of  Heymann's  models  of  co-operation  (above  Chapter  2),  the  prosecutorial 
model  describes  attitudes  that  were  perceived  by  interviewees  for  this  study  as  being  the  more 
positive.  But  interestingly,  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  were 
seen  to  differ  between  different  actors  within  individual  criminal  justice  systems.  The  ready 
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willingness  to  co-operate  and  assist  as  far  as  possible  a  fellow  investigator  was  not  always 
mirrored  amongst  prosecutors  or  administrators.  Political  agenda  could  influence  the  manner 
in  which  assistance  was  provided  and  arguably  disrupted  transnational  investigation  rather 
than  the  transnational  criminality  that  was  the  subject  of  the  investigation.  To  this  general 
observation  CS2  provides  an  exception  in  that  not  only  was  investigator  assistance 
unhesitatingly  provided,  but  the  legislature  amended  national  laws  in  order  to  support 
international  norms  and  so  be  able  to  provide  better  assistance  in  the  future. 
Attitudes  encountered  by  English  local  forces  are  recorded  in  Box  7,  Chapter  6,  (P. 
114  above).  The  perception  of  foreign  attitudes  to  requests  for  assistance  is  predominantly 
negative,  as  indeed  it  was  when  Nicholson  &  Harrison  conducted  their  survey  (1996:  24). 
Here  there  is  a  disparity  between  the  mainly  negative  attitudes  encountered  by  local  forces 
and  the  largely  positive  and  helpful  attitudes  encountered  by  proactive  investigators.  The 
difference  may  be  explained  by  the  different  types  of  crime  under  investigation.  The  sort  of 
assistance  being  sought  by  investigators  tackling  organised  crime  in  action  is  dynamic  and 
spontaneous.  And  in  the  event  that  the  foreign  authorities  would  need  to  seek  help  from 
English  investigators,  the  English  investigators  with  the  skills  to  undertake  such  assistance 
requests  will  be  the  same  investigators,  or  will  at  least  work  for  the  same  organisations,  as 
those  English  investigators  making  proactive  requests.  Therefore  the  spirit  of  reciprocity  and 
comity  prevails  wherever  possible:  a  driving  ethos  that  will  not  necessarily  exist  amongst 
investigators  making  and  receiving  requests  for  individual  pieces  of  evidence  in  a  reactive 
investigation. 
The  EU  survey  is  largely  silent  on  both  the  above  issues,  yet  in  seeking  to  promote 
common  understanding  across  the  EU,  the  very  undertaking  of  peer  evaluation  is  itself  a  step 
towards  overcoming  some  of  the  differences  that  bedevil  the  mutual  legal  assistance  process. 
Working  relationship  with  foreim  colleagues 
Heymann's  prosecutorial  model  presupposes  common  values  shared  between 
investigators  and  prosecutors.  Common  values  are  a  good  foundation  for  a  positive  working 
relationship.  Although  never  expressed  by  interviewees  in  terms  of  common  values,  there  was 
general  recognition  that  a  positive  working  relationship  with  foreign  colleagues  contributed 
significantly  to  the  successful  outcome  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  As  identified  above,  the 
self-completion  questionnaire  and  Gallagher  (1998:  Chapter  5)  both  confirm  this.  Conversely, 
lack  of  confidence  in  foreign  colleagues  leads  to  a  poor,  and  ultimately  unproductive,  working 
relationship  (Nicholson  &  Harrison  1996:  Chapter  6). 
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CS3  corroborates  both  Gallagher  and  Nicholson  &  Harrison.  The  element  of  the 
investigation  described  in  detail  above  illustrates  the  benefits  of  a  good  rapport  between 
foreign  investigators.  Founded  upon  a  memorandum  of  understanding,  the  relationship 
fostered  good  practice  such  as  contacting  foreign  colleagues  in  advance  of  submitting  an 
ILOR  in  order  to  identify  how  best  to  phrase  the  request  in  order  to  achieve  the  desired 
objective.  The  coroner's  investigation  running  alongside  the  criminal  investigation  required 
the  active  assistance  of  authorities  from  State  E.  Following  six  weeks  of  negotiation,  officers 
from  State  E  were  deployed  to  England  where  the  hosting  agencies  had  arranged  domestic 
and  office  accommodation.  No  reason  was  given  but  the  visiting  officers  declined  the 
arrangements  provided  for  them  and  found  their  own  accommodation.  English  officers 
hypothesised  that  this  was  because  the  investigators  from  State  E  were  in  some  way 
suspicious  of  the  arrangements  made  before  their  arrival.  Those  English  investigators  engaged 
in  the  criminal  investigation  enjoyed  a  far  more  comfortable  and  fruitfid  relationship  with 
their  colleagues  from  State  A  than  their  counterparts  on  the  coroner's  investigation  enjoyed 
with  the  investigators  from  State  E.  And  when  investigators  from  the  criminal  investigation 
sought  evidential  assistance  from  State  E,  they  were  frustrated  through  the  lack  of  co- 
operation.  Coincidentally,  one  of  the  investigators  from  State  E  deployed  to  England  in 
relation  to  the  coroner's  investigation,  studied  for  his  LLM  with  the  present  author  in 
England.  Although  once  in  the  UK  he  telephoned  to  make  social  contact  with  the  present 
author,  when  a  social  meeting  was  suggested  the  foreign  investigator  stated  that  this  would 
not  be  possible.  Even  a  pre-existing  relationship  appears  not  to  have  curtailed  the  concerns 
that  investigators  from  State  E  had  in  coming  to  England. 
The  SIO  in  CS4  was  prepared  to  risk  offending  protocol  by  building  his  investigation 
with  foreign  colleagues  with  whom  he  had  previously  worked.  For  the  SIO  the  advantages  of 
working  with  colleagues  already  known  and  trusted  outweighed  any  political  disadvantages 
that  might  have  arisen  by  seeking  help  from  an  agency  that  did  not  have  primacy  in  the 
matter.  As  such,  the  valued  previous  working  relationships  influenced  the  strategy  and  tactics 
applied  in  the  new  investigation. 
In  CS6,  positive  working  relationships  were  established  directly  between 
investigators  when  formal  channels  of  request  and  communication  failed  to  achieve  assistance 
in  a  reasonable  timescale.  Everything  that  the  English  investigators  wanted  to  achieve  was 
achieved  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  formal  assistance.  The  prosecutor  in  that  case  also  commented 
favourably  on  how  good  police-to-police  relations  in  another  State  overcame  many  obstacles. 
To  the  anecdotal  evidence  from  SlOs  about  the  value  of  establishing  good  working 
relations  with  colleagues  abroad  in  furthering  request  execution  (which  includes  deploying 
English  officers  abroad  to  observe  the  execution)  can  be  added  the  SCQ  data  on  this  issue. 
Clive  Harfield.  Process  and  Practicalifies  159 Chapter  8:  Emerging  picture  of  mutual  legal  assistance  in  pracfice 
The  answers  to  Question  13  (discussed  pp.  104-5  above)  note  what  has  been  achieved  in  the 
way  of  assistance,  including  evidence  acquisition,  without  recourse  to  formal  mechanisms. 
Box  2,  Chapter  6,  contains  ten  free  text  answers  that  reinforce  the  data  from  the  SIOs.  Box  9, 
Chapter  6,  also  contains  some  responses  highlighting  the  value  of  direct  communication 
between  investigators.  The  more  positive  the  working  relationship  between  requesting  and 
requested  investigators,  the  more  productive  the  execution  of  a  request  is  likely  to  be.  Such  a 
truism  might  not  be  thought  remarkable  but  the  fact  that  it  is  emphasised  by  so  many 
respondents  when  given  the  opportunity  to  do  so  indicates  that  this  is  an  important  factor  in 
the  success  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  It  is  a  factor  for  which  no  specific  provision  is  made  in 
the  infrastructure.  Europol  and  Interpol  can  only  facilitate  the  fostering  of  such  working 
relationships.  Neither  can  provide  the  direct  operational  assistance  that  investigators  need. 
The  instrument  framework  of  mutual  legal  assistance  has  hitherto  been  structured  around  the 
provision  of  assistance  between  judicial  authorities  and  the  transmission  of  requests  between 
central  authorities;  different  types  of  working  relationship  from  those  at  the  root  of 
transnational  investigation.  As  will  be  seen  in  the  next  Chapter,  the  new  statutory  provision 
for  joint  investigation  teams  implicitly  recognises  the  value  of  working  relationships  as  a 
basis  for  overcoming  some  of  the  bureaucratic  problems  inherent  in  mutual  legal  assistance. 
The  EU  survey  recognised  the  value  of  effective  relationships  and  short  lines  of 
communication  both  in  the  final  report  (European  Union  2001a:  26)  and  in  the  report  on  the 
UK  (European  Union  2001c:  60)  by  promoting  the  concept  of  direct  transmission  and  the 
value  of  the  EJ`N  respectively.  To  these  initiatives  might  be  added  that  of  Eurojust  which  also 
serves  to  promote  and  facilitate  understanding  and  practical  co-operation  between 
prosecutors.  Eurojust  is  still  in  its  infancy  although  it  is  already  establishing  itself  within  the 
co-operative  network  (Eurojust  2003).  Awareness  of  its  role  and  potential  is  still  varied.  One 
English  prosecutor  has  observed:  "you  know  of  the  existence  of  these  bodies  but  they  are  a 
rather  mysterious  world,  and  we  have  never  been  disabused.  You  know,  'here  be  dragons' 
don't  go  there",  (interview  23  January  2004).  Which  contrasts  with  the  very  positive 
welcome  for  Eurojust  articulated  by  one  police  respondent  to  the  SCQ:  "introduction  of 
Eurojust  within  the  EU  is  a  valuable  avenue  for  fast-tracking  and  checking  progress  of 
applications",  (Box  9,  Chapter  6  above).  It  is  possible  that  neither  respondent  nor  interviewee 
fully  understood  the  role  and  function  of  Eurojust.  An  informal  measure  of  the  success  of 
Eurojust  will  be  the  extent  to  which  it  fosters  the  positive  working  relationships  that  so  many 
practitioners  have  identified  as  a  key  factor  in  achieving  a  successful  request  execution. 
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Collaboration  with  prosecutors  (including  debriefing) 
If  the  prosecutor  in  CS6  attempted  in  vain  to  establish  a  good  relationship  with  the 
prosecutors  overseas,  his  experience  of  assisting  English  investigators  in  the  preparation  of 
ILORs  convinces  him  that  early  collaboration  between  prosecutors  and  investigators  is  very 
beneficial  in  achieving  a  successful  outcome  in  mutual  legal  assistance.  It  was  a  view  shared 
with  the  prosecutor  in  CS5.  In  the  latter  case,  unlike  in  CS6,  the  prosecutor  was  consulted 
only  after  the  case  was  already  well  under  way,  and  one  of  the  lessons  that  the  prosecutor  felt 
should  be  leamt  from  that  experience  was  that  the  earlier  a  prosecutor  can  advise  on  the 
suitability  and  acquisition  of  foreign  evidence,  the  better.  The  interviewee  did  not  go  into 
detail  but  implied  that  previous,  fruitless  attempts  by  investigators  to  acquire  evidence 
through  mutual  assistance  rather  than  mutual  legal  assistance  had  unnecessarily  complicated 
matters.  The  prosecutor  was  also  of  the  opinion  that  what  he  described  as  the  log-jam 
obstructing  the  progress  of  the  investigation  could  have  been  overcome  more  quickly  or 
avoided  altogether  through  early  collaboration  between  police  and  prosecutors.  It  greatly 
aided  the  overall  investigation  when  prosecutors  from  the  different  jurisdictions  were  able  to 
meet  and  confer  directly,  explaining  each  other's  evidential  and  procedural  needs  and  so 
overcoming  confusion  and  concerns  that  existed  between  the  various  investigators  involved. 
The  advantage  of  early  collaboration  is  not  lost  on  SIOs.  It  was  commented  upon 
favourably  in  CS2  where  the  early  allocation  of  a  single  prosecutor  had  ensured  a  consistent 
and  informed  approach  to  ILORs.  When  researching  related  issues  for  an  LLM  dissertation, 
the  present  author  found  that  there  were  very  few  prosecutors  with  much  knowledge  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  and  that  it  was  entirely  possible  that  any  number  of  CPS  offices  would 
have  no  staff  experienced  in  mutual  legal  assistance  (Harfield  1999:  36-7).  The  increase  in 
transnational  evidence-gathering  is  such  that  the  CPS  has  now  initiated  its  own  in-house 
training  programme  and  aims  to  have  staff  trained  in  mutual  legal  assistance  available  in 
every  office  (Bill  Wheeldon,  International  Directorate  CPS,  interview  12  April  2001  and 
subsequent  pers.  comm..  ) 
What  none  of  the  prosecutors  or  SIOs  had  ever  experienced  was  the  formal  dcbriefing 
with  each  other  of  any  given  investigation.  As  outlined  above  in  relation  to  CS2,  such  a 
formal  debriefing,  especially  between  prosecutors  and  investigators  from  foreign 
jurisdictions,  may  have  clarified  misunderstandings  which  have  fuelled  mistrust.  None  of  the 
intervicwees  thought  that  debriefing  was  a  bad  idea,  but  they  created  the  collective  impression 
with  the  researcher  that  such  an  activity  was  perceived  as  'desirable'  rather  than  'essential'.  If 
it  is  not  considered  essential,  there  is  a  danger  that  time  will  never  be  made  for  such  reflection 
and  that  opportunities  for  shared  learning  will  be  missed.  There  is  a  growing  body  of  expertise 
being  amassed  within  CPS  but  no  formal  structures  for  capturing  this  learning  other  than  by 
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revising  the  in-house  manual  of  guidance  on  mutual  legal  assistance  (interview  23  January 
2004;  Bill  Wheeldon  pers.  comm..  ). 
Case-by-case  collaboration  between  prosecutors  and  investigators  did  not  feature  in 
the  EU  survey.  None  of  the  respondents  to  the  SCQ  reinforced  the  experience  of  the  SIOs  and 
prosecutors  about  the  value  of  early  collaboration,  although  responses  to  Question  8  (Chapter 
6,  Table  2,  p.  96  above)  indicated  that  the  second  most  frequently  contacted  source  of  advice 
on  mutual  legal  assistance  for  local  force  investigators  was  the  CPS. 
Clearly,  on  the  basis  of  these  observations,  collaboration  offers  opportunities  to 
capture  learning,  both  during  and  after  investigations.  There  should  be  in  place  systematic 
means  of  recording  this  learning  and  making  it  available  for  dissemination.  Whilst  currently 
there  is  no  central  repository  for  such  learning,  Eurojust  is  a  potential  vehicle  for  prosecutorial 
knowledge  capture.  NCIS  would  regard  itself  as  already  being  the  law  enforcement  equivalent 
but  doubts  have  been  raised  about  the  quality  of  advice  disseminated  by  NCIS  to  date  (Tim 
Crosland,  incoming  Head  of  the  newly  established  in-house  legal  department  at  NCIS,  pers. 
comm.,  November  2003). 
Domestic  agency  rivalry 
Rivalry  between  domestic  agencies  can  be  cultural,  as  in  the  antagonism  documented 
by  Bames  that  existed  between  police  and  customs  (2000:  111-2;  114;  125,136),  or  it  can  be 
derived  from  a  conflict  of  operational  interests.  The  Curtis  Warren  investigation  illustrated 
what  could  be  achieved  in  terms  of  co-operation  to  overcome  differences  between 
organizational  cultures  but  it  also  demonstrated  that  such  good  practice  could  be  short-lived. 
To  investigate  Warren  police  and  customs  set  up  a  joint  investigation  team  [JIT]  which  was 
entirely  covert,  operating  from  specially  acquired  premises  away  from  any  operational  teams 
from  either  organization.  It  demonstrated  one  of  the  benefits  envisaged  for  JITs  to  be 
established  across  borders  under  the  EUCMA  (Article  13).  Perhaps  because  of  the  remoteness 
of  this  team,  the  goodwill  and  camaraderie  fostered  during  this  investigation  did  not  translate 
across  to  other  operational  teams  in  either  organization. 
In  CS5  operational  security  and  'need-to-know'  principles  meant  that,  initially 
oblivious  to  each  other's  investigations,  a  number  of  operational  teams  from  different 
agencies  were  investigating  the  same  network  of  criminals  from  different  angles.  The  NCIS 
target  flagging  system  should  alert  SIOs  when  this  happens  within  the  UK  and  close  liaison 
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with  Europol  should  achieve  the  same  awareness  across  borders!  But  flagging  systems  are 
only  as  effective  as  the  information  fed  into  them  and  such  has  the  been  the  level  of  mistrust 
between  individual  SIOs  in  both  police  and  customs  that  some  have  been  reluctant  to  flag 
their  targets  for  fear  of  alerting  a  rival  organisation  to  a  conviction  possibility. 
The  impression  forined  by  the  prosecutor  in  this  case  study  was  that  one  operational 
team,  12,  considered  it  preferable  to  impede  the  investigation  of  It  by  only  partially  disclosing 
available  intelligence  rather  than  provide  full  proactive  co-operation  because  to  have  done  so 
would  have  disrupted  their  own  investigation.  This  indicates  that  the  common  objective  of 
disrupting  and  detecting  criminality  can  sometimes  be  lost  sight  of  in  the  desire  to  secure 
prosecutions  out  of  any  given  investigation.  In  this  case  it  took  a  conference  of  prosecutors  to 
overcome  the  counter-productive  activity  in  which  various  investigators  had  engaged. 
Sharing  intelligence  and  evidence  does  not  necessarily  compromise  an  individual 
operation  and  parallel  investigations  can  be  managed.  For  English  investigators  there  will  be 
issues  of  disclosure  which  can  be  addressed  from  the  outset  with  careful  management  but 
which  will  only  become  more  complicated  if  matters  are  concealed  from  other  SIOs  or 
prosecutors. 
This  issue  did  not  feature  in  either  the  EU  peer  evaluation  or  the  SCQ  responses, 
which  is  unremarkable  as  neither  of  those  sample  populations  is  engaged  in  proactive 
investigation  sharing  perfonnance  indicators  which  other  agencies.  Evidence  of  inter-agency 
rivalry  is  not  confined  to  the  UK  (Harfield  2003:  226;  Robinson  2000:  343).  Its  consequences 
are  equally  universal:  frustrated  investigations,  impeded  prosecutions.  This  observation 
provides  mirror  corroboration  of  the  value  of  good  working  relationships. 
Different  attitudes  towards  testimo 
Cultural  differences  are  also  to  be  found  between  jurisdictional  traditions,  leading  to 
some  problematic  issues  for  English  SIOs  when  seeking  testimony  from  their  foreign  counter- 
parts.  English  investigators  have  most  frequently  encountered  problems  when  seeking 
evidence  from  foreign  surveillance  teams.  In  England  each  investigator  within  a  surveillance 
team  would  be  expected  to  testify  at  trial.  In  civil  law  jurisdictions,  it  is  often  the  case  that 
surveillance  teams  will  report  to  a  senior  officer  and  that  senior  officer  will  testify  on  their 
behalf  at  trial.  English  laws  of  hearsay  prohibit  such  an  approach  in  English  trials.  Foreign 
jurisdictions  often  refuse  to  allow  their  surveillance  officers  to  attend  trial  in  the  UK  in  order 
1  Target  flagging  involves  registering  an  investigation  with  the  NCIS  'ALERT'  database.  Investigators 
involved  in  any  form  of  covert  investigation  should  check  with  NCIS  prior  to  conducting  covert 
operations  to  ascertain  whether  an  individual  is  subject  of  other  flagged  operations  and  whether  that 
individual  has  previously  compromised  any  sensitive  investigation  techniques. 
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to  protect  their  identity  and  in  order  to  preserve  their  operational  capability  (SIO  interviews 
17  June  1999  and  11  September  2002).  It  serves  no  purpose  to  the  Dutch  police,  for  sake  of 
example,  to  have  an  entire  surveillance  team  kicking  their  heels  in  an  English  court  waiting  to 
give  evidence  when  they  could  be  conducting  surveillance  against  criminals  operating  in 
Holland.  With  Civil  Code  Juges  invested  with  the  authority  to  interpret  evidence  and  its 
probative  value  rather  than  adjudicate  trial  fairness,  the  system  of  exposing  only  one  officer  at 
trial  works  well.  It  also  works  because  Civil  Code  courts  tend  to  afford  the  testimony  of 
investigators  greater  probative  credibility  than  English  courts. 
Different  attitudes  towards  testimony  were  experienced  in  four  of  the  case  studies.  In 
CS2  a  policy  decision  was  taken  at  the  outset  by  the  English  prosecutor  not  to  avail  himself  of 
the  opportunities  to  have  evidence  relayed  by  video  or  telephone  links  from  abroad  because 
the  prosecutor,  as  much  as  the  defence,  preferred  to  have  a  live  witness  in  court.  In  the  event  a 
series  of  guilty  pleas  meant  that  live  witnesses  were  not  required.  Courts  have  occasionally 
questioned  the  practicality  of  this  preference.  Stuart-Smith  LJ  opined  (R  v  Castillo  [1996]  1 
Cr.  App.  R  438,442-3)  that  judges  must  weigh  up  the  importance  of  the  evidence  and  how 
prejudicial  it  might  be  to  the  defendant  were  the  witness  not  available  for  cross-examination. 
Cost  should  not  be  a  consideration  for  the  prosecution,  nevertheless  serious  consideration 
must  be  given  to  whether  it  was  justified  to  bring  a  witness  from  Venezuela  (in  the  case  of 
Castillo)  to  give  evidence  on  a  matter  that  was  not  open  to  serious  challenge  in  cross- 
examination.  Such  common  sense  nevertheless  falls  foul  of  a  second  reason  for  preferring  not 
to  use  technology  to  receive  evidence.  Hitherto  there  has  been  no  reciprocal  arrangement  for 
testimony  required  by  a  foreign  court  to  be  heard  in  an  English  court  and  relayed  by  live  link 
to  the  foreign  jurisdiction.  Up  until  2004  English  statute  prohibited  the  use  of  cameras  in 
courts  so  reciprocity  was  not  possible.  That  paradox  is  being  corrected  with  the  C(IQA  2003, 
various  sections  of  which  will  come  into  force  during  2004  and  2005. 
In  CS4  State  D  refused  to  allow  any  of  their  officers  to  testify  at  trial  in  England.  In 
CSS  the  prosecutor  conference  that  overcame  the  investigators'  issues  also  secured  a  solution 
to  the  statutory  prohibition  by  State  A  on  its  surveillance  officers  giving  evidence  at  trial  in 
England.  On  explanation  by  the  English  prosecutors  of  how  evidence  as  adduced  at  trial  in 
England,  the  authorities  in  State  A  were  persuaded  to  identify  from  the  outset  appropriate 
officers  to  give  direct  surveillance  evidence. 
In  miscellaneous  material  gathered  during  the  course  of  the  case  study  interviews,  one 
interviewee  highlighted  an  alternative  solution  to  the  surveillance  evidence  problem 
(interview  11  September  2002).  "In  practical  terms  you  can  get  lulled  into  a  false  sense  of 
security  because  their  surveillance  teams  looks  awfully  like  ours".  Belgium  is  another 
jurisdiction  that  will  not  pennit  its  surveillance  officers  to  give  evidence  at  trial.  Their 
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evidence  is  submitted  to  the  procis  verbale  in  a  statement  written  by  the  case  officer  from  a 
written  report  produced  by  the  senior  officer  on  the  surveillance  team  who  does  not  take  part 
in  the  surveillance  itself  but  receives  an  account  from  his  or  her  staff.  To  adduce  evidence  in 
trial  at  England  from  a  joint  operation  investigating  a  planned  drugs  transaction  due  to  take 
place  in  Belgium,  the  SIO  had  to  agree  a  particular  tactic  with  the  Belgian  authorities  when 
conducting  an  undercover  operation  so  as  to  avoid  involving  the  Belgian  surveillance  team  in 
the  chain  of  evidence.  Belgian  investigators  were  asked  to  maintain  surveillance  on  the  car 
park  where  the  drugs  exchange  was  scheduled  to  take  place  but  their  role  was  only  to  alert 
English  investigators  when  the  suspects  entered  the  car  park.  Video  surveillance  was 
maintained  to  record  the  suspects  approaching  a  car  that  had  been  hired  by  the  English 
investigators  (and  so  could  be  proved  by  an  English  officer's  testimony  not  to  have  had  drugs 
in  it  prior  to  its  being  parked  in  the  car  park).  The  Belgian  suspects  placed  the  drugs  in  the 
car  and  departed,  being  arrested  subsequently  away  from  the  scene.  The  drugs  were  promptly 
recovered  by  an  English  undercover  officer  while  the  car  was  still  in  situ  so  that  their  recovery 
was  recorded  continuous  video  surveillance  maintained  through  out  the  exchange.  That 
officer  then  handed  the  drugs  to  a  Belgian  investigator  who  had  not  been  part  of  the 
surveillance  team  and  so  could  testify  in  a  Belgian  court.  The  suspects  in  Belgium  could  then 
be  prosecuted  and  the  same  evidence  could  be  used  to  prosecute  the  English  suspects  involved 
in  this  drugs  network  in  an  English  court.  The  Belgian  officer  to  whom  the  drugs  had  been 
handed,  and  who  had  subsequently  arranged  for  forensic  identification  of  the  drugs,  was  able 
to  give  evidence  in  England  by  prior  arrangement  with  the  Belgian  authorities. 
Such  complex  choreographing  of  evidential  opportunities  is  only  required  in 
proactive  investigation  of  on-going  criminality.  It  illustrates  the  lengths  to  which  SIOs 
sometimes  have  to  go  in  order  to  accommodate  different  procedures  and  practices  into  their 
evidence-gathering.  In  reactive  investigations  into  completed  crimes  such  issues  rarely  arise. 
In  CS3  testimony  issues  were  in  part  overcome  by  the  fact  that  surveillance  evidence  was  not 
relied  upon  at  trial.  Also  beneficial  was  the  fact  that  investigators  from  England  and  State  A 
had  been  allowed  to  travel  to  each  other's  States  and  secure  evidence  directly  from  witnesses. 
Under  mutual  legal  assistance  law  no  foreign  witness  residing  abroad  can  be  compelled  to 
attend  trial  in  England  to  testify  (ECMA  1959  Article  8,  preserved  under  EUCMA  2000 
Article  1). 
This  issue  was  not  a  feature  of  either  the  EU  peer  evaluation  or  the  SCQ  responses 
perhaps  because  both  these  research  exercises  invited  participants  to  focus  more  on  processes 
and  outputs  than  upon  outcomes.  However,  academic  lawyers  have  explored  in  detail  the 
ways  in  which  different  legal  frameworks  deal  with  testimony.  Spencer  (2002)  provides  a 
helpful  summary  that  illustrates  why  the  problems  noted  in  Chapter  7  have  been  encountered. 
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"In  England  the  rules  of  evidence  are  considerably  more  exacting  than  they  are  in  the 
neighbouring  systems  of  continental  Europe"  (ibid.:  594).  Where  juries,  lay  magistrates  and 
more  recently  District  Judges,  determine  guilt  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  in  Civil  Code 
systems  the  standard  of  proof  is  the  intime  conviction,  a  legal  concept  that  dates  from  the  time 
of  the  French  Revolution  when  the  previous  concept  of  'legal  proof  (torture  and  ordeal)  was 
reformed.  Courts  were  no  longer  obliged  to  convict  simply  because  certain  pieces  of  evidence 
(such  as  a  confession)  were  present  and  were  given  the  freedom  to  convict  on  evidence  of  any 
kind  if  the  evidence  was  found  to  be  compelling.  The  probative  value  of  each  piece  of 
evidence  was  to  be  assessed  by  the  judge  (ibid.:  60  1). 
Key  differences  in  evidence  admissibility  exist  between  the  English  system  and 
continental  European  jurisdictions.  Certain  types  of  evidence  can  be  adduced  in  Civil  Code 
criminal  trials  that  would  be  inadmissible  in  most  circumstances  in  an  English  trial;  for 
instance  the  previous  convictions  of  a  defendant  (ibid.:  602).  Observing  a  number  of  trials  in  a 
court  of  first  instance  in  Dieppe,  2  the  present  author  noted  that  in  each  trial  the  prosecution 
case  began  with  evidence  of  the  defendant's  previous  convictions  whereas  in  an  English  trial 
such  antecedents  would  only  be  introduced  post-verdict  in  order  to  inform  sentencing. 
There  are  different  attitudes  towards  evidence  that  has  been  obtained  illegally  or 
unfairly.  Such  different  approaches  raise  potential  hazards  for  transnational  investigations  in 
terms  of  risk  to  evidence  admissibility  from  a  variety  of  investigative  techniques.  Although 
Crompton  J  (R  v  Leatham  [1861]  8  Cox  CC  498  at  501)  was  prepared  to  overlook  entirely  the 
manner  in  which  evidence  was  obtained,  a  view  followed  as  recently  as  1980  (R  v  Sang 
[1980]  AC  402)  and  1992  (R  v  Governor  Pentonville  Prison  exparte  Chinoy  [1992]  1  All  ER 
317),  there  had  been  an  increasing  tendency  in  English  courts  to  exclude  unfairly  obtained 
evidence,  particularly  since  the  discretionary  power  to  do  so  was  enacted  in  §78  PACE  Act 
1984. 
"In  France,  as  in  England,  evidence  illegally  or  improperly  obtained  is  not 
automatically  excluded.  "  (ibid.:  605).  French  courts  tend  to  overlook  breaches  by  police  of 
rules  relating  to  arrest,  detention  &  questioning  but  have  regarded  breaches  of  search  and 
seizure  rules  as  sufficient  to  give  rise  to  nullit6  -  the  reverse  of  court  attitudes  in  England.  "By 
making  the  issue  of  exclusion  turn  exclusively  on  the  nature  of  the  rule  that  has  been  broken, 
and  ignoring  the  broader  context  of  the  case,  French  law  appears  (at  least  to  English  eyes) 
both  arbitrary  and  formalistic"  (ibid.:  606). 
Nor  is  exclusion  -  Beweisverwertungsverbote  -  automatic  in  Germany.  "The  German 
theory  is  not  that  certain  acts  of  evidence-gathering  are  null  and  void.  It  is  rather  -  as  in 
2  The  English  equivalent  of  a  court  of  first  instance  would  be  a  magistrates  court. 
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English  law  -  that  the  use  of  certain  types  of  evidence,  or  evidence  obtained  in  certain  ways, 
is  forbidden"  (ibid.:  607).  The  German  constitution  regards  certain  types  of  evidence  as  legally 
unobtainable  and  certain  methods  as  legally  unacceptable:  for  example,  statements  obtained 
by  improper  means;  the  use  of  a  suspect's  diaries;  and  unauthorised  audio-probes.  German 
courts  balance  the  interests  of  the  defendant  (fair  trial)  against  the  interests  of  the  State  (crime 
suppression):  Abwdgungslehre  theory  (ibid.:  608). 
Both  Italy  and  Belgium  take  strong  lines  in  excluding  improperly  obtained  evidence 
with  Italy  operating  the  concept  of  nullitý  and  in  Belgium  courts  generally  excluding  any 
evidence  that  seems  improperly  obtained.  "There  is  no  attempt,  as  in  English  law,  to  weigh  up 
the  overall  fairness  of  admitting  it"  (ibid.:  609).  Belgian  courts  have  been  known  to  quash 
whole  proceedings,  not  just  exclude  evidence. 
There  are  similar  disparities  over  the  right  to  silence,  (ibid.:  6104)  and  evidence  as  to 
the  defendant's  character,  (ibid.:  614-6)  From  the  perspective  of  protecting  surveillance 
techniques  and  methodology,  a  primary  concern  of  the  SlOs  and  prosecutors  in  the  case 
studies  above  (Chapter  7),  it  is  the  variety  of  attitudes  towards  hearsay  that  causes  particular 
problems.  English  law  has  fourteen  exceptions  to  the  hearsay  rule,  US  law  allegedly  has  forty 
(ibid.:  617). 
The  key  principle  in  England  is  that  of  immediacy.  Oral  witness  testimony  is  essential 
to  allow  proper  testing  of  the  evidence.  In  Germany  the  situation  is  superficially  similar  but 
"the  immediacy  principle  is  an  inclusionary  rule,  not  an  exclusionary  one.  "  Hearsay  is  not 
banned,  but  where  still  available,  the  original  witness  should  testify  in  court  (ibid.:  618). 
Hearsay  in  Germany  is  generally  admissible  and  this  includes  German  police  officers  reciting 
statements  made  to  them  by  informants. 
"In  France  and  Belgium  there  is  nothing  that  corresponds  to  the  English  hearsay  rule 
or  to  the  German  immediacy  principle  ...  the  President  of  the  court  nevertheless  has  the 
power  to  read  to  the  court  the  procýs-verbaux  of  an  absent  witness,  so  the  situation  is  not  so 
very  different  in  practice...  nothing  prevents  a  witness  from  repeating  the  statements  of  other 
people  in  the  course  of  his  evidence'  (ibid.:  619). 
The  Italian  penal  code  of  1988  made  strenuous  strides  towards  hearsay  and 
immediacy  and  the  general  rule  is  that  a  court  must  decide  a  case  on  oral  evidence  rather  than 
on  a  written  dossier.  But  "nothing  in  law  prevents  an  Italian  witness  from  mentioning  in 
evidence  something  that  he  heard  from  someone  else'  (ibid.:  620). 
The  attitude  to  expert  witnesses  is  as  different  as  it  could  be.  In  Common  Law  trials 
experts  argue  adversarily  the  case  for  each  side  whilst  in  Civil  Code  systems  court-appointed 
official  experts  give  evidence  from  a  neutral  perspective  (ibid.:  6324). 
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Each  of  these  statutory  approaches  in  their  own  way  is  considered  to  be  generally 
compliant  with  Article  6  ECHR  (right  to  fair  trial)  which  illustrates  how  even  agreed  norms 
can  be  variously  interpreted  or  enacted.  As  will  be  discussed  below  (Chapter  9),  mutual 
recognition  is  the  concept  currently  being  developed,  by  which  governments  hope  to 
overcome  some  of  the  difficulties  encountered  in  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation  but  mutual  recognition  is  intended  to  address  court  orders  and 
sentencing  rather  than  evidence  admissibility  and  procedural  rules.  Common  EU  positions  in 
respect  of  procedural  protection  for  defendants  in  criminal  trials  are  being  debated  but  current 
proposals  do  not  address  the  sorts  of  fundamental  differences  outlined  here  (European 
Commission  2003;  2004). 
The  point  to  be  made  here  is  that  successfully  accessing  evidential  opportunities 
through  mutual  legal  assistance  does  not  guarantee  that  such  evidence  will  be  successfully 
adduced  at  trial.  Reducing  the  risk  of  evidence  exclusion  and  witness  non-co-operation  is  as 
important  an  obstacle  to  overcome  as  barriers  to  mutual  legal  assistance. 
Different  attitudes  towards  intelligence  handling 
Closely  linked  to  the  issue  of  different  attitudes  to  testimony  -  the  presentation  of 
evidence  before  a  court  -  is  the  issue  of  differences  in  handling  criminal  intelligence.  The 
distinction  between  intelligence  and  evidence  in  England  is  robust.  It  is  preserved  with  sterile 
corridors,  even  extending  under  the  Police  Act  1997  to  separate  organisations  to  handle 
intelligence  about  organized  crime  (NCIS)  and  investigate  organized  crime  (NCS)  although 
the  separation  of  organisations  has  since  been  reviewed  as  counter-productive  (Home  Office 
2004:  22).  English  investigators  can  seek  to  protect  intelligence  from  disclosure  through 
prosecutorial  scrutiny  under  the  CM  Act  1996  and  public  immunity  interest  applications.  The 
distinction  is  less  clear-cut  abroad.  It  is  a  recurring  complaint  from  English  SIOs  that  material 
supplied  to  foreign  investigators  on  an  'intelligence  only,  not  to  be  used  as  evidence'  basis  is 
routinely  placed  into  theproces  verbale  to  which  the  defence  have  access. 
In  CS3,  where  good  working  relations  reinforced  with  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  between  the  investigators  in  England  and  State  A  underpinned  the  success  of 
the  operation  and  parallel  prosecutions,  just  such  a  request  for  confidentiality  was  ignored 
leading  to  the  publication  of  confidential  intelligence  in  the  media.  In  CS4  a  similar  pre-court 
disclosure  of  confidential  intelligence  to  the  defence  meant  that  the  suspects  awaiting 
extradition  knew  exactly  who  had  informed  against  them  and  how  they  came  to  be  arrested, 
thus  endangering  the  lives  of  the  original  informants.  The  SIO  described  this  disclosure  as 
'accidental'  but  again  such  pre-trial  disclosure  of  the  court  files  was  required  by  law  in  this 
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State.  An  accused  has  no  right  to  have  a  lawyer  present  during  police  questioning  and  so  such 
pre-trial  disclosure  serves  to  protect  an  accused  by  affording  access  to  the  case  he  or  she  has 
to  answer. 
Outside  this  study  other  similar  examples  are  known.  It  has  not  been  possible  within 
the  scope  of  this  research  to  ascertain  the  different  ways  in  which  life-threatening  intelligence 
is  protected  from  defence  access  in  various  other  States.  But  for  English  investigators  the 
lessons  are  clear:  because  neither  raw  nor  sanitised  intelligence  can  be  protected  abroad  in  the 
same  way  that  it  can  in  England,  a  strategy  for  addressing  this  issue  must  be  identified  and 
applied  across  all  agencies  likely  to  be  involved  in  similar  scenarios.  Serious  consideration 
might  have  to  be  given  to  not  sharing  such  sensitive  information  at  all  because  once  it 
becomes  available  in  the  public  domain  abroad,  it  could  undermine  any  related  or  parallel 
prosecutions  in  the  UK.  Closer  preparatory  liaison  on  a  case-by-case  basis  between  English 
prosecutors,  investigators  and  their  foreign  counterparts  may  be  a  way  forward.  And  if  so, 
reinforces  the  call  for  prosecutors  and  investigators  to  work  more  closely  in  such  complex 
cases  (Home  Office  2004b:  32-33). 
Although  intelligence  exchange  did  not  feature  in  the  EU  peer  evaluation  of  mutual 
legal  assistance,  it  is  (at  the  time  of  writing,  late  2003/early  2004)  the  subject  of  a  current 
unionwide  peer  evaluation  process  into  intelligence  handling  and  exchange  between 
authorities  in  Member  States.  Such  is  the  sensitivity  surrounding  this  subject,  the  national  and 
final  reports  will  remain  classified  as  secret  (Hans  Nilsson,  Head  of  the  Division  of  Judicial 
Co-operation,  Council  of  the  European  Union,  pers.  comm.  21  November  2003).  The  EU 
Member  States  are  each  developing  a  National  Intelligence  Model  [NIM]  which  collectively 
will  inform  a  European  Intelligence  Model.  The  UK  NIM  has  already  been  developed  with 
full  implementation  due  by  April  2004  (National  Policing  Plan  2003/4;  see  also 
www.  ncis.  co.  uk/nim.  asp,  visited  7  May  2004).  The  NIM  is  essentially  a  business  model  that 
seeks  to  identify  priorities  for  a  control  strategy,  identify  gaps  in  available  intelligence, 
identify  emerging  trends,  patterns  and  problems  and  so  inform  intervention  strategies, 
resource  allocation  and  enforcement  action.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  UK  concept  of  a 
NIM  (as  a  business  model)  is  reproduced  throughout  the  EU  or  whether  there  will  be  as  many 
different  models  as  there  are  Member  States.  If  the  business  model  concept  is  adopted  this 
single  initiative  could  do  more  to  achieve  commonality  across  disparate  jurisdictions  that  any 
other.  It  could  also  influence  a  common  policy  approach  to  mutual  legal  assistance. 
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Different  procedural  laws 
Different  attitudes  towards  testimony  and  intelligence-handling  arise  from  different 
jurisdiction  traditions  and  legal  frameworks.  Outside  these  specific  issues,  this  study  has 
identified  other  key  differences  which  English  investigators  and  prosecutors  must  take  into 
consideration  when  planning  operational  and  prosecutions  strategies.  CSI  illustrates  how 
different  laws  concerning  subject  notification  of  surveillance  can  impose  restrictions  or  time 
constraints  on  investigation  strategies.  English  investigators  had  to  work  to  a  time-table 
dictated  by  Dutch  laws  that  required  disclosure  of  the  surveillance  to  the  subject  six months 
after  surveillance  commenced.  CS2  illustrates  how  different  local  laws  relating  to  the 
execution  of  search  wan-ants  (even  within  a  national  federal  jurisdiction)  can  inhibit  co- 
ordination  of  simultaneous  joint  operations.  Time  constraints  imposed  upon  English 
investigators  in  CS5  were  derived  from  English  laws  requiring  trials  to  commence  within  a 
set  period  from  charging,  which  may  present  problems  to  foreign  civil  law  jurisdictions  where 
bail  pending  trial  and  remands  in  custody  are  dealt  with  very  differently,  often  allowing 
investigators  far  more  time  to  collate  their  case.  One  of  the  key  issues  identified  in  the  EU 
peer  evaluation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  arrangements  was  the  legal  complexity  arising 
"from  the  accumulation  of  international  and  national  rules  to  be  applied  in  the  same  case; 
basic  training  in  this  matter  for  those  involved  in  mutual  legal  assistance  is  essential"  (EU 
2001  a:  4).  What  is  true  for  the  civil  servants  involved  in  mutual  legal  assistance  is  equally  true 
for  prosecutors  and  investigators.  Eurojust  has  a  contribution  to  make  here;  so,  too,  the 
European  Police  College. 
Wl-iilst  specific  problems  arising  from  such  issues  did  not  feature  directly  in  either  the 
EU  survey  or  the  SCQ  responses,  both  these  exercises  highlighted  the  need  for  expertise  in 
mutual  legal  assistance  and,  by  extension,  in  foreign  jurisdiction  procedures  in  relation  to 
mutual  legal  assistance  (European  Union  2001a:  3,4;  Box  3,  Chapter  6).  Within  England  and 
Wales,  the  CPS  has  also  recognised  this  need  and  has  launched  its  own  mutual  legal 
assistance  training  programme  (footnote  12,  Chapter  6).  This  reinforces  the  conclusion  drawn 
from  the  observations  about  different  attitudes  to  testimony. 
Disclosure  issues 
The  problems  that  can  arise  from  different  national  attitudes  towards  the  issue  of 
disclosure  have  been  highlighted  above  where  foreign  authorities  have  released  information 
that  would  have  been  lawfully  withheld  from  the  defence  under  English  law.  But  even  where 
there  is  no  desire  to  protect  information,  English  disclosure  laws  can  still  present  problems. 
CS3  illustrated  how  disclosure  problems  can  arise  from  two  parallel  investigations  into 
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related  but  different  crimes.  The  disclosure  issues  that  scuppered  the  English  prosecution  in 
CS4  at  a  pre-trial  hearing  would  not  have  arisen  had  the  case  been  brought  before  a  court  in 
any  of  the  other  States  that  could  legitimately  have  claimed  jurisdiction.  Potential  disclosure 
pitfalls  in  CS5  were  quickly  identified  by  English  prosecutors  and  were  successfully 
addressed  by  collaboration  between  prosecutors.  The  need  for  disclosure  management 
strategies  was  identified  by  the  English  prosecutor  as  a  key  learning  point  arising  from  this 
case. 
Defence  lawyers  are  becoming  alert  to  the  possible  abuses  of  due  process  (which 
would  therefore  violate  Article  6  of  the  ECHR  guaranteeing  a  right  to  fair  trial)  that  may  arise 
from  forum-shopping  or  process-laundering  (Gane  &  Mackarel  1996).  Co-ordinated  effort 
between  District,  State  and  Assistant  US  Attorneys  is  common  in  the  USA  in  order  to  achieve 
maximum  punitive  effect  against  suspects  vulnerable  to  criminal  sanctions  in  multiple 
jurisdictions.  Clearly  the  SIO  and  prosecutors  in  CS4  had  a  choice  ofjurisdictions  in  which  to 
prosecute  their  suspects.  In  making  use  of  a  Common  Law  criminal  trial  rather  than  a  Civil 
Law  criminal  trial  (a  decision  influenced  by  a  sense  of  case-ownership  rather  than  objective 
strategic  decisions),  the  prosecution  team  left  itself  vulnerable  to  a  defence  intervention  which 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  criminality  that  had  been  investigated  and  to  which  the  charges 
related  but  which  nevertheless  frustrated  a  very  expensive  investigation.  The  balance  to  be 
struck  is  for  the  prosecution  to  avail  itself  of  its  optimum  prosecution  opportunities  without 
causing  unfair  disadvantage  to  the  suspect.  It  can  reasonably  be  anticipated  that  case-law  in 
both  domestic  courts  and  Strasbourg  will  come  to  define  this  issue  finther  in  the  future. 
Although  disclosure  issues  featured  strongly  in  anecdotal  evidence  firom  the  SIO 
interviews  and  have  been  highlighted  as  a  significant  problem  by  Spencer  (2002:  630-2),  they 
were  not  mentioned  in  either  the  EU  survey  or  the  SCQ  responses.  Such  matters  could  be 
encompassed  within  the  wider  issue  of  different  procedural  laws.  This  is  an  example  of  where 
the  SIO  interviews  have  provided  a  specific  example  of  singular  significance  within  the 
broader  data  context. 
Loss  of  evidence  /  timeliness  problems 
The  Final  Report  on  the  EU  peer  evaluation  exercise  drew  the  general  conclusion  that 
whilst  delay  and  inefficiency  were  habitual  criticisms  of  mutual  legal  assistance  across  the 
EU,  the  reality  was  by  no  means  as  bleak  as  it  was  reputed  it  to  be  (European  Union  200  1  a:  3). 
Nevertheless,  the  peer  evaluation  did  note  problems  caused  by  delays  and  bureaucracy 
(ibid.:  16,18  &  23)  and  used  this  evidence  as  a  reason  for  introducing  direct  transmission  of 
requests,  by-passing  administrative  central  authorities  wherever  feasible  (ibid.  22). 
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28%  of  respondents  in  Nicholson  &  Harrison's  study  reported  problems  arising  from 
delays  in  or  non-response  to  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  whilst  86%  felt  the  process  to  be 
too  time-consuming  and  unnecessarily  bureaucratic  (1996:  23).  The  questionnaire  results  in 
Chapter  6  (Question  17)  revealed  that  investigators  still  experience  fi7ustrations  at  the  lack  of 
timely  responses  in  mutual  legal  assistance  matters  (Boxes  1,4  &  5,  Chapter  6  above). 
Questionnaire  respondents  reported  three  instances  of  prosecutions  discontinued  due  to  lack 
of  requested  foreign  evidence;  two  instances  of  reduced  charges  being  preferred;  and  seven 
instances  of  investigations  abandoned  or  not  even  attempted  because  of  the  problems 
encountered  or  anticipated  with  mutual  legal  assistance. 
Interview  evidence  gathered  in  chapter  7  reinforces  the  questionnaire  evidence. 
Requested  evidence  arrived  too  late  for  use  at  trial  or  has  never  been  furnished  at  all,  in  CS2, 
CS3,  and  CS5.  In  CS6  the  inability  of  Interpol  to  provide  timely  assistance  prompted 
investigators  to  make  their  own  enquiries,  keeping  Interpol  appraised  as  they  did  so.  The 
prosecutor  in  CS6  also  reported  that  it  was  his  general  experience  that  a  wait  of  two  years  for 
evidence  to  be  ftmlished  via  mutual  legal  assistance  channels  was  not  unusual.  As  was  seen, 
he  catered  for  this  eventuality  by  seeking  to  send  investigators  to  accompany  the  ILOR  or  a 
copy  of  it  wherever  possible  -a  tactic  also  employed  in  CS3  where  evidence  was  available  at 
trial  that  was  never  formally  provided  through  mutual  legal  assistance  channels  although  it 
had  been  so  requested.  As  demonstrated  above,  a  number  of  SIOs  and  prosecutors  warn  of  the 
dangers  of  losing  evidence.  None  of  the  SIOs  or  prosecutors  interviewed  here  reported  having 
had  to  abandon  a  trial  as  a  result  of  foreign  evidence  failing  to  arrive  in  time  because  they  all 
argued  they  would  proceed  with  the  best  evidence  they  had,  whatever  that  might  be  at  the 
time.  But  they  did  make  the  point  that  had  requested  evidence  arrived  in  time  it  may  well  have 
persuaded  some  juries  not  to  acquit  certain  defendants  or  it  could  have  supported  more  serious 
charges  or  simply  reinforced  the  charges  laid  and  helped  inform  appropriate  sentencing  upon 
conviction. 
Abandoned  investigations,  discontinued  trials,  and  conviction  on  lesser  charges:  none 
of  these  outcomes  are  desirable  in  the  unionwide  fight  against  transnational  organised  crime. 
It  is difficult  to  quantify  these  undesirable  outcomes  as  a  proportion  of  all  investigations  and 
prosecutions,  and  so  discern  the  ratio  of  successftil  investigations  leading  to  convictions  on 
appropriate  charges  compared  with  the  undesirable  outcomes.  Further  work  would  need  to  be 
undertaken  across  the  EU  to  ascertain  whether  this  was  a  problem  unique  to  adversarial 
Common  Law  systems  or  one  experienced  in  all  Member  States.  The  evidence  of  this 
research  merely  highlights  the  issue.  Further  work  would  also  need  to  be  undertaken  to 
identify  the  relative  proportions  of  the  various  causes  of  failure  in  order  to  identify 
appropriate  remedial  strategies.  In  essence,  this  was  the  objective  of  the  EU  peer  evaluation 
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review,  but  as  can  be  seen  in  tabulated  form  in  Appendix  H,  issues  examined  by  the  peer 
review  do  not  necessarily  coincide  with  issues  experienced  by  practitioners. 
Forced  spontaneous  tactical  changes 
The  need  for  SIOs  to  respond  quickly  and  with  the  maximum  possible  flexibility  to 
spontaneous  developments  in  proactive  investigations  was  illustrated  in  both  CSI  and  CS4. 
Such  flexibility  is  only  required  for  the  investigation  of  inchoate  offences  still  in  the  process 
of  being  committed  and  is  not  an  issue  faced  by  investigators  seeking  available  evidence  of  an 
historic  crime.  It  presents  particular  challenges  to  a  mutual  legal  assistance  infrastructure 
geared  primarily  towards  reactive  investigative  rather  than  proactive  investigation.  CS4 
illustrates  how  complicated  a  proactive  enquiry  can  become.  The  SIO  and  prosecutors 
deliberately  structured  their  ELORs  to  cater  as  far  as  possible  for  this  need  for  flexibility  and  it 
is  worth  noting  that  the  spontaneous  changes  imposed  upon  them  were  a  result  not  only  of 
changes  in  the  behaviour  of  the  criminals  under  investigation  but  in  the  nature  of  support 
given  to  them  by  foreign  colleagues. 
Not  an  issue  identified  in  either  the  EU  peer  evaluation  or  the  questionnaire  survey, 
nevertheless  it  reinforces  the  need  for  flexible  and  responsive  co-operation  mechanisms.  The 
Joint  Investigation  Teams,  discussed  below  (Chapter  9)  may  be  a  step  towards  achieving  such 
flexibility  within  the  Convention  framework. 
ILOR  mannement  infonnation  available 
None  of  the  interviewees  was  able  to  provide  specific  ILOR  management  information 
(despite  advance  warning  of  the  questions)  although  some  were  able  to  quantify  the  number 
of  ILORs  issued.  In  all  cases  there  were  comments  to  the  effect  that  reference  to  the  case 
papers  would  be  required  to  answer  specific  questions  about  how  many  ILORs,  to  which 
authorities,  when  replies  were  received  and  how  long  this  had  taken  in  measured  time.  Even 
in  CS3,  the  only  investigation  studied  here  in  which  a  senior  investigator  was  assigned  the 
sole  responsibility  of  managing  mutual  legal  assistance  matters  for  the  enquiry,  no  statistical 
data  was  available  with  which  to  quantify  or  measure  the  success  of  mutual  legal  assistance 
mechanisms. 
This  relative  dearth  of  information  is  consistent  with  the  findings  both  of  the 
questionnaire  survey  (Chapter  6)  and  the  EU  evaluation  (European  Union  2001a:  24). 
Evidence  of  delays  was  largely  anecdotal  and  referenced  not  by  how  long  a  response  took  in 
terms  of  days,  weeks  or  months  but  in  terms  of  whether  it  arrived  in  time  for  trial.  Granted  the 
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latter  is  the  key  performance  measure  in  terms  of  outcome  rather  than  outputs,  but  the  absence 
of  specific  management  information  about  requests  and  delays  impedes  identification  of 
process  problems  and  so  inhibits  correction  of  those  problems.  The  then  Home  Office 
Minister,  Bob  Ainsworth  MP,  conceded  that  his  officials  would  be  unable  to  provide  data 
regarding  mutual  legal  assistance  performance  because  it  "has  not  been  scored  and  analysed 
centrally"  (HC  Hansard,  Standing  Committee  A,  10  June  2003,  col.  64). 
Comparison  with  1996 
Although  the  exact  methodology  could  not  be  reproduced,  it  is  useful  to  include  a 
specific  comparison  with  the  principal  findings  of  Nicholson  and  Harrison  (1996:  Executive 
Summary)  as  discussed  in  Chapter  5  above  (pp.  83-4). 
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Table  10:  developments  since  1996  in  relation  to  thefindings  offficholson  &  Harrison 
Nicholson  &  Harrison's  findings  1996  Findings  of  this  research  2004 
Advanced  fee  fraud  the  most  common  type  of  offence  Fraud  (including  advanced  fee  fraud)  remains  the  offence  for 
necessitating  mutual  legal  assistance  which  mutual  legal  assistance  is  most  frequently  sought, 
followed  by  murder  and  drugs  trafficking? 
Experienced  investigators  obtained  evidence  from  abroad  [Not  tested  but  a  truism  that  is  likely  to  remain  valid] 
more  quickly  than  those  unfamiliar  with  the  process 
From  1990-1996,  US  authorities  provided  the  quickest  average  Not  specifically  tested  but  research  suggests  that  the  US 
response  to  UK  requests,  Spanish  authorities  the  slowest  authorities  are  no  quicker  than  any  other.  Indeed  when  the 
present  author  visited  the  FBI  in  Washington  DC,  the  one  case 
they  chose  to  use  as  an  example  of  a  request  which  they  were 
expediting  urgently  was  a  high  profile  murder  for  which  the 
suspect  had  already  been  convicted.  CS6  is  a  particular 
example  where  official  contacts  via  Interpol  and  the  US 
authorities  were  so  slow,  the  officers  contacted  state 
authorities  instead  and  obtained  their  own  evidence  in  the  US. 
The  only  jurisdiction  commented  upon  favourably  during  the 
present  research  were  the  Dutch  authorities. 
Only  one  defendant  had  been  acquitted  as  a  result  of  time  Fewer  examples  of  investigations  or  prosecutions  frustrated  by 
delays  associated  with  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad;  69  absence  of  foreign  evidence  (Table  8,  Chapter  6)  but  this  may 
investigations  or  prosecutions  had  been  abandoned  as  a  result  be  due  to  a  smaller  research  sample.  Note  comments  about 
of  such  problems  alternative  charging  in  CSS  and  CS6. 
Obtaining  original  documentation  for  use  at  was  the  most  [Not  tested] 
problematic  aspect  of  securing  evidence  from  abroad 
50%  respondents  felt  Interpol  needed  to  improve  both  its  Not  specifically  tested  but  Interpol  was  the  institution  to  which 
performance  and  its  image  investigators  were  most  likely  to  turn  for  assistance  in 
gathering  evidence  abroad. 
A  number  of  minor  abuses  to  the  formal  system  were  reported  The  situation  does  not  appear  to  have  changed  since  1996. 
but  none  of  these  were  commented  on  or  tested  at  court 
Vast  majority  of  respondents  involved  in  gathering  evidence  Despite  EU  claims  to  the  contrary  (Final  Report:  3),  and 
abroad  found  it  both  bureaucratic  and  time-consuming  positive  action  at  UKCA  to  reduce  backlogs,  this  remains  a 
widely-held  perception. 
Few  forces  had  guidelines  or  instructions  on  international  14  forces  had  internal  guidance  on  making  requests.  II  had 
evidence  gathering  similar  guidance  on  executing  requests.  All  ILJDs  have  been 
issued  with  a  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  CD  Rom  by  Interpol 
NCB  London  although  the  new  Head  of  the  NCIS  Legal  Dept 
regarded  the  advice  therein  as  poor  and  in  need  of  rewriting 
(pers.  comm.  October  2003) 
Few  forces  consider  alternative  means  or  consider  the  effects  [Not  tested] 
of  international  evidence  gathering  in  their  case  acceptance 
criteria 
Between  1990  and  1996  the  requirement  for  UK  officers  to  Not  tested  in  the  same  way  as  the  1996  survey.  The  majority 
travel  abroad  had  increased  by  700%  of  forces  felt  it  necessary  to  deploy  officers  abroad  in  less  than 
25%  of  cases  involving  mutual  legal  assistance.  The  case 
studies  indicate  the  value  of  foreign  deployment  and  the 
innovation  of  JlTs  will  formalise  foreign  deployment  in 
investigations  into  crimes  in  action. 
There  was  a  universal  desire  for  a  centralised  database  of  The  NCIS,  housing  as  it  does  both  the  Interpol  NCB  and  the 
information  about  mutual  legal  assistance  procedures  and  UK  Europol  Bureau,  considers  itself  to  be  the  gateway  to 
contacts  foreign  assistance  for  UK  investigators.  HMCE  has  its  own 
specialist  mutual  legal  assistance  lawyers.  Since  1996  both 
Eurojust  and  the  EJN  have  been  established;  the  latter  with  a 
specific  remit  to  produce  a  mutual  legal  assistance  'atlas'  for 
the  EU  which  should  address  precisely  the  desire  expressed  by 
investigators  in  1996 
'  What  is  noteworthy  about  this  finding  is  that  whilst  fraud  committed  against  the  EU  is  a  priority 
within  the  EU,  fraud  generally  is  not  a  priority  crime  for  any  police  force  in  the  UK  except  the  City  of 
London.  It  is  not  a  priority  crime  under  the  National  Policing  Plan. 
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Underlying  the  superficial  improvements  since  1996  there  is  a  substantial  difference. 
There  is  now  a  political  impetus  driving  international  law  enforcement  co-operation, 
especially  within  the  EU.  This  has  led  to  the  construction  of  a  co-operative  and  assistance- 
focused  infrastructure  that  was  unheard  of  in  1996.  Countering  the  political  impetus  at  the 
transnational  level  is  the  political  focus  on  local  policing;  dealing  with  volume  crimes  and 
violence  that  fuel  the  widespread  fear  of  crime  (National  Policing  Plan). 
As  a  post-script  to  the  1996  survey,  it  will  be  recalled  that  there  was  severe  criticism 
of  the  UKCA.  The  UKCA  has  enjoyed  increased  staffing  to  help  reduce  the  backlog  of 
requests  and  better  manage  the  workload.  It  also  has  enjoyed  a  higher  profile  as  the  policy 
lead  on  mutual  legal  assistance  in  the  Home  Office  as  international  law  enforcement  co- 
operation  and  co-ordinated  action  against  transnational  organised  crime  rise  up  the  political 
agenda.  But  as  the  Home  Office  review  of  mutual  legal  assistance  has  noted  "with  the  growth 
in  international  crime,  and  the  increase  in  political  focus  on  effectively  countering  the  threat  it 
poses,  greater  demands  are  made  on  the  system  than  were  contemplated  when  the  LJKCA  was 
set  up"  in  1990  (Home  Office  2004a:  10). 
Conclusion 
The  formal  recommendations  made  by  the  EU  evaluation  team  to  the  Home  Office 
centre  on  the  restructuring  of  the  UKCA  and  legislative  changes  to  bring  into  domestic  effect 
the  provisions  of  the  EUCMA  (European  Union  2001c:  58-60).  The  legislative  changes  have 
been  provided  for  mainly  by  the  C(IQ  Act  2003  even  if  they  are  not  yet  all  in  force.  A  review 
commissioned  in  March  2000  to  consider  the  future  structure  and  role  of  the  UKCA  was 
suspended  in  the  wake  of  the  September  2001  terrorist  attacks  and  the  needs  to  respond  to 
America's  subsequent  war  on  terror.  It  was  re-commenced  only  in  January  2004  with  the 
circulation  amongst  interested  parties  of  a  consultation  document  entitled  Home  0Jrice 
Review  of  Mutual  Legal  Assistance:  A  Consultation  Document  for  Law 
EnforcementlProsecution  Agencies  and  Relevant  Government  Departments!  A  number  of 
options  were  offered  for  consideration  all  of  which  sought  to  find  the  best  fit  between  the 
infrastructure  of  a  Common  Law  system  based  around  43  police  forces  and  prosecution  areas 
and  the  "vision  within  Europe  [which]  is  now  for  direct  communication  between  competent 
judicial  authorities"  (Home  Office  2004a:  14).  Almost  immediately  the  options  offered  were 
circumscribed  by  subsequent  developments,  namely  the  publication  of  a  White  Paper 
4  The  present  author,  as  a  member  of  the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum,  received  a  copy  and 
responded  in  a  personal  capacity  citing  the  findings  of  this  research.  The  author  initially  attended  the 
forum  as  a  representative  of  the  NHTCU.  He  now  attends  in  a  private  capacity  as  a  ESRC-funded 
researcher  studying  mutual  legal  assistance.  HMCE  is  represented  at  the  forum  by  lawyers  rather  than 
investigators.  The  current  Head  of  UKCA  is  a  seconded  HMCE  lawyer. 
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reviewing  the  future  of  the  NCS,  the  NCIS  and  HMCE  and  the  whole  UK  response  to 
transnational  organised  crime  (Home  Office  2004b).  At  the  time  of  writing,  the  conclusion  of 
both  these  consultations  is  awaited. 
Of  all  the  EU  recommendations  to  the  UK,  only  that  seeking  to  address  the  speed  and 
efficiency  of  request  execution  (the  recommendation  to  adopt  direct  transmission  of  requests) 
addresses  concerns  raised  by  investigation  practitioners.  What  this  dichotomy  serves  to 
illustrate  is  the  different  perspectives  on  mutual  legal  assistance  held  by  policy- 
makers/administrators  and  practitioners.  There  is  no  real  surprise  in  this  dichotomy.  The  real 
surprise  is  in  the  fact  that,  even  in  the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum,  established  by  the 
Home  Office  to  consult  mutual  legal  assistance  participants,  it  still  has  not  been  properly 
recognised.  This  is  possibly  because  the  forum  membership  is  still  heavily  weighted  towards 
civil  servants  and  lawyers  and  has  relatively  few  investigation  practitioners.  And  whilst  there 
are  police  representatives  on  the  forum,  they  each  represent  vested  interests  rather  than  the 
police  service  (the  NHTCU,  the  MPS  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  &  Extradition  Section,  the 
City  of  London  Fraud  Squad  and  Kent  County  Constabulary).  The  absence  of  ACPO  and 
NCS  representation  has  been  notable.  As  a  direct  consequence  of  this  point  being  made  by  the 
present  researcher  in  a  written  response  to  the  MLAF  Review,  a  senior  NCS  officer  and  the 
NCS  International  Policy  Advisor  were  invited  to  join  the  forum,  and  NCIS  were  represented 
by  a  more  senior  officer. 
Traditional  administrative  approaches  towards  mutual  legal  assistance  prevail  despite 
the  fact  that  "international  co-operation  generally  is  a  much  more  sophisticated  process  than 
when  the  1959  Council  of  Europe  Convention  on  Mutual  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters  was 
agreed",  (Home  Office  2004a:  14). 
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Chapter  9 
Mutual  legal  assistance  in  the  twenty-first  century 
It  has  been  a  persistent  theme  of  the  present  UK  government  for  half  a  decade  that 
law  enforcement  needs  to  depart  the  nineteenth-century  and  use  twenty-first  century  methods 
against  twenty-first  century  crime.  The  point  was  first  made  by  the  then  Home  Secretary,  Jack 
Straw,  to  an  EU  seminar  on  judicial  co-operation  at  Avignon,  France  (speech  by  Jack  Straw, 
16  October  1998).  1  It  was  re-iterated  by  the  Prime  Minister  (The  Independent,  I  September 
2000,  p.  1)  and  subsequently  by  Home  Secretary  David  Blunkett  (HC  Hansard  29  November 
2002  col.  666),  and  again  by  Home  Office  Minister  Caroline  Flint,  who  in  particular 
emphasised  the  role  of  international  co-operation:  "we  believe  that  in  the  twenty-first  century 
-  with  regard  to  communications,  travel  and  very  serious  crimes  -  closer  collaboration  is 
essential",  (HC  Hansard,  Standing  Committee  A,  19  June  2003,  col.  268).  It  has  been  the 
rationale  that  has  underpinned  root  and  branch  reform  (Anti-terrorism,  Crime  and  Security 
Act  2001  [ATCS],  Proceeds  of  Crime  Act  2002,  Police  Reform  Act  2002)  and  radical  White 
Paper  proposals  for  changing  the  way  in  which  intervention  and  enforcement  against 
transnational  organised  crime  is  executed  (One  Step  Ahead:  a  21'  Century  Strategy  to  Defeat 
Organised  Crime,  Home  Office  2004b).  Yet  before  the  commencement  of  this  research  in 
October  2000,  a  Home  Office  official  observed  to  the  present  author  that  whilst  the  UK  may 
have  just  signed  the  EUCMA  (29  May  2000),  for  many  reasons  it  was  very  unlikely  the  UK 
would  ratify  the  convention  in  the  life-time  of  this  PhD  (interview,  Loma  Harris,  then  Head  of 
UKCA,  29  August  2000):  a  not-unreasonable  prediction  given  the  relative  inertia  past  UK 
administrations  have  demonstrated  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation  (as  discussed  in  Appendix  A). 
To  the  political  impetus  provided  by  Tampere  -  for  which,  with  hindsight,  Straw's 
Avignon  speech  may  be  viewed  as  but  one  harbinger  -  was  added  the  political  expediency  of 
fighting  the  'war  on  terrorism',  launched  by  US  President  George  W.  Bush  in  response  to  the 
terrorist  attacks  against  New  York  on  II  September  200  1.  The  rush  to  be  seen  to  be 
responding  robustly  to  the  attacks  gripped  the  EU  (Conclusions  and  Action  Plan  of  the 
Presidency,  Extraordinary  Inforinal  meeting  of  the  European  Council,  Brussels,  21  September 
200  1;  Mitsilegas  et  al.  2003:  122,124,164-5),  one  of  the  measures  being  an  aspiration  to  have 
the  EUCMA  fully  ratified  by  December  2002.  In  an  attempt  to  meet  this  deadline,  the  UK 
government  sought  to  give  effect  to  international  obligations  through  secondary  legislation 
11  am  grateful  to  the  Home  Office  for  supplying  me  with  the  text  of  this  unpublished  speech. 
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under  Part  13  of  the  ATCS  Act,  an  unprecedented  mechanism  for  achieving  domestic  effect 
for  international  obligations  which  ultimately  failed  because  the  government  could  not  meet 
stringent  deadlines  set  by  the  House  of  Lords.  The  Police  Reform  Act  2002  gave  effect  to  the 
provisions  of  Article  13  EUCAM  (JITs)  before  the  UK  ratified  the  EUCMA  on  31  October 
2003  when  the  Crime  (International  Co-operation)  Act  [QlQA]  was  enacted.  This 
maelstrom  of  measures  aimed  at  combating  the  perceived  threat  of  terrorism,  often  linked  in 
political  debate  with  transnational  organised  crime,  has  not  been  without  consequences  for 
what  might  be  termed  routine,  daily  transnational  law  enforcement. 
Because  of  all  these  changes,  it  has  been  deemed  necessary  to  update  this  research 
with  additional  consideration  of  the  new  measures  in  order  to  provide  a  meaningful  context 
within  which  to  consider  the  conclusions  drawn  in  Chapter  8.  Unconventional  though  this  is 
for  a  PhD  structure,  circumstances  dictated  this  course  of  action. 
This  chapter  considers  developments  in  the  domestic  and  international  framework  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  instruments  that  have 
taken  place  during  the  course  of  this  PhD  as  the  LJK  positions  itself  for  tackling  transnational 
crime  in  the  twenty-first  century  within  the  context  of  EU.  Firstly  there  is  consideration  of 
various  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  initiatives  already  in  place  designed  to 
facilitate  co-operation  outside  the  formal  mutual  legal  assistance  framework  in  such  a  way  as 
to  enhance  the  operation  of  mutual  legal  assistance.  The  chapter  then  looks  towards  the  future 
with  consideration  of  both  on-going  developments  in  the  legal  and  constitutional  framework 
at  the  European  level  in  respect  of  evidence-gathering  and  JHA  issues,  a  consideration  of  the 
implications  for  citizens'  rights,  and  discussion  of  relevant  policy  reviews  currently  being 
undertaken  within  the  UK. 
Intemational  law  enforcement  co-operation:  the  ECPOTF  and  JIT  initiatives 
The  data  in  chapters  6  and  7  revealed  the  high  value  placed  by  investigators  on  good 
working  relationships  with  their  foreign  colleagues  when  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation  is  required.  The  better  the  working  relations,  the 
more  chance  of  a  successful  request  execution  and  positive  assistance  being  afforded.  In  the 
case  studies  there  are  examples  of  parallel  investigations  and  joint  investigations,  arranged  on 
an  ad  hoc  basis,  case  by  case. 
The  Tampere  Conclusions  and  the  EUCMA  each  contain  initiatives  to  formalise  such 
relations  where  formality  would  add  value.  At  the  strategic  and  tactical  levels,  the  European 
Chief  Police  Officers'  Task  Force  [ECPOTF]  was  established  as  a  forum  for  police  leaders 
concerned  in  transnational  crime.  Its  effectiveness  is  limited  by  the  parallel  existence  of 
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different  police  agencies  within  many  Member  States  leading  to  confusion  about  which 
agency  should  represent  any  given  Member  State.  The  LJK  is  represented  by  the  Director 
General,  NCS  (the  domestic  jurisdiction  of  which  is  confined  to  England  and  Wales  only). 
The  Task  Force  has  organised  specific  'days  of  action'  and  has  facilitated  some  joint 
operations  between  Member  States,  for  instance  against  human  trafficking,  transnational 
vehicle  crime  and  on-line  paedophile  offending  (interview,  Bill  Hughes,  Director  General 
NCS  and  UK  representative  on  the  ECPOTF,  London,  27  November  2002).  In  the  aftermath 
of  9/11  and  the  continuing  'war  on  terrorism'  the  ECPOTF  is  now  tasked  with  reviewing  how 
its  operational  capacity  can  best  be  reinforced  to  focus  on  proactive  intelligence  relating  to 
terrorism  (JHA  Council  2588*  Meeting,  8  June  2004,9782/04  (Presse  173):  pp.  9  &  11; 
Brussels  European  Council  Presidency  Conclusions,  17-18  June  2004,10679/04,  paragraph 
15). 
At  the  operational  level,  the  concept  of  the  Joint  Investigation  Team  [Jrr]  has  been 
introduced.  Article  13(l)  EUCMA  2000  states: 
By  mutual  agreement,  the  competent  authorities  of  two  or  more  Member  States 
may  set  up  a  joint  investigation  team  for  a  specific  purpose  and  a  limited  period,  which  may 
be  extended  by  mutual  consent,  to  carry  out  criminal  investigations  in  one  or  more  of  the 
Member  States  setting  up  the  team.  The  composition  of  the  team  shall  be  set  out  in  the 
agreement 
A  PIT]  may,  in  particular,  be  set  up  where: 
a)  a  Member  State's  investigations  into  criminal  offences  require  difficult 
and  demanding  investigations  having  links  to  other  Member  States; 
b)  a  number  of  Member  States  are  conducting  investigations  into  criminal 
offences  in  which  the  circumstances  of  the  case  necessitate  co- 
ordinated,  concerted  action  in  the  Member  States  involved. 
A  request  for  the  setting  up  of  a  PM  may  be  made  by  any  of  the  member  States 
concerned.  The  team  shall  be  set  up  in  one  of  the  Member  States  in  which  the 
investigations  are  expected  to  be  carried  out. 
The  key  feature  of  Jrrs  in  terms  of  improving  mutual  legal  assistance  lies  in  the 
mechanism  provided  for  avoiding  mutual  legal  assistance  altogether.  Article  13(7): 
Where  the  PIT]  needs  investigative  measures  to  be  taken  in  one  of  the  Member 
States  setting  up  the  team,  members  seconded  to  the  team  by  that  Member  State  may 
request  their  own  competent  authorities  to  take  those  measures.  Those  measures  shall  be 
considered  in  the  Member  State  under  the  conditions  which  would  apply  if  they  were 
requested  in  a  national  investigation. 
The  twelve  sub-sections  of  Article  13  provide  the  rubric  for  JITs.  The  teams  will  be 
led  by  an  officer  from  a  competent  authority  in  the  Member  State  in  which  the  team  is 
opemting  at  the  time.  The  domestic  law  of  this  Member  State  will  apply.  (Thus  leadership  and 
local  law  could  vary  during  the  course  of  a  single  investigation  if  the  geographical  locus  of 
criminality  shifted  as  it  did  in  CS4  above.  )  There  are  an-angements  for  intelligence-sharing 
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between  team  members  seconded  from  different  foreign  agencies.  Members  of  Europol, 
Euro  ust  or  OLAF  may  be  co-opted  in  a  non-operational  capacity  into  JITs  (Article  7,  Council  4 
Recommendation  on  a  Model  Agreementfor  setting  up  a  Joint  Investigation  Team,  7061/03, 
CRIMORG  17,7  April  2003).  The  initiation  of  a  JIT  is  achieved  by  means  of  an  ILOR 
although,  as  has  been  seen,  JIT  infrastructure  is  intended  to  minimise  the  need  for  further 
recourse  to  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms,  unless  the  authorities  of  a  non-EU  State  are 
invited  to  participate,  in  which  case  requests  for  action  and  assistance  between  the  JIT  and 
those  authorities  would  have  to  be  by  mutual  legal  assistance  (Home  Office  Circular 
53/2002:  paragraph  9). 
Pending  the  coming  into  force  of  the  EUCAM  (upon  ratification  by  eight  EU  States), 
a  Council  Framework  Decision  [CFD]  mirrors  Article  13  to  give  early  effect  to  these 
measures  (Council  Framework  Decision  of  13  June  2002,  OJ  L  162/1,20  June  2002:  Article 
5  of  the  CFD  provides  the  sunset  clause  linking  the  lifetime  of  the  CFD  to  the  entry  into  force 
of  the  EUCUA). 
Upon  the  initiative  of  the  Greek  government  (JHA  memo  dated  24  January  2003, 
JAl/B3/FP/MW)ý  a  Council  Recommendation  for  a  Model  Agreementfor  setting  up  a  Joint 
Investigation  Team  has  been  drafted  (7061/03  CRIMORG  17,7  April  2003).  This  provides 
guidance  and  a  template  for  the  composition  and  conduct  of  a  JIT. 
For  all  this,  in  many  EU  Member  States  (including  for  instance  the  UK  and  Sweden) 
it  is  possible  through  the  permissive  nature  of  relevant  domestic  legislation  for  JlTs  to  be  set 
up  without  the  CFD  being  enacted  into  domestic  legislation.  Valich  begs  the  question,  what  is 
the  added  value  of  the  CFD  and  Model  Agreement?  In  the  view  of  EU  officials,  these 
instruments  bring  the  added  value  of  clarity  into  a  previously  ad  hoc  arena  and  promote 
operational  consistency  (interview,  Frederico  Prato,  JHA  Directorate,  European  Commission, 
Brussels,  15  May  2003). 
A  deadline  of  I  January  2003  was  set  for  Member  States  to  enact  domestic  legislation 
giving  effect  to  the  CFD,  and  subsequently  the  EUCMA.  Only  the  UK  and  Finland  met  that 
deadline,  although  other  Member  states  have  subsequently  legislated  accordingly.  Despite 
many  positive  messages  declared  at  an  EU  conference  on  JITs  held  in  Dublin,  7-9  October 
2002,  in  which  Member  States  set  out  their  legal  positions  in  respect  of  JlTs,  as  of  May  2003 
Seven  Member  States  had  yet  to  report  their  progress  in  this  regard  to  the  European 
21  am  grateful  to  Frederico  Prato  at  the  European  Commission  for  providing  me  with  access  to  this 
internal  memorandum  and  relevant  conference  papers.  Signor  Prato  is  the  European  Commission  JHA 
official  with  direct  responsibility  for  JIT  implementation. 
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Commission.  3A  report  on  implementation  of  JIT  legislation  was  scheduled  for  completion  in 
July  2004  but  at  time  of  writing  has  yet  to  be  publicly  available. 
Attitudes  to  domestic  enactment  have  varied  across  the  EU.  In  Finland,  statute  law 
enacted  30  December  2002  and  effective  from  I  January  2003  exactly  reproduces  elements  of 
the  CFD  and  EUCALI: 
While  a  team  is  operating  in  a  foreign  state,  if  it  proves  necessary  for 
investigations  to  be  carried  out  in  Finland,  the  investigations  shall,  if  so  requested  by  the 
Finnish  member,  be  carried  out  under  the  same  conditions  as  they  would  be  if  the  offence 
in  question  had  been  committed  in  Finland.  (§5,  Law  1313/2002) 
In  England  and  Wales,  the  need  for  new  legislation  was  considered  minimal  and  was 
confined  to  provisions  regarding  the  criminal  and  civil  liability  of  foreign  team  members 
operating  in  England  and  Wales  (Police  Refonn  Act  2002,  §  103)  and  assaults  on  foreign  team 
members  whilst  operating  in  England  and  Wales  (§104).  Given  that  any  JIT  operating  in  the 
UK  would  be  doing  so,  pursuant  to  the  CFD  and  Convention,  in  accordance  with  relevant  UK 
laws,  there  was  no  finther  need  to  legislate  specifically  for  their  investigations  since  coercive 
powers  will  only  be  executed  by  UK  investigators,  with  foreign  seconded  members  of  the  JIT 
being  allowed  observer  status  when  such  enforcement  was  carried  out. 
Noting  that  there  is  "no  obligation  to  set  up  a  JIT  if  less  formal  ways  of  working  are 
more  appropriate"  (Home  Office  Circular  53/2002:  paragraph  7),  the  UK  government 
observed  that  whilst  existing  ad  hoc  arrangements  had  generally  worked  well,  there  was  an 
increasing  need  in  combating  transnational  crime  "for  clarity  and  consistency  in  the  way 
investigations  are  conducted  and  information  is  exchanged  so  that  evidence  is  admissible  in 
the  courts.  There  is  also  a  need  to  ensure  that  the  rights  and  duties  of  foreign  members  of 
teams  are  not  in  doubt"  (ibid.:  paragraph  3). 
Despite  the  consensus  regarding  the  clarity  that  the  new  framework  brings  to  such  co- 
operative  working,  unspecified  various  practical  difficulties  have  meant  that  whilst  informal 
JITs  continue  as  they  did  before  in  those  States  with  permissive  regimes,  no  formal  JITs 
pursuant  to  the  EUCMA  have  yet  been  established  anywhere  in  the  EU  (Rosana.  Mirkovic, 
Home  Office,  email  to  author,  16  August  2004). 
3  Research  interviews  were  conducted  during  the  14  and  15  May  2003  at  the  JHA  Directorate  of  the 
European  Commission.  The  author  is  grateful  for  what  one  EU  official  described  as  unprecedented 
academic  access  to  the  relevant  JHA  departments. 
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International  law  enforcement  co-operation:  liaison  magistrates 
On  22  April  1996  the  Council  of  the  EU  adopted  a  Joint  4ction  concerning  a 
framework  for  the  exchange  of  liaison  magistrates  to  improve  judicial  co-operation  between 
the  Member  States  of  the  EU  (OJ  L  1051127  April  1996,96/277/JIIA).  4  The  UK  simply  did 
not  see  "the  necessity"  of  such  bilateral  exchanges  (UKCA  2001  a:  1)  and  so  did  not  appoint 
any  UK  liaison  magistrates  for  posting  to  foreign  jurisdictions.  The  Home  Office  did, 
however,  accept  foreign  liaison  magistrates  into  the  UK,  initially  from  France,  then  from  the 
US  and  subsequently  from  other  EU  States.  Only  in  2001  did  the  UK  decide  to  establish  its 
own  liaison  magistrates  overseas  (ibid.  ).  The  UK  now  has  liaison  magistrates  in  Madrid, 
Paris,  Rome  and  Washington.  5 
Liaison  magistrates  are  magistrates  (in  the  Civil  Code  sense)  or  prosecutors  whose 
role  is  "to  encourage  and  accelerate  all  forms  of  judicial  co-operation  in  criminal,  and  where 
appropriate,  civil  matters"  (Joint 
. 
4ction,  96/277/JHA,  Art.  2)  pursuant  to  the  overall  aim  of 
increasing  "the  speed  and  effectiveness  of  judicial  co-operationý'  and  of  pooling  infortnation 
about  each  other's  criminal  justice  systems  (Joint  4ction,  96/277/JHA,  Art.  1(3)).  They  are 
usually  posted  to  the  justice  ministry  in  the  host  jurisdiction  but  also  liaise  closely  with  their 
national  embassy  in  the  host  nation.  Exchange  of  information  and  explanation  of  their  own 
jurisdiction's  laws  and  procedures  is  part  and  parcel  of  this  encouragement.  The  then  US 
liaison  magistrate  posted  to  the  Home  Office,  Su  Zann  Lamb,  provided  the  present  author 
with  valuable  introductory  insights  during  preparation  for  a  research  fellowship  in 
Washington  in  200  1. 
UK  liaison  magistrates  are  CPS  lawyers  and  they  regularly  report  on  their  work  to  the 
Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum  at  the  Home  Office.  Numerous  successes  are  reported  and  the 
exchanges  clearly  work  well  to  the  mutual  benefit  of  all  concerned.  The  key  success  factor, 
resonating  with  the  observations  noted  in  Chapter  8,  would  appear  to  be  the  establishment  of 
personal  working  relationships  that  then  provide  the  foundation  upon  which  to  facilitate  the 
transactions  of  official  business  through  effective  communication.  Examples  invariably 
involve  the  liaison  magistrates  resolving  confusion  on  either  the  part  of  the  requesting  or 
requested  authority.  They  can  explain  why  a  request  is  or  has  to  be  structured  a  particular  way 
thus  preventing  delays  caused  by  the  rejection  of  requests  for  redrafting.  Where  clarification 
of  a  request  or  evidence  derived  from  a  request  is  required,  they  are  on  hand  to  obtain  or 
provide  such  guidance.  They  have  been  able  to  explain  the  role  of  the  disclosure  officer  in 
4  The  first  such  exchange  of  liaison  magistrates  took  place  in  1993  between  France  and  Italy. 
5  As  of  May  2003  the  following  European  nations  were  participating  in  the  framework:  the  Czech 
Republic,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Holland,  Italy,  Russia,  Spain,  and  the  UK.  The  following 
non-European  jurisdictions  had  established  exchanges  with  European  States:  Canada,  Morocco  and  the 
US  (David  Clark,  then  UK  liaison  magistrate  in  Paris,  seminar,  Trier,  15-17  May  2003). 
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relation  to  English  investigations  thus  obtaining  permission  for  a  disclosure  officer  to  travel  to 
a  foreign  jurisdiction  to  make  further  enquiries  for  disclosure  purposes  when  such  a  request 
might  otherwise  have  been  summarily  dismissed  (CPS  2003:  24-27).  The  successes  cited  by 
the  CPS  not  only  demonstrate  how  liaison  magistrates  have  helped  mutual  legal  assistance, 
they  also  demonstrate  how,  in  the  absence  of  this  role  and  function,  the  current  mutual  legal 
assistance  system  cannot  work  as  effectively  as  is  needed. 
One  new  area  of  work  in  which  liaison  magistrates  anticipate  that  they  will  play  an 
important  role  involves  the  European  Arrest  Warrant  [EAW  -  about  which,  more  below] 
where  the  key  issue  will  be  the  speedy  acquisition  of  accurate  and  complete  information, 
reinforced  by  tight  statutory  timescales  intended  to  deliver  expedited  extradition.  Specifically 
they  will  be  in  a  position  to  advise  on  initial  documentation,  to  assist  local  prosecutors  at 
court  hearings,  to  advise  on  the  nature  of  the  offence  and  any  dual  criminality  issues,  to 
provide  a  channel  of  communication  for  additional  information  and  to  discuss  with  the 
host/requested  jurisdiction  the  nature  of  any  reply  to  requests  for  additional  information 
(David  Clark,  then  UK  liaison  magistrate  in  Paris,  seminar  on  the  EAW,  Trier,  15-17  May 
2003). 
There  is  undeniable  functional  overlap  -  and  therefore  a  risk  of  too  many  working 
relationships  -  between  the  expanding  network  of  liaison  magistrates,  the  European  Judicial 
Network  (for  Central  Authorities  and  other  experts)  and  Eurojust  (for  prosecutors). 
Representatives  from  each  network  would  argue,  with  justification,  that  although  there  is 
overlap  in  some  functionality,  each  offers  something  unique  to  overall  aim  of  judicial  co- 
operation  between  States:  members  of  the  EJN  include  officials  perhaps  better  placed  than 
others  to  influence  the  development  of  policy;  Eurojust,  located  at  The  Hague,  offers  a  central 
hub  of  communication  and  co-operation  whilst  the  liaison  magistrates  provide  for  their  home 
nations,  a  particular  domestic  expertise  in  law  and  language  in  relation  to  their  host 
jurisdiction.  (Clark  ibid,;  Kennedy  interview,  London,  13  December  2002;  Angel  Galgo, 
Secretary  to  the  EJN,  presentation  to  the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum,  Home  Office,  30 
January  2004). 
Intemational  law  enforcement  co-operation:  The  Schengen  Convention  1990 
In  July  1984  France  and  Germany  agreed  to  lift  border  controls  between  their  two 
countries.  In  October  that  year  Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands  joined  the 
agreement.  The  following  year,  on  14  June  1985,  this  agreement  was  formally  signed  as  the 
Schengen  Agreement  (subsequently  renamed  the  Schengen  Accord).  In  1990  what  had  begun 
as  a  consensus  objective  to  work  towards  the  gradual  abolition  of  controls  at  common 
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frontiers  acquired  an  institutional  structure  and  formal  instruments  with  the  Schengen 
Implementing  Convention  and  by  1996  the  number  of  EU  Member  States  that  had  signed  the 
1990  Convention  had  risen  to  thirteen.  Of  the  EU  States  only  the  UK  and  Eire  had  not 
participated.  Iceland  and  Norway  had  become  associate  signatories  of  the  Convention  and 
there  was  political  pressure  for  the  Schengen  Convention  to  be  adopted  within  the  EU 
framework  which  ambition  was  achieved  in  the  Treaty  ofAnisterdam,  1997. 
Having  a  common  land  border  with  only  one  other  EU  State,  and  anxious  to  preserve 
the  special  nature  of  its  geopolitical  borders,  the  UK  government  initially  asserted  that  it  had 
no  wish  to  participate.  The  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  European  Communities 
monitored  developments  closely  (1998b,  1998c,  )  and  eventually  concluded  that  "in  the  three 
main  areas  of  Schengen  -  border  controls,  police  co-operation  (Schengen  Information 
System)[SIS]  and  visa/asyluni/immigration  policy  -  there  is  a  strong  case  for  full  United 
Kingdom  participation".  The  Committee  went  on  to  express  the  concern  that  disengagement 
from  the  Schengen  Implementing  Convention  would  diminish  UK  influence  over  other  JHA 
policy  developments  and  that  "weaker  UK  influence  over  the  development  of  European 
polices  will  mean  that  such  policies  will  reflect  the  preferences  of  others  and  fail  to  take  into 
account  particular  UK  concerns"  (1999c:  paragraph  59).  On  12  March  1999  the  Home 
Secretary  announced  at  the  JHA  Council  that  the  UK  government  was: 
"ready  to  participate  in  law  enforcement  and  criminal  judicial  co-operation 
derived  from  the  Schengen  provisions,  including  the  SIS.  We  have  been  in  the  forefront 
of  EU  co-ordination  in  the  fight  against  crime  and  drugs  and  we  shall  maintain  that 
position.  "  (quoted  in  House  of  Lords  2000a:  paragraph  11). 
The  Irish  government  announced  a  similar  intention  at  the  same  meeting  which  took 
place  a  few  months  before  the  Tampere  Special  European  Council  on  JHA.  Details  of  the 
UK's  application  and  the  decision  to  admit  the  UK  to  certain  articles  of  the  Schengen 
Convention  are  outlined  in  a  report  by  the  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European 
Union  (2000a). 
The  Schengen  Acquis  (the  collective  name  for  the  portfolio  of  the  Accord,  the 
Convention  and  various  protocols  and  other  supporting  documents)  sits  outside  the 
framework  of  traditional  mutual  legal  assistance  instruments  because,  in  relation  to  its  police 
and  border  co-operation  measures,  it  is  essentially  a  formalisation  of  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation.  it  makes  provision  for  the  exchange  of  intelligence  and 
information  rather  than  evidence.  It  defines  the  operational  parameters  for  investigators 
dealing  proactively  with  criminals  seeking  to  utilise  the  crossing  of  borders  to  frustrate 
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investigators.  The  formalisation  of  such  practical  co-operation  is  a  significant  step  in  the 
expansion  of  the  concept  of  mutual  legal  assistance. 
In  respect  of  the  Convention's  police  co-operation  measures,  the  guiding  principle 
confirms  that  this  is  about  operational  assistance  and  that  the  coercive  judicial  measures  for 
securing  evidential  assistance  remain  matters  for  mutual  legal  assistance: 
"The  Contracting  Parties  undertake  to  ensure  that  their  police  authorities  shall, 
in  compliance  with  national  legislation  and  within  the  limits  of  their  responsibilities, 
assist  each  other  for  the  purposes  of  preventing  and  detecting  criminal  offences, 
insofar  as  national  law  does  not  stipulate  that  the  request  be  made  to  legal  authorities 
and  provided  the  request  or  the  implementation  thereof  does  not  involve  the  application 
of  coercive  measures  by  the  requested  Contracting  Party.  Where  the  requested  police 
authorities  do  not  have  jurisdiction  to  implement  a  request,  they  shall  forward  it  to  the 
competent  authorities.  "  (Article  39,  Schengen  Implementing  Convention,  1990). 
The  key  police  co-operation  measures  are  cross-border  surveillance  (Art.  40),  hot 
pursuit  (Art.  41),  the  establishment  of  dedicated  communication  structures  for  cross-border 
policing  (Art.  44),  the  spontaneous  exchange  of  information  (Art.  46)  and  the  SIS  (pan- 
European  computer  access  to  information  about,  inter  alia,  wanted  persons,  stolen  property 
and  criminal  records:  Title  IV).  Of  these,  the  fast  two  articles  deal  with  the  spontaneous 
operational  deployment  of  agents  from  one  State  into  the  territory  of  another,  once  the  sort  of 
prohibited  action  that  mutual  legal  assistance  (along  with  extradition)  was  originally  intended 
to  render  unnecessary.  " 
The  cross-border  surveillance  provisions  allow  officers  conducting  surveillance  of  a 
suspect  in  their  own  territory  (State  A)  to  continue  their  observations  in  the  territory  of 
another  contracting  party  (State  B)  in  the  event  that  the  suspect  crosses  their  mutual  border, 
subject  to  prior  authorisation  and  until  the  authorities  of  State  B  can  take  over  the  surveillance 
for  the  remainder  of  the  time  that  the  suspect  in  located  within  their  territory.  In  the  event  of  a 
spontaneous  and  unheralded  border  crossing,  in  which  case  prior  authorisation  would  be 
impossible,  the  officers  of  State  A  must  immediately  notify  the  authorities  of  State  B  and  may 
maintain  their  own  surveillance  for  a  period  up  to  five  hours  from  the  moment  they  crossed 
the  border  in  order  to  allow  the  authorities  of  State  B  the  time  necessary  to  arrange  to  take 
over  the  surveillance.  In  these  circumstances  officers  from  State  A  maintaining  their 
surveillance  in  State  B  "may  neither  challenge  nor  arrest  the  person  under  observation7' 
(Art.  40(3)(f)).  There  are  further  qualifications  that  include  the  limiting  of  such  authority  to 
6  The  concept  of  'hot  pursuit'  is  derived  from  the  ancient  legal  concept  of  'fresh  pursuit'.  Hot  pursuit 
has  only  been  codified  in  relation  to  the  international  law  of  the  sea.  In  respect  of  hot  pursuit  across 
land  borders  it  is  expressly  prohibited  except  where  permitted  by  bilateral  treaty:  Poulantzas  2002:  1-13. 
In  451  pages  on  the  international  law  of  hot  pursuit,  Poulantzas  makes  no  reference  to  the  Schengen 
Implementing  Convention.  A  further  indication  that  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  is  not 
regarded  as  comprising  part  of  international  law. 
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cross  borders  to  certain  police  forces  and  for  certain  offences  only.  Officers  who  cross  a 
border  must  have  the  means  to  identify  themselves  and  prove  they  are  acting  in  an  official 
capacity  (Art.  40(3)(c))  and  (except  in  the  cases  of  spontaneous  and  unheralded  border 
crossing)  be  in  possession  of  written  authority  permitting  their  surveillance  (Art.  40(3)(b)). 
Whilst  these  provisions  could  include  overt  surveillance  conducted  by  uniformed 
officers  (if  they  were  members  of  police  agencies  designated  under  the  Convention),  they  are 
primarily  intended  for  circumstances  in  which  covert  surveillance  is  being  conducted.  Article 
41,  hot  pursuit,  is  specifically  limited  to  uniformed  operations,  or  least  to  police  staff  and 
vehicles  that  are  clearly  and  visibly  identified  as  such  (Art.  41(5)(d)).  Once  again  the  power 
applies  to  specified  offences.  The  suspect  must  either  be  trying  to  escape  having  committed 
such  an  offence  or  be  in  the  act  of  committing  such  an  offence.  In  instances  of  hot  pursuit  by 
investigators  from  State  A  into  the  territory  of  State  B,  only  officers  from  State  B  may  arrest 
the  suspect  although  in  urgent  circumstances  officers  from  State  A  may  detain  the  suspect 
pending  the  arrival  of  officers  from  State  B  to  effect  the  arrest.  Neither  the  provisions  for 
Art-40  or  Art.  41  permit  the  officers  from  State  A  to  enter  homes  or  private  places  or 
undertake  coercive  investigative  actions.  Crucially,  hot  pursuit  can  only  be  conducted  over 
land  borders  (Art.  41(5)(b).  The  UK  shares  only  one  land  border  with  another  EU  Member 
State,  Eire,  and  given  special  bilateral  measures  already  in  place,  neither  jurisdiction  has 
7  sought  to  accede  to  Article  4  1. 
It  was  expedient  to  incorporate  domestic  measures  necessary  to  give  effect  to  LJK 
Schengen  obligations,  such  as  they  are,  within  the  C(IQ  Act  2003.  The  lengthy  debates, 
particularly  in  relation  to  the  Schengen  provisions,  reveal  much  about  prevailing  attitudes 
within  the  UK  political  arena  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  mutual 
legal  assistance. 
The  CaQ  Bill  was  introduced  in  the  House  of  Lords  and  there  had  its  Second 
Reading  on  2  December  2002,  having  been  announced  in  the  Queen's  Speech  a  few  days 
earlier.  Lord  Stoddart  of  Swindon  illustrated  the  depth  of  opposition  early  in  the  debate  by 
evoking  the  gratuitous  imagery  of  jackbooted  foreign  police  officers  trampling  at  will 
throughout  the  kingdom.  '  In  a  direct  reference  to  the  intention  to  give  effect  to  UK  obligations 
under  Article  40  he  argued:  "it  is  totally  unacceptable  to  allow  police  and  customs  officials 
from  other  countries  to  operate  unaccompanied  and  unsupervised  in  the  United  Kingdom  for 
any  period  of  time",  (HL  Hansard,  12  December  2002,  col.  1007).  For  Lord  Stoddart  this  was 
7  The  Irish  government  also  opted  out  of  Art.  40  because  of  the  sensitivities  surrounding  its  border  with 
Northern  Ireland  (HC  Hansard  Standing  Committee  A,  19  June  2003,  col.  249). 
's  In  closing  the  debate  for  the  Government,  Lord  Filkin  invited  Lord  Stoddart  and  fellow  peers  to 
consider  whether  they  would  prefer  foreign  police  officers  or  foreign  criminals  to  enter  the  LJK  (HL 
Hansard,  2  December  2002  col.  10  17. 
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the  "thin  end  of  the  wedge'  that  would  inevitably  lead  to  "the  establishment  of  a  European 
federal  bureau  of  investigation"  (ibid.  ).  9 
The  technical  confusion  over  the  distinction  between  cross-border  surveillance  and 
hot  pursuit  persisted  throughout  the  Bill's  parliamentary  passage.  Baroness  Anelay,  leading 
for  the  Opposition,  referred  variously  to  "hot  surveillance",  "hot  watcW'  (,  HL  Hansard  2 
December  2002,  col.  977;  HL  Hansard  3  February  2003,  col.  GC4)  and  "surveillance"  (IM 
Hansard  29  January  2003,  col.  GC201).  Lord  Filkin,  for  the  Government,  made  a  patient 
distinction  between  'surveillance'  and  'hot  pursuit'  for  the  noble  lords  (HL  Hansard  29 
January  2003,  col.  GC205).  However,  a  few  days  later  the  Opposition  were  once  again 
bemoaning  the  issue  of  "hot  surveillance'  (Lord  Carlisle  of  Bucklow,  HL  Hansard  3  February 
2003,  col.  GC5)  and  questioning  why  it  was  that  foreign  surveillance  teams  might  be  allowed 
up  to  five  hours  operating  in  the  UK  before  domestic  authorities  assumed  responsibility  for 
continuing  the  surveillance  (ibid  &  Baroness  Anelay,  HL  Hansard  3  February  2003, 
col.  GC4).  The  Government's  answer  was  unconvincing,  relying  as  it  did  upon  the  fact  that 
five  hours  is  stipulated  in  the  Schengen  Convention,  in  the  drafting  of  which  the  UK  took  no 
part  (Lord  Filkin,  ILL  Hansard  3  February  2003,  col.  GC7).  Without  giving  away  sensitive 
tactical  information  it  could  reasonably  have  been  argued  that,  given  no  prior  notice  as  to  time 
or  location,  it  can  take  up  to  five  hours  to  assemble  the  necessary  resources  to  mount  effective 
surveillance  which  was  why  that  limit  was  implemented  in  the  Schengen  Convention.  Lord 
Filkin  further  noted  that  practical  experience  of  the  measure's  operation  on  continental 
Europe  has  been  positive,  and  it  appears  to  be  working  well. 
The  confusion  persisted  throughout  the  Commons  committee  debates  on  the  Bill 
despite  the  intervention  of  Elfyn  Lloyd  MP  who,  in  response  to  concerns  expressed  by  Greg 
Knight  MP  (following  the  lead  given  by  Lord  Stoddart)  about  "foreign  police  officers 
roaming  around  the  English  countryside"  (HC  Hansard  I  April  2003  col.  840),  felt  it  helpful 
to  point  out  that  "having  a  fully  dressed  gendarme  following  someone  through  the  streets  of 
London  would  not  be  clever  surveillance'  (HC  Ransard  I  April  2003,  col.  841).  Apparently 
lacking  tactical  awareness  of  the  resources  involved,  Mark  Sinimonds  MP  could  see  no  reason 
why  English  authorities  could  not  mount  a  full  spontaneous  surveillance  operation  in  the  "one 
hour"  it  takes  to  cross  the  English  Channel  (HC  Hansard,  Standing  Committee  A,  19  June 
2003,  col.  250).  Nick  Hawkins  MP  sought  to  have  the  expression  "hot  surveillance'  inserted 
into  the  Bill  (HC  Hansard,  Standing  Committee  A,  19  June  2003  col.  243)  thus  equating 
surveillance  with  hot  pursuit  whilst  at  the  same  time  introducing  confusion  and  an  alien 
concept  into  the  precise  translation  of  the  Schengen  Convention  Title  III  into  UK  law  (ibid.  ). 
9  For  the  Government  Lord  Filkin  asserted:  "we  are  against  the  EU  FBI  idea  or  proposar'  (HL  Hansard, 
2  December  2002,  col.  10  17. 
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David  Heath  MP  described  the  talk  of  'hot  surveillance'  as  "an  awful  lot  of  nonsense"  (HC 
Hansard  Standing  Committee  A  19  June  2003  col.  245)  and  the  Home  Office  Minister, 
Caroline  Flint  MP,  spent  a  significant  amount  of  time  reiterating  the  distinction  between 
surveillance  and  hot  pursuit  for  the  benefit  of  MPs  (HC  Hansard  Standing  Committee  A  19 
June  2003  cols.  251-55). 
Two  aspects  of  these  exchanges  disturb  the  external  observer.  Mark  Hammonds' 
question  demonstrates  an  understandable  lack  of  awareness  about  resources  required  for 
surveillance  tactics.  Had  he  be  briefed  by  law  enforcement  he  might  not  have  asked  the 
question.  The  Government  could  not  directly  answer  the  point  because  in  doing  so  sensitive 
and  confidential  information  would  have  been  placed  in  the  public  domain  via  Hansard.  This 
illustrates  the  constraints  within  which  legislators  sometimes  operate  when  debating  proposed 
laws  in  public. 
The  second  concern  is  the  apparent  lack  of  familiarity  with  the  text  and  meaning  of 
the  Schengen  Convention.  Given  that  the  Convention  is  a  matter  of  public  record  to  which 
MPs  have  access,  this  is  less  excusable.  The  Government  eventually  placated  some  of 
malcontents  by  proposing  an  amendment  (which  itself  was  slightly  amended  by  the 
Opposition)  that  reinforced  the  text  of  the  Convention  by  making  it  unlawful  for  foreign 
officers  on  surveillance  in  the  UK  to  challenge  (i.  e.  stop  and  question)  and  arrest  persons 
under  surveillance  (HC  Hansard  14  October  2003,  cols.  66-74).  There  appears  to  have  been  no 
legislative  necessity  for  this  since  such  actions  are  expressly  prohibited  in  the  Convention 
(Art.  40(3)(f)) 
,  although  it  had  undoubtedly  become  politically  expedient  by  that  stage. 
And  the  fact  that  it  was  politically  expedient  illustrates  the  mistrust  that  MPs  had  in 
the  Schengen  text  and  its  interpretation.  The  UK's  lack  of  input  into  the  drafting  of  the 
Convention  was  the  subject  of  debate  three  times  (HL  Hansard  3  February  2003  col.  GC7;  HC 
Hansard  12  June  2003  col.  SCA89;  HC  Hansard  I  April  2004  col.  854).  There  was  a  sense 
that  it  was  not  a  good  thing  to  try  and  translate  a  'foreign'  instrument  into  domestic  law.  The 
lack  of  trust  in  the  criminal  justice  systems  of  other  States  (including  those  of  EU  partners) 
was  evident  on  eight  occasions  during  the  Commons  debate  (HC  Hansard  I  April  2003, 
cols.  820,821,828,829,833,838,839/40,  and  849).  There  was  concerted  opposition  to  any 
innovation  that  smacked  of  either  a  European  FBI  (HL  Hansard  2  December  2002,  cols.  1007, 
10  17),  or  a  European  public  prosecutor  (HC  Hansard  I  April  2003,  col.  8  10/  1). 
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Table  H:  References  to  mutual  recognition  and  reciprocity 
References  to  Mutual  Recognition  In  the  QIQ  Bill 
debates 
References  to  Reciprocity  in  the  C(IQ  Bill  debates 
HL  2  December  2002  col.  973  HL  27  January  2003,  col.  GCI  36 
HL  29  January  2003  col.  GC210-1  HL  29  January  2003,  col.  GC225 
HL  3  February  2003  col.  GC23  HL  3  February  2003,  col.  GC6;  GC7 
HL  3  March  2003  col.  648  HL  25  Fcbruary  2003,  col.  GC  190 
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The  government  has  placed  great  emphasis  on  mutual  recognition  and  the  need  for 
reciprocity  (see  Table  11).  Yet  there  were  many  views  and  questions  expressed  during  the 
C(IQ  Bill  debates  that  suggested  many  parliamentarians  remain  unconvinced  about  the  value 
of  mutual  recognition  and  the  part  that  reciprocity  has  to  play  in  facilitating  international  law 
enforcement  co-operation  and  mutual  legal  assistance.  Without  trust  neither  reciprocity  nor 
mutual  recognition  stand  much  chance  of  success  (Mitsilegas  et  aL  2003:  162-3).  The  trust  and 
spirit  of  reciprocity  that  are  so  often  found  between  investigators  from  different  jurisdictions, 
and  which  form  the  foundation  for  international  law  enforcement  co-operation,  are  difficult  to 
formalise  into  treaty  instruments  in  a  way  satisfactory  to  all.  Investigators  reading  the  debates 
might  be  forgiven  for  feeling  disappointed  at  the  lack  of  understanding  of  their  issues  and 
operational  realities  evident  on  both  sides  of  the  debate.  As  Bill  Newton-Dunn  MEP  and 
supporter  of  a  pan-European  investigative  operational  capability  (2004)  observed, 
parliamentarians  are  generalists  representing  the  public  rather  than  specialist  legislators 
addressing  the  needs  of  investigators  (interview,  22  January  2004).  And  balancing  the 
protection  of  the  public  interest  and  civil  liberties  against  statutory  excess  in  favour  of  the 
executive  is  the  legitimate  duty  of  parliaments  but  whether  this  is  best  achieved  by  the  use  of 
gratuitous  imagery  reflecting  the  xenophobia  of  the  more  euro-sceptic  elements  of  the  media 
is  a  moot  point.  Officials  in  the  Civil  Service  and  Treasury  Counsel  oversee  the 
metamorphosis  of  government  policy  into  law.  The  comfortable  parliamentary  majority  of  the 
Government  ensured  that,  in  this  case,  the  expertise  that  informed  the  Bill  was  not  over-ridden 
by  the  apparently  less-well  informed  opposition  views.  But  as  has  been  noted  already,  even 
the  officials  in  this  case  were  informed  mainly  by  their  own  perspective  as  mutual  legal 
assistance  administrators  and  a  limited  consultation  with  specialist  vested  interests  rather  than 
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the  considered  opinion  of  the  police  service  as  a  whole.  The  lack  of  public  awareness  about 
organised  crime  and  how  it  harms  their  local  communities  was  noted  during  the  debate  (HL 
Hansard  3  March  2003,  col.  636;  HC  Hansard  I  April  2003,  col.  820).  At  times  the  level  of 
debate  about  the  C(IQ  Bill  will  have  done  very  little  to  illuminate  the  darkness. 
The  Schengen  Convention  extends  the  framework  of  mutual  legal  assistance 
instruments  to  include  operational  issues  more  akin  to  international  law  enforcement  co- 
operation  than  traditional  mutual  legal  assistance.  In  doing  so  it  enhances  co-operative  effort 
by  seeking  to  overcome  real  practical  problems  faced  by  investigators  whose  subjects  are 
likely  to  exploit  national  borders  in  an  attempt  to  frustrate  law  enforcement.  10  Nevertheless  in 
implementing  such  measures  alongside  the  more  conventional  mutual  legal  assistance 
measures  from  the  EUCAM,  the  passage  of  the  C(IQ  Act  has  illustrated  how  much  has  yet  to 
be  done  to  convince  British  politicians  that  this  is  a  desirable  way  forward  in  the  intemational 
effort  against  transnational  crime. 
European  Developments:  The  Evidence  Wan-ant  FEEM 
Like  the  EAW  before  it  in  the  arena  of  extradition,  the  EEW  is  intended  to  overcome 
the  impediment  to  transnational  investigations  posed  by  the  bureaucracy  of  mutual  legal 
assistance.  For  British  Parliamentarians  it  raises  many  of  the  same  concerns  as  the  adoption  of 
elements  of  the  Schengen  Acquis. 
The  concept  is  simple  enough.  In  a  Proposalfor  a  Council  Framework  Decision  on 
the  European  Evidence  Warrant  for  obtaining  objects,  documents  and  data  for  use  in 
proceedings  in  criminal  matters  published  on  14  November  2003,  (Com  (2003)  688  Final; 
2003/0270  (CNS)),  the  European  Commission  re-iterated  mutual  recognition  as  the 
cornerstone  of  judicial  co-operation  (ibid.:  5).  Pursuant  to  this  philosophical  foundation,  the 
EEW  would  provide  powers  of  search,  production  and  seizure  for  physical  objects,  documents 
and  data.  It  would  not  be  applicable  to  the  interviewing  of  suspects,  the  taking  of  statements 
or  the  examination  of  victims  and  witnesses  (ibid.:  7).  Nor  can  it  be  used  to  initiate  action  or 
request  the  performance  of  investigations.  It  applies  only  to  evidence  already  in  existence 
(Working  Document  on  the  Proposal  on  the  [EEK7,  Committee  on  Citizen's  Freedoms  and 
Rights,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  European  Parliament,  13  January  2004,  PE  339.590).  11 
10  It  will  be  recalled  from  Case  Study  1,  Chapter  7  above,  how  Schengen  provisions  enabled  constant 
surveillance  to  be  maintained  despite  the  suspect's  attempts  to  lose  the  surveillance  teams  by  crossing 
borders. 
11  1  am  grateful  to  Bill  Newton-Dunn  MEP,  member  of  the  European  Parliament  Committee  on 
Citizen's  Freedoms  and  Rights,  for  providing  me  with  a  copy  of  this  working  document. 
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As  the  Commission  explicitly  recognises,  this  would  create  a  two-tier  regime  in 
which  some  evidence  could  be  obtained  by  a  domestic  judicial  order  executed  directly  in  the 
requested  State  whilst  other  evidence  relating  to  the  same  investigation  would  necessitate  the 
issuing  of  an  ILOR  under  the  existing  co-operation  regime.  The  Commission  therefore  makes 
clear  that  this  proposal  is  an  interim  step  towards  a  single  mutual  recognition  instrument, 
applicable  to  all  forms  of  evidence  that  would  replace  mutual  legal  assistance  (Com.  (2003) 
688  Final.:  9-10). 
The  latter  concept  is  a  long  way  from  achieving  fruition.  The  initial  step,  the  EEW, 
has  yet  to  be  agreed  and  there  is  much  debate  yet  to  be  held  over  the  protection  of  the  rights  of 
the  accused.  An  order  to  obtain  evidence  "has  many  different  meanings  in  the  Member  States' 
procedural  laws"  (ihid.:  9).  To  resolve  any  confusion  arising  from  this,  the  Commission 
proposes  that  an  EEW  would  "specify  only  the  objective  to  be  achieved  ...  Although  it  is 
mandatory  under  the  [EEW]  to  obtain  the  evidence,  it  is  left  to  the  executing  State  to 
determine,  in  the  light  of  the  information  supplied  by  the  issuing  State,  the  most  appropriate 
way  to  obtain  the  evidence  in  accordance  with  its  domestic  procedural  law"  (ibid.  ).  For 
minimum  safeguards  the  Commission  relies  upon  the  norms  established  in  the  ECHR, 
particularly  under  Article  6,  the  right  to  fair  trial.  On  26  July  2000,  the  Commission  asserted 
that  it  must  be  "ensured  that  the  treatment  of  suspects  and  the  rights  of  the  defence  would  not 
only  not  suffer  from  the  implementation  of  the  principle  [of  mutual  recognition]  but  that  the 
safeguards  would  even  be  improved  through  the  process"  (Communication  to  the  Council  and 
the  European  Parliament  on  Mutual  Recognition  of  Final  Decisions  in  Criminal  Matters, 
COM  (2000)  495  Final).  A  Green  Paper  was  published  on  19  February  2003  on  the 
procedural  safeguards  for  suspects  and  defendants  in  criminal  proceedings,  explaining  that 
divergent  practices  risked  impeding  mutual  trust  and  confidence  between  different  national 
jurisdictions  (COM  (2003)  75  Final).  The  Green  Paper  does  not  discuss  protections  in  the 
context  of  the  coercive  measures  proposed  in  the  EEW  draft  Framework  Decision,  but  the 
Commission  argues  that  the  EEW  protections  that  are  proposed  are  consistent  with  the 
principles  of  the  Green  Paper  (Com  (2003)  688  Final:  11-12).  The  issuing  judicial  authority 
for  an  EEW  would  be  a  judge,  juge  dinstruction  or  prosecutor  and  the  issuing  authority 
"must  be  satisfied  that  it  would  be  able  to  obtain  the  objects,  documents  or  data  in  similar 
circumstances  if  they  were  on  the  territory  of  its  own  Member  State.  "  With  considerable 
confidence  the  Commission  states  "this  prevents  the  [EEW]  from  being  used  to  circumvent 
national  safeguards  on  obtaining  evidence'  (ibid.:  12). 
With  considerable  concern  Christopher  Murray,  from  his  perspective  as  a  private 
practice  solicitor  and  part-time  judge,  argues  that  it  does  not  (interview,  12  March  2004). 
When  acting  as  a  Recorder  of  the  Crown  Court,  Murray  could  issue  an  EEW  for  execution  in 
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another  EU  Member  State  that  would  translate  the  coercive  powers  applicable  in  England  and 
Wales  to  the  other  State.  There  would  be  no  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  requested  State  to 
refuse  the  EEW.  It  would  have  to  execute  the  warrant  in  a  way  that  was  consistent  with  the 
domestic  legislation.  An  accused  person  about  whom  evidence  was  being  sought  in  such  a 
fashion  could  be  confident  that  the  English  judge  would  have  to  abide  by  statutory  protections 
such  as  those  of  the  PACE  Act  1984  and  so  an  EEW  issued  from  England  and  Wales  could 
not,  for  instance,  seek  the  seizure  of  legally  privileged  material,  as  defined  (PACE  Act  1984 
§10).  But  the  same  level  of  protection  to  such  material  might  not  be  afforded  in  another  EU 
State.  In  which  case  that  other  State  could  issue  an  EEW  entirely  consistent  with  its  own 
domestic  procedural  law,  that  required  the  seizure  of  material  in  England  that  would  normally 
be  protected  under  English  law.  The  EEW  preserves  and  affords  primacy  to  the  protections  of 
the  requesting  (or  issuing)  State  not  the  requested  (or  executing)  State.  Once  such  material  has 
been  surrendered  and  used  abroad,  it  has  entered  the  public  domain  and  can  be  used  by 
investigators  in  England  (in  the  same  way  in  which  foreign  intercepted  communications  can 
be  adduced).  This  could  facilitate  process  laundering  (otherwise  known  as  forum  shopping).  It 
could  be  'lawful'  to  break  the  law  of  the  requested  State  using  an  EEW. 
Currently,  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  proceedings  before  an  English  court 
nominated  by  the  Home  Secretary  to  receive  such  a  request,  "the  court  has  to  consider  when 
faced  with  an  application  involving  the  production  of  documents,  any  claim  made  by  a  person 
not  to  have  to  produce  the  documents  as  if  the  proceedings  were  domestic  English 
proceedings.  Thus  English  law  and  English  considerations  must  apply"  (Collins  J  in  Rv  Bow 
Street  Magistrates'  Court  ex  parte  King,  unreported  CO/3489/97,8  October  1997,  Queens 
Bench  Division;  discussed  in  detail  in  Murray  &  Harris,  2000:  73).  12  As  currently  drafted,  the 
EEW  proposed  Framework  Decision  over-tums  that  principle  of  English  law.  It  means, 
perversely,  that  English  investigators  could  have  more  coercive  power  when  acting  on  foreign 
request  than  when  acting  pursuant  to  English  law.  It  begs  the  important  question,  at  which 
point  would  the  accused  person  be  able  to  challenge  the  process  and  assert  his  or  her  rights 
under  ECHR?  Such  a  challenge  would  not  be  possible  in  the  issuing  State  because  the 
objectives  of  the  EEW  would  be  lawful  there.  And  challenge  would  not  be  possible  in  English 
courts  because  the  EEW  has  direct  effect  and  discretion  is  limited  to  the  manner  of  execution 
only.  Execution  is  mandatory  under  current  proposals.  None  of  the  protections  in  relation  to 
Evidence  Freezing  Orders,  enshrined  in  the  C(IQ  Act  2003  (§21)  arc  being  suggested  by  the 
Commission  for  use  in  the  EEW. 
The  concept  of  the  EEW  and  its  potential  operative  effect  demands  further  study 
outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis,  hence  reference  here  has  been  no  more  than  introductory  in 
12  1  am  grateful  to  Christopher  Murray  for  alerting  me  to  the  significance  of  this  ruling. 
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nature.  In  the  context  of  the  present  study,  the  fact  that  such  a  concept  is  oil  tile  JI  IA  agenda 
being  actively  driven  by  the  European  Commission  is  indicative  of  how  tar  thinking  oil 
judicial  co-operation  has  come  since  the  ECMA  was  first  proposed  filly  years  ago.  It  is  seen 
by  the  European  Commission  as  a  preparatory  step  towards  a  single  co-operative  instruniclit 
based  on  pure  mutual  recognition.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether,  in  promoting  mutual 
recognition  as  more  politically  acceptable  than  harmonisation  and  a  single  EU  criminal  code, 
the  UK  government  feels  it  could  support  such  an  extension  of  the  principle. 
European  Developments:  Policy  and  Constitution 
The  graph  below  (Figure  1:  JIIA  texts  adopted  by  the  EU),  based  on  statistics 
compiled  by  the  author  from  information  on  the  EU  website  (JflA  pages),  illustrates  the 
significant  rise  in  JHA  instruments  (Joint  Actions,  Framework  Decisions  etc)  adopted  by  the 
EU  over  the  past  decade.  Unsurprisingly  there  was  a  rise  in  1998  coincidental  with  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  and  its  documented  aspiration  to  create  an  area 
of  freedom,  security  and  justice. 
Figure  I:  AIA  texts  adopted  by  the  EU 
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The  slight  slowing  of  additional  instruments  in  1999  is  coincidental  with  file  Tailycre 
Special  European  Council  meeting  during  which  HIA  issues  were  rcl'ocuscd.  The  rclativcly 
sharp  rise  from  2001  onwards  coincides  with  the  afierniath  of9/1  1. 
Two  themes  of  ongoing  development  follow  oil  t,  rom  these  statistics  that  reveal  the 
increasing  concern  that  EU  has  with  JHA.  Firstly,  the  terrorist  attacks  of'  2001  added 
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emphasis  to  an  already  established  momentum  but  may  yet  significantly  change  the  character 
of  JHA  in  the  EU.  Secondly,  there  is  a  political  drive  to  transfer  the  majority  of  JHA  from  the 
intergovernmental.  arena  to  the  arena  of  European  law  having  direct  effect. 
The  changing  character  of  JHA  to  acconunodate  the  'war  on  terror'  is  evident  not 
only  from  the  immediate  reaction  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2001  attacks  but  also  in  recent  policy 
texts  published  in  the  aftermath  of  the  terrorist  attacks  in  Madrid,  II  March  2004.  On  the  19 
March  2004  an  Extraordinary  JHA  Council  meeting  was  held  in  Brussels  to  consider  the 
European  Commission's  Action  Paper  in  Response  to  the  Terrorist  Attacks  on  Madrid, 
(MEMO/04/66,18  March  2004).  Recognising  the  Madrid  terrorism  as  an  attack  on  the 
fundamental  principles  upon  which  the  EU  is  built  -  respect  for  human  dignity,  liberty, 
democracy,  equality,  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights  -  the  Commission  argued 
that  new  instruments  and  institutions  were  not  necessary  as  a  response  but  that  there  should  be 
better  implementation  of  existing  instruments  and  enhanced  operational  co-operation  and  co- 
ordination  (ibid.:  I).  Those  Member  States  that  had  not  taken  action  in  respect  of  either  the 
EAW  or  the  Framework  Decision  on  the  Fight  Against  Terrorism  (OJ  U2002  164/2,22  June 
2003)  were  encouraged  to  do  so  promptly  (MEMO/04/66:  2).  The  fact  that,  as  of  18  March 
2004,  only  four  Member  States  had  ratified  the  EUCAM  was  noted  with  regret,  as  was  the  fact 
that  only  nine  Member  States  had  notified  the  Commission  of  their  proposed  arrangements  for 
transposition  in  respect  of  JITs  despite  the  deadline  for  entry  into  force  being  I  January  2003 
(ibid.:  3).  Four  other  instruments  similarly  suffering  a  lack  of  domestic  implementation  were 
identified.  There  were  calls,  too,  for  the  ECPOTF,  Europol  and  Eurojust  to  become  more 
involved  in  the  protection  of  the  EU,  its  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice,  and  its  citizens 
from  terrorist  attacks  (ibid:.  8). 
What  these  appeals  appear  to  illustrate  is  an  institutional  and  legislative  framework 
that  exists  but  is  ineffective  due  to  lack  of  commitment  amongst  Member  States, 
implementation  of  agreed  actions  and  provisions  being  the  measure  of  commitment  in  these 
circumstances. 
Accepting  the  second  annual  report  of  Eurojust,  the  JHA  Council  Meeting  on  29 
April  2004,  welcomed  the  new  emphasis  on  countering  terrorism  adopted  by  Eurojust  and 
reaffirmed  "that  the  effective  combating  of  crime,  and  of  terrorism  in  particular,  is  a  necessary 
and  essential  component  in  realising  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice"  (8694/04 
(Presse  129):  9).  Member  States  were  once  again  urged  to  make  it  happen.  At  its  meeting  in 
Luxembourg,  8  June  2004,  the  JHA  Council  called  for  renewed  effort  against  terrorism, 
particularly  from  Europol  and  the  ECPOTF  (which  was  directed  to  develop  a  proactive 
intelligence  capability  in  relation  to  terrorism)  whilst  Member  States  were  encouraged  to 
make  "Optimum  and  most  effective  use"  of  Eurojust  (ibid.  ). 
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By  the  time  the  Brussels  European  Council  took  place,  17-18  June  2004,  EU  leaders 
were  able  to  welcome  the  appointment  of  an  EU  counter-terrorism  co-ordinator,  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  Counter-Terrorism  Task  Force  within  Europol,  and  proposals  for  the 
ECPOTF  to  review  operational  capacity  in  relation  to  counter-terrorism  no  later  than 
December  2004  (Brussels  European  Council  -  Presidency  Conclusions,  10679/04:  2-3). 
The  Presidency  Conclusions  inextricably  linked  the  maintenance  of  an  area  of 
freedom,  security  and  justice  with  the  fight  against  terrorism.  In  doing  so  it  was  noted  that 
there  had  been  "substantial  progress"  in  implementing  the  five-year  Tampere  programme  and 
that  the  "time  has  now  come  to  launch  the  next  phase  of  the  process....  [the  Council  and 
Commission  were  invited]  to  prepare  proposals  for  a  new  programme  for  the  coming  years  to 
be  considered  by  the  European  Council  before  the  end  of  2004"  (ibid.:  1).  All  comments  in  the 
Brussels  Presidency  Conclusions  regarding  the  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  relate  to 
terrorism  not  crime. 
There  is  an  active  debate  about  the  relationship  between  transnational  organised 
crime  and  terrorism  and  the  extent  to  which  measures  to  tackle  one  are  suitable  for  tackling 
the  other.  Thus  the  Home  Office: 
"Organised  crime  groups  share  many  characteristics  with  terrorists  .... 
A 
successful  approach  to  organised  crime  is  therefore  inseparable  from  our  wider  effort 
against  threats  to  national  security.  "  (Home  Office  2004b:  1) 
"Organised  crime  groups  and  terrorist  groups  have  many  similarities  in  their 
ways  of  operating.  ... 
How  much  overlap  there  is  in  practice  between  the  two  types  of 
group  is  controversial.  "  (Home  Office  2004b:  7) 
Organised  crime  and  terrorism  are  often  linked  in  rhetoric.  But  this  can  sometimes  be 
counter-productive.  Communications  data  is  a  powerful  investigative  tool.  Prior  to  September 
2001  law  enforcement,  government  and  industry  in  the  UK  were  engaged  in  protracted 
negotiations  about  a  policy  to  inforin  a  statute  on  the  retention  of  communications  data  that 
would  cater  for  the  needs  of  law  enforcement  without  creating  an  undue  burden  upon  industry 
resources  (the  NCIS  had  the  lead  for  law  enforcement  on  this  issue).  Industry  was  keen  to 
avoid  any  statutory  obligation  whatsoever.  The  hasty  UK  legislative  reaction  to  the  events  of 
9111,  the  Anti-terrorism,  Crime  and  Security  Act  2001  [ATCS],  provides  for  the  Home 
Secretary  to  issue  Codes  of  Practice  in  relation  to  communication  data  retention.  The  Codes 
of  Practice  (yet  to  be  drafted  as  of  July  2004)  are  to  be  purely  voluntary  and  are  to  be  only  for 
the  purpose  of  "safeguarding  national  security"  or  "for  the  purpose  of  prevention  or  detection 
of  crime  or  the  prosecution  of  offenders  which  may  relate  directly  or  indirectly  to  national 
security"  (ATCS  Act  2001  §  102(3)  &  (4)).  This  gave  industry  the  opportunity  to  appear  to  be 
conceding  to  such  measures  as  a  contribution  to  the  war  against  terror  whilst  at  the  same  time 
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actually  denying  law  enforcement  an  investigative  option  considered  crucial  in  the  fight 
against  crime.  Tbus  a  potentially  vital  tool  has  been  reserved  for  the  purposes  of  protecting 
national  security. 
Bunyan,  likewise,  highlights  concerns  over  the  apparent  confusion  of  aims  in  relation 
to  terrorism  and  crime  (2004)  citing  as  an  example  the  European  Commission's 
Communication  on  measures  to  be  taken  to  combat  terrorism  and  otherforms  of  serious 
crime,  in  particular  to  improve  exchanges  of  information  (COM  221,29  March  2004)  which 
seeks  to  co-ordinate: 
"...  the  Union's  arsenal  of  weapons  against  terrorism.  Many  of  these  are  not 
specifically  anti-terrorism  but  range  wider  while  including  terrorism  [and]  a  link  should 
be  established  between  terrorism  and  other  forms  of  crime  [even  though  these  are]  not 
always  immediately  obvious  ... 
(COM  221:  3) 
... 
if  the  fight  against  terrorism  is  to  be  totally  effective,  it  must  be  handled  in 
conjunction  with  the  fight  against  other  forms  of  crime.  "  (COM  221:  5) 
The  extent  to  which  the  establishment  of  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice 
becomes  skewed  away  from  the  fight  against  transnational  crime  towards  the  fight  against 
terrorism  will  become  apparent  in  the  coming  months  and  particularly  with  the  promised 
phase  two  of  Tampere,  ideas  for  which  are  due  with  the  European  Council  by  the  end  of  2004. 
Despite  the  experience  of  UK  law  enforcement  illustrated  above,  the  concern  of  civil  liberties 
groups  is  that,  in  the  name  of  securing  Europe  against  terrorism,  ever-more  intrusive  and 
oppressive  executive  measures  will  be  introduced  and  made  applicable  to  criminal 
investigation  as  well. 
The  second  area  of  influence  over  the  immediate  and  mid-terrn  future  of  transnational 
criminal  enforcement  within  the  EU  comes  from  the  new  Constitution  for  Europe.  At  the 
outset  of  work  on  the  proposed  constitution  by  the  specially  constituted  European  Covention, 
two  important  challenges  were  identified: 
"Firstly 
...  the  detailed  objectives  set  out  in  the  current  Treaties  do  not  match 
up  to  the  political  objectives  clearly  expressed  by  the  European  Council  at  Tampere. 
Unless  the  objectives  set  out  at  Amsterdam  are  aligned  to  match  what  was  later 
decided  at  Tampere,  there  is  a  real  risk  that  the  full  development  of  the  area  of 
freedom,  security  and  justice  will  be  hampered.  " 
"Secondly 
... 
For  all  the  advances  made  at  Amsterdam,  the  separation  of 
issues  into  two  Pillars,  decision-making  by  unanimity,  a  shared  and  sometimes 
competing  right  of  initiative  for  the  Member  States  and  the  Commission,  and  the 
complexity  of  variable  geometry  have  proved  serious  brakes  on  the  efficient  delivery  of 
the  outcomes  heads  of  State  and  Government  want  to  see.  "  (The  European 
Convention's  Working  Group  X:  Freedom,  Security  and  Justice  (WG  X  WD  14,15 
November  2002:  4). 
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The  political  aspirations  of  the  interior  and  justice  Ministers  who  met  at  Tampere 
appeared  to  go  further  than  the  ToA  envisaged  as  the  JHA  agenda  developed  apace.  And  the 
structure  by  which  political  and  practical  progress  could  be  made  was  no  longer  considered  fit 
for  the  purpose.  There  was  perceived  a  need  to  anchor  the  JHA  agenda  more  firmly  to  the 
framework  of  EU  institutions  and  instruments  -  or  else  change  the  architecture  of  the  EU  so 
as  more  closely  to  reflect  policy  aspirations.  It  was  never  going  to  be  uncontroversial. 
At  time  of  writing  the  text  of  the  EU  constitution  has  been  agreed  but  not  yet  opened 
for  signature  so  the  following  discussion  is  based  on  the  draft  text  as  published  18  July  2003 
(OJ  2003/C  169/  1),  and  subsequent  amendments  (CIG  81/04  and  CIG  85/04,  June  2004). 
The  Constitution  repeals  previous  EU  treaties  (Article  IV-2)  and  makes  clear  its 
fundamental  approach: 
"Reflecting  the  will  of  the  citizens  13  and  States  of  Europe  to  build  a  common 
future,  this  Constitution  establishes  the  European  Union,  on  which  the  Member  States 
confer  competences  to  attain  objectives  they  have  in  common.  The  Union  shall  co- 
ordinate  the  policies  by  which  the  Member  States  aim  to  achieve  these  objectives,  and 
shall  exercise  in  the  Community  way  the  competences  they  confer  on  it.  "  (Constitution 
for  Europe,  Article  1-  1). 
The  aspirations  articulated  in  Article  29  ToA  1997,  regarding  the  establislunent  of  an 
area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice,  are  retained  in  Chapter  IV  of  Title  III  of  Part  III  of  the 
constitution.  There  are  two  guiding  principles,  mutual  recognition  and  respect  for  different 
legal  traditions: 
"The  Union  shall  offer  its  citizens  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice 
without  internal  frontiers,  and  a  single  market  where  competition  is  free  and 
undistorted.  11  (Constitutionfor  Europe,  Article  1-3). 
"The  Union  shall  constitute  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice  with 
respect  for  fundamental  rights  and  the  different  legal  traditions  and  systems  of  the 
MemberStates.  11  (Constitutionfor  Europe,  Article  III-158(l  )).  14 
"The  Union  shall  endeavour  to  ensure  a  high  level  of  security  by  measures  to 
prevent  and  combat  crime,  racism  and  xenophobia,  and  measures  for  co-ordination 
and  co-operation  between  police  and  judicial  authorities  and  other  competent 
authorities,  as  well  as  by  the  mutual  recognition  of  judgements  in  criminal  matters  and, 
if  necessary,  the  approximation  of  criminal  laws.  "  (Constitution  for  Europe,  Article  III- 
158(3)). 
13  Given  the  concern  expressed  by  the  June  2004  Brussels  European  Council,  (Presidency  Conclusions, 
10679/04:  paragraph  3)  about  the  low  voter  turn-out  in  the  2004  European  elections,  the  strength  of  the 
mandate  for  such  an  assertion  is  debatable. 
14  A  discussion  of  the  legal  implications  of  the  phrase  'area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice'.  within  the 
context  of  the  ToA  and  TEU,  is  to  be  found  in  Boeles  2001. 
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Specifically  in  relation  to  judicial  co-operation: 
"Judicial  co-operation  in  criminal  matters  in  the  Union  shall  be  based  on  the 
principle  of  mutual  recognition  of  judgements  and  judicial  decisions  and  shall  include 
the  approximation  of  the  laws  and  regulations  of  the  Member  States  in  the  areas 
referred  to  in  paragraph  2  and  in  Article  111-172",  (Constitution  for  Europe,  Article  III- 
171). 
"To  the  extent  necessary  to  facilitate  mutual  recognition  of  judgements  and 
judicial  decisions  and  police  and  judicial  co-operation  in  criminal  matters  having  a 
cross-border  dimension,  European  framework  laws  may  establish  minimum  rules.  Such 
rules  shall  take  into  account  the  differences  between  the  legal  traditions  and  systems  of 
the  Member  States",  (Constitutionfor  Europe,  Art.  III-172). 
The  subsequent  qualifications  in  Art.  III-171(2)  referred  to  in  Art-111-171  relate  to  the 
admissibility  of  evidence  between  Member  States,  the  rights  of  individuals  in  criminal 
procedures  and  the  rights  of  victims.  Art.  III-172  provides  that,  in  respect  of  terrorism, 
trafficking  in  human  beings  and  sexual  exploitation  of  women  and  children,  illicit  drug 
trafficking,  illicit  am-is  trafficking,  money  laundering,  corruption,  counterfeiting  of  means  of 
payment,  computer  crime  and  organised  crime; 
"European  framework  laws  may  establish  minimum  rules  concerning  the 
definition  of  criminal  offences  and  sanctions  in  the  areas  of  particularly  serious  crime 
with  cross-border  dimensions  resulting  from  the  nature  or  impact  of  such  offences  or 
from  a  special  need  to  combat  them  on  a  common  basis.  "  (Constitution  for  Europe, 
Art-III-172(l)). 
In  combination  the  message  seems  to  be  that  mutual  recognition  will  apply  wherever 
the  differences  between  different  national  jurisdictions  are  not  problematic  but  that  the  EU 
may  seek  the  approximation  or  harmonisation.  of  domestic  laws  in  order  to  achieve  Union 
objectives  (as  per  Art.  I-1)  where  it  is  considered  necessary  to  do  so  to  achieve  approximation 
or  harmonisation. 
The  strategic  lead  in  relation  to  JIIA  is  vested  in  the  European  Council  (Art.  111-159). 
National  parliaments  are  required  to  ensure  that  proposals  and  initiatives  comply  with  the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  and  are  afforded  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  such  pcer  evaluation 
of  implementation  as  may,  from  time  to  time,  be  executed  (Art.  111-  160:  this  would  include,  for 
instance,  any  re-evaluation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  to  assess  whether 
improvements  had  been  implemented).  There  is  an  article  on  Eurojust  (111-174)  which  brings 
this  Tampere  initiative  (Tampere  Presidency  Conclusions,  1999:  paragraph  46)  properly  into 
the  legislative  framework  of  the  EU,  and  an  article  on  Europol  (111-177)  reaffirming  the 
provisions  Of  the  ToA  1997.  Thus  these  institutions  are  identified  as  key  elements  of  the  EU 
RIA  infrastructure. 
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As  well  as  regularising  the  status  quo,  the  EU  Constitution  introduces  into  the  JIIA 
arena  the  new  concept  of  a  European  Public  Prosecutors  Office  [EPPO]  (Art.  111-175),  as  a 
complementary  initiative  alongside  Eurojust  and  Europol.  This  proposal  attracted  particular 
criticism  from  UK  Parliamentarians  and  illustrates  how  big  a  gap  remains  between  European 
policy  aspirations  and  perceptions  of  national  interest  among  Member  States.  The  Lords 
Select  Committee  on  the  European  Union  considered  the  proposal  "a  surprising  and 
undesirable  inclusion  in  the  new  Treaty"  (House  of  Lords  2003:  34).  The  Commons  European 
Scrutiny  Committee  regarded  the  idea  as  "impractical  and  likely  to  remove  the  prosecution 
function  from  democratic  accountability"  with  the  "potential  for  creating  an  engine  of 
oppression"  (House  of  Commons  2003:  i-5).  In  evidence  to  the  Scrutiny  Committee,  Peter 
Hain  MP,  Minister  and  UK  representative  at  the  European  Convention  on  the  Future  of 
Europe,  said  in  response  to  MPs'  questioning  about  the  EPPO:  "Yes,  we  are  still  opposed  to 
that  and  we  have  sought  in  our  amendments  to  delete  it"  (House  of  Commons  2003:  ii- 
Question  100). 
The  EPPO  article  was  not  deleted  from  the  constitution  but  the  ambition  for  this 
institution  was  severely  curtailed  in  amendment.  From  having  a  role  to  prosecute  all  "serious 
crimes  affecting  more  than  one  Member  State"  (Art.  III-175(2)  as  at  July  2003)  and  offences 
against  the  EU's  financial  interests  in  order  to  "combat  serious  crime"  (Art.  Ill-175(l)  as  at 
July  2003),  the  remit  of  the  EPPO  was  reduced  to  "offences  against  the  Union's  financial 
interests"  (Art.  III-175(2)  as  amended)  in  order  to  combat  financial  crime  against  the  EU 
(Art-III-175(l)  as  amended).  A  new  sub-clause  was  entered  into  the  draft  providing  a  way  to 
extend  the  remit  of  the  EPPO  at  some  future  date  subject  to  the  "European  Council  acting 
unanimously  after  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  European  Parliament  and  consulting  the 
COmn-lission"  (Art-Ill-I  75(4)).  For  the  time-being  it  appears  the  EPPO  will  prosecute  merely 
in  response  to  OLAF  investigations. 
Eurojust  and  Europol,  already  established,  proved  less  controversial.  The  clauses 
relating  to  Eurejust  were  also  subject  to  amendment  although  its  role  has  expanded.  Currently 
Eurojust  may  ask  the  competent  authorities  of  Member  States  to  consider  undertaking  and 
investigation  or  prosecution  of  specific  acts  (Council  Decision  setting  up  Eurojust,  28 
February  2002,  Articles  6&7,  OJ  2002/L  63/3).  Its  constitutional  powers  afford  Eurojust  the 
"initiation  of  criminal  investigations  as  well  as  proposing  the  initiation  of  prosecutions, 
conducted  by  competent  national  authorities,  particularly  those  relating  to  offences  against  the 
financial  interests  of  the  Union"  (Constitution  for  Europe,  Art.  111-1  74(2)(a)  as  amended). 
Following  such  initiation,  Eurojust  is  empowered  to  co-ordinate  such  investigations  and 
prosecutions  (Art.  111-174(2)(b)).  The  idea  that  Eurojust  should  supcrvise  Europol's  activities, 
proposed  in  early  discussions,  was  not  included  in  the  constitution,  although  it  did  meet  with 
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qualified  approval  from  the  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  which  recognised  that  the 
proposal  mirrored  prosecutorial  supervision  of  investigations  within  Civil  Code  jurisdictions 
and  saw  this  as  at  least  some  compensation  for  the  lack  of  supervision  by  European  courts 
(House  of  Lords  2003:  334)  and  lack  of  scrutiny  by  the  European  Parliament  (ibid.:  38).  The 
final  version  of  the  constitution  addresses  the  latter  concern  by  making  provision  for 
European  laws  to  stipulate  scrutiny  procedures  for  Europol  involving  both  the  European 
Parliament  and  Member  States'  national  parliaments  (Constitution  for  Europe,  Art.  111- 
177(2)). 
To  mirror  the  general  presumption  of  judicial  co-operation  (Constitution  for  Europe, 
Art-III-171  as  amended),  the  constitution  also  imposes  a  European  obligation  in  relation  to 
police  co-operation: 
"(1)  The  Union  shall  establish  police  co-operation  involving  all  the  Member 
States'  competent  authorities,  including  police,  customs  and  other  specialised  law 
enforcement  services  in  relation  to  the  prevention,  detection  and  investigation  of 
criminal  offences. 
(2)  To  this  end,  European  laws  or  framework  laws  may  establish  measures 
concerning: 
a)the  collection,  storage,  processing,  analysis  and  exchange  of  relevant 
information; 
b)support  for  the  training  of  staff,  and  co-operation  on  the  exchange  of  staff,  on 
equipment  and  on  research  into  crime-detection; 
c)common  investigative  techniques  in  relation  to  the  detection  of  serious  forms 
of  organised  crime. 
(3)  A  European  law  or  framework  law  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  may  establish 
measures  concerning  operational  co-operation  between  the  authorities  referred  to  In 
this  article.  The  Council  of  Ministers  shall  act  unanimously  after  consulting  the 
European  parliament.  "  (Constilutionfor  Europe,  Art.  I11-1  76:  the  UK  has  announced  its 
intention  of  opting  out  from  Art.  III-  I  71(2)(a)). 
The  Constitution  for  Europe  establishes  within  the  infrastructure  of  the  EU  key 
institutions,  competences  and  legislative  functions  that  enable  the  EU  to  guide  and  co- 
ordinate  action  by  Member  States  in  relation  to  JIIA.  The  hitherto  episodic  and  ad  hoc 
initiatives  (for  example  Dublin  1996,  Tampere  1999)  have  led  to  the  creation  of  a  formal 
architecture,  built  upon  the  foundations  of  the  ToA  1997.  Yet  as  the  policy  documents  post. 
Madrid  reveal,  lack  of  implementation  amongst  Member  States  severely  constrains  the 
effectiveness  of  these  measures. 
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The  private  perspective 
The  Constitution  for  Europe  is,  in  one  sense,  a  definition  of  the  relationship  between 
the  EU  and  its  citizens.  It  has  already  been  seen,  in  relation  to  the  EEW,  that  there  are 
concerns  about  protecting  citizens  (when  under  criminal  suspicion)  and  this  concern  extends 
to  other  aspects  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation. 
Such  issues  deserve  detailed  research  consideration  in  their  own  right.  But  it  is  worth  briefly 
highlighting  the  issues  in  order  to  balance  the  context  of  discussion  about  enhanced  State  co- 
operative  capability. 
The  mutual  legal  assistance  framework  has  been  established  primarily  for  enhancing 
co-operation  between  judicial  authorities  when  investigating  and  prosecuting  transnational 
crime.  Which  begs  the  question,  what  provision  is  made  for  the  accused  in  transnational 
investigations,  seeking  to  prepare  a  defence,  or  to  third  parties  caught  up  in  a  mutual  legal 
assistance  request  by  virtue  of  the  fact  they  have  the  capability  to  enable  investigator  access  to 
the  evidence  sought  (legal  or  financial  representatives  for  instance)? 
It  is  misleading  to  think  of  mutual  legal  assistance  defence  work  per  se.  Instead,  it  is 
more  appropriate  to  think  in  terms  of  private  practice  or  non-prosecutorial  mutual  legal 
assistance  work.  A  leading  private  practice  authority  on  mutual  legal  assistance,  Christopher 
MurTay,  15  has  made  relatively  few  defence  applications  under  §3  CJ(IQ  Act  1990  and  none  so 
far  under  the  new  legislation  (interview,  Murray  12  March  2004).  When  he  has  utilised  the 
measure,  it  has  usually  been  successful.  For  instance,  when  witnesses  refused  to  attend  the 
UK  to  testify,  mutual  legal  assistance  has  secured  from  them  either  a  statement  or  from  the 
court  an  order  to  travel  with  the  prosecutor  to  examine  the  witness  overseas. 
Much  of  Murray's  mutual  legal  assistance  work  involves  representing  third  parties 
caught  up  in  a  mutual  legal  assistance  request  or  representing  foreign  authorities  that  have 
transmitted  ILORs  to  the  UK  for  execution.  In  the  latter  circumstance  Murray  has  represented 
the  Canadian  government  and  the  Nigerian  government  because  foreign  governments 
requesting  assistance  "get  a  much  better  service'  if  they  are  represented  by  lawyers  in  the 
requested  State.  Among  the  third  parties  he  has  represented  have  been  witnesses  from  whom  a 
statement  is  being  sought  and  persons  or  companies  from  whom  evidence  is  being  sought  by 
way  of  a  requested  coercive  measure  and  whose  rights,  as  well  as  those  of  the  accuscd, 
deserve  to  be  protected.  16 
15  See  Murray  &  Ilarris,  2000  for  instance. 
16  More  detailed  discussion  of  specific  case  examples  is  to  be  found  in  Murray  &I  larris  2000:  111:  CPS 
on  behalfofthe  DPPforAustralia  v  Holman,  Fenwick  &  Willan  (a  law  firm)(unreported,  13  December 
1993;  and  Rv  InnerLondon  Crown  Court  exparte  Baines  &  Baines  (a  law  firm)  [1988]  1  Q.  B.  579. 
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The  position  or  status  of  both  the  suspect  and  the  partie  civile  within  mutual  legal 
assistance  structures  are  aspects  of  mutual  legal  assistance  that  merit  further  academic 
attention.  It  is  an  area  that  directly  engages  issues  under  the  ECHR.  The  partie  civile  -a  third 
party  other  than  the  accused  person  or  prosecutor,  usually  the  victim  -  is  regarded  differently 
from  State  to  State  but  in  general  the  victim  plays  a  more  active  role  in  Civil  Code 
investigations  and  trials  than  the  victim  would  in  a  Common  Law  trial.  In  the  latter  the  victim 
might  be  called  as  any  other  witness  but  in  France,  for  instance,  the  partie  civile  has  the  right 
to  address  the  criminal  trial  judge  and  be  represented  by  counsel  (Hatchard  et  al  1996:  72-73) 
whilst  in  Gen-nany  the  Victim  Protection  Act  1986  (Opferschutzgesetz)  affords  victims  of 
serious  crimes  an  active  part  in  the  proceedings  in  the  role  of  subsidiary  prosecutor  (ibid.:  145- 
6). 
This  concept  of  the  participating  victim  potentially  has  implications  for  the  way  in 
which  UK  investigators  respond  to  ILORs.  The  foreign  judicial  authority  conducting  the  pre- 
trial  investigation  may,  for  example,  issue  an  ILOR  in  respect  of  questions  the  victim  wants 
answered.  Alternatively,  a  UK  witness  summoned  to  give  evidence  at  trial  in  a  Civil  Code 
State  (unlikely  given  the  reliance  on  the  documentary  dossier  in  such  jurisdictions  but 
nevertheless  a  possibility),  may  be  subject  to  examination  by  the  judge  and  the  victim,  as  well 
as,  although  not  necessarily,  by  the  prosecutor  or  the  defence  counsel.  Since  victims'  rights 
are  protected  by  the  positive  obligations  imposed  on  public  authorities  by  the  ECIIR,  a  UK 
law  enforcement  agency  potentially  faces  action  for  violation  of  rights  from  a  victim  overseas 
in  the  event  of  n-dshandled  request  execution. 
By  far  the  more  frequently-voiced  cause  for  concern,  however,  is  the  protection  of  the 
rights  of  the  accused  within  mutual  legal  assistance  provisions.  Neither  the  ECMA  nor  the 
EUCMA  make  provision  for  accused  persons  to  gather  evidence  from  abroad  in  their  defence. 
This  is  a  consequence  of  the  underpinning  principle  in  Civil  Code  criminal  investigations  that 
the  investigating  judge  seeks  the  truth  of  what  has  occurred.  Only  the  investigating  judge  is 
responsible  for  gathering  evidence.  The  trial  judge  then  evaluates  the  evidence  and  determines 
the  outcome.  In  Common  Law  States  the  adversarial  trial  pits  the  evidence  selectively 
presented  by  the  prosecution  against  that  selectively  presented  by  the  defence.  Each  side  aims 
to  prove  thejustness  of  its  claim. 
Since  the  investigating  judge  in  a  Civil  Code  jurisdiction  is  charged  with  gathering  all 
relevant  evidence,  incriminating  or  exculpatory,  an  ILOR  executed  by  a  UK  investigator  on 
behalf  of  judicial  authorities  in  a  foreign  State  might  be  in  search  of  ! prosecution!  or  'defence' 
evidence.  Either  way,  the  actions  of  the  UK  agents  in  executing  the  request  will  be  subject  to 
scrutiny  under  Article  6  ECHR  (Right  to  Fair  Trial).  As  has  been  seen  from  the  SIO  interview 
data  (chapter  7  above)  the  compilation  of  the  proces  verbale  and  subsequent  defence  access  to 
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this  file  permitted  by  the  juge  dinstruction  has  caused  some  practical  problems  for  English 
investigators  and  prosecutors. 
For  a  person  accused  or  suspected  within  England  and  Wales  the  matter  is  rather 
different.  There  it  is  a  duty  imposed  on  investigators  to  pursue  "all  reasonable  lines  of 
enquiry"  (§23(l)(a)  Criminal  Procedure  &  Investigations  Act  1996  [CPIA])  and  so  discover 
both  incriminating  and  exculpatory  evidence.  The  effectiveness  of  this  legislation  (both 
prosecutors  and  defence  lawyers  regularly  allege  that  the  other  side  has  failed  to  comply  with 
its  respective  obligations)  has  been  reviewed  by  Sir  Robin  Auld  and  recommendations  for  its 
improvement  made  (Criminal  Courts  Review,  Summary,  paragraph  13,  www.  criminal-courts- 
review.  org.  uk/summary.  htm,  accessed  10  September  2001).  It  does  not  appear  to  amount  to 
the  same  duty  imposed  upon  the  investigating  judge  in  a  Civil  Code  State.  If  law  enforcement 
agents  in  the  UK  believe  they  have  sufficient  evidence  to  charge  a  suspect  (i.  e.  demonstrate 
all  the  points  to  prove  a  particular  offence),  then  as  soon  as  they  hold  this  belief  the  Police  & 
Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984  requires  that  the  suspect  must  be  charged  (§37(7)).  Under  these 
circumstances  the  investigators  may  not  decide  to  pursue  a  supplementary  line  of  enquiry 
abroad  that  would  prove  a  more  serious  offence,  which  appears  on  the  face  of  it  to  undermine 
the  political  strategic  aim  of  prosecuting  effectively  transnational  organised  crime. 
Far  more  likely  is  that  foreign  authorities  may  not  understand  or  be  willing  to  co- 
operate  with  English  disclosure  requirements.  US  authorities  are  notoriously  reluctant  to 
accede  to  disclosure  requests  being  "unimpressed"  by  the  concept  of  unused  material  that  may 
undermine  the  prosecution  case  or  assist  the  defence  (as  defined  in  the  CPI  Act  1996  and 
accompanying  Codes  of  Practice)  despite  the  concept  of  'discovery'  in  US  pre-trial 
Procedures  (CPS  representative  at  the  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum,  Home  Office,  30 
January  2004;  LaFave  et  al.  2000:  chapter  20).  The  relationship  between  the  CPI  .  4ct  and 
mutual  legal  assistance  provisions  is  worthy  of  further  exploration  by  both  practising  and 
academic  lawyers. 
If  an  accused  person  (already  charged  with  an  offence)  believes  that  there  is  evidence 
abroad  that  will  help  prove  innocence,  or  cast  doubt  upon  the  prosecution's  allegation,  then 
§7(3)  C(IQ  Act  2003  (which  updates  a  similar  provision  under  §3  CJ(1Q  Act  1990)  provides 
a  mechanism  for  request  to  be  assisted.  The  accused  person  may  apply  to  a  court  for  an  ILOR 
to  be  issued  but  has  no  more  guarantee  than  an  investigator  that  the  requested  State  will 
execute  the  request.  The  English  court  will  have  discharged  its  statutory  obligation  simply  by 
issuing  the  ILOR.  It  cannot  force  the  foreign  authorities  to  execute  the  request.  Unlike  the 
investigators,  the  accused  may  not  have  the  resources  to  make  precursor  enquiries  in  support 
of  such  a  request  or  the  resources  to  press  for  the  execution  of  such  a  request  in  the  event  of 
inordinate  delay.  Seeking  mutual  legal  assistance  can  be  "very  problematic"  for  accused 
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persons  (interview  Christopher  Murray,  Kingsley  Napley  Solicitors,  London,  12  March  2004; 
see  also  Van  Den  Wyngaert  &  Stessens  1995:  290).  To  that  extent  the  accused  appears  at  a 
disadvantage. 
In  the  US,  the  thought  of  permitting  accused  persons  access  to  mutual  legal  assistance 
mechanisms  is  an  anathema  (interview  Lystra  Blake,  Office  of  International  Affairs,  Dept  of 
Justice,  Washington  DC,  16  May  2001  and  reinforced  by  many  other  US  government  lawyers 
and  law  enforcement  officials).  Their  argument  is  that  the  accused  person  will  have  access  to 
all  the  material  they  need  simply  because  they  are  the  accused.  This  may  not  necessarily  be 
true  even  in  cases  where  the  correct  suspect  has  been  charged.  An  accused  person  seeking  to 
prove  a  Particular  point  might  need  access  to  evidence  abroad  that  can  only  be  secured  and 
adduced  through  coercive  action,  official  records  for  instance,  in  which  case  the  denial  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  forces  the  accused  to  request  such  coercion  in  a  private  capacity, 
which  may  not  be  an  option  available  to  them.  Such  a  request  made  to  the  US  authorities,  for 
instance,  may  simply  not  be  countenanced  because  of  US  official  attitudes  to  defence  requests 
(interview,  Blake).  In  other  instances  US  authorities  have  been  known  to  frustrate  a  defence 
exparte  request  under  §3  CJ(7Q  4ct  1990  by  disclosing  details  of  the  confidential  request  to 
English  investigators  and  the  CPS  (interview,  Murray). 
Even  if  an  accused  person  is  able  to  approach  witnesses  abroad  directly  and  seek 
their  voluntary  co-operation  and  attendance  at  trial  without  the  bureaucracy  involved  in  an 
ILOR,  the  accused  is  still  disadvantaged  because  defence  witnesses  seem  obliged  to  pay  their 
own  travel  expenses  (unlike  prosecution  witnesses).  Witnesses  cannot  be  compelled  to  attend 
and  give  evidence. 
Case  law  regarding  extradition  indicates  further  practical  lin-dtations  of  §3  CJ(IQ  Act 
1990.  In  Cuoghi  v  Governor  Brixton  Prison  and  another,  [1997]  1  WLR  1346,  the  applicant's 
extradition  was  sought  by  Swiss  authorities.  In  support  of  a  habeas  corpus  application  an 
ILOR  was  issued  on  behalf  of  Cuoghi.  This  was  subsequently  quashed  on  the  grounds  that  the 
CWQ  ACT  did  not  apply  to  Swiss  domestic  offences.  (See  also  Rv  Governor  Brixton  Prison 
and  another,  ex  parte  Evans  [  1994]  1  WLR  1006.  ) 
The  manner  in  which  evidence  to  be  used  against  them  is  collected  is  of  conccm  to 
accused  persons.  States  may  prefer  to  disregard  breaches  of  domestic  law  when  evidence  is 
gathered  abroad  in  favour  of  pursuing  their  own  prosecutions  (Gane  &  Mackarcl  1996:  104-5). 
Such  behaviour  is  prejudicial  to  an  accused  person.  Occasionally  this  issue  may  be  addressed 
if  provision  is  made  by  the  requested  State  for  the  defence  to  be  represented  when  prosecution 
witnesses  are  examined  abroad.  UK  investigators  requesting  evidence  are  under  no  obligation 
to  include  in  that  request  provision  for  the  defence  to  be  represented  when  it  is  so  secured. 
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Indeed,  such  representation  would  disrupt  on-going  proactive  investigations  into  transnational 
organised  crime.  "Neither  the  accused's  right  to  cross-examine  witnesses  nor  his  right  to  call 
defence  witnesses  is  absolute'  (Harris  et  aL  1995:  267).  In  such  circumstances  mutual  legal 
assistance  provisions  concerning  the  trial  testimony  of  witnesses  assume  great  significance  at 
least  in  Common  Law  adversarial  trials.  The  current  defence  preference  for  being  able  to 
cross-examine  prosecution  witnesses  in  person  may  be  tempered  if  the  only  way  a  witness 
will  agree  to  testify  on  behalf  of  the  accused  is  via  video  link.  The  prosecution  might  then 
protest  at  the  lack  of  opportunity  to  cross-examine  the  defence  witness  in  person  but  the  court 
will  almost  certainly  opt  for  the  lesser  of  the  two  evils  and  permit  live  video  testimony  rather 
than  deny  the  adducing  of  exculpatory  evidence. 
Within  Europe,  as  the  authorities  utilise  mutual  legal  assistance  instruments,  so 
individuals  resort  to  the  ECHR.  The  development  of  human  rights  case  law  has  run  parallel 
with  the  growing  need  for  enhanced  mutual  assistance  between  judicial,  prosecuting  and 
investigating  authorities.  Investigative  actions  that  violate  protected  rights  are  permissible  in 
certain  circumstances  provided  for  in  statute.  The  relationship  between  the  development  of 
human  rights  law  and  mutual  legal  assistance  law  that  permits  intrusive  investigation  is  thus  a 
subject  of  much  interest.  Norms  in  human  rights  philosophies  must  be  matched  by 
international  harmony  in  properly  authorised  use  of  intrusive  investigation  tactics.  In  the 
absence  of  such  cohesion,  the  effectiveness  of  mutual  legal  assistance  may  be  reduced  for  the 
investigator  (techniques  allowed  in  one  State  are  prohibited  in  another),  whilst  the  risk  of 
unwarranted  violation  arguably  is  increased  for  the  accused.  For  transnational  criminal 
investigation  to  be  effective  using  the  investigative  tactics  necessary  to  combat  sophisticated 
criminality,  mutual  legal  assistance  provisions  must  keep  pace  with  human  rights 
requirements  that  violations  be  founded  in  law  (Art.  8(2)  ECHR). 
When  requests  for  assistance  are  executed  between  national  jurisdictions,  it  is  unclear 
which  country  assumes  responsibility  for  safc-guarding  the  suspect's  rights  (Klip  1997:  456). 
ECHR  Commission  decisions,  insofar  as  they  offer  any  guidance,  have  regarded  evidence 
obtained  from  another  country  as  the  responsibility  of  the  requesting  state  (X  v  Germany, 
[1988]  10  EIIRR  521].  This  sits  uneasily  with  the  locus  regit  actum  principle  because  the 
requesting  State  has  little  or  no  control  over  how  the  requested  State  executes  the  request 
although,  as  already  been  observed,  this  principle  is  reversed  in  the  EUCAM. 
Domestic  caselaw  indicates  an  equivocal  approach  among  courts  and  prosecuting 
authorities.  Chinoy,  residing  in  France,  was  wanted  in  the  US  for  money-laundering.  Crucial 
evidence  to  support  his  prosecution  was  obtained  in  France  in  a  manner  contrary  to  French 
law.  On  a  visit  to  the  UK  Chinoy  was  arrested  on  behalf  of  US  authorities  who  then  sought 
his  extradition.  Chinoy  appealed  against  extradition  and  sought  to  have  the  French  evidcncc 
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excluded.  In  dismissing  his  appeal  (Rv  Governor  Pentonville  Prison,  exparte  Chinoy,  [19921 
1  All  ER  317)  Nolan  J  cited  Rv  Sang,  [1979]  2  All  ER  1222,  as  authority  for  adducing 
relevant  admissible  evidence  even  if  it  was  improperly  obtained.  Gane  &  Mackarel  describe 
this  as  "process  laundering"  by  the  US  authorities  in  order  to  use  otherwise  inadmissible 
evidence  (1996:  1134:  'process  laundering'  appears  synonymous  with  Schomburg's  concept  of 
'forum  shopping',  2000:  56). 
The  reverse  phenomenon  is  to  admit  evidence  obtained  lawfully  in  the  requested  State 
in  circumstances  that  would  not  be  lawful  in  the  requesting  State.  Belgian  courts  have 
admitted  evidence  obtained  in  France  according  to  French  law  and  in  compliance  with  the 
ECHR,  which  would  have  been  inadmissible  if  obtained  in  Belgium  (ibid.  ).  "Where  evidence 
is  obtained  abroad  its  admissibility  at  the  domestic  level  is  enhanced  by  effectively  applying 
the  lowest  available  threshold  for  the  admission  of  evidence.  Thus,  where  the  standard  of 
admissibility  at  the  domestic  level  is  lower  than  that  applied  in  the  foreign  jurisdiction,  the 
domestic  level  is  applied.  If,  however,  the  evidence  is  obtained  abroad  in  a  manner  which 
would  non-nally  render  the  evidence  inadmissible  if  such  methods  had  been  adopted 
domestically,  the  foreign  impropriety  is  ignored,  either  absolutely,  or  subject  to  qualification" 
(Gane  &  Mackarel  1996:  116). 
When,  as  in  the  Belgian  case  cited  here,  investigative  actions  are  undertaken  abroad 
that  comply  with  the  ECHR  but  breach  domestic  laws,  what  redress,  if  any,  is  there  for  the 
accused  person?  In  such  circumstances  applicants  to  the  Strasbourg  Court  may  have  to  rely  on 
the  margin  of  appreciation  (Harris  et  aL  1995:  12-15)  normally  applied  to  national  authorities. 
The  ECHR  has  influence  beyond  European  jurisdictions  and  has  provided  protection 
for  Member  State  citizens  at  jeopardy  from  non-European  authorities  in  relation  to  extradition 
(Soefing  v  UK  [1989]  11  EHRR  439).  It  could  therefore  be  argued  that  the  ECHR  applies  in 
circumstances  where  non-European  authorities  have  gathered  evidence  on  behalf  of  European 
investigators  in  a  manner  that  breaches  the  ECHR.  Non-European  requesting  States  may  find 
themselves  subject  to  the  provisions  of  a  European  convention,  even  though  they  are  not  party 
to  it. 
The  area  of  human  rights  and  mutual  legal  assistance  has  hithcrto  been  subject  of 
some  academic  comment  (Gane  &  Mackarel  1996;  Klip  1997)  but  will  undoubtedly  attract 
more.  Both  the  gathering  of  the  evidence  and  its  subsequent  admissibility  arc  important 
issues.  Evidence  obtained  abroad  is  currently  the  responsibility  of  the  rcqucstcd  State  (Art. 
13(2)  ECMA),  in  which  case  "it  might  not  be  appropriate  to  apply  national  norms  on 
admissibility"  (Klip  1997:  454).  But  the  EUCMA  allows  rcquesting  States  to  stipulate  how 
evidence  is  gathered  on  their  behalf  and  in  what  form  (Art.  4).  The  norms  of  adn-dssibility 
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should  then  cease  to  be  an  issue  for  a  trial  State,  whilst  the  convention  that  requested  States 
may  refuse  requests  contrary  to  their  own  domestic  law  should  afford  some  protection,  but 
this  has  not  always  been  true  in  the  past. 
Domestic  developments:  SOCA 
Moving  from  the  international  and  regional  issues  to  specific  UK  developments,  in 
March  2004  Home  Secretary  David  Blunkett  promised:  "we  will  create  a  new  Agency  tasked 
with  defeating  organised  crime"  (Home  Office  2004b:  iii)-  Despite  individual  successes  for 
existing  agencies  such  as  the  NCS  and  the  NCIS,  "we  have  not  yet  seen  reductions  in  the 
overall  harm  caused  by  organised  crime  on  the  scale  of  those  seen  for  volume  crime' 
(ibid.:  2).  The  new  Agency  will  amalgamate  the  current  functions  of  the  NCS,  the  NCIS,  the 
intelligence  and  investigative  work  of  RMCE  in  relation  to  serious  drug  trafficking  and  the 
Home  Office  functions  for  tackling  organised  immigration  crime.  This  radical  departure  from 
the  current  law  enforcement  infrastructure  in  England  and  Wales  is  considered  necessary 
because  of  the  new  challenges  posed  by  transnational  organised  crime  in  the  context  of 
increased  globalisation  and  an  increasing  disparity  between  rich  and  developing  nations 
(ibid.:  10-12). 
The  Home  Office  rightly  identifies  international  efforts  as  a  critical  success  factor  and 
once  again  lengthy  quotation  of  extracts  is  appropriate  to  establish  context: 
"Criminals  recognise  and  exploit  the  potential  of  borders  to  frustrate  law 
enforcement  action  against  them.  The  criminals'  task  can  be  made  easier  by  the  low 
priority  given  to  offences  not  harming  the  source  or  transit  country  or  by  law 
enforcement  in  some  countries,  particularly  those  with  weak  or  failing  governments  ... 
The  continuing  importance  of  engaging  foreign  governments  on  matters  of 
international  crime  is  demonstrated  in  the  Foreign  and  Commonwealth  Office's  eight 
strategic  priorities,  the  second  of  which  sets  an  objective  of  'protection  of  the  UK  from 
illegal  immigration,  drug  trafficking  and  other  international  crime'.... 
Much  bilateral  assistance  relies  on  smooth  and  effective  co-operation  between 
law  enforcement  agencies,  including  through  the  network  of  Interpol  bureaux 
... 
UK 
diplomatic  posts  host  over  120  UK  law  enforcement  liaison  officers  who  support 
domestic  and  enforcement  agencies  ... 
We  will  work  to  identify  any  practical  obstacles  to  operational  co-operation,  and 
use  diplomatic  effort  to  seek  to  overcome  these,  and  to  ensure  partner  Governments 
are  able  fully  to  deliver  their  international  obligations.  We  are  also  committed  to  getting 
best  results  out  of  the  extensive  mechanisms  which  already  exist  for  multilateral  co- 
operation... 
The  UK  is  an  active  and  leading  player  in  developing  more  effective  EU  action 
against  organised  crime.  Significant  advances  have  been  made  in  the  last  few  years  in 
developing  an  EU  framework  to  tackle  organised  crime,  built  on  the  principle  long 
advocated  by  the  UK  of  mutual  recognition  of  diverse  legal  systems.  * 
With  our  EU  partners,  we  are  seeking  to  develop  common  policies  to  tackle 
organised  crime  through  capacity  building  and  EU  Action  Plans,  such  as  in  new  and 
candidate  Member  States  and  the  Balkans.  EU  membership  is  a  key  objective  of  these 
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countries  and  it  is  essential  that  their  ability  to  tackle  serious  crime  reaches  EU 
standards... 
Ultimately,  international  co-operation  can  lead  directly  to  action  in  court  cases 
in  this  country.  Yet  the  handling  of  evidence  obtained  from  overseas  continues  to  be 
problematic.  The  Government  has  continued  to  seek  improvements  in  judicial  co- 
operation.  Modernisation  and  streamlining  of  legal  procedures,  for  example,  in 
extradition  cases  and  requests  for  foreign  evidence,  are  essential  for  effective 
investigation  and  prosecution  of  organised  international  crime,  and  for  tracing  and 
seizing  criminal  assets.  The  framework  for  such  co-operation  must  also  include  as 
many  countries  as  possible.... 
We  are  seeking  to  establish  whether  the  difficulties  of  operating  across 
different  jurisdictions  might  be  alleviated  by  further  legislation 
...  and  welcome  views  on 
this  issue.  "  (extracts  from  ibid.:  16-20). 
What  immediately  strikes  the  reader  is  how  far  the  Home  Office  has  travelled  in 
policy  terms  from  the  robust  rejection  of  European-level  co-operation  in  1959  (Appendix  A 
below)  and  its  mea  culpa  internal  review  of  1988  (p.  41  above).  Policy  collaboration  and 
operational  co-operation  are  now  the  mantra.  Consultation  is  actively  being  pursued.  17  The 
political  priority  that  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
now  enjoys  is  obvious  to  all. 
But  what  are  the  likely  implications  of  the  creation  of  such  an  Agency  for  mutual 
legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation?  What  difference  might  it 
make  to  the  issues  raised  during  this  research? 
The  proposed  name  for  the  agency  is  the  Serious  Organised  Crime  Agency  [SOCA] 
(Home  Office  2004b:  21).  Its  investigators  will  be  agents  rather  than  police  or  customs  officers 
-  thus  creating  a  new  type  of  law  enforcement  officer,  which  further  develops  the  innovation 
founded  in  §38  Police  Reform  Act  2002  that  enabled  senior  police  officers  to  designate 
suitably  trained  civilians  to  exercise  certain  specified  investigative  powers.  This  approach 
achieves  a  number  of  aims.  It  offers  the  political  opportunity  for  radical  and  headline- 
grabbing  policy  innovation:  a  fresh  start  to  deal  with  the  recently-recognised,  'new'  strategic 
threat  of  transnational  organised  crime  and  to  focus  on  outcomes  (reduced  harm  to  the 
community)  rather  than  outputs  (arrests  and  commodity  seizures).  It  separates  the  new  body 
from  any  negative  perceptions  associated  with  existing  police  agencies  and  the  label  'crime 
squad'  (the  former  regional  crime  squads  were  impeded  by  the  lack  of  corporate  status  as  held 
by  the  NCS  following  its  creation  in  1998  and  corruption  amongst  certain  officers  tainted  the 
name  of  the  West  Midlands  Crime  Squad  in  the  1970s  and  1980s).  It  separates  the 
investigative  arm  of  HMCE  from  the  recent  disastrous  series  of  failed  organised  crime 
prosecutions  (Butterfield  2003;  File  on  Four,  BBC  Radio  4  broadcast  16  March  2004, 
17  Such  a  clarion  call  further  supports  the  academic  case  for  the  present  research:  a  satisfying 
reinforcement  of  the  justification  for  such  research  just  as  the  thesis  was  being  written  up! 
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transcript  available  from  www.  bbc-co.  uk/radio4;  'Customs  stripped  of  the  right  to  prosecute 
after  failed  cases'  The  Independent  6  December  2003  P-9).  It  combines  in  a  single  entity 
intelligence  about  organised  crime  with  the  capability  to  take  enforcement  action  based  on 
such  intelligence;  a  potential  not  fully  realised  in  the  relationships  between  the  NCIS  and  its 
clients  such  as  the  NCS  (which  felt  it  necessary  to  develop  its  own  operational  intelligence 
capability  with  its  Central  Intelligence  Unit)  and  I-IMCE,  which  never  gave  up  its  intelligence 
capability  even  though  in  theory  the  NCIS  existed  to  service  HMCE  (from  which  organisation 
a  great  many  of  the  NCIS  staff  were  seconded).  Moreover,  it  offers  an  opportunity  to  dispel 
future  problems  arising  from  inter-agency  rivalry  as  illustrated  in  Chapter  7  (above). 
But  it  raises  serious  questions  left  unanswered  (in  some  cases  even  unasked)  in  the 
VAiite  Paper  about  some  of  the  functionality'of  the  NCIS  which  fits  very  well  with  a  criminal 
intelligence  service  servicing  local  and  national  law  enforcement  agencies  but  not  necessarily 
within  an  organisation  devoted  to  serious  organised  crime.  The  units  devoted  to  gathering, 
analysing  and  disseminating  intelligence  about  football  hooligans  and  individual  sex 
offenders  are  two  such  NCIS  departments  that  obviously  seem  to  fit  well  within  SOCA  since 
they  fail  the  organised  crime  'test':  "normally  working  with  others,  in  continuing  serious 
criminal  activities  for  substantial  profit,  whether  based  in  the  UK  or  elsewhere"  (Home  Office 
2004b:  7). 
The  impact  of  the  changes  on  the  Interpol  and  Europol.  bureaux  and  their  relationship 
with  local  forces  is  also  uncertain.  Currently  sited  in  the  NCIS,  which  has  successfully 
positioned  itself  as  an  information  and  intelligence  gateway  to  LJK  law  enforcement  for  both 
domestic  and  foreign  agencies,  the  co-location  of  the  two  bureaux  within  a  single  open-plan 
office  area  at  NCIS  HQ  has  contributed  much  to  the  work  of  the  two  international  agencies 
and  to  that  of  NCIS.  The  bureaux,  even  as  'tenants'  of  the  NCIS,  have  a  clear  identity  and,  as 
was  seen  in  Chapter  6  (above),  the  majority  of  local  police  force  investigators  regard  the 
Interpol  NCB  as  the  centre  of  excellence  within  the  NCIS  for  advice  on  international  co- 
operation. 
Would  the  Interpol  NCB  and  Europol  bureaux  appear  less  accessible  and  less  likely 
to  be  interested  in  local  force  assistance  if,  along  with  the  remainder  of  NCIS  departments, 
they  were  subsumed  within  the  functionally-specialist  SOCA  as'  appears  to  be  under 
consideration?  If  they  were  not  subject  to  the  overall  amalgamation,  where  else  would  they  sit 
in  terms  of  location  and  organisation?  The  functional  speciality  of  the  NCIS  focused  on 
intelligence  and  information  sharing.  It  was  logical  to  re-locate  the  Interpol  NCB  from  New 
Scotland  Yard  to  the  NCIS,  and  equally  logical  to  locate  the  Europol  office  there  when  that 
was  created.  But  the  same  argument  for  moving  the  Interpol  NCB  away  from  the 
Metropolitan  Police  Service  HQ  (because  the  Interpol  NCB  was  dominated  by  the  MPS  to  the 
Clive  Barfield.  Process  and  Practicalities  210 Chapter  9:  Mutual  legal  assistance  in  the  21"  Century 
detriment  of  others,  House  of  Commons  1990:  paragraphs  80-81)  is  an  equally  valid  reason 
for  not  locating  the  bureaux  within  SOCA.  There  must  be  a  potential  danger  that  the  Interpol 
NCB  will  align  itself  to  the  business  of  the  host  organisation  and  so  tend  to  neglect  the  very 
different  needs  of  local  police  forces.  In  the  US,  precisely  to  avoid  such  a  tendency,  the 
Interpol  NCB  sits  within  the  Department  of  Justice.  18 
It  is  apparent  from  data  cited  in  Chapter  7  that  Interpol,  whilst  providing  a  vehicle  for 
international  communication  between  law  enforcement  agencies  (when  planning  co-operative 
work  for  instance,  CS2,  or  when  circulating  information  about  wanted  persons),  cannot 
necessarily  meet  the  needs  of  investigators  engaged  in  dynamic  investigations  either  into 
completed  crimes  (CS3,  CS6)  or  crimes  in  action  (in  CS4  and  CS5  the  investigators  made  no 
use  of  Interpol  and  had  no  need  to).  Given  its  limited  operational  functionality,  how 
comfortably  would  Interpol  sit  within  an  agency  focused  on  proactive  investigation  of  crimes 
in  action?  SOCA  will  need  to  develop  its  own  mutual  legal  assistance  expertise  and  capability 
(both  lawyers  and  investigators)  but  this  need  will  not  necessarily  be  met  by  Interpol  or 
Europol. 
On  policy  issues,  particularly  within  Europe,  close  consultation  can  be  anticipated 
between  SOCA  and  Europol  but  rather  like  the  problems  already  being  encountered  with  the 
EPCOTF,  will  SOCA  be  able  effectively  to  represent  the  interests  of  the  remainder  of  UK  law 
enforcement,  particularly  if  it  is  not  a  police  agencyper  se? 
These  are  issues  that  can  only  be  highlighted  here  as  the  project  team  is  assembled 
and  begins  work  on  creating  the  new  agency  which  is  scheduled  to  become  operational  in 
2006.  The  impact  of  SOCA  on  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  in  the  UK  is  a 
matter  worthy  of  future  academic  study.  How  the  SOCA  project  team  will  address  such 
uncertainty  remains  to  be  seen. 
Domestic  developments:  mutual  leizal  assistance  review 
The  EU  peer  evaluation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  in  Member  States  was 
well  under  way,  although  the  UK  had  not  yet  been  inspected,  when  the  Home  Office 
commissioned  a  review  of  mutual  legal  assistance  in  the  UK,  recruiting  from  the  Serious 
Fraud  Office  Loma  Harris,  a  senior  lawyer  experienced  in  mutual  legal  assistance,  to 
undertake  the  review  as  the  new  head  of  the  UKCA.  The  ten-ns  of  reference  are  set  out  in 
Table  12. 
18  Federal  agencies  second  staff  to  the  Interpol  NCB  in  Washington  DC  and  in  doing  so  the  NCB  has 
become,  de  facto,  a  vehicle  through  which  US  federal  agencies  communicate  with  each  other  in 
circumstances  in  which  they  might  not  otherwise  do  so,  if  only  because  the  NCB  is  acting  as  a  clearing 
house  for  incoming  requests. 
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Table  12:  tenns  ofreference  for  the  rMew  ofmittual  legal  assistance,  2000 
0  The  role  of  the  central  authority  in  the  execution  of  mutual  legal  assistance  requests,  including  in  the 
light  of  the  EU's  Schengen  provisions  on  direct  transmission  between  judicial  authorities; 
e  Ile  location,  operational  procedures  and  staffing  of  such  a  unit; 
0  The  role  of  the  designated  prosecuting  authorities  in  the  preparation  of  requests  for  mutual  legal 
assistance; 
The  role  of  agencies  in  the  execution  of  requests  for  assistance; 
The  relationship  of  the  UKCA  in  the  Home  Office,  with  the  central  points  in  the  devolved 
administrations  in  Scotland  and  Northern  Ireland; 
9  The  provision  of  adequate  management  information; 
Current  legislative  provisions  and  the  impact  of  international  instruments; 
0  Anticipated  legislative  requirements  resulting  from  the  new  international  instruments,  and  from  the 
revicw. 
Questionnaire  surveys  were  conducted  with  key  partner  departments  and  agencies 
relating  to  mutual  legal  assistance  legislation  and  the  role  of  the  central  authority  and  the 
results  circulated  in  two  discussion  papers  in  August  2001.19  The  review  then  went  into  Matus 
for,  as  a  circulated  discussion  document  put  it  with  masterly  understatement,  "a  series  of 
operational  pressures  and  changes  to  proposals  for  legislation 
...  resulted  in  a  delay  of  the 
review"  (Home  Office  2004a:  paragraph  1.2).  In  the  aftermath  of  the  terrorist  attacks  on  New 
York  and  Washington  DC,  the  staff  undertaking  the  review  were  diverted  from  the  review  and 
consideration  of  how  best  to  implement  the  EUCMA  in  UK  legislation  to  new  legislation  such 
as  the  A  TCS  Act  200  1,  and  certain  sections  of  the  Police  Reform  Act  2002  in  an  immediate 
response  to  the  political  imperatives  arising  from  the  attacks.  There  immediately  followed  an 
effort  to  bring  the  EUCAM  into  UK  legislation  (the  C(IQ  Bill)  as  soon  after  the  December 
2002  deadline  for  enactment  as  possible. 
"As  a  result  of  these  operational  and  legislative  pressures,  the  review  has  had  to  be 
broken  down  into  component  elements  and  both  undertaken  and  implemented,  at  least  in  part, 
in  a  more  piecemeal  way  than  originally  intended.  "  (ibid.:  paragraph  1.3). 
Not  only  was  the  piecemeal  approach  not  was  originally  intended,  it  was  clearly  far 
from  ideal.  The  ideal  would  have  been  to  have  a  single  piece  of  legislation  that  implemented 
considered  policy  following  comprehensive  consultation  and  review  but  the  political  need  to 
be  seen  to  be  doing  something  as  soon  as  possible  as  a  response  to  President  Bush's  'war  on 
19  1  am  grateful  to  staff  at  the  UKCA  for  providing  me  copies  of  the  discussion  papers  and 
questionnaire  results.  Subsequently  having  become  an  attendee  at  the  Home  Office  Mutual  Legal 
Assistance  Forum,  the  present  author  also  received  a  copy  of  a  further  circulated  discussion  document 
(Home  Office  2004a).  All  this  unpublished  documentation  has  informed  the  remarks  made  here. 
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terrorism'  denied  the  Home  Office  such  luxury.  Policy  was  made  and  enacted  on  the  hoof. 
Hence  the  ultimately  redundant  sections  III  and  112  of  the  A  TCS  Act  2001  in  which  the 
Government  sought,  without  precedent  and  ultimately  in  vain,  to  introduce  certain  EU  mutual 
legal  assistance  measures  by  way  of  secondary  legislation.  Hence  the  inclusion  of  Jrr  liability 
legislation  in  the  Police  Reform  Act  2002  because  that  happened  to  offer  a  convenient 
alternative  vehicle  for  enacting  at  least  that  particular  initiative.  Hence  the  discomfort  in 
Committee  of  Bob  Ainsworth  MP,  the  then  Home  Office  Minister,  as  the  opposition  probed 
to  discover  just  who,  besides  police  constables  and  customs  officers,  the  Home  Secretary  had 
in  mind  when  seeking  the  ability  to  prescribe  "others"  as  having  the  authority  to  assist  in 
evidence  gathering  under  sections  13-26  C(IQ  Act  2003.  The  Minister  conceded  that  the 
Government  had  no  idea  at  that  stage  who  else  might  be  so  empowered:  "we  have  no 
immediate  plans  to  confer  powers  on  other  authorities,  but  a  general  review  of  our  mutual 
legal  assistance  system  is  in  progress  ...  that  must  be  considered  in  the  review  of  our  mutual 
legal  assistance  provisione',  (HC  Hansard  Standing  Committee  A,  12  June  2003  col.  122). 
Clear  evidence  that  with  the  C(IQ  Act  2003  the  job  was  only  half  done  and  the  Government 
had  yet  to  identify  the  full  catalogue  of  changes  necessary  to  make  the  UK's  mutual  legal 
assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  regime  fit  for  purpose  in  the  fight 
against  twenty-first  century  crime. 
Not  until  January  2004  could  the  UKCA  resume  work  on  the  mutual  legal  assistance 
review  free  from  the  burden  of  preparing  new  legislation  and  monitoring  it  through 
Parliament,  by  which  time  the  co-operation  landscape  had  changed  significantly.  The  Home 
Office  discussion  paper  of  January  2004  updates  the  discussion  presented  originally  in  the 
papers  of  August  2001,  in  the  light  of  changed  political  circumstance  and  recently  enacted 
legislation.  But  the  January  2004  paper  has  itself  been  overtaken  by  events  with  the 
publication  of  the  White  Paper  discussing  a  twenty-first  century  strategy  to  defeat  organised 
crime  (Home  Office  2004b). 
The  most  significant  change  that  must  be  brought  about  is  the  system  to  permit  direct 
transmission  of  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  between  judicial  authorities;  easier  to  achieve 
in  Civil  Code  jurisdictions  than  in  the  UK.  Pending  discovery  of  a  way  of  doing  this 
successfully,  the  UK  has  opted  out  of  the  direct  transmission  provisions  of  the  EUCMA 
(Home  Office  2004a:  paragraph  5.3).  In  consequence  the  French  authorities  have  declared  that 
they  will  not  accept  direct  transmission  from  UK  authorities  until  the  UK  is  in  a  position  to 
reciprocate.  The  role  and  location  of  the  central  authority  have  yet  to  be  agreed  upon.  A 
central  authority  is  still  required  pursuant  to  bilateral  MLATs  with  non-EU  States.  Three 
options  are  under  consideration: 
9  Move  the  UKCA  to  another  department  of  government 
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0  Transfer  the  function  of  the  UKCA  to  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  and 
CPS 
e  Enhance  the  functionality  of  the  UKCA  by  giving  it  capability  to  execute 
requests  itself 
None  of  these  options  is  without  significant  problems  and  thus,  at  time  of  writing,  the 
review  remains  a  work  in  progress.  Realistically  this  work  cannot  be  finalised  until 
consultation  and  review  of  the  organised  crime  White  Paper  has  concluded,  and  any  new 
legislation  required  (for  instance  to  relocate  the  UKCA)  is  unlikely  to  be  accommodated  in 
the  Parliamentary  schedule  until  the  Queen's  Speech  of  2005.  Depending  upon  prevailing 
circumstances,  that  may  mean  that  the  Bill  is  a  'Fifth  Session  Bill',  vulnerable  to  the  political 
tactics  of  a  Prime  Minister  who  will  be  obliged  to  call  a  general  election  at  some  point  during 
that  Session. 
Conclusion 
So  might  any  of  this  new  work  address  the  practitioner  issues  identified  in  this 
research? 
The  JIT,  ECPOTF  and  Liaison  Magistrate  initiatives  all  have  the  potential  to  utilise 
the  value  widely  perceived  in  personal  working  relationships.  Early  success  has  been  noted 
with  the  Liaison  Magistrates  and  the  first  JIT  will  no  doubt  be  monitored  with  great  interest. 
But  within  the  ECPOT'F,  confusion  about  which  domestic  agencies  should  represent  their 
particular  national  jurisdiction  illustrates  the  continued  risk  of  inter-agency  rivalry  hobbling 
international  law  enforcement  co-operation. 
Access  to  a  cross-border  surveillance  capability  is  likely  to  be  as  positive  an 
experience  for  UK  agencies  as  it  has  been  for  their  Continental  counter-parts.  It  enables  some 
tactical  spontaneity  which,  as  was  seen  in  CS4,  can  be  an  issue  for  SIOs  commanding  a 
proaCtive  transnational  investigation  in  which  the  suspects  retain  the  element  of  surprise.  But 
sustained  political  opposition  within  the  UK  may  agitate  for  reasons  to  withdraw  from 
Schengen,  and  the  Gibraltar  issue  means  that  access  to  this  capability  is  still  denied  to  UK 
agencies. 
The  Constitution  for  Europe  provides  the  legislative  framework  for  mutual 
recognition  as  the  way  forward  and  regularises  the  JHA  Acquis  that  was  in  danger  of 
increasing  incrementally  rather  than  within  a  strategic  fi-amework  founded  upon  legal  and 
constitutional  certainty.  Regardless  of  political  perspectives,  increased  legal  and  constitutional 
certainty  is,  without  doubt,  beneficial.  Supporters  and  opponents  will  at  least  be  clearer  about 
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the  concerns  at  issue.  But  the  Constitution  will  not  resolve  difficulties  arising  from  different 
procedural  laws  (evidential  disclosure  and  intelligence  handling,  for  instance),  nor  will  it 
resolve  different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  although  it  has 
the  potential  to  enshrine  common  values. 
The  use  of  the  EEW  as  an  alternative  to  ILORs  within  the  EU,  if  accepted  across  the 
EU,  will  be  dependent  upon  the  level  of  trust  invested  in  mutual  recognition  -  the  issue  of 
working  relationships  once  again.  The  adoption  of  the  EEW  will  not  resolve  all  the  issues 
identified  in  Chapter  8  regarding  testimony  and  the  adducing  of  foreign  evidence.  Nor  will  it 
necessarily  resolve  the  issues  of  timeliness  as  delays  are  caused  not  by  the  issuing  of  an  ILOR 
but  by  its  execution,  and  that  will  be  equally  true  for  EEWs.  Nor  will  it  necessarily  overcome 
the  sorts  of  problems  caused  by  variable  interpretations  of  the  functions  of  an  ILOR.  There 
may  evolve  just  as  many  variations  on  how  an  EEW  might  be  used. 
The  Constitution  also  provides  for  a  pan-European  prosecution  capability  despite 
Parliamentary  opposition  to  the  proposal.  The  working  relationships  between  the  EPPO, 
Eurojust  and  domestic  prosecution  agencies  may  well  generate  furious  debate.  It  is  not  a 
proposal  geared  towards  resolving  the  practical  problems  arising  from  the  different 
characteristics  of  adversarial  and  inquisitorial  prosecution  services.  English  investigators  and 
prosecutors  will  still  be  the  odd  ones  out. 
But  the  Constitution  appears  to  depend  upon  the  ECHR  for  protection  of  personal 
rights  and  due  process  norms,  and  the  new  provisions  focus  primarily  on  enhancing  law 
enforcement  capability  without  balancing  this  increased  provision  with  a  restatement  of  due 
process  protections.  Both  the  EEW  and  the  issues  concerning  due  process  protections  for 
suspects  subject  to  a  transnational  investigation  warrant  further  research  study. 
Domestically,  the  on-going  mutual  legal  assistance  review  cannot  yet  be  commented 
upon  but  the  progression  towards  the  new  SOCA  is  gathering  pace.  This  is  one  potential 
mechanism  for  overcoming  some  of  the  problems  of  inter-agency  rivalry,  although  as  the 
interviewee  in  CS5  noted,  better  operational  co-ordination  is  the  key  and  this  may  not 
necessarily  be  derived  from  amalgamating  existing  agencies.  The  way  in  which  the 
organisational  culture  of  the  new  agency  evolves  will  significantly  influence  whether  it 
succeeds  or  fails  and  amalgamation  may  lead  to  the  incorporation  of  deep-seated  prejudices 
wit1iin  the  new  culture  despite  the  logic  of  such  a  re-organisation  in  trying  to  eradicate  such 
impediments.  There  is  also  uncertainty  about  the  future  of  the  Interpol  and  Europol  UK 
bureaux  that  must  be  resolved  quickly  and  in  a  way  that  does  not  effectively  divorce  these 
institutions  from  the  wider  LJK  law  enforcement  community. 
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Whilst  the  initiatives  that  have  emerged  during  the  course  of  this  research  all  connect 
in  some  way  with  most  of  the  concerns  identified  by  SlOs  and  local  force  international  liaison 
officers,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  concerns  identified  in  this  research  will  be  fully 
addressed  even  if  the  initiatives  succeed.  There  remains  plenty  of  scope  for  the  current 
problems  to  prevail,  even  if  in  modified  form.  And,  of  course,  there  is  always  the  potential  for 
new  problems,  as  yet  unforeseen,  to  emerge.  Problems  in  international  relations  also  have  the 
potential  to  derail  mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation 
Progress  (for  instance,  the  troubled  relations  between  the  UK  and  Spain  over  Gibraltar). 
Where  there  is  hope  is  in  the  increased  willingness  to  debate  the  issues  and  at  least  try 
to  resolve  them.  Nowhere  has  this  been  more  apparent  than  in  the  attitude  of  the  Home  Office. 
The  EU,  too,  is  now  much  more  focused  on  addressing  JIIA  issues  (Mitsilegas  et  aL  2003). 
Progress  depends  upon  political  will.  With  increased  dialogue,  particularly  dialogue  that 
includes  stakeholder  practitioners,  comes  increased  opportunity  to  resolve  the  issues. 
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Chapter  10 
United  in  diversity? 
As  has  already  been  alluded  to,  at  the  outset  of  this  research  neither  the  Home  Office 
nor  the  author  anticipated  the  extent  to  which  the  mutual  legal  assistance  arena  being  studied 
would  change  during  the  life-time  of  this  work.  After  all,  the  UK's  record  in  mutual  legal 
assistance  between  1870  and  1990  was  hardly  characterised  by  a  vigorous  dynamism.  Yet 
what  began  as  a  work  of  political  commentary  became,  by  force  of  circumstance,  more  a 
work  of  contemporaneous  historical  record  as  the  1990  UK  statutory  regime  supporting 
mutual  legal  assistance  (CJ(IC)  Act)  was  replaced  by  the  2003  statutory  regime  (C(IQ  Act) 
while  the  thesis  was  being  written  (and  re-written!  ).  Despite  the  changing  political  and 
legislative  contexts,  the  research  remained  valid  and,  arguably,  became  more  topical  than 
could  have  been  realised  at  the  outset.  The  original  aspiration,  that  a  review  of  the 
practicalities  experienced  by  investigators  using  the  1990  legislation  might  be  offered  to  the 
Home  Office  to  inform  future  policy  considerations,  was  realised  if  a  little  more  rapidly  that 
might  have  been  expected  and  considerations  arising  from  this  research  informed  both  the 
author's  work  at  G8  concerning  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  his 
contributions  to  the  Home  Office  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  Forum.  Written  submissions  based 
on  this  research  have  been  made  both  to  the  Home  Office  mutual  legal  assistance  review  and 
to  the  Government's  consultation  exercise  seeking  views  on  the  White  Paper  proposals  for  a 
new  agency  to  tackle  transnational  organised  crime  (Home  Office  2004b). 
This  thesis  will  be  submitted  before  the  Government's  consultations  and  subsequent 
deliberations  are  concluded.  Indeed,  at  the  current  rate  of  progress  it  will  be  submitted  before 
the  C(IQ  Act  2003  comes  fully  into  force.  At  time  of  writing  this  conclusion  (late  surnmer 
2004)  the  diplomatic  problems  concerning  the  status  and  sovereignty  of  Gibraltar  look  set  to 
impede  UK  progress  in  mutual  legal  assistance  within  Europe.  Spain  has  concerns  about  the 
UK's  membership  of  Schengen  because  of  the  border  implications  for  Gibraltar.  Until  the  UK 
is fully  accepted  by  other  States  into  those  parts  of  the  Schengen  Convention  in  which  the  UK 
wishes  to  participate,  the  UK  cannot  ratify  the  EUCMA  and  so  implement  its  measures.  It  had 
been  hoped  that  the  UK  would  ratify  the  EUCMA  in  April  2004.  There  is  currently  no 
scheduled  date  for  ratification.  As  of  late  summer  2004  the  EUCMA  still  requires  a  further 
three  ratifications  in  order  to  come  in  force  within  the  EU. 
Mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal  matters  came  about  as  a  result  of  the  need  for 
jurisdictions  to  be  able  to  repatriate  through  extradition  fugitives  from  justice.  This  need  was 
Clive  Harfeld.,  Process  and  practicalities  217 Chapter  10:  Processes  andpracticalities 
first  recognised  and  addressed  in  the  nineteenth  century.  In  the  aftermath  of  World  War  II, 
within  a  context  of  the  search  for  war  criminals,  there  emerged  an  international  consensus  that 
ad  hoc  and  bilateral  extradition  arrangements  could  and  should  be  supplemented  by  a 
multilateral  convention  in  Europe,  just  as  human  rights  norms  had  been  established  through 
such  instruments  within  the  UN  and  Europe.  Almost  as  an  afterthought  upon  conclusion  of 
the  extradition  convention,  provisions  were  made  for  evidential  assistance  in  support  of 
extradition  measures.  The  political  rationale  underpinning  these  initiatives  was  the  need  to 
preserve  national  sovereignty  by  protecting  the  integrity  of  national  jurisdiction  and  ensuring 
that  criminal  fugitives  could  not  easily  evade  justice.  The  processes  for  achieving  this  aim 
were,  unsurprisingly,  formal  and  diplomatic  in  character. 
Ultimately,  in  the  UK,  this  resulted  in  the  CJ(IQ  Act  1990  and  a  statutory  regime  in 
which  the  diplomatic  Commission  Rogatoire  familiar  within  the  Foreign  Office  was 
transformed  into  an  ELOR  process  administered  by  the  Home  Office,  a  further  guarantee 
against  possible  violations  of  sovereignty.  What  changed  was  the  nature  of  the  threat  to 
national  sovereignty. 
The  debate  about  whether  or  not  transnational  organised  crime  is  a  threat  to  national 
security  is  largely  a  diversion  that  matters  most  to  agencies  that  feel  threatened  by  the  roles 
and  remits  of  other  agencies.  '  It  can  occasionally  result  in  unwelcome  by-products  such  as  ill- 
considered  legislation  or  policies  that  fail  to  recognise  the  distinction  between  the  immediacy 
of  actual  organised  crime  leading  to  daily  harm  in  local  communities  compared  with  the 
perceived  permanent  threat  of  terrorism  leading  to  irregular  (albeit  spectacular)  atrocities.  The 
relevant  priorities  differ;  intelligence  is  required  to  prevent  the  latter  while  evidence  is 
required  to  prosecute  the  former.  The  intelligence  and  evidential  communities  operate  in 
different  ways  for  different  aims  and  are  not  always  well  served  by  instruments  intended  to 
approximate  both  objectives.  A  national  security  threat  is  not  necessarily  a  threat  to  national 
sovereignty;  the  latter  is  evident  in  the  undermining  of  national  jurisdiction  by  those  capable 
of  evading  it. 
It  is  in  the  latter  category  that  there  has  been  witnessed  a  change  of  degree  and 
emphasis.  The  original  mutual  legal  assistance  framework  was  intended  to  address  the 
problems  posed  by  those  who  committed  a  crime  in  State  A  and  then  went  to  State  B  to 
escape  justice.  With  the  economic  infrastructure  of  the  late  twentieth  and  early  twenty-first 
1  The  Home  Office  MLA  Forum  demonstrates  its  own  interesting  political  dynamics.  Chaired  by  the 
head  of  UKCA,  a  former  HMCE  lawyer,  the  forum  is  dominated  by  IIMCE  lawyers  (six  at  the  last 
meeting  compared  to  the  three  sent  by  the  CPS).  No  other  agency  feels  the  need  to  send  so  many 
representatives  to  this  meeting.  Not  a  little  ironic  given  the  criticism  of  I  IMCE  lawyers  in  the  1999  and 
2000  case  reviews  by  Sir  Gerald  Hosker  and  Gerald  Butler  QC  respectively,  the  departmental  review  of 
Gower  &  Hammond  (2000)  and  the  Butterfield  Report  (2003);  all  leading  to  the  establishment  of  an 
independent  customs  prosecution  service. 
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centuries,  it  is  now  possible  to  commit  serious  crimes  in  State  A  without  ever  going  there. 
Indeed,  it  is  possible  and  often  necessary  for  the  multinational  criminal  businesses  to  structure 
their  activities  through  a  variety  of  national  jurisdictions  because  of  the  economic  structure  of 
their  criminality  (product-sourcing  in  one  State  in  order  to  feed  a  market  in  another  State, 
transporting  the  illicit  products  via  however  many  States  might  lie  between  source  and 
market).  The  diplomatic  processes  of  nineteenth-century  mutual  legal  assistance,  formalised 
into  international  norms  through  the  ECMA,  were  well  structured  to  enable  extradition  with 
supporting  evidence  (the  primary  aim)  in  a  way  in  which  agents  of  the  requesting  State  were 
least  likely  to  cause  diplomatic  offence  to  the  requested  State  (the  secondary  aim).  It  has  been 
conceded  by  all  EU  governments  that  such  structures  cannot  cope  with  the  new  transnational 
criminality  that  emerged  in  the  latter  part  of  the  twentieth  century. 
The  problems  it  caused  government  officials  and  their  administrative  processes  were 
highlighted  in  the  EU  peer  evaluation  review  of  mutual  legal  assistance  conducted  in  1999- 
2001  leading  to  a  number  of  reforms  both  at  national  and  EU  level.  Some  of  the  problems 
caused  to  investigators  were  hinted  at  in  Nicholson  &  Harrison's  survey  of  1996  (which 
principally  highlighted  a  lack  of  awareness  and  expertise  amongst  police  investigators)  and  by 
the  survey  and  case  studies  undertaken  for  this  PhD  which  have  detailed  the  practical 
problems  current  processes  pose  for  reactive  investigators  at  local  force  level  and  proactive 
investigators  at  national  level  tackling  transnational  organised  crime.  The  documentation  of 
these  practical  problems  is  an  important  contribution  to  what  is  now  a  vigorous  debate. 
Mutual  legal  assistance  and  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  have  risen  high  upon 
the  political  agenda,  initially  because  of  EU  concerns  expressed  at  Dublin  (1996)  and  then 
Tampere  (1999).  Transatlantic  impetus,  with  the  potential  to  derail  European  progress 
because  of  different  perceptions  (Harfield  2003),  was  injected  following  the  9/11  attacks.  In 
the  UK  prosecutors  are  beginning  to  adopt  a  more  proactive  role  in  relation  to  mutual  legal 
assistance  which  is  a  move  for  the  better. 
Repatriating  fugitives  remains  important  and  has  now  been  joined  on  the  priority  list 
by  the  repatriation  (or  at  the  very  least  confiscation)  of  criminal  proceeds.  2  Extradition  and 
mutual  legal  assistance  processes  put  in  place  fifty  years  ago  to  protect  sovereignty  by 
ensuring  that  national  agents  do  not  offend  foreign  jurisdictions  and  that  fugitives  cannot 
escape  now  militate  against  its  protection  because  they  are  open  to  exploitation  by  the 
increasing  number  of  criminals  and  criminal  groups  operating  across  national  borders.  To 
adhere  to  mutual  legal  assistance  processes  that  reinforce  and  protect  national  sovereignty 
along  traditional  lines  perversely  reinforces  the  very  structures  exploited  by  transnational 
2  Both  the  operation  of  new  extradition  and  asset  recovery  laws  are  each  equally  worthy  of  concerted 
academic  study,  probably  with  the  capacity  to  sustain  a  number  of  PhDs. 
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criminals  for  their  own  protection  against  prosecution.  The  process  was  in  danger  of 
becoming  self-defeating. 
In  principle  then,  traditional  mutual  legal  assistance  structures  may  no  longer  be  fit 
for  purpose  because  of  the  way  in  which  they  seek  to  protect  sovereignty  and  because  of  the 
way  in  which  sovereignty  is  viewed  as  sacrosanct  and  invulnerable.  Sacrosanct  it  may  be  but 
invulnerable  it  is  not,  either  to  legitimate  international  influences  (economics,  international 
relations,  foreign  policies)  or  illegitimate  (transnational  organised  crime).  From  the  invidious 
pervasion  of  transnational  crime,  no  single  government  can  protect  its  sovereignty.  Each 
needs  the  help  of  others.  This  has  been  recognised  in  the  last  five  years  particularly  in  the  EU 
which  has  generated  a  plethora  of  initiatives  with  consequential  impact  upon  UK  legislation. 
But  the  focus  has  been  on  updating  traditional  infrastructures  rather  than  rethinking  the 
paradigm  and  such  an  approach  does  not  address  all  the  problems.  This  seems  evident  from 
the  lack  of  correspondence  between  areas  of  concern  identified  by  officials  in  the  EU  survey 
and  areas  of  concern  identified  by  investigators  in  this  present  research.  And  here  the  two 
different  data  sets  utilised  in  this  research  have  reinforced  this  distinction  because  some  of  the 
major  issues  arising  from  the  SCQ  data  (drawn  from  reactive  investigators)  may  well  be 
addressed  in  due  course  by  some  of  the  innovations  emerging  as  a  result  of  the  EU  peer 
evaluation  survey  but  reforms  based  solely  on  the  latter  will  not  resolve  the  issues  raised  by 
SlOs  in  the  mainly  proactive  case  studies. 
Time  and  again  in  this  research  interviewees  have  stressed  the  value  of  close  and 
spontaneous  communication  between  key  players.  Extant  forr-nal  mutual  legal  assistance 
communication  processes  are  far  from  spontaneous,  nor  are  they  particularly  close.  The  direct 
transmission  of  requests  permissible  under  the  EUCAM,  if  fully  adopted  (there  are  worrying 
differences  in  the  interpretation  of  direct  transmission  based  on  various  adoption  strategies 
pending  the  EUCAM  coming  into  force  (UKCA  2004:  1)),  may  speed  up  part  of  the 
Communication  process  but  it  is  the  preparatory  communication  in  advance  of  formal  requests 
that  is  proving  so  valuable.  The  issue  is  not  the  speed  with  which  formal  requests  can  be 
transmitted  but  the  preparation  of  a  feasible  request  beforehand  and  its  informed  execution. 
For  this  numerous  liaison  networks  have  been  created  and  there  must  be  a  danger  of 
overlap.  The  Liaison  Magistrates,  ON,  and  Eurojust,  for  instance,  all  seem  to  be  serving  the 
same  audience  although  they  have  the  potential  to  define  distinct  roles  and  complement  each 
other.  David  Clark,  then  UK  Liaison  Magistrate  in  France,  argued  at  an  EAW  seminar  that  "it 
is  a  question  of  deciding  how  best  to  use  these  tools  in  the  circumstances  of  an  individual 
case'  (Trier,  15-17  May  2003). 
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Here  there  is  scope  for  future  research  to  assess  the  value  of  these  new  prosecutor 
liaison  structures  once  they  have  had  time  to  establish  themselves.  Will  they  prove  to  be  more 
effective  at  securing  successful  prosecutions  than  traditional  investigator  liaison  networks 
(Interpol,  Europol,  the  DLO  system  for  instance)?  Indeed,  have  they  already  overtaken 
investigators  in  the  sophistication  of  their  co-operation?  Will  they  reduce  the  number  of 
instances  reported  in  both  the  SCQ  and  the  case  study  interviews  where  a  stronger  prosecution 
case  and  more  serious  charges  could  have  been  made  if  the  foreign  evidence  known  to  exist 
had  actually  been  successfully  secured  and  adduced,  thus  bringing  an  added  value  to 
investigation  outcome?  What  further  barriers  to  effective  communication  have  yet  to  be 
identified  in  order  that  they  can  be  removed? 
Another  area  suitable  for  future  research,  too  new  for  detailed  consideration  here,  is 
the  concept  of  mutual  recognition  which  was  referred  to  many  times  in  Parliamentary  debates 
on  the  C(IQ  Bill.  Mutual  recognition  is  the  alternative  to  having  international  criminal 
procedural  law,  itself  a  relatively  new  concept  only  recently  considered  in  relation  to  the  pre- 
trial  stages  of  investigations  likely  to  end  before  the  ICC  (Safferling,  2001,  in  particular 
Chapter  2).  The  EAW  and  EEW  are  logical  expressions  of  the  concept  of  mutual  recognition 
but  neither  enjoys  whole-hearted  political  support.  This  thesis  has  examined  the  context  in 
which  mutual  recognition,  as  an  alternative  to  procedural  harmonisation,  came  to  be  common 
currency  in  the  mutual  legal  assistance  debate.  In  the  years  to  come  the  account  of  this  genesis 
will  serve  as  a  starting  point  for  a  review  of  the  philosophy  and  the  achievements  deriving 
from  it.  For  the  doom-sayers,  it  is  inconceivable  that  mutual  recognition  could  ever  succeed 
between  asymmetrical  legal  systems  (Bill  Cash  MP,  HC  Hansard,  I  April  2003,  col.  834). 
As  argued  elsewhere  (Harfield  2003:  230-232),  asymmetry  is  the  comerstone  of  US 
policies  in  relation  to  international  law  enforcement  co-operation,  geared  towards  achieving 
unilateral  rather  than  regional  objectives.  Yet  in  the  aftermath  of  9/11  the  US,  whose  officials 
have  scoffed  at  the  ineffectiveness  of  EU  multilateral  approaches  as  leading  to  a  lowest 
common  denominator  outcomes  (ibid.  ),  now  actively  seeks  participation  in  the  sorts  of  fast- 
track  assistance  based  on  mutual  recognition  currently  being  instigated  within  the  EU,  made 
possible  because  of  documented  European  norms.  A  dynamic  'can-do'  approach  suits  the 
American  psyche.  But  transatlantic  perceptions  of  what  mutual  legal  assistance  is  and  is  about 
are  at  such  variance  that  at  times  it  appears  the  various  parties  are  not  really  talking  about  the 
same  concepts  even  if  they  think  they  are  (Harfield  2003).  Witness  the  UK-US  MLAT  in 
which  are  to  be  found  articles  to  which  the  UK  signed  up  at  US  insistence  but  which  cannot 
possibly  be  enacted  under  current  UK  law  no  matter  how  insistently  the  US  authorities  might 
request  such  assistance  (Home  Office  official,  pers.  comm.  July  2003).  The  Americans  are 
happy  because  the  measures  are  in  the  treaty  even  though  they  recognise  that  such  requests 
Clive  Harfeld.  Process  andpracticalifies  221 -ChaPter 
10:  Processes  andpracticalities 
would  never  be  granted  because  they  are  contrary  to  UK  law.  Similarly  the  EU-US  MLAT 
suffers  from  unenforceable  drafting  because  it  is  an  issue  upon  which  only  individual  Member 
States  (most  of  whom  have  bilateral  treaties  with  the  US)  can  negotiate  such  instruments,  not 
the  EU  -  or  at  least  not  at  that  time.  Some  EU  initiatives  simply  cannot  be  translated  into  the 
current  transatlantic  relationship.  For  instance  direct  transmission  is  at  odds  with  US 
insistence  upon  central  authorities.  The  wider  context  of  mutual  legal  assistance  between  the 
EU  and  third  parties  is  a  third  area  of  future  research,  increasingly  important  within  the 
context  of  the  so-called  war  on  terrorism  and  apparently  non-executable  treaties. 
Over-capping  all  these  areas  of  detail  is  the  whole  issue  of  supranational  policy  in 
relation  to  justice  and  home  affairs.  This  thesis  marks  not  only  the  end  of  the  UK's  1990 
statutory  regime  but  also  the  end  of  the  EU  concept  of  'justice  and  home  affairs'.  With  the 
appointment  of  Rocco  Buttiglione  as  the  new  commissioner  to  replace  JHA  Commissioner 
Vittorino,  comes  the  parallel  announcement  that  the  EC  Directorate  General  is  to  be  re-named 
'Justice,  Freedom  and  Security',  picking  up  the  concept  of  an  'area  of  freedom,  security  and 
justice'  articulated  first  in  Art.  29  ToA.  Whether  this  is  a  cosmetic  change  or  the  harbinger  of  a 
significant  shift  in  philosophy  and  approach  only  time  and  future  research  will  reveal. 
Tluough  original  research  this  thesis  has  identified  problems  inherent  in  the  processes 
and  practicalities  of  mutual  legal  assistance  at  a  given  moment  in  time,  coincidently  the 
moment  at  which  the  UK  ovcr-hauled  its  existing  statutory  framework  in  order  to  incorporate 
new  ideas  and  methods  of  working  within  the  context  of  EU  membership.  Some  of  these 
problems  hitherto  may  not  have  been  identified  by  governments  and  their  officials  although 
HM  Government  has  recognised  that  there  may  be  practical  problems  in  the  operation  of 
mutual  legal  assistance  of  which  it  is  not  yet  aware  with  its  call  for  relevant  research 
(2004b:  20).  This  research  has  contributed  to  that  consultation  and  in  doing  so  has  highlighted 
where  problems  in  processes  and  practicalities  remain.  It  provides  a  bench-mark  against 
which  to  measure  future  developments  in  the  UK  and  against  which  to  assess  whether, 
through  the  current  JHA,  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  mutual  legal 
assistance  initiatives,  the  EU  is  moving  any  closer  to  being  united  in  diversity. 
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Appendix  A 
British  policy  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  1950-1990 
Statutory  UK  engagement  in  European  mutual  legal  assistance  began  in  1990  when 
the  CJ(IQ  Act  ratified  the  recent  UK  signature  to  the  ECAM  1959.  To  provide  a  historical 
context,  it  is  worth  exploring  briefly  UK  official  attitudes  around  the  time  that  the  ECAM  was 
being  negotiated  to  understand  why  it  was  the  UK  took  so  long  to  engage  with  its  European 
neighbours.  Such  Government  records  as  have  been  released  reveal  that  at  the  time  that  both 
police  co-operation  and  mutual  legal  assistance  initiatives  were  being  developed  in  Europe, 
UK  attitudes  were  characterised  by  disdain,  ambivalence  and  vested  interests. 
Although  conunentators  have  noted  (Brown  1998:  51)  that  the  UK  took  no  part  in 
negotiations  concerning  the  drafting  of  the  Convention,  such  negotiations  were  at  least 
monitored  in  Whitehall.  Invited  to  respond  to  specific  German  proposals,  for  instance,  the 
Foreign  Office  at  least  declared  that  it  had  no  objection  to  them  whilst  the  Home  Office  chose 
not  to  comment  at  all  (minute  dated  20  July  1959,  National  Archives:  F071/146282:  WUC 
1651/2). 
Mr  (later  Sir)  Samuel  Knox  Cunningham,  the  Ulster  Unionist  MP  for  South  Antrim 
1955-1970,  was  a  member  of  the  UK  delegation  to  the  Council  of  Europe  between  1956  and 
1959.1  He  it  was  who  gave  the  formal  explanation  of  the  UK  position  to  the  Council  of 
Europe  Consultative  Assembly  on  22  January  1959: 
*In  the  United  Kingdom  we  have  three  different  systems  of  law.  In  England  and  Wales 
there  is  one  system;  in  Scotland  there  is  another  which  is  fundamentally  different.  Again,  In 
Northern  Ireland  the  system  is  very  similar  to  that  of  England  and  Wales,  but  differs  with  regard 
to  land  law,  and  there  are  also  other  statutory  differences.  On  the  other  hand,  there  Is  a  marked 
difference  between  all  these  three  systems  and  the  main  system  of  law  existing  in  Europe  across 
the  Channel. 
May  I  give  you  an  example  from  the  draft  Convention?  There  Is  a  provision  for 
evidence  to  be  taken  in  one  country  for  use  in  another  under  'letters  rogatory'.  Such  evidence 
can  be  taken  in  the  United  Kingdom,  but  our  rules  of  evidence  do  not  permit  the  use  In  criminal 
matters  of  evidence  taken  in  another  counIfy  under  'letters  rogatory'.  There  are  other 
fundamental  differences  and  I  do  not  believe  that  it  will  be  possible  for  the  United  Kingdom  to 
ratify  this  Convention.  That  is  not  to  say  that  my  country  Is  not  deeply  Interested  in  giving 
assistance  in  criminal  matters  to  other  countries.  The  United  Kingdom  is  a  member  of  Interpol, 
the  organisation  through  which  police  forces  render  mutual  assistance  In  criminal  matters,  and  It 
plays  its  part  fully  in  that  work.  '  (Report  of  the  Council  of  Europe  Consultative  Assembly, 
10'h  Ordinary  Session,  30th  Sitting,  National  Archives:  F0371/146282:  WUC  1651/6, 
my  emphasis). 
11  am  grateful  to  staff  at  the  House  of  Commons  Information  Office  for  supplying  career  details  of  Sir 
Samuel  Knox  Cunningham  MP. 
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What  is  not  available  is  the  brief  given  by  VVhitehall  officials  to  Cunningham.  This  is 
unfortunate  because  had  it  been  available  it  would  have  enabled  comparison  between  his  brief 
and  his  formal  statement,  and  between  these  sources  and  the  brief  officials  compiled  one 
month  later  for  a  Written  Answer  to  a  Parliamentary  Question  tabled  by  Cunningham  (HC 
Hansard  19  February  1959  col.  92W).  The  brief  for  the  Written  Answer  is  unequivocal. 
'  The  United  Kingdom  have  been  against  this  Convention  from  the  start.  UK  Experts  did 
not  take  part  in  its  preparation.  We  have  indicated  that  we  are  unlikely  to  sign  it. 
The  main  reason  for  our  opposition  is  that  it  would  require  a  change  in  our  law  to  permit 
us  to  enter  into  agreements  whereby  witnesses  in  this  country  could  be  compelled  to  give 
evidence  at  a  foreign  trial.  We  should  be  unlikely  to  be  willing  to  permit  foreign  police  forces  to 
come  and  pursue  their  enquiries  here,  and  especially  to  interview  witnesses. 
On  the  other  hand,  our  Extradition  Acts  of  1870  and  1873  and  our  agreements  with 
Interpol  already  cover  some  of  the  activities  dealt  with  by  this  draft  Convention'  (minute  dated 
12  February  1959,  FO  371/146282:  WUC  1651/7). 
Leaving  aside  the  issue  that  the  second  paragraph  does  not  accurately  reflect  the 
provisions  of  the  ECAM  (Articles  I&  4)  concerning  the  role  of  authorities  from  the 
requesting  State,  none  of  this  candour  was  reflected  in  the  reply  to  Cunningham's  invitation 
by  WrittenQuestion  to  the  Foreign  Secretary  to  make  a  statement.  "In  the  circumstance' 
came  the  fonnal  answer,  "it  would  be  premature  to  make  a  statement  now"  (HC  Hansard  19 
February  59  col.  92W). 
Quite  why  Cunningham  felt  the  need  to  table  such  a  question  and  quite  why  the 
Government  was  so  reluctant  to  reveal  its  position  in  public  is  not  apparent  from  the  records 
but  a  briefing  note  for  officials  attending  the  Council  of  Europe  meeting  in  March  1959 
details  further  the  belief  that  the  UK  was  already  in  a  position  to  respond  positively  to 
requests  for  assistance  from  other  States.  The  issue  of  whether  UK  authorities  might  need 
foreign  assistance  seems  not  to  have  been  a  consideration:  it  is  a  matter  not  mentioned. 
""We  have  been  against  the  draft  convention  from  its  inception...  the  purposes  of  any 
such  convention  are  to  a  great  extent  achieved  as  far  as  the  United  Kingdom  Is  concerned: 
a)  by  our  Extradition  Acts  of  1870  and  1873  which  provide  means  whereby  evidence 
may  be  taken  in  this  country  to  be  used  In  criminal  proceedings  pending  before 
foreign  tribunals; 
b)  by  the  use  of  Interpol  by  our  police  authorities  to  pass  on  Information  and  histories  of 
criminal  antecedents  to  foreign  police  forces. 
...  It  is  most  unlikely  that  we  should  agree  to  permit  officers  of  foreign  police  forces  to 
come  and  pursue  their  enquiries  here,  and  especially  to  Interview  witnesses.  *  (Minute  prepared 
for  meeting  on  2  March  1959,  National  ArchivesT0371/146282:  WUC  1651/9).  2 
If  the  UK  had  no  interest  in  contributing  to  the  development  of  co-opcrative 
mechanisms  to  tackle  crime  more  effectively,  it  was,  perhaps  by  default,  actively  setting  the 
agenda  in  defining  the  most  pressing  crime  problems  facing  Europe  in  the  late  1950s.  A 
European  Committee  of  Experts  on  Crime  Problems  [ECCP]  was  founded,  established  at  the 
2  The  provisions  of  the  Extradition  Act  1870,  as  amended  in  1873,  are  summarised  in  Appendix  1. 
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suggestion  of  the  Committee  of  Experts  who  drafted  the  European  Convention  on  Extradition 
1957  rather  than  at  the  instigation  of  the  Council  of  Europe  itself.  The  Council  of  Europe 
allowed  the  ECCP  to  draw  up  its  own  programme  of  work  (briefing  note  21  January  1959, 
National  Archives:  F0371/146282:  VTUC  1651/10).  Sir  Lionel  Fox,  Chairman  of  the  Prison 
Commission  in  London,  was  the  UK  representative  and  was  elected  Chairman  of  the  ECCP 
(Report  of  the  First  Meeting  ofthe  [ECCP],  National  Archives:  F0371/146282:  WUC  1651/1). 
The  programme  of  work  decided  upon  by  these  experts  seems  certainly  to  incorporate  Fox's 
Professional  interests  (see  Table  13)  but  to  what  extent  it  accurately  reflects  the  most  pressing 
contemporary  crime  problems  in  Europe  is  less  clear. 
Table  13:  Programme  of  work  identified  by  the  ECCP,  1959 
Punishment  of  motoring  offences 
Prison  wages  and  related  questions 
Civil  and  political  rights  of  detained  and  released  persons 
Mutual  assistance  in  after-care  or  post-penitentiary  treatment  including  repatriation  after 
sentence  or  probation 
*  Abolition  of  the  death  penalty 
0  Juvenile  delinquency 
Despite  Fox's  concern  to  avoid  both  an  "ambitious,  general  and  costly  programme" 
and  any  duplication  of  effort  with  the  UN  in  this  area  (ibid.  ),  it  was  precisely  these  issues  that 
Foreign  Office  officials  cited  as  reasons  to  treat  the  ECCP  with  caution  (briefing  note  21 
January  1959,  National  Archives:  F0371/146282:  WUC  1651/10).  The  note  also  reveals  that 
the  Home  Office  were  "a  little  unhappy"  about  the  budget  proposals  for  the  ECCP. 
The  1959  ECCP  programme  focuses  on  post-conviction  issues.  3  Nowhere  did  it 
consider  pre-trial  mutual  assistance  and  co-operation  or  any  particular  type  of  criminality. 
Both  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Home  Office  held  the  view  that,  in  any  case,  all  these  issues 
were  properly  the  remit  of  the  UN,  not  a  regional  body  in  Europe  (ibid.  ).  In  a  context  in  which 
the  UK  had  recently  declined  an  invitation  to  join  the  'Common  Market'  (Leonard  1994:  6), 
such  an  attitude  might  be  interpreted  as  wanting  to  limit  the  influence  of  European  neighbours 
rather  than  a  policy  to  enhance  the  role  of  the  UN. 
UK  foreign  affairs  at  this  time  appear  to  have  been  dominated  by  the  metamorphosis 
of  Empire  into  Commonwealth.  In  this  arena  the  records  reveal  a  rather  different  attitude 
3  The  ECCP  now  has  a  much  broader  brief  and  regularly  reports  on  all  aspects  of  criminal  law 
enforcement  in  Europe. 
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towards  mutual  legal  assistance.  Between  1959  and  1961  the  UK  loaned  a  Parliamentary 
Counsel  to  Ghana  to  help  this  emerging  nation  adapt  an  off-the-shelf  criminal  code  to  local 
circumstance.  The  proffering  of  such  'designer  codes'  was  usual  UK  practice  and  that  being 
adopted  in  Ghana,  Jamaica  had  recently  rejected.  Dr  Kwame  Nkrumah,  the  Ghanaian  Head 
of  State,  in  a  letter  to  Harold  Macmillan  (14  April  1961,  National  Archives:  LC02/8471) 
suggested  that  Ghana  could  make  its  experience  of  such  an  implementation  available  to  its 
African  neighbours  but  would  require  UK  assistance  to  achieve  this.  One  of  the  issues  that 
was  being  resolved  in  Ghana  involved  the  very  extradition  procedures  that  the  UK  had  cited 
as  reason  not  to  ratify  the  ECAM  - 
"Because  of  technical  differences  between  Colonial  Territories  which  were  regarded  as 
Protectorates  or  settled  Colonies  different  Extradition  Acts  applied  in  different  parts  of  the  same 
Colonial  Territory.  When  Ghana  became  independent  in  March  1957,  there  were  no  less  than 
four  different  Extradition  Acts,  each  one  applicable  in  one  part  of  the  county  (briefing  note  17 
April  1961,  National  Archives:  LC02/8471). 
"The  original  proposal  by  Dr  Nkrumah  had  obvious  drawbacks.  It  was  essentially  a 
scheme  for  extending  Ghanaian  influence  in  other  parts  of  Africa,  and  in  the  light  of  recent 
events,  it  is  decidedly  doubtful  whether  Ghanaian  legal  arrangements  are  to  be  commended  as  a 
model  for  others  to  follow.  Nevertheless  the  letter  seemed  to  contain  the  germ  of  a  good  idea" 
(letter  from  Colonial  Relations  Office,  London,  to  British  High  Commissioner,  Accra, 
29  November  1961,  National  Archives:  LC02/8472). 
The  germ  of  a  good  idea  bore  fruit  in  the  shape  of  the  Commonwealth  Technical 
Legal  Assistance  Scheme  operated  by  the  British  Institute  of  International  &  Comparative 
Law,  headed  by  Lord  Denning,  by  which  means  the  UK  Government  diverted  (and  diluted) 
the  original  suggestion,  making  it  pan-Commonwealth  rather  than  just  pan-African.  The 
Scheme  (National  Archives:  LC02/8473)  is  of  little  relevance  to  this  thesis  but  the 
circumstances  of  its  generation  illuminate  Government  thinking.  At  the  same  time  as  the  UK 
was  shying  away  from  closer  co-operation  with  European  neighbours,  it  was  fully  prepared  to 
impose  harmonisation  on  newly  independent  States  that  were  once  colonies. 
The  relationship  between  British  Colonies  and  Interpol  was  also  the  subject  of  close 
attention  at  this  time  following  the  re-constitution  of  Interpol  in  1956.  The  issue  had  first  been 
raised  following  a  telegram  to  Whitehall  from  the  Governor  of  Gibraltar  (24  December  1952, 
National  Archives:  C0968/268).  The  Governor  described  a  request  he  had  received  from  an 
organisation  he  had  never  heard  of  to  make  three  arrests,  a  request  retracted  three  days  after  it 
was  received.  The  Governor  sought  advice.  The  UK  was  represented  at  meetings  of  the 
International  Criminal  Police  Commission  (as  Interpol  was  then  called)  by  the  Assistant 
Commissioner  in  charge  of  CID  at  Scotland  Yard.  On  20  March  1953  the  Colonial  Office 
informed  the  Assistant  Commissioner  that  it  was  now  thought  "desirable  to  fumish  the 
Commissioners  of  Colonial  Police  Forces  with  some  information  as  to  the  constitution  and 
purposes  of  the  Commission  [Interpol]"  (ibid.  ).  The  Interpol  Bureau  at  Scotland  Yard  became 
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the  conduit  for  contact  between  colonial  police  forces  and  Interpol,  an  arrangement  that 
remained  in  place  even  after  the  re-constitution  of  Interpol  (National  Archives:  CO1037/93). 
Interpol  offered  (20  June  1957:  ibid.  ),  within  the  ternis  of  the  UK  subscription  to  the 
Organisation,  the  opportunity  to  establish  sub-Bureaux  in  each  of  the  colonial  police  forces. 
The  UK  would  retain  just  one  vote  in  the  General  Assembly.  Whitehall  consulted  the  colonial 
police  commissioners  advising  them  at  the  same  time  that  they  would  be  responsible  for  their 
own  travel  expenses  in  attending  Interpol  meetings  and  should  offer  voluntary  subscriptions 
in  lieu  of  having  to  pay  full  subscriptions.  Unanimously  the  colonial  police  commissioners 
decided  that  they  had  no  need  of  their  own  sub-Bureau  whilst  Scotland  Yard  was  prepared  to 
represent  them. 
In  1958  Interpol  held  its  General  Assembly  meeting  in  London.  Besides  the  official 
UK  delegation  consisting  of  the  Metropolitan  Police  Assistant  Commissioner  for  CID  and  the 
Inspector-General  of  Colonial  Police  (also  based  at  Scotland  Yard),  six  provincial  chief 
constables  were  invited  to  attend  as  observers.  Government  and  police  attitudes  to  the  role  of 
Interpol  now  came  under  scrutiny  (National  Archives:  110287/453  4  ).  The  Chief  Constable  of 
Hertfordshire  (Wilcox)  led  the  charge.  Confessing  how  remiss  he  had  been  in  ignoring  his 
obligations  to  the  wider  intemational  police  community,  he  sought  permanent  provincial 
representation  in  the  UK  delegation  (letter  to  the  Under-Secretary  of  State,  Home  Office,  24 
January  1959).  The  Under-Secretary  envisaged  undefined  "administrative  difficulties  which  it 
might  not  be  possible  to  overcome"  (27  January  1959).  Wilcox  did  not  give  up,  and  was 
joined  by  (amongst  others)  Colonel  Young,  Commissioner  of  the  City  of  London  Police,  who 
volunteered  to  be  a  UK  delegate  and  cited  his  extensive  foreign  travels  on  behalf  of  the  City 
of  London  police  as  qualification  for  the  role  (14  January  1959). 
The  Home  Office  engaged  in  a  strategy  of  sequential  procrastinations  with  which 
viewers  of  the  situation  comedies  Yes,  Minister  and  Yes,  Prime  Minister  would  be  familiar 
(BBC  TV,  first  transmitted  1980  to  1986).  Correspondence  went  unanswered  for  months. 
Requests  to  put  this  matter  on  the  agenda  for  the  chief  constables'  conference  were  ignored 
for  as  long  as  civil  servants  could  get  away  with  it.  The  file  was  temporarily  mislaid,  for  many 
weeks.  The  Scottish  Home  Office  was  incited  to  agitate  the  argument  that  Scottish  cliief 
constables  had  a  stronger  claim  than  their  English  counter-parts.  And  when  these  stratagems 
regarding  principles  had  run  their  course,  the  Home  Office  ignited  a  vigorous  debate  between 
HM  Treasury  and  the  County  Councils  Association  on  the  practicalities  of  the  issue  by  asking 
who  would  pay  for  provincial  delegates  to  attend  Interpol  meetings.  On  the  25h  June  1964, 
4  All  subsequent  correspondence  on  this  matter  is  contained  within  the  single  Home  OfT'ice  file 
archived.  at  the  National  Archives  and  released  in  1995. 
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six  years  after  he  had  volunteered  his  services,  Colonel  Young  was  at  last  authorised  as  a  UK 
delegate  to  the  Interpol  meeting  in  Venezuela,  at  the  expense  of  the  Corporation  of  London. 
Neither  Wilcox,  Young,  nor  any  of  their  colleagues  appear  to  have  advanced  a 
substantiated  business  case  for  provincial  delegates.  If  they  did,  it  is  not  recorded  in  the 
correspondence.  Nor  did  the  Home  Office  ever  present  a  convincing  argument  against  such 
representation.  There  is  nothing  in  official  government  files  to  provide  hard  evidence  one 
way  or  the  other  of  the  actual  need  for  police  co-operation  or  mutual  legal  assistance  at  this 
time.  Interpol  appears  to  have  been  viewed,  to  borrow  an  historical  analogy,  as  a  "good  thing" 
(Sellar  &  yeatman  1930)  but  little  thought  appears  to  have  been  given  to  the  nature  and 
purpose  of  interaction  between  UK  law  enforcement  and  Interpol.  The  lack  of  hard  evidence 
allows  the  deduction  that,  in  fact,  there  was  probably  little  significant  demand  at  this  time  for 
transnational  police  co-operation.  Had  there  been,  a  more  timely  response  to  the  issue  of 
provincial  representation  might  have  been  apparent.  This  sheds  further  light  on  the  context 
within  which  Kent  police  established  the  CCIC. 
Reluctance  to  enter  into  formal  MLATs  was  reflected  elsewhere  when  a  meeting  was 
held  early  in  1986  to  consider  mutual  assistance  between  Commonwealth  countries. 
"Senior  officials  opened  their  deliberations  with  a  discussion  of  a  suggestion  that  the 
new  arrangements  take  the  form  of  a  multi-lateral  treaty,  but  concluded  that  the  non-treaty, 
informal  'scheme'  approach  (under  which  countries  adopting  the  scheme  enact  similar 
legislation)  still  offered  the  most  appropriate  approach  to  mutual  judicial  assistance  within  the 
Commonwealth"  (Commonwealth  Secretariat  1986:  6). 
The  conference  recommended  to  law  ministers  the  adoption  of  two  schemes:  the  first 
to  enhance  mutual  assistance  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  criminal  matters;  5  and 
the  second  to  permit  the  transfer  of  prisoners  convicted  abroad  to  their  home  State  to  serve 
their  sentence.  A  third  scheme  concerning  the  protection  of  cultural  heritage  was  referred  for 
further  policy  guidance  from  ministers  (ibid.  38). 
The  Commonwealth  Harare  Scheme  in  fact  came  to  provide  a  model  for  subsequent 
UN  treaties  such  as  the  1988  Vienna  drugs  treaty,  that  echo  the  call  for  the  harmonisation  of 
domestic  laws  and  the  criminalisation  of  agreed  behaviours  (Gilmore  1995:  xviii).  Nor  was  the 
cross-fertilisation  just  one  way.  Increasingly,  Common  Law  countries  are  entering  into 
MLATs  because  they  obviously  feel  a  need  to  do  so.  By  doing  so  they  can  at  least  ensure  that 
their  concerns  are  addressed  when  dealing  with  non-Common  Law  countries.  The  latter,  of 
course,  have  little  alternative  within  their  constitutional  arrangements.  Australia  and  Canada 
each  have  drawn  up  Model  Treaties  (Gilmore  1995:  224-247)  and  the  UK,  having  signed  a 
MLAT  with  the  US  concerning  the  Cayman  Islands  in  1986  (Gilmore  1995:  280-297;  see  also 
National  Archives  FO  93/8/476)  followed  that  up  by  ratifying  the  ECMA  and  the  UN  Vienna 
3  The  Harare  Scheme,  text  as  amended  in  1999  with  commentary  in  Murray  &  Ilarris  (2000:  264-282). 
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drugs  treaty  in  1990  (CJ(IQ  Jct  1990)  and  by  negotiating  a  separate  general  MLAT  with  the 
US  in  1994  (Murray  &  Harris  2000:  362-373;  National  Archives  FO  93/8/537). 
In  its  dealings  with  the  drafting  of  the  ECM,  the  role  of  the  ECCP,  colonial  legal 
developments  and  relations  with  Interpol,  the  UK  government  adopted  wherever  possible  the 
role  of  a  detached  observer  whose  own  house  was  in  order  and  who  was  anxious  that 
neighbours  should  not  unduly  disturb  the  status  quo.  Such  attitudes  were  to  change  from  1986 
as  the  Commonwealth  ushered  in  its  informal  Harare  Scheme  and  the  UK  and  US  had  to 
negotiate  a  bilateral  MLAT  to  resolve  their  differences  over  jurisdiction  in  the  Cayman 
Islands.  And  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  within  this  context  practitioners  marshalled  peer 
Pressure  which  the  Home  Office  recognised  in  1988. 
Clive  Harfeld:  Processes  and  Practicalifies  229 Appendix  B 
Appendix  B 
Recommendations  of  the  EU  mutual  legal  assistance  evaluation  Final  and  UK  Reports 
This  appendix  quotes  at  length  recommendations  arising  from  the  Final  Report  on  the  whole 
three-year  evaluation  exercise  across  the  EU  and  from  the  EU  evaluation  of  the  UK  mutual 
legal  assistance  mechanisms.  It  supports  discussion  outlined  in  chapter  4. 
European  Union,  Final  Report  on  the  First  Evaluation  Exercise  -  Mutual  Legal 
Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters,  8648/01  CRIMORG  55,10  May  2001 
Unlike  the  UK  evaluation  report  cited  below,  the  Final  Report  discusses  its  recommendations 
at  it  progresses  through  its  text.  Thus  there  is  no  separate  list  summarising  the 
recommendations.  What  follows  are  the  recommendations  as  extracted  from  the  main  text. 
"Recommendation  1  (p.  9) 
The  Council  urges  the  Member  States  to  devote  particular  attention  to  ratifying,  in  compliance  with  their 
constitutional  requirements,  international  instruments  which  facilitate  assistance  In  criminal  matters 
within  a  reasonable  period.  Special  attention  should  be  given  to  an  early  ratification  of  the  2000 
Convention.  [Member  States  to  be  asked  to  report  on  reasons  for  non-ratification  by  I  October  2001.1 
Recommendation  2  (p.  10) 
The  Council  invites  the  Member  States  to  review  their  national  legislation  and  practices  with  a  view  to 
ensuring  that  a  request  for  mutual  legal  assistance  from  another  Member  State  Is  not  refused  solely  on 
the  ground  that  the  offence  giving  rise  to  the  request  is  barred  by  statutes  of  limitations  In  the  requested 
Member  State. 
Recommendation  3  (p.  12) 
The  Council  notes  with  satisfaction  that  work  is  being  carried  out  In  the  Working  Party  on  Cooperation  In 
Criminal  Matters  on  an  expedited  procedure  for  tracing  bank  accounts  of  natural  or  legal  persons  and 
requests  the  Working  Party  to  seek  satisfactory  solutions  to  this  matter  as  quickly  as  possible. 
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Recommendabon  4  (p.  1  5) 
The  Council  notes  that  double  criminality  remains  controversial  among  Member  States  and 
recommends  continued  discussion  on  this  subject. 
Recommendation  5  (p.  1  7) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  Member  States  to: 
-  Rationalise  the  internal  procedures  and  the  administrative  path  and  eliminate  red  tape  in  the  authorities 
dealing  with  mutual  legal  assistance  by  defining  exact  lines  of  demarcation  and  specific  tasks, 
simplifying  the  role  of  the  hierarchy  and  making  the  officials  concerned  responsible.  The  objective  is  to 
achieve  a  flexible  and  dynamic  service;  the  informal  approach  developed  in  some  Member  States 
should  be  taken  into  consideration. 
-  Ensure  that  a  request  for  specific  measure  from  another  Member  State  will  not  be  executed  in  a  less 
efficient  way  than  a  measure  In  a  domestic  case. 
Recommendation  6  (p.  18) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  Member  States  to  examine  their  national  procedural  provisions  in  order  to 
prevent  rights  of  appeal  from  being  used  for  delaying  purposes. 
Recommendation  7  (p.  18) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  Member  States  to  examine  their  structures  relating  to  Investigations  into 
financial  crime  with  a  view  to  drawing  on  best  practices  on  how  other  Member  States  are  organised  and 
examining  if  it  is  necessary  to  reorganise  their  own  structures  in  order  to  improve  co-operation  between 
the  Member  States. 
Recommendation  8  (p.  19) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  Member  States  to  simplify  the  procedure  for  transfer  of  material  to  the 
requesting  Member  State  by  dispensing  with  multiple  controls. 
Recommendation  9  (p.  19) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  EJN  to  continue  the  further  development  of  a  standard  form  for  outgoing 
requests  aiming  at  facilitating  mutual  assistance  and  make  it  available  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Council 
also  recommends  the  Member  States  to  examine  the  potential  within  their  own  country  for  a 
computerised  system  for  the  drafting  of  outgoing  requests  and  coordinate  these  efforts  at  EU  level, 
possibly  with  Community  funding. 
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Recommendation  10  (p.  20) 
The  Council  invites  the  Member  States  to  assess  the  respect  for  the  measures  set  out  in  the  Joint  Action 
of  29June  1998  on  good  practice  in  mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal  matters.  The  EJN  contact  points 
could  assist  by  notifying  their  own  judicial  authorities  or  their  counterparts  in  the  Network  of  any  failings 
encountered. 
Recommendation  11  (p.  21) 
The  Council  encourages  the  Member  States  to  issue  guidelines,  through  the  means  which  are  in  line 
with  their  constitutional  traditions,  to  their  judicial  authorities  to  ensure  the  dissemination  of 
homogeneous  pracbces, 
Recommendafion  12  (p.  22) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  relevant  Working  Party  to  discuss  the  role  of  the  central  authority  and  how 
this  central  unit,  despite  the  moves  towards  decentralisation.  could  maintain  an  effective  role,  and 
examine  whether  there  are  any  functions,  such  as  overall  guidance  and  monitoring,  which  central 
authorities  are  best  placed  to  perform  in  the  developing  scenarios. 
Recommendabon  13  (p.  23) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  Member  States  and  the  EJN to  make  the  Network  more  widely  known  to  the 
judicial  authorities  in  the  Member  States  and  remind  them  of  the  advantages  to  make  more  extensive 
use  of  the  Network's  contact  points,  especially  in  urgent  cases. 
Recommendation  14  (p.  23) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  Member  States  to  provide  the  EJN  contact  points  with  all  necessary 
resources  and  training,  and  insists  on  the  speedy  implementation  of  the  Council  decision'  to  provide 
contact  points  with  Intranet  facilities  as  well  as  a  secure  email. 
Recommendation  15  (p.  24) 
In  reiterating  the  need  for  an  early  ratification  o  the  2000  Convention  the  Council  calls  upon  the  Member 
States  to  promote  and  support  the  direct  communication  between  judicial  authorities  of  requests  for 
mutual  legal  assistance  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Convention.  In  this  respect,  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Judicial  Atlas  will  play  an  instrumental  role. 
1A  decision  was  taken  on  II  January  2001  to  implement  the  pilot  project  concerning  the  Virtual 
Private  Network  with  a  view  to  it  becoming  operational  in  August  2001. 
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Recommendation  16  (p.  24) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  Member  States  to  install  and  use  a  computerised  system  for  record  keeping 
in  order  to  give  a  clearer  picture  of  the  actual  situation  regarding  mutual  assistance  and  enable  a  better 
monitoring  and  follow-up  for  each  case. 
Recommendation  17  (p.  26) 
The  Council  calls  on  Member  States  to  formulate  a  genuine  forward-looking  policy  on  mutual 
assistance,  which  could  include  a  policy  to  facilitate  visits  abroad  by  police  and  judicial  authorities 
concerning  mutual  assistance,  and  accordingly  to  provide  the  administrative  departments  and  judicial 
authorities  responsible  for  these  matters  with  the  premises,  means  and  resources  they  need. 
Recommendation  18  (p.  27) 
The  Council  calls  on  Member  States  to: 
-  Promote  and  extend,  from  recruitment  and  during  the  course  of  careers,  initial  and  further  training  for 
the  purpose  of  at  very  least  acquiring  and  maintaining  and  subsequently  improving  knowledge  and 
fluency  in  at  least  one  language  in  addition  to  the  mother  tongue.  This  requirement  could  apply  to  the 
police,  judicial  and  administrafive  authorities  operating  in  the  field  of  mutual  assistance. 
-  Accelerate,  amplify  and  update  the  initial  and  continuous  training  for  prosecutors  and  judges  in  order 
to  ensure  that  judicial  authorities  have  the  necessary  minimum  skills  to  practise  active  and  passive 
mutual  assistance.  Specialist  training  should  be  encouraged  for  the  prosecutors  and  judges  most 
involved  in  these  issues. 
-  Encourage  and  promote  initial  and  further  training  to  impart  and  improve  knowledge  of  the  legal, 
judicial  and  institutional  systems  of  the  other  Member  States.  The  initiatives  taken  by  certain  Member 
States  in  this  area  and  also  in  the  framework  of  the  Eurojustice  conferences  should  be  supported  and 
Initiative  by  France  regarding  a  European  Judicial  Training  Network  could,  when  adopted,  contribute  to 
furthering  this  process. 
Recommendation  19  (p.  28) 
The  Council  calls  on  the  Member  States  to  examine  the  possibility  of  having  judicial  and  administrative 
staff  specialising  in  the  management  of  mutual  assistance  in  criminal  matters.  In  that  context  should  be 
examined  the  possibility  of  having  a  specific  Union  financing  programme  under  Title  A  to  meet  these 
needs.  Such  a  programme  could  for  instance  address  training  in  mutual  legal  assistance. 
Recommendation  20  (p.  29) 
The  Council  calls  on  the  General  secretariat  of  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  and  the  EJN  to  make 
the  Information  contained  in  the  evaluation  reports  available  in  electronic  form. 
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Recommendabon  21  (p.  29) 
The  Council  asks  the  Presidency  to  prepare  a  letter  on  the  basis  of  the  conclusions  of  the  evaluation 
report  on  each  Member  State  and  to  forward  R  to  the  Member  States  according  to  a  timetable  reflecting 
the  original  order  of  evaluations;  each  State  would  then  have  to  describe  the  institutional,  legal, 
Practical,  administrative  and  logistical  measures  it  had  taken  or  will  take  in  response  to  the 
recommendations  addressed  to  it  The  outcome  could  then  be  passed  on  to  the  Council  by  means  of  a 
Presidency  report. 
Recommendation  22  (p.  30) 
The  Council  calls  upon  the  relevant  Working  Party  to  extend  the  mechanism  for  evaluating  international 
mutual  assistance  to  the  States  candidates  for  accession.  2* 
European  Union,  Evaluation  Report  on  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  and  Urgent  Requestsfor 
the  Tracing  and  Restraint  of  Property:  Report  on  the  United  Kingdom  7249/01  CRIMORG 
31,26  March  2001 
In  this  document  the  recommendations  fall  into  two  categories,  those  directed  to  the 
UK  (and  where  applicable  to  other  Member  States)  and  those  directed  to  the  EU  and  its 
Member  States.  The  numbering  of  the  original  report  is  utilised  here. 
"5.1  To  the  United  Kingdom.  and  where  apDlicable.  to  other  Member  States  of  the  EU: 
5.1.1  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  the  UK  should  take  the  opportunity  of  the  imminent  signing 
of  the  new  Convention  on  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  in  the  EU  and  its  application  to  join  parts  of  the 
Schengen  system,  to  consider  some  changes  at  a  legislative  and  administrative  level  and 
a)  Ensure  full  implementation  of  its  international  commitments  made  under  the  1959  Convention; 
b)  Consider  ways  for  a  more  direct  transmission  of  requests  where  appropriate  between 
requesting  and  executing  authorities  and  for  a  limitation  of  checks; 
C)  For  outgoing  requests,  consider  direct  transmission  from  the  Issuing  agency  to  the  foreign 
executing  agency; 
d)  Examine  search  and  seizure  legislative  provisions  and  procedure  and  simplify  them;  consider 
at  the  same  time  abolishing  the  two  separate  schemes  and  two  types  of  designation  for 
2  The  Council  Secretariat  has  informed  the  Presidency  that,  if  this  proposal  were  to  entail  any 
additional  expense  to  the  Council  budget,  it  would  have  a  formal  reservation  on  this  matter  and  that  it 
would  have  to  inform  the  Deputy  Secretary  General  of  the  proposal. 
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restraining  assets;  improve  the  possibilities  to  restrain  assets  at  an  early  stage  of  the 
investigation; 
e)  Recommend  considering  solutions,  which  would  allow  restraining  amounts  of  less  than 
Ell  0,000  in  England,  Wales  and  Northern  Ireland; 
f)  Consider  and  examine  the  possibility  and  feasibility  of  a  centrallsed  banking  information  system 
as  well  as  a  central  registration  system  for  stolen  property; 
9)  Consider  legal  changes  in  order  to  allow  its  authorities  to  co-operate  more  fully  concerning  the 
taking  of  finger-prints  and  DNA  evidence; 
h)  Allow  the  seizure  of  evidence  of  offences  other  than  the  offence  to  which  the  request  relates, 
pending  a  new  letter  of  request; 
1)  Allow  for  video  recording  in  courts  whenever  requested  by  a  foreign  authority; 
j)  Consider  whether  transmission  of  evidence  via  the  UKCA  should  be  maintained; 
5.1.2  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  the  UK  should  redefine,  through  legal  changes  or  new 
practice,  the  role  of  the  UKCA  in  mutual  assistance  cases,  which  will 
a)  Enable  the  UKCA  to  take  the  lead  role  in  the  entire  process  of  mutual  legal  assistance  and 
make  arrangements  to  plan  for  the  co-ordination  of  the  process  across  all  agencies; 
b)  Give  the  UKCA  overall  responsibility  for  all  training  in  mutual  legal  assistance  in  consultation 
with  other  agencies,  to  ensure  nation-wide  consistency  in  these  programmes  by  preparing 
modules  on  specific  topics  and  developing  minimum  training  standards; 
c)  Provide  that  the  UKCA  co-ordinate  all  guidelines,  and  eventually  prepare  in  consultation  with 
the  main  agencies  a  single,  comprehensive  guide  covering  all  agencies  to  advise  foreign 
requesting  authorities; 
d)  Allow  the  UKCA  [to]  undertake  to  co-ordinate  between  all  authorities  involved  in  sending 
requests  in  order  to  achieve  a  better  standardisation  of  UK  requests; 
e)  Allow  the  UKCA  [to]  devise  a  mechanism  for  monitoring  requests  which  will  provide  for 
consistency  in  approach  by  all  agencies  in  monitoring  requests  e.  g.  set  time  limits  for  issuing 
incoming  requests  to  executing  authorities,  issuing  reminders,  checking  full  execution  etc.; 
Allow  the  UKCA,  in  consultation  with  other  agencies,  [to]  take  all  initiatives  necessary  to  better 
organise  and  centralise  the  record  keeping  of  mutual  legal  assistance  cases  and  consider  the 
development  of  a  uniform  fully  comprehensive  computer  based  system  in  all  the  main  agencies 
and  across  agencies  both  for  incoming  and  outgoing  requests; 
9)  Allow  the  UKCA  [to]  co-ordinate  the  work  of  the  EJN  at  national  level  and  inform  all  smaller 
agencies  on  a  regular  basis  of  the  activities  of  the  Network; 
5.1.3  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  the  UKCA  is  given  appropriate  resources  to  carry  out  Its 
duties  and  implement  the  recommendations  of  the  evaluation  team.  This  would  include: 
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a)  The  provision  of  sufficient  staff.  including  experienced  lawyers  and  other  practitioners  to  enable 
it  to  fulfil  all  its  tasks  and  implement  the  recommendations  made  by  experts; 
b)  The  integration  of  the  mutual  legal  assistance  and  extradition  sections  in  the  Home  Office; 
C)  Access  by  the  staff  of  the  UKCA,  eventually  through  the  use  of  modem  technology,  to  at  least 
some  of  the  information  in  the'Alert'  System  held  by  NCIS; 
d)  The  provision  of  clear  guidance  and  consistency  for  deciding  on  refusal  of  a  request; 
5.1.4  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  all  agencies  be  provided  with  sufficient  resources  to  enable 
them  to  fulfil  the  UK's  international  commitments; 
5.1.5  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  UK  authorities  coSnsider  changing  their  practice 
concerning  the  hearing  of  witnesses  under  oath  when  these  refuse  to  testify,  whenever  a  specific 
request  Is  made  to  it  [sic]; 
5.1.6  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  UK  authorities  respect  as  much  as  possible  the 
classification  as  urgent  given  by  foreign  judicial  authorities; 
5.1.7  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  UK  provide  the  designated  authorities  including  EJN 
contact  points  with  Internet;  appoint  EJN  contact  points  in  all  major  agencies,  and  provide  them  with  the 
necessary  resources  such  as  Internet  access;  involve  more  the  EJN  contact  points  in  Scotland  and  In 
some  of  the  agencies  in  the  meetings  of  the  Network;  improve  the  work  of  the  liaison  magistrate  through 
a  more  pro-active  approach  and  a  better  involvement  in  the  daily  work  of  the  UKCA;  consider 
exchanging  liaison  magistrates  with  other  countries  with  which  the  UK  have  most  problems; 
5.1.8  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  the  Crown  Office  examine  its  processes  to  shorten 
procedures  and  to  arrange  for  direct  transmission  of  requests  or  evidence  to  the  overseas  requested 
authorities;  organise  regular  meetings  with  all  Procurators  Fiscal  under  the  direction  of  the  Crown  Office 
for  training  purposes,  to  arrange  seminars  etc.  and  exchange  views  and  to  learn  of  new  developments  in 
mutual  legal  assistance; 
5.1.9  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  requests  for  service  of  summonses/documents  be  co- 
ordinated  centrally  to  ensure  compliance  with  legal  requirement  of  requested  states; 
5.1 
.  10  The  evaluation  team  recommends  the  UK  to  put  its  practice  In  line  with  its  commitments  and  that 
UKCA  case  officers  have  clear  instructions  how  to  deal  with  urgent  requests  in  compliance  with  the  UK's 
statement  of  good  practice; 
5.1.11  The  experts  invite  the  UK  to  consider  ways  to  speed  up  court  practice  In  appeal  procedures  In 
cases  of  serious  crime. 
5.2  To  the  Eurogean  Union  and  its  Member  States: 
5.2.1  The  evaluation  team  recommends  that  Member  States  and  the  European  Union  address  the 
problem  of  improving  the  definition  of  the  distinction  between  police  and  judicial  co-operation  In  all 
Member  States  where  it  is  appropriate,  with  due  respect  to  the  protection  of  citizens  but  also  to  avoid 
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overloading  the  channels  for  mutual  legal  assistance  in  criminal  matters  with  requests  of  a  minor  nature; 
The  team  recommends  that  the  EU  should  discuss  the  different  traditions  of  mutual  legal  assistance 
within  the  Member  States; 
5.2.2  The  experts  recommend  that  both  the  Member  States  and  the  Union  ensure  that  in  all  Member 
States  all  forms  of  serious  crime  are  criminalised  or  reduce  the  requirement  of  dual  criminality  for  the 
use  of  coercive  measures  in  the  fight  against  serious  crime; 
5.2.3  The  team  recommends  that  Member  States  and  the  Union  take  all  necessary  initiatives,  if 
necessary  in  the  framework  of  the  EJN,  to  improve  the  quality  of  requests  for  mutual  legal  assistance 
and  co-ordinate  initiatives  in  setting  up  computer  based  systems  for  drafting  letters  of  request; 
5.2.4  The  evaluation  team  suggests  the  discussion  at  European  level  of  court  practices  in  Member 
States  in  order  to  arrive  to  a  balanced  situation  in  all  Member  States,  which  would  take  into  account  both 
the  need  for  efficient  prosecution  and  the  rights  of  individuals  in  legal  proceedings; 
5.2.5  the  evaluation  team  recommends  that  all  judicial  authorities  respect  as  much  as  possible  the 
classification  as  urgent  given  by  foreign  judicial  authorities  in  accordance  with  the  Joint  Action  on  good 
practice  in  mutual  legal  assistance.  ' 
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Appendix  C 
Recommendations  made  by  Nicholson  &  Harrison,  1996 
This  appendix  quotes  in  full,  without  conunent,  recornmendations  made  by  Nicholson 
and  Harrison  on  the  basis  of  their  review  of  police  experiences  of  gathering  evidence  from  abroad 
(  1996).  It  supports  discussion  outlined  in  chapter  5. 
Nicholson  W&  Harrison  S,  1996,  International  Evidence  Gathering  -  Are  We  Succeeding? 
(Police  Research  Group,  Home  Office,  London). 
PaaeS  41-43:  Key  Point  Notes 
1.  'The  Interpol  Guidance  Manual  on  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad  should  be  Included 
within  all  Force  procedures,  orders  and  guidelines. 
2.  Police  managers  should  be  aware  of  the  likely  increase  in  police  officers  to  undertake 
foreign  travel  and  cater  for  this  in  their  strategic  planning. 
3.  There  should  be  a  central  point  within  the  UK  for  the  collation  and  distribution  of  advice 
from  and  to  police  officers  who  are  involved  in  the  obtaining  of  evidence  from  abroad. 
4.  Further  research  should  be  commissioned  In  respect  of  combining  offence  types,  trends 
and  suspects  to  facilitate  the  investigation  of  future  offences  which  will  necessitate 
obtaining  evidence  from  abroad. 
5.  To  encourage  better  performances,  those  concerned  In  administering  UK  requests  for  the 
obtaining  of  evidence  from  foreign  countries  should  keep  and  publish  performance 
indicators  which  include  turn  around  times. 
6.  Police  managers  responsible  for  determining  case  acceptance  criteria  should  consider  In 
their  decision  making  process  the  anticipated  time  and  resource  Implications  associated 
with  the  obtaining  of  evidence  from  abroad. 
7.  Police  managers  should  consider  the  cost  benefits  of  transporting  foreign  witnesses  to  the 
UK  to  give  their  evidence  as  an  alternative  to  foreign  travel. 
8.  UK  investigators  when  abroad  should  try  and  obtain  the  original  documentation  or  copies 
thereof  and  return  with  them  personally. 
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9.  UK  investigators,  prior  to  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad,  should  consider  the  effects  in 
their  investigation  of  foreign  data  protection,  disclosure,  privacy,  media  and  freedom  of 
information  legislation. 
10.  There  should  be  a  national  register  of  interpreters  who  are  accredited  and  prepared  to 
travel  abroad.  Entry  onto  this  register  should  be  via  a  system  of  competitive  tendering  and 
based  on  a  'value  for  money'  concept. 
11.  The  Interpol  Interpost  Bulletin  should  be  made  the  subject  of  a  marketing  drive,  directed  at 
all  relevant  departments  with  UK  police  forces. 
12.  AM  forces  should  review  the  role  of  their  Interpol  Liaison  officer.  Included  in  that  review 
should  be  the  relationship  between  the  Force  and  Interpol  and  the  co-ordination  of  Force 
activities  requiring  the  assistance  or  support  of  Interpol. 
13.  Consideration  should  be  given  to  the  formation  of  a  'one  stop  shop'  approach  to 
international  evidence  gathering. 
14.  Police  managers  should  consider,  where  appropriate,  initiating  or  encouraging  civil 
proceedings  to  assist  in  the  process  of  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad. 
15.  Police  managers  should  consider,  where  appropriate,  the  use  of  postal  and  facsimile 
facilities  to  supplement  the  process  of  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad. 
16.  There  should  be  a  central  database,  available  to  all  UK  investigators  and  prosecutors 
involved  in  the  obtaining  of  evidence  from  abroad  which  contains  Information  or  contacts. 
advice  and  relevant  working  practices.  ' 
Pages  44-45-  Recommendations 
"I  -  Recommendations  at  force  level 
a)  The  Interpol  Guidance  Manual  on  obtaining  evidence  from  abroad  should  be  Included 
within  all  Force  procedures,  orders  and  guidelines.  Such  Instructions  should:  I)  cater  for 
the  requirements  of  individual  forces  and  emphasise  the  role  of  the  Force's  Interpol 
Liaison  Officer  and  ii)  include  advice  in  respect  of  such  evidence  gathering. 
b)  Police  managers  should  be  aware  of  the  anticipated  use  rise  in  the  requirement  for  police 
officers  to  undertake  foreign  travel  and  cater  for  this  in  budget  planning. 
C)  Police  managers  responsible  for  determining  case  acceptance  criteria  should,  In  their 
decision  making  process,  consider  the  anticipated  time  and  resource  Implications 
associated  with  gathering  evidence  from  abroad. 
d)  Police  managers  should  consider  the  cost  benefits  of  alternative  methods  of  obtaining 
evidence  such  as  transporting  foreign  witnesses  to  the  UK  to  give  their  evidence. 
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2-  Recommendation  at  national  level 
There  should  be  one  central  point  to  co-ordinate  the  passage  of  requests  for  evidence  to  and  from 
the  United  Kingdom.  Personnel  within  this  central  point  should  include  representatives  from  Interpol,  the 
Home  Office,  investigative  bodies  and  prosecutors.  The  operation  of  this  unit  should  be  based  on  a  'One 
Stop  Shop'  philosophy  and  the  following  functions  should  be  included  within  its  Terms  of  Reference: 
a)  Advice  on  how  to  progress  enquiries  in  the  form  of  a  Help  Desk 
b)  The  identification  of  offence  types,  trends  and  suspects. 
C)  The  creation  and  maintenance  of  performance  indicators  and  management  information. 
d)  The  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  national  index  of  translators  and  interpreters. 
e)  Regular  reporting  to  Forces,  prosecuting  authorities  and  other  relevant  agencies. 
0  The  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  computerised  database  which  contains  information  on 
contacts,  advice  and  working  practices. 
9)  To  conduct  further  research  in  respect  of  international  evidence  gathering  as  appropriate. 
h)  To  conduct  research  on  the  effect  non  co-operation  may  be  having  on  the  well-being  of 
member  states,  especially  in  respect  of  financial  crime.  ' 
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Appendix  D 
The  self-completion  questionnaire  used  to  survey  ACPO  forces 
This  Appendix,  supporting  Chapter  6,  presents  the  template  used  for  the  SCQ.  A  covering 
note  from  Chief  Constable  Kernaghan,  not  copied  to  the  author,  was  sent  with  the  electronic 
distribution.  The  template  begins  with  an  introduction  setting  the  context  of  the  SCQ. 
lntrod=j2ýýý 
In  1996  Supt.  W.  Nicholson  &  D/Insp.  S.  Harrison,  Devon  &  Cornwall  Constabulary,  undertook  a 
questionnaire  survey  into  evidence-gathering  outside  the  UK  for  UK-based  police  investigations  as  part  of 
the  Home  Office  Police  Research  Award  Scheme.  The  results  of  their  survey,  covering  the  period  1990- 
1995,  were  published  by  the  Home  Office  in  a  Police  Research  Group  (as  it  then  was)  Report:  International 
Evidence  Gathering  -.  4re  We  Succeeding? 
Since  the  completion  of  the  above  work  there  have  been  a  number  of  significant  developments  in  the  arena 
of  mutual  legal  assistance,  particularly  within  the  EU  and  including  recent  evaluation  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  structures  at  government  level.  Within  this  context  a  second  survey  (attached)  is  being  conducted 
as  Part  of  a  portfolio  of  research  activity  into  mutual  legal  assistance  that  includes  both  doctoral  research  at 
the  University  of  Southampton  and  a  Fulbright  Police  Fellowship  at  Georgetown  University,  Washington 
DC. 
With  Permission  from  the  Home  Office  Police  and  Reducing  Crime  Unit  (successors  to  the  PRG)  and  with 
the  support  of  the  Home  Office  Judicial  Co-operation  Unit  (UK  Central  Authority)  and  ACPO,  this  present 
survey  revisits  some  of  the  questions  used  by  Nicholson  and  Harrison  in  order  to  provide  comparative  data 
six  years  on.  Areas  of  interest  not  researched  by  Nicholson  and  Harrison  are  also  explored  in  the  light  of 
recent  EU  Political  developments. 
The  survey  seeks: 
To  identify  force  procedures  for  obtaining  evidence  from  outside  the  UK 
To  identify  force  procedures  to  respond  to  requests  for  assistance  from  foreign  authorities 
To  identify  the  frequency  with  which  foreign  evidence  is  required 
To  identify  the  types  of  criminality  being  investigated  using  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms 
To  identify  what  works  and  what  doesn't  work  in  current  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms 
PLEASE  RETURN  COMPLETED  QUESTIONNAIRES  TO: 
Clive  Harfield,  [physical  address  given] 
or  to  [email  address  given] 
by  I't  October  2002. 
Thank  you  for  taking  the  trouble  to  complete  this  questionnaire. 
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FORCE  &  STAFF  MEMBER  COMPLETING  SURVEY: 
1:  Does  the  force  keep  records  of  the  number  of  enquiries  that  necessitate  gathering  evidence 
outside  the  UK? 
a)  Yes  b)  No 
2:  Does  the  force  keep  records  of  the  number  of  enquiries  that  are  carried  out  in  the  force  area  on 
behalf  of  foreign  authorities? 
a)  Yes  b)  No 
3:  Does  the  force  have  a  single  point  of  contact  for  transmitting  out-going  requests  for  mutual 
legal  assistance  and  for  receipt  of  requests  from  foreign  authorities? 
a)  Yes  b)  No 
If  yes,  what  is  that  single  point  of  contact: 
4:  Does  the  force  have  a  special  unit/department  for  undertaking  or  facilitating  enquiries  to 
obtain  evidencefrom  outside  the  UK  for  force-led  investigations? 
a)  Yes  b)  No 
If  yes,  what  is  that  unit  or  department: 
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5:  Does  the  force  have  a  special  unit/department  for  undertaking  enquiries  to  obtain  evidence  in 
theforce  area  in  response  to  requests  from  foreign  authorities? 
a)  Yes  b)  No 
If  yes,  what  is  that  unit  or  department: 
6:  Does  the  force  have  published  guidelines  in  respect  of  gathering  evidence  from  outside  the 
UK? 
a)  Yes  b)  No 
7:  Does  the  force  have  published  guidelines  in  respect  of  providing  evidence  in  response  to 
requests  for  assistance  from  foreign  authorities? 
a)  Yes  b)  No 
8:  Where  does  the  force  seek  guidance  in  obtaining  evidence  from  outside  the  UK?  Select  as 
many  as  are  appropriate. 
a)  NCIS  (Interpol  NCB) 
b)  Other  NCIS  unit  (please  sped 
C)  CPS 
d)  UKCA 
e)  Other  (please  sped 
Clive  Harfield.  -  Processes  and  Practicafifies  243 Appendix  D 
9:  HOW  many  force  enquiries  have  necessitated  gathering  evidence  from  outside  the  UK  in  the 
last  5  Years?  (In  the  absence  of  confirmed  statistics,  estimates  are  acceptable.  ) 
No.  of  Occasions 
0-5 
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
6-10 
11-20 
21+ 
Don't  know 
10:  How  often  has  the  force  secured  evidence  in  the  force  area  on  behalf  of  foreign  authorities  in 
the  last  5  years?  (In  the  absence  of  confirmed  statistics,  estimates  are  acceptable.  ) 
No.  of  Occasions  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
0-5 
6-10 
11-20 
21+ 
Don't  know 
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11:  What  percentage  of  total  cases  dealt  with  by  the  force  have  involved  the  obtaining  of  evidence 
from  outside  the  UK  over  the  last  six  years? 
1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
%  of  cases 
12:  Are  officers  deployed  outside  the  UK  to  gather  evidence  or  observe  it  being  gathered  on  the 
force's  behalP 
a)  Never 
b)  In  up  to  25%  cases 
C)  In  between  26-50%  cases 
d)  In  between  51-75%  cases 
e)  In  more  than  75%  cases 
13:  How  often,  and  under  what  circumstances,  has  evidence  from  outside  the  UK  been  obtained 
without  the  need  for  an  international  letter  of  request  (commission  rogatoire)?  Please  give  a 
numerical  figure  is  possible.  (Please  use  additional  sheets  if  required.  ) 
14:  How  does  the  force  transmit  formal  requests  for  evidence  located  outside  the  UK?  Select  as 
many  as  are  applicable. 
a)  Direct  to  the  foreign  authority  Sometimes  /  Always 
b)  Via  the  UKCA  Sometimes  /  Always 
C)  Via  CPS  Sometimes  /  Always 
d)  Via  NCIS  Sometimes  /  Always 
e)  Via  another  route  but  copied  to  NCIS  Sometimes  /  Always 
f)  Via  Europol  Sometimes  /  Always 
g)  Via  another  route  but  copied  to  Europol  Sometimes  /  Always 
h)  Via  Interpol  NCB  Sometimes  /  Always 
i)  Via  another  route  but  copied  to  Interpol  NCB  Sometimes  /  Always 
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15:  In  ranking  order  of  frequency  over  the  last  five  years,  what  type  of  offences  have  necessitated 
gathering  of  evidence  from  outside  the  UK?  (The  type  of  offence  for  which  evidence  from 
outside  the  UK  is  most  frequently  requested  by  the  force  should  be  graded  1,  the  second  most 
frequent  type  should  be  graded  2  etc.  )  if  there  have  been  no  instances  of  the  force  requesting 
evidence  from  outside  the  UK  in  any  of  these  categories,  this  should  be  indicated  with  a  tick  in 
the  third  column. 
Offence  type  Frequency  ranking  No  occurrence 
Murder 
Child  abuse  (excluding  possession/ 
exchange  of  paedophilic  material) 
Exchange  &  possession  of  pacdophilic 
material 
Any  other  type  of  assault 
Drugs  trafficking 
Immigrant  trafficking 
Money  laundering 
Asset  confiscation 
Fraud,  including  advance  fee  fraud 
Computer  hacking 
Thcft  of  property  other  than  vehicles 
Vehicle  theft  (including  caravans) 
Traffic  offences  (including  accident/ 
collision  investigation) 
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16:  Please  indicate  if  any  of  the  following  have  occurred  in  the  last  five  years: 
Action  Yes  -  please  Number  of 
tick  occasions 
(if  known) 
Investigation  not  undertaken  or  abandoned  because  evidence  was  located  outside  the  UK 
Investigation  /  prosecution  discontinued  because  of  delay  in  obtaining  evidence  from  outside 
the  UK 
Prosecutions  discontinued  because  foreign  witnesses  would/could  not  appear 
Lesser  charge  preferred  in  order  to  avoid  having  to  obtainlrely  on  evidence  from  outside  the 
UK 
Evidence  from  outside  the  UK  excluded  at  trial  because  the  manner  of  its  being  gathered  by 
foreign  authorities  was  challenged 
Evidence  from  outside  the  UK  excluded  at  trial  because  the  transmission  of  the  request  for 
assistance  to  foreign  authorities  was  challenged 
Evidence  from  outside  the  UK  excluded  at  trial  because  the  defence  did  not  have  the 
Opportunity  to  be  present  when  the  evidence  was  gathered. 
Video  link  used  at  trial  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  a  witness  travelling  to  the  UK  to  give 
evidence 
Documentary  evidence  admitted  in  lieu  of  the  witness  having  to  attend  the  UK  to  give 
evidence  in  person 
[A 
conviction  obtained  that  depended  upon  the  adducing  of  foreign  evidence  at  trial 
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17:  What  are  the  critical  factors  in  ensuring  mutual  legal  assistance  mechanisms  succeed  in 
securing  evidence  from  outside  the  UK?  (Please  use  additional  sheets  if  required.  ) 
18:  What  problems  are  encountered  with  current  mutual  legal  assistance  structures?  (Please  use 
additional  sheets  if  required.  ) 
19:  What  works  well  in  current  mutual  legal  assistance  structures?  (Please  use  additional  sheets  if 
required.  ) 
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Appendix  E 
Forces  that  participated  in  the  self-completion  questionnaire  survey 
Avon  &  Somerset  Constabulary 
Bedfordshire  Police 
Cheshire  Constabulary 
City  of  London  Police 
Cleveland  Police 
Cumbria  Constabulary 
Derbyshire  Constabulary 
Devon  &  Cornwall  Constabulary 
Dorset  Police 
Durham  Constabulary 
Dyfed-Powys  Police  /  Heddlu 
Essex  Police 
Gloucestershire  Constabulary 
Gwent  Police  /  Heddlu 
Humberside  Police 
Kent  County  Constabulary 
Lancashire  Constabulary 
Leicestershire  Constabulary 
Lincolnshire  Police 
Merseyside  Police 
Norfolk  Constabulary 
Northamptonshire  Police 
Northumbria  Police 
Nottinghamshire  Police 
South  Wales  Police  /  Heddlu 
Staffordshire  Police 
Suffolk  Constabulary' 
Thames  Valley  Police 
Warwickshire  Police 
West  Mercia  Constabulary 
West  Yorkshire  Police 
One  unidentified  respondent 
1  No  contact  details  given  on  response  form  but 
post-mark  indicated  force  identity. 
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Appendix  F 
Interview  template  used  for  case  study  SIO  interviews 
This  basic  template  was  the  foundation  for  all  the  SIO  case  study  interviews.  It  was 
adapted  on  a  case-by-case  basis  with  supplementary  questions  relevant  to  the  case  in  question. 
This  appendix  supports  Chapter  7.  Interviewees  were  sent  the  questions  in  advance  together 
with  an  accompanying  letter  which  precedes  the  template  below. 
Text  of  letter  to  interviewees 
This  interview  is  being  conducted  as  part  of  a  programme  of  research  for  a  part-time  PhD  degree 
examining  the  role  of  mutual  legal  assistance  in  combating  transnational  organised  crime.  Study 
commenced  in  October  2000  and  is  scheduled  to  lastfouryears. 
2he  research  is  intended  to  identify  and  discuss  issues  facing  UK  investigators  when  they  seek  to 
secure  evidence  from  a  Civil  Law  system  European  jurisdiction  1  for  use  in  a  Common  Law  system 
criminal  trial  in  England  and  Wales.  It  will  also  seek  to  evaluate  whether  mutual  legal  assistance 
mechanisms  are  effective  in  prosecuting  transnational  organised  criminality. 
A  literature  review  of  primary  and  secondary  sources  is  being  undertaken  and  the  purpose  of  the 
interview  Programme  is  to  supplement  the  literature  review  with  practitioners'  expert  opinion, 
experience  and  case  study  data. 
Yhe  researcher  has  DV  security  clearance,  however  the  final  document  may  be  deposited  in  the 
university  library  for  public  access,  and  the  researcher  may  wish  to  publish  certain  aspects  of  the 
research.  Therefore  if  the  interviewee  volunteers  information  that  is  of  a  sensitive  nature  or  is  sub 
judice  (for  background  information  purposesfor  instance),  it  is  requested  that  he  or  she  make  thisfact 
explicit  so  that  such  material  may  be  excludedfrom  thefinalproduct.  Should  they  wish  it,  interviewees 
will  be  given  the  opportunity  to  examine  the  final  draft  in  which  their  data  has  been  cited  to  verify 
accuracyprior  to  submission  to  the  examiners. 
Permission  will  be  sought  to  tape  record  interviews.  It  is  recognised  that  this  will  not  be  universally 
acceptable  and  in  this  event  it  is  proposed  to  record  data  by  means  of  contemporaneous  hand-written 
notes.  In  either  case  the  interview  will  be  based  on  the  attached  questions.  An  anonymous  citation 
system  has  been  arranged  so  that  interviewees  can,  if  they  wish,  he  referred  to  by  role  rather  than  by 
true  identity  with  their  data  presented  in  a  sanitisedform. 
It  remains  only  to  thank  you  in  advancefor  your  participation.  Ifyou  have  any  questions  prior  to  the 
interview  or  subsequentlyplease  contact  me  on  07831622905  or  via  cliveharfteld@hotmail.  com. 
Clive  Barfield, 
Post-graduate  research  student, 
Dept  ofPolitics, 
University  of  Southampton. 
1  The  Civil  Law  system  is  also  sometimes  referred  to  as  the  Roman  Law  system  or  the  Napoleonic  Code 
system 
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Semi-structured  interview  template: 
Thefollowing  (Home  Office)  definitions  are  applied: 
Mutual  legal  assistance  =  any  assistance  provided  in  response  to  a  formal  request  between 
judiciallProsecuting  authorities.  In  uK  terms,  anythingfor  which  a  com.  rog.  was  issued  either  by  the 
CPS  or  a  court  under  the  Criminal  Justice  (International  Co-operation)  Act  1990. 
Mutual  assistance  =  any  assistance  provided  as  a  result  of  direct  agency-to-agency  contactfor  which 
a  com.  rog.  was  not  generated  at  the  time  orpreviously. 
Some  questions  have  a  number  ofpossible  answers.  If  more  than  one  answer  is  applicable.  all  relevant 
options  should  be  identified.  Ae  options  may  be  supplemented  with  general  comments- 
Introduction 
1.  Briefly,  what  are  the  facts  of  this  operation?  (Type  of  criminality,  number  of  suspects, 
number  of  UK  officers  deployed,  length  of  time  for  the  whole  operation?  ) 
2.  Was  mutual  legal  assistance  required  during  this  operation? 
3.  Was  mutual  assistance  required  during  this  operation? 
4.  How  many  requests  of  each  type  of  assistance  were  made?  (If  exact  figures  were  not  kept 
or  cannot  easily  be  quantified,  what  was  the  approximate  proportion  of  mutual  legal 
assistance  requests  to  mutual  assistance  requests?  ) 
Mutual  legal  assistance 
5.  To  what  purpose  was  mutual  legal  assistance  put? 
a)  To  arrange  meetings  between  investigators? 
b)  To  obtain  intelligence/information  with  which  to  plan  further  investigative 
action? 
C)  To  arrest  suspects? 
d)  To  obtain  statements  from  witnesses  located  outside  England  &  Wales? 
e)  To  seize  physical/electronic  evidence  located  outside  England  &  Wales? 
f)  For  any  other  purpose  (please  specify). 
6.  What  did  mutual  legal  assistance  achieve  in  this  operation  that  could  not  otherwise  have 
been  achieved? 
7.  From  how  many  foreign  authorities  was  mutual  legal  assistance  requested?  (Assuming 
there  is  no  danger  of  compron-dse,  the  identity  of  the  judicial  and  investigative  authorities 
is  also  sought.  ) 
8.  Was  all  requested  assistance  provided?  (If  not,  why  not?  What  were  the  grounds  for 
refusal  if  any?  ) 
9.  Who  issued  the  com.  rogs.  in  England  &  Wales?  (Was  it  always  the  same  source  and  if 
not,  why?  ) 
10.  Was  a  UK  officer  ever  present  when  a  com.  rog  request  was  executed?  (If  yes,  how  often, 
where  and  why?  ) 
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11.  Was  a  request  to  have  an  observer  present  ever  refused,  and  if  so  why? 
12.  Were  the  'defence'  ever  offered  the  opportunity  to  be  present  when  a  com-rog  request 
was  executed?  (If  there  were  instances  when  the  defence  was  not  offered  such  an 
opportunity,  why  was  it  denied  to  them?  ) 
13.  Was  there  assistance  that  could  be  provided  by  formal  mutual  legal  assistance  that  could 
not  have  been  provided  by  informal  mutual  assistance? 
14.  On  what  basis  were  comrogs  issued  and  accepted? 
a)  A  separate  comrog.  for  every  individual  request? 
b)  A  com.  rog.  to  each  relevant  foreign  authority  covering  a  list  of  requests? 
c)  A  com.  rog.  issued  in  a  general  terms  that  a  foreign  authority  was  happy  to  accept 
as  the  basis  for  all  subsequent  requests? 
Mutual  assistance 
15.  To  what  purpose  was  mutual  assistance  put? 
a)  To  arrange  meetings  between  investigators? 
b)  To  obtain  intelligence/information  with  which  to  plan  further  investigative  action? 
c)  To  prepare  information/contacts  to  supportlexecute  a  formal  mutual  legal 
assistance  request? 
d)  To  arrest  suspects? 
e)  To  obtain  statements  from  witnesses  located  outside  England  &  Wales? 
f)  To  seize  physical/electronic  evidence  located  outside  England  &  Wales? 
9)  For  any  other  purpose  (please  specify). 
16.  What  did  mutual  assistance  achieve  in  this  operation  that  could  not  otherwise  have  been 
achieved,  even  by  formal  mutual  legal  assistance  request? 
17.  What  criteria  determined  whether  mutual  assistance  was  preferred  to  mutual  legal 
assistance? 
18.  From  how  many  foreign  authorities  was  mutual  assistance  requested?  (Assuming  there  is 
no  danger  of  compromise,  the  identity  of  the  judicial  and  investigative  authorities  is  also 
sought.  ) 
19.  Was  all  requested  assistance  provided?  (If  not,  why  not?  What  were  the  grounds  for 
refusal  if  any?  ) 
Pre-trial  &  trial  process  issues 
20.  What  challenges  were  made,  if  any,  to  the  processes  by  which  evidence  was  secured  from 
outside  England  &  Wales?  (As  distinct  from  challenges  about  whether  or  not  the  witness 
was  telling  the  truth.  ) 
21.  How  many  witnesses  located  outside  England  &  Wales  were  required  to  attend  a  UK 
court  in  person? 
22.  How  many  witnesses  located  outside  England  &  Wales  were  permitted  to  give  evidence 
by  telephone  or  video  link? 
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23.  For  how  many  witnesses  located  outside  England  &  Wales  were  statements  or  other 
documents  adduced  in  evidence  thus  negating  the  need  for  the  witness  to  give  oral 
testimony? 
24.  Was  any  type  of  evidence  adduced  from  a  location  outside  England  &  Wales  as  a  result  of 
mutual  assistance  rather  than  mutual  legal  assistance  (Le,  without  a  com.  rog.  )?  (If  so, 
what?  ) 
Post-trial  &  summarising  questions 
25.  Has  the  operation  been  debriefed  with  the  foreign  agencies  involved? 
26.  Have  the  mutual  legal  assistance  issues  been  debriefed  with  the  CPS  or  the  Home  Office? 
27.  Is  either  mutual  assistance  or  mutual  legal  assistance  still  required  in  this  operation?  (e.  g. 
concerning  victim/witness  support  issues,  or  as  a  result  of  generating  new  enquiries  by 
foreign  agencies  within  their  own  domestic  jurisdictions?  ) 
28.  What  were  the  unforeseen  issues  concerning  mutual  legal  assistance  and  mutual 
assistance  that  developed  during  the  operation? 
29.  What  worked  and  what  didn't  in  relation  to  mutual  legal  assistance  and  mutual  assistance 
in  this  operation? 
30.  How  was  the  mutual  legal  assistance/mutual  assistance  arranged  and  effected? 
a)  Face-to-face  meetings  with  foreign  prosecutors/investigators? 
b)  Video-conferencing? 
C)  Telephone? 
d)  Fax? 
e)  Email? 
f)  Ordinary  letters? 
31.  What  improvements  would  you  like  to  see  in  the  process  of  obtaining  and  adducing 
evidence  located  outside  England  &  Wales  for  trial  in  England  &  Wales? 
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Appendix  G 
Interview  template  used  for  case  study  prosecutor  interviews 
This  basic  template  was  the  foundation  for  all  the  prosecutor  case  study  interviews.  It  was 
adapted  on  a  case-by-case  basis  with  supplementary  questions  relevant  to  the  case  in  question. 
This  appendix  supports  Chapter  7.  The  questions  were  sent  to  the  interviewee  in  advance 
accompanied  by  the  same  letter  reproduced  in  Appendix  F  above. 
1.  Facts  of  the  case  (type/extent  of  criminality,  number  of  defendants,  number  ofjurisdictions 
engaged) 
2.  At  what  stage  of  the  investigation  did  CPS  become  involved? 
3.  flow  many  formal  mutual  legal  assistance  requests  were  made? 
How  were  these  structured  (multiple  requests  in  an  ILOR  or  one  request  per  ILOR)? 
What  sort  of  assistance  was  requested? 
What  was  the  process  by  which  requests  were  made  (from  SIO  policy  to  return  of 
product)? 
4.  Was  everything  that  was  requested  actually  provided? 
5.  Were  any  of  the  requests  refused,  and  if  so,  on  what  grounds? 
6.  Was  evidence  from  abroad  acquired  and  adduced  without  a  formal  mutual  legal  assistance 
ILOR? 
7.  What  challenges  at  trial  were  made  against  the  admissibility  of  foreign  evidence? 
8.  What  mutual  legal  assistance  issues  /  Icaming  points  arose  from  this  case? 
9.  What  mutual  legal  assistance  issues  /  learning  points  have  arisen  from  other  cases  prosccutcd 
by  this  CPS  office? 
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Appendix  II 
Comparison  of  research  findings  between  the  EU  peer  reviews  and  this  study 
This  appendix,  supporting  ýhapter  8,  tabulates  for  easy  comparison  the  principal  findings 
of  the  EU  peer  evaluation  of  mutual  legal  assistance  (UK  and  Final  Reports)  and  the  two  original 
research  exercises  conducted  for  the  present  study. 
*-  correspondence 
o-  partial  correspondcnee 
Finding  EU  surveys 
(UK  &  Final 
Reports) 
SCQ 
(Chap  6) 
SIO  Interviews 
(Chap  7) 
I  labitual  criticism  of  mutual  legal  assistance  is  that  it  is  slow  & 
inefficient 
... 
0  0  0 
...  but  it  does  not  operate  as  badly  as  it  reputed  to  do 
Outdated  practices  and  pointless  bureaucracy  0 
Loss  of  evidence  /  timeliness  0 
There  is  a  lack  of  suff  ic  ient  &  suitable  management  data  a 
Policies  vary  between  UKCA  &  agencies  as  to  what  management 
data  is  collected 
a  0 
Different  use  of/  attitudes  towards  ILORs  0  0  0 
Different  attitudes  towards  international  law  enrorcemcrit  co- 
operation 
0  0  0 
Working  relationships  with  foreign  colleagues  0  0  0 
Different  procedural  laws  0  0  0 
Increase  in  mutual  legal  assistance  activity  0 
Most  UK  mutual  lcgal  assistance  activity  is  within  EU  0 
Resources  are  insufficicnt  [central  authority]  0 
Insufficient  language  knowledge  0 
Need  to  train  mutual  legal  assistance  specialists  a  a 
Major  discrepancies  between  MS  in  the  application  of 
conventions 
0 
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Finding  (contd)  EUsurveys 
(UK  &  Final 
Reports) 
SCQ 
(Chap  6) 
SIO  interviews 
(Chap  7) 
Tax  offences  are  problematic  0 
Conventions  take  longer  to  ratify  than  is  justified  0 
Double  criminality  is  still  cited  as  a  reason  for  refusal  0 
Rights  of  appeal  are  abused  to  delay  process  0 
Good  practice  should  be  implemented  by  MS  &  monitored  by 
ON 
0 
Resources  to  execute  ILORs  received  are  competing  with 
demands  for  local  policing 
0 
Statutes  of  limitation  should  no  longer  frustrate  requests  0 
Unlike  other  MS,  the  UK  reserves  mutual  legal  assistance  mainly 
for  serious  crime 
0  0 
Disparity  in  mutual  legal  assistance  training  between  UK  police 
&  customs 
0  0 
Domestic  agency  rivalry  0 
Different  attitudes  towards  testimony  0 
Different  attitudes  towards  intelligence  handling  0 
Disclosure  issues  - 
Forced  spontaneous  tactical  changes  during  ongoing  operation  - 
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Appendix  I 
English  mutual  legal  assistance  legislation  relating  to  evidence-gathering 
This  appendix,  supporting  the  thesis  as  a  whole  but  specifically  Appendix  A,  summariscs 
key  mutual  legal  assistance  legislation  in  England  in  relation  to  evidence-gathering. 
Law  Purpose 
Extradition  Act  1870  "The  testimony  of  any  witness  may  be  obtained  in  relation  to  any  criminal  matter 
pending  in  any  court  or  tribunal  in  a  foreign  state  in  like  manner  as  it  may  be 
§  24  -  Power  of  foreign  obtained  in  relation  to  any  civil  matter  under  the  Act  of  the  session  of  the 
nineteenth  and  twentieth  years  of  the  reign  of  Her  present  Majesty,  chapter  113, 
state  to  obtain  evidence  in  intitled  "An  Act  to  provide  for  taking  evidence  in  Her  Majesty's  Dominions  in 
United  Kingdom  relation  to  civil  and  commercial  matters  pending  beforeforeign  tribunals;  "  and  all 
that  provisions  of  that  Act  shall  be  construed  as  if  the  term  civil  matter  included  a 
Repealed  by  CJ(IQA  1990  criminal  matter,  and  the  term  cause  included  a  proceeding  against  a  criminal: 
Provided  that  nothing  in  this  section  shall  apply  in  the  case  of  any  criminal  matter 
of  a  political  character.  " 
Extradition  Act  1873  "A  Secretary  of  State  may,  by  order  under  his  hand  and  scal.  require  a  police 
magistrate  or  a  justice  of  the  peace  to  take  evidence  for  the  purposes  of  any 
§5-  Power  of  taking  criminal  matter  pending  in  any  court  or  tribunal  in  any  foreign  state;  and  the  police 
f  h  d  h  i  i  f  h  i  ll  k  h  pt  o  suc  or  er,  s  mag  strate  or  just  ce  o  t  e  peace,  upon  rece  a  ta  et  e 
evidence  in  UK  for  foreign  evidence  of  every  witness  appearing  before  him  for  the  purpose  in  like  manner  as 
criminal  matters  if  such  witness  appeared  on  a  charge  against  some  defendant  for  an  indictable 
offence,  and  shall  certify  at  the  foot  of  the  depositions  so  taken  that  such  evidence 
Repealed  by  CJ(IQA  1990  was  taken  before  him,  and  shall  transmit  the  same  to  the  Secretary  of  State;  such 
evidence  may  be  taken  in  the  presence  of  or  absence  of  the  person  charged,  if  any, 
and  the  fact  of  such  presence  or  absence  shall  be  stated  in  such  deposition.  " 
"Every  person  who  wilfully  gives  false  evidence  before  a  police  magistrate  or 
justice  of  the  peace  under  this  section  shall  be  guilty  of  pcdury.  Provided  that 
nothing  in  this  section  shall  apply  in  the  case  of  any  criminal  matter  of  a  political 
character.  " 
Evidence  (Colonial  Proof  of  statutes  of  British  Possessions 
Statutes)  Act  1907  [Ilalsbury's  Statutes  (4  Ih  Edn)  vol  17,  p.  154] 
Evidence  (Foreign,  Proof  of  effect  of  foreign,  dominion  and  colonial  registers  and  certain 
Dominion  &  Colonial  official  certificates 
Documents)  Act  1933 
th  (1  lalsbury's  Statutes  (4  Edn)  vol  17,  p.  157] 
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Evidence  (Proceedings  in  Mutual  legal  assistance  provisions  for  incoming  requests  in  civil 
Other  Jurisdictions)  Act  proceedings  and  in  ICJ  P  rocecdings. 
'  1975  Edn)  vol  17,  p.  212]  [Halsbury's  Statutes  (4 
Criminal  Justice  Established  permissive  mutual  legal  assistance  regime  for  UK  authorities 
(International  Co-  to  request  and  provide  evidential  assistance  whether  or  not  a  MLAT  was  in 
operation)  Act  1990  effect,  and  in  most  cases  without  dual  criminality.  Also  enabled  the  service 
of  process,  and  the  transfer  of  prisoners  to  give  evidence  at  trials. 
Part  1 
§14,7  &8  repealed  by 
C(IQA  2003 
Criminal  Justice  &  Provides  for  cross-border  arrest  powers,  reciprocal  powers  of  arrest  and 
Public  Order  Act  1994  warrant  execution  with  the  UK,  thus  allowing  police  officers  from 
England  &  Wales,  for  instance,  to  use  either  their  powers  of  arrest  in 
Part  X  Scotland  and  Northern  Ireland  for  the  first  time,  or  to  use  those  powers  of 
arrest  that  apply  within  the  relevant  jurisdiction. 
Police  Act  1996  English  &  Welsh  police  forces  may  provide  advice  and  assistance  to  non- 
UK  law  enforcement  agencies  if  requested  to  do  so.  This  is  intended  to 
§  26  cover  training  and  non-operational  support  as  much  as  operational  support. 
Illuman  Rights  Act  1998]  Gives  domestic  effect  to  UK  obligations  under  the  1958  Council  of  Europe 
Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental 
Freedoms.  In  essence,  adopts  with  UK  law,  the  multilateral  human  rights 
norms  adopted  throughout  western  Europe.  Provides  protection  for 
suspects  against  procedural  abuse  by  public  authorities. 
Regulation  of  Gives  domestic  effect  to  UK  obligations  under  EUCAM  to  provide  mutual 
Investigatory  Powers  Act  legal  assistance  in  respect  of  telephone  interception.  Relevant  sections 
2000  came  into  force  2004  enabling  foreign  authorities  to  request  interception  of 
communications  within  the  UK  for  evidential  purposes  even  though  UK 
Part  I  authorities  cannot  use  the  product  of  interception  in  evidence.  Also  allows 
UK  investigators  to  be  authoriscd  under  RIPA  to  conduct  covert 
investigations  abroad,  subject  to  additional  permission  from  the  foreign 
authorities. 
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Anti-Terrorism,  Crime  At  any  time  before  July  1"  2002  an  authorised  Minister  (Home  Secretary, 
&  Security  Act  2001  Lord  Chancellor,  Treasury  Ministers)  may,  by  regulation,  make  provision 
for  implementing  any  UK  obligation  arising  from  7be  Simplified 
Part  13  Extradition  Procedure  (1995  Convention  under  Article  K.  3  of  the  Treaty); 
§  Extradition  between  the  MS  of  the  EU  (under  the  1996  Convention); 
freezing  orders,  JITs  or  combating  terrorism  under  Article  34  of  the 
[7-ime-scale  not  met  by 
Treaty;  and  the  EUCMA. 
Parliament  and  so  no 
provisions  made.  ] 
Police  Reform  Act  2002  Amends  the  1996  and  1997  Police  Acts  to  address  legal  liability  issues  in 
relation  to  Joint  Investigation  Teams  and  to  incorporate  non-UK  team 
§  1034  members  who  are  assaulted  whiIst  on  duty  with  the  JIT. 
Crime  (International  Co-  Gives  domestic  effect  to  those  provisions  of  the  EUCMA  not  already  in 
operation)  Act  2003  UK  statute,  inter  alia  allowing  direct  transmission  of  requests  and  process; 
creating  freezing  orders  enabling  evidence  to  be  preserved  pending  the 
issuing  of  an  ILOR;  permitting  the  hearing  of  evidence  by  TV  links;  and 
allowing  for  the  exchange  of  information  about  banking  transactions. 
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